diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/mainproc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | g10/mainproc.c | 62 |
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c index d56790bcd..a2bfae3f4 100644 --- a/g10/mainproc.c +++ b/g10/mainproc.c @@ -1002,7 +1002,7 @@ list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node) keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid ); if (mainkey) c->trustletter = (opt.fast_list_mode? - 0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL)); + 0 : get_validity_info (c->ctrl, pk, NULL)); es_printf ("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" ); if (c->trustletter) es_putc (c->trustletter, es_stdout); @@ -1603,31 +1603,31 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) } /* Check that the message composition is valid. - - Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed: - - S{1,n} -- detached signature. - S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature - O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature. - C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature. - - - O = One-Pass Signature packet. - S = Signature packet. - P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal) - (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows - for a signed message but that does not work as it - introduces ambiguities.) - We keep track of these packages using the marker packet - CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK. - C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures. - - We reject all other messages. - - Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of - each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently - introduce a bug here. - */ + * + * Per RFC-2440bis (-15) allowed: + * + * S{1,n} -- detached signature. + * S{1,n} P -- old style PGP2 signature + * O{1,n} P S{1,n} -- standard OpenPGP signature. + * C P S{1,n} -- cleartext signature. + * + * + * O = One-Pass Signature packet. + * S = Signature packet. + * P = OpenPGP Message packet (Encrypted | Compressed | Literal) + * (Note that the current rfc2440bis draft also allows + * for a signed message but that does not work as it + * introduces ambiguities.) + * We keep track of these packages using the marker packet + * CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK. + * C = Marker packet for cleartext signatures. + * + * We reject all other messages. + * + * Actually we are calling this too often, i.e. for verification of + * each message but better have some duplicate work than to silently + * introduce a bug here. + */ { kbnode_t n; int n_onepass, n_sig; @@ -1871,7 +1871,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) does not print a LF we need to compute the validity before calling that function. */ if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_SHOW_UID_VALIDITY)) - valid = get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0); + valid = get_validity (c->ctrl, pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, NULL, 0); else valid = 0; /* Not used. */ @@ -1950,7 +1950,8 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) dump_attribs (un->pkt->pkt.user_id, pk); if (opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS) - show_photos (un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs, + show_photos (c->ctrl, + un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs, un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs, pk ,un->pkt->pkt.user_id); } @@ -1973,7 +1974,8 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) actually ask the user to update any trust information. */ valid = (trust_value_to_string - (get_validity (pk, un->pkt->pkt.user_id, sig, 0))); + (get_validity (c->ctrl, pk, + un->pkt->pkt.user_id, sig, 0))); log_printf (" [%s]\n",valid); } else @@ -2061,7 +2063,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) { if ((opt.verify_options & VERIFY_PKA_LOOKUPS)) pka_uri_from_sig (c, sig); /* Make sure PKA info is available. */ - rc = check_signatures_trust (sig); + rc = check_signatures_trust (c->ctrl, sig); } /* Print extra information about the signature. */ |