aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiffstats
path: root/g10/mainproc.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to '')
-rw-r--r--g10/mainproc.c161
1 files changed, 96 insertions, 65 deletions
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index 05c1a5c28..8fe45c544 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -308,26 +308,41 @@ proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
c->last_was_session_key = 2;
if(!s || opt.list_only)
goto leave;
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
- if(c->dek)
+
+ if(opt.override_session_key)
{
- /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key
- comes before a public key in the message - if the user
- doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a chance
- that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to be a
- valid one, which will make the returned dek appear
- valid, so we won't try any public keys that come
- later. */
- if(enc->seskeylen)
+ c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+ if(get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key))
{
- if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen))
+ m_free(c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ c->dek=passphrase_to_dek(NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0, NULL, NULL);
+
+ if(c->dek)
+ {
+ /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric
+ key comes before a public key in the message - if
+ the user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is
+ a chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen
+ to be a valid one, which will make the returned dek
+ appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that
+ come later. */
+ if(enc->seskeylen)
{
- m_free(c->dek);
- c->dek=NULL;
+ if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey,
+ enc->seskeylen))
+ {
+ m_free(c->dek);
+ c->dek=NULL;
+ }
}
+ else
+ c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
- else
- c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
}
}
@@ -392,31 +407,21 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
if( result == -1 )
;
- else {
- if( !result ) {
- if( opt.verbose > 1 )
- log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") );
- if ( opt.show_session_key ) {
- int i;
- char *buf = m_alloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 );
- sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo );
- for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ )
- sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] );
- log_info( "session key: \"%s\"\n", buf );
- write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf );
- }
- }
+ else
+ {
/* store it for later display */
- {
- struct kidlist_item *x = m_alloc( sizeof *x );
- x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
- x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
- x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
- x->reason = result;
- x->next = c->pkenc_list;
- c->pkenc_list = x;
- }
- }
+ struct kidlist_item *x = m_alloc( sizeof *x );
+ x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0];
+ x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1];
+ x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo;
+ x->reason = result;
+ x->next = c->pkenc_list;
+ c->pkenc_list = x;
+
+ if( !result && opt.verbose > 1 )
+ log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") );
+ }
+
free_packet(pkt);
}
@@ -501,40 +506,55 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
int algo;
STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL;
- /* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */
- if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo))
- log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
+ if(opt.override_session_key)
+ {
+ c->dek = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek );
+ result=get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key);
+ if(result)
+ {
+ m_free(c->dek);
+ c->dek = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */
+ if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo))
+ log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"),
cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
- else if ( check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) ) {
- algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
- if (!algo)
- algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
- idea_cipher_warn(1);
- log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
- "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
- cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
- }
- else {
- algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
- if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo) {
- /* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */
- s2kbuf.mode = 0;
- s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
- s2k = &s2kbuf;
- }
- log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
- }
+ else if ( check_cipher_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) )
+ {
+ algo = opt.def_cipher_algo;
+ if (!algo)
+ algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo;
+ idea_cipher_warn(1);
+ log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, "
+ "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"),
+ cipher_algo_to_string(algo));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA;
+ if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo)
+ {
+ /* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */
+ s2kbuf.mode = 0;
+ s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+ s2k = &s2kbuf;
+ }
+ log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA");
+ }
- c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
- if (c->dek)
- c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+ c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL );
+ if (c->dek)
+ c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1;
+ }
}
else if( !c->dek )
result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
if( !result )
result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek );
- m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
if( result == -1 )
;
else if( !result || (result==G10ERR_BAD_SIGN && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) {
@@ -545,6 +565,16 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC );
else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn)
log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n"));
+ if(opt.show_session_key)
+ {
+ int i;
+ char *buf = m_alloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 );
+ sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo );
+ for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ )
+ sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] );
+ log_info( "session key: \"%s\"\n", buf );
+ write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf );
+ }
}
else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) {
log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n"));
@@ -557,6 +587,7 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
/* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple
* ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/
}
+ m_free(c->dek); c->dek = NULL;
free_packet(pkt);
c->last_was_session_key = 0;
write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION );
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-04-30 13:04:30 +0000