diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/mainproc.c | 1963 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/openfile.c | 241 |
2 files changed, 1153 insertions, 1051 deletions
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c index 19f1aac5e..bc186d3f9 100644 --- a/g10/mainproc.c +++ b/g10/mainproc.c @@ -1,7 +1,6 @@ /* mainproc.c - handle packets - * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, - * 2008, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. - * Copyright (C) 2013, 2014 Werner Koch + * Copyright (C) 1998-2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2013-2014 Werner Koch * * This file is part of GnuPG. * @@ -47,16 +46,18 @@ #define MAX_NESTING_DEPTH 32 -struct kidlist_item { - struct kidlist_item *next; - u32 kid[2]; - int pubkey_algo; - int reason; +/* An object to build a list of keyid related info. */ +struct kidlist_item +{ + struct kidlist_item *next; + u32 kid[2]; + int pubkey_algo; + int reason; }; -/**************** - * Structure to hold the context +/* + * Object to hold the processing context. */ typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX; struct mainproc_context @@ -90,8 +91,8 @@ struct mainproc_context DEK *dek; int last_was_session_key; - KBNODE list; /* The current list of packets. */ - IOBUF iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */ + kbnode_t list; /* The current list of packets. */ + iobuf_t iobuf; /* Used to get the filename etc. */ int trustletter; /* Temporary usage in list_node. */ ulong symkeys; struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* List of encryption packets. */ @@ -104,135 +105,150 @@ struct mainproc_context }; -static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a ); -static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ); -static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ); +/*** Local prototypes. ***/ +static int do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a); +static void list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node); +static void proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node); static int literals_seen; + +/*** Functions. ***/ + + void reset_literals_seen(void) { - literals_seen=0; + literals_seen = 0; } + static void release_list( CTX c ) { - if( !c->list ) - return; - proc_tree(c, c->list ); - release_kbnode( c->list ); - while( c->pkenc_list ) { - struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next; - xfree( c->pkenc_list ); - c->pkenc_list = tmp; + if (!c->list) + return; + proc_tree (c, c->list); + release_kbnode (c->list); + while (c->pkenc_list) + { + struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next; + xfree (c->pkenc_list); + c->pkenc_list = tmp; } - c->pkenc_list = NULL; - c->list = NULL; - c->any.data = 0; - c->any.uncompress_failed = 0; - c->last_was_session_key = 0; - xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; + c->pkenc_list = NULL; + c->list = NULL; + c->any.data = 0; + c->any.uncompress_failed = 0; + c->last_was_session_key = 0; + xfree (c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; } static int -add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +add_onepass_sig (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { - KBNODE node; + kbnode_t node; - if ( c->list ) /* add another packet */ - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); - else /* insert the first one */ - c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt ); + if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */ + add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt)); + else /* Insert the first one. */ + c->list = node = new_kbnode (pkt); return 1; } static int -add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +add_gpg_control (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { - if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { - /* New clear text signature. - * Process the last one and reset everything */ - release_list(c); + if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) + { + /* New clear text signature. + * Process the last one and reset everything */ + release_list(c); } - if( c->list ) /* add another packet */ - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); - else /* insert the first one */ - c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); + if (c->list) /* Add another packet. */ + add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt)); + else /* Insert the first one. */ + c->list = new_kbnode (pkt); - return 1; + return 1; } - static int -add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +add_user_id (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { - if( !c->list ) { - log_error("orphaned user ID\n" ); - return 0; + if (!c->list) + { + log_error ("orphaned user ID\n"); + return 0; } - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); - return 1; + add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt)); + return 1; } + static int -add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +add_subkey (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { - if( !c->list ) { - log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" ); - return 0; + if (!c->list) + { + log_error ("subkey w/o mainkey\n"); + return 0; } - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); - return 1; + add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt)); + return 1; } + static int -add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +add_ring_trust (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { - if( !c->list ) { - log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" ); - return 0; + if (!c->list) + { + log_error ("ring trust w/o key\n"); + return 0; } - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); - return 1; + add_kbnode (c->list, new_kbnode (pkt)); + return 1; } static int -add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +add_signature (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { - KBNODE node; - - c->any.sig_seen = 1; - if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) { - /* This is the first signature for the following datafile. - * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses - * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method - * of prepending the signature to the data is - * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read - * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */ - node = new_kbnode( pkt ); - c->list = node; - return 1; + kbnode_t node; + + c->any.sig_seen = 1; + if (pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list) + { + /* This is the first signature for the following datafile. + * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses + * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method + * of prepending the signature to the data is + * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read + * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */ + node = new_kbnode (pkt); + c->list = node; + return 1; } - else if( !c->list ) - return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/ - else if( !c->list->pkt ) - BUG(); /* so nicht */ - - /* add a new signature node id at the end */ - node = new_kbnode( pkt ); - add_kbnode( c->list, node ); - return 1; + else if (!c->list) + return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/ + else if (!c->list->pkt) + BUG(); /* so nicht */ + + /* Add a new signature node item at the end. */ + node = new_kbnode (pkt); + add_kbnode (c->list, node); + + return 1; } static int -symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen ) +symkey_decrypt_seskey (DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen) { gcry_cipher_hd_t hd; @@ -267,132 +283,137 @@ symkey_decrypt_seskey( DEK *dek, byte *seskey, size_t slen ) return 0; } + static void -proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +proc_symkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { - PKT_symkey_enc *enc; + PKT_symkey_enc *enc; - enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc; - if (!enc) - log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n"); - else if(!c->dek) - { - int algo = enc->cipher_algo; - const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo); - - if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo)) - { - if(!opt.quiet) - { - if(enc->seskeylen) - log_info(_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s ); - else - log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s ); - } - } - else - log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo ); - - if(openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo)) - { - log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest" - " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo); - s=NULL; - } - - c->last_was_session_key = 2; - if(!s || opt.list_only) - goto leave; - - if(opt.override_session_key) - { - c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); - if(get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key)) - { - xfree(c->dek); - c->dek = NULL; - } - } - else - { - c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 3, - NULL, NULL); - if(c->dek) - { - c->dek->symmetric=1; - - /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric - key comes before a public key in the message - if - the user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is - a chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen - to be a valid one, which will make the returned dek - appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that - come later. */ - if(enc->seskeylen) - { - if(symkey_decrypt_seskey(c->dek, enc->seskey, - enc->seskeylen)) - { - xfree(c->dek); - c->dek=NULL; - } - } - else - c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; - } - } - } + enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc; + if (!enc) + log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n"); + else if(!c->dek) + { + int algo = enc->cipher_algo; + const char *s = openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo); + + if (!openpgp_cipher_test_algo (algo)) + { + if (!opt.quiet) + { + if (enc->seskeylen) + log_info (_("%s encrypted session key\n"), s ); + else + log_info (_("%s encrypted data\n"), s ); + } + } + else + log_error (_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo); + + if (openpgp_md_test_algo (enc->s2k.hash_algo)) + { + log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest" + " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo); + s = NULL; + } + + c->last_was_session_key = 2; + if (!s || opt.list_only) + goto leave; + + if (opt.override_session_key) + { + c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek); + if (get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key)) + { + xfree (c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; + } + } + else + { + c->dek = passphrase_to_dek (NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 3, NULL, NULL); + if (c->dek) + { + c->dek->symmetric = 1; + + /* FIXME: This doesn't work perfectly if a symmetric key + comes before a public key in the message - if the + user doesn't know the passphrase, then there is a + chance that the "decrypted" algorithm will happen to + be a valid one, which will make the returned dek + appear valid, so we won't try any public keys that + come later. */ + if (enc->seskeylen) + { + if (symkey_decrypt_seskey (c->dek, + enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen)) + { + xfree (c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; + } + } + else + c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; + } + } + } leave: - c->symkeys++; - free_packet(pkt); + c->symkeys++; + free_packet (pkt); } + static void -proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +proc_pubkey_enc (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { - PKT_pubkey_enc *enc; - int result = 0; - - /* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */ - c->last_was_session_key = 1; - enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc; - /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/ - /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is - * function to check it. */ - if( opt.verbose ) - log_info(_("public key is %s\n"), keystr(enc->keyid) ); - - if( is_status_enabled() ) { - char buf[50]; - /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo - number to the Libgcrypt definef one. This is due a - chicken-egg problem: We need to have code in libgcrypt for - a new algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm - before the IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP - indentifier. */ - snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0", - (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo ); - write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf ); + PKT_pubkey_enc *enc; + int result = 0; + + /* Check whether the secret key is available and store in this case. */ + c->last_was_session_key = 1; + enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc; + /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/ + /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is + * function to check it. */ + if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("public key is %s\n"), keystr (enc->keyid)); + + if (is_status_enabled()) + { + char buf[50]; + /* FIXME: For ECC support we need to map the OpenPGP algo number + to the Libgcrypt defined one. This is due a chicken-egg + problem: We need to have code in Libgcrypt for a new + algorithm so to implement a proposed new algorithm before the + IANA will finally assign an OpenPGP indentifier. */ + snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0", + (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo); + write_status_text (STATUS_ENC_TO, buf); } - if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) { - /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in - * secure memory because it has already been passed on the - * command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */ - c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); - result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key ); - if ( result ) { - xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; + if (!opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key) + { + /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in + * secure memory because it has already been passed on the + * command line and the GCHQ knows about it. */ + c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek); + result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key); + if (result) + { + xfree (c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; } } - else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) - || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA - || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA - || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA - || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH - || is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) - || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL) { + else if (is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) + || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA + || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA + || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_EDDSA + || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH + || is_RSA (enc->pubkey_algo) + || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL) + { /* Note that we also allow type 20 Elgamal keys for decryption. There are still a couple of those keys in active use as a subkey. */ @@ -400,341 +421,352 @@ proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) /* FIXME: Store this all in a list and process it later so that we can prioritize what key to use. This gives a better user experience if wildcard keyids are used. */ - if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1]) - || opt.try_all_secrets - || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid)) ) { - if( opt.list_only ) - result = -1; - else { - c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); - if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) { - /* error: delete the DEK */ - xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; + if (!c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1]) + || opt.try_all_secrets + || have_secret_key_with_kid (enc->keyid))) + { + if(opt.list_only) + result = -1; + else + { + c->dek = xmalloc_secure_clear (sizeof *c->dek); + if ((result = get_session_key (enc, c->dek))) + { + /* Error: Delete the DEK. */ + xfree (c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; } } } - else - result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; + else + result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; } - else - result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; + else + result = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; - if( result == -1 ) - ; - else - { - /* store it for later display */ - struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc( sizeof *x ); - x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0]; - x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1]; - x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo; - x->reason = result; - x->next = c->pkenc_list; - c->pkenc_list = x; - - if( !result && opt.verbose > 1 ) - log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") ); - } + if (result == -1) + ; + else + { + /* Store it for later display. */ + struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc (sizeof *x); + x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0]; + x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1]; + x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo; + x->reason = result; + x->next = c->pkenc_list; + c->pkenc_list = x; + + if (!result && opt.verbose > 1) + log_info (_("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n")); + } - free_packet(pkt); + free_packet(pkt); } - -/**************** +/* * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could * not decrypt. */ static void -print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed ) +print_pkenc_list (struct kidlist_item *list, int failed) { - for( ; list; list = list->next ) { - PKT_public_key *pk; - const char *algstr; + for (; list; list = list->next) + { + PKT_public_key *pk; + const char *algstr; - if ( failed && !list->reason ) - continue; - if ( !failed && list->reason ) - continue; + if (failed && !list->reason) + continue; + if (!failed && list->reason) + continue; + + algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo); + pk = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *pk); + + if (!algstr) + algstr = "[?]"; + pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo; + if (!get_pubkey (pk, list->kid)) + { + char *p; + log_info (_("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"), + nbits_from_pk (pk), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk), + strtimestamp (pk->timestamp)); + p = get_user_id_native (list->kid); + log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"), p); + xfree (p); + } + else + log_info (_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"), + algstr, keystr(list->kid)); - algstr = openpgp_pk_algo_name ( list->pubkey_algo ); - pk = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *pk ); - - if( !algstr ) - algstr = "[?]"; - pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo; - if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) ) - { - char *p; - log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %s, created %s\n"), - nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, keystr_from_pk(pk), - strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) ); - p=get_user_id_native(list->kid); - log_printf (_(" \"%s\"\n"),p); - xfree(p); - } - else - log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %s\n"), - algstr,keystr(list->kid)); - - free_public_key( pk ); - - if( list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY ) { - if( is_status_enabled() ) { - char buf[20]; - snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX", - (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]); - write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf ); + free_public_key (pk); + + if (list->reason == G10ERR_NO_SECKEY) + { + if (is_status_enabled()) + { + char buf[20]; + snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%08lX%08lX", + (ulong)list->kid[0], (ulong)list->kid[1]); + write_status_text (STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf); } } - else if (list->reason) - { - log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"), - g10_errstr(list->reason)); - write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason); - } + else if (list->reason) + { + log_info (_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"), + g10_errstr(list->reason)); + write_status_error ("pkdecrypt_failed", list->reason); + } } } static void -proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { - int result = 0; + int result = 0; - if (!opt.quiet) - { - if(c->symkeys>1) - log_info(_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"),c->symkeys); - else if(c->symkeys==1) - log_info(_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n")); - print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 ); - print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 ); - } + if (!opt.quiet) + { + if (c->symkeys>1) + log_info (_("encrypted with %lu passphrases\n"), c->symkeys); + else if (c->symkeys == 1) + log_info (_("encrypted with 1 passphrase\n")); + print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 ); + print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 ); + } - /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */ - - - write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION ); - - /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/ - if( opt.list_only ) - result = -1; - else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) { - int algo; - STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL; - - if(opt.override_session_key) - { - c->dek = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c->dek ); - result=get_override_session_key(c->dek, opt.override_session_key); - if(result) - { - xfree(c->dek); - c->dek = NULL; - } - } - else - { - /* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */ - algo = opt.def_cipher_algo; - if ( algo ) - log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), + /* FIXME: Figure out the session key by looking at all pkenc packets. */ + + write_status (STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION); + + /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/ + if (opt.list_only) + result = -1; + else if (!c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key) + { + int algo; + STRING2KEY s2kbuf; + STRING2KEY *s2k = NULL; + + if (opt.override_session_key) + { + c->dek = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c->dek); + result = get_override_session_key (c->dek, opt.override_session_key); + if (result) + { + xfree (c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; + } + } + else + { + /* Assume this is old style conventional encrypted data. */ + algo = opt.def_cipher_algo; + if (algo) + log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), + openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo)); + else if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA)) + { + algo = opt.def_cipher_algo; + if (!algo) + algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo; + log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, " + "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"), openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo)); - else if ( openpgp_cipher_test_algo (CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) ) - { - algo = opt.def_cipher_algo; - if (!algo) - algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo; - log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, " - "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"), - openpgp_cipher_algo_name (algo)); - } - else - { - algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA; - if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo) - { - /* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */ - s2kbuf.mode = 0; - s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; - s2k = &s2kbuf; - } - log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA"); - } - - c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 3, NULL, NULL ); - if (c->dek) - c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; - } + } + else + { + algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA; + if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo) + { + /* If no digest is given we assume SHA-1. */ + s2kbuf.mode = 0; + s2kbuf.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1; + s2k = &s2kbuf; + } + log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA"); + } + + c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 3, NULL, NULL ); + if (c->dek) + c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; + } } - else if( !c->dek ) - result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; - - if (!result) - result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek ); - - if( result == -1 ) - ; - else if( !result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE - && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) { - write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY ); - if( opt.verbose > 1 ) - log_info(_("decryption okay\n")); - if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result ) - write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC ); - else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn) - log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n")); + else if( !c->dek ) + result = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY; + + if (!result) + result = decrypt_data (c->ctrl, c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek ); + + if (result == -1) + ; + else if (!result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE + && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) + { + write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY); + if (opt.verbose > 1) + log_info(_("decryption okay\n")); + if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result) + write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC); + else if (!opt.no_mdc_warn) + log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n")); } - else if( result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN ) { - glo_ctrl.lasterr = result; - log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n")); - write_status( STATUS_BADMDC ); - write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED ); + else if (result == G10ERR_BAD_SIGN) + { + glo_ctrl.lasterr = result; + log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n")); + write_status (STATUS_BADMDC); + write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED); } - else { - if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY - && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0') - { - log_debug(_("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n"), - c->dek->s2k_cacheid); - passphrase_clear_cache (NULL, c->dek->s2k_cacheid, 0); - } - glo_ctrl.lasterr = result; - write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED ); - log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result)); - /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple - * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/ + else + { + if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_KEY + && *c->dek->s2k_cacheid != '\0') + { + log_debug (_("cleared passphrase cached with ID: %s\n"), + c->dek->s2k_cacheid); + passphrase_clear_cache (NULL, c->dek->s2k_cacheid, 0); + } + glo_ctrl.lasterr = result; + write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED); + log_error (_("decryption failed: %s\n"), g10_errstr(result)); + /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple + * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK). */ } - xfree(c->dek); c->dek = NULL; - free_packet(pkt); - c->last_was_session_key = 0; - write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION ); + + xfree (c->dek); + c->dek = NULL; + free_packet (pkt); + c->last_was_session_key = 0; + write_status (STATUS_END_DECRYPTION); } static void proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) { - PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext; - int any, clearsig, rc; - KBNODE n; - - literals_seen++; - - if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) ) - log_info(_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n")); - else if( opt.verbose ) - log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name); - free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); - if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0)) - BUG (); - /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1 - * and no armoring - Not yet tested - * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1 - * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1?? - * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09 - */ - any = clearsig = 0; - for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next ) - { - if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) - { - /* For the onepass signature case */ - if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ) - { - gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, - n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo); - any = 1; - } - } - else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL - && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control - == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) - { - /* For the clearsigned message case */ - size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen; - const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data; - - /* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */ - if ( datalen < 2 ) - log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n"); - /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped - * documents */ - clearsig = (*data == 0x01); - for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ ) - gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data); - any = 1; - break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not - expected. */ - } - else if(n->pkt->pkttype==PKT_SIGNATURE) - { - /* For the SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */ - gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo ); - any=1; - } - } + PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext; + int any, clearsig, rc; + kbnode_t n; - if( !any && !opt.skip_verify ) - { - /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal - according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that - often. There is no good way to specify what algorithms to - use in that case, so these three are the historical - answer. */ - gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 ); - gcry_md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 ); - } - if ( DBG_HASHING ) { - gcry_md_debug ( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); - if ( c->mfx.md2 ) - gcry_md_debug ( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); + literals_seen++; + + if (pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8)) + log_info (_("Note: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n")); + else if (opt.verbose) + log_info (_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name); + + free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx); + if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0)) + BUG (); + /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1 + * and no armoring - Not yet tested + * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1 + * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1?? + * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09 + */ + any = clearsig = 0; + for (n=c->list; n; n = n->next ) + { + if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG) + { + /* The onepass signature case. */ + if (n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo) + { + gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo); + any = 1; + } + } + else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START) + { + /* The clearsigned message case. */ + size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen; + const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data; + + /* Check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash. */ + if (datalen < 2) + log_fatal ("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n"); + /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped + * documents. */ + clearsig = (*data == 0x01); + for (data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++) + gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, *data); + any = 1; + break; /* Stop here as one-pass signature packets are not + expected. */ + } + else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) + { + /* The SIG+LITERAL case that PGP used to use. */ + gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo ); + any = 1; + } } - rc=0; + if (!any && !opt.skip_verify) + { + /* This is for the old GPG LITERAL+SIG case. It's not legal + according to 2440, so hopefully it won't come up that often. + There is no good way to specify what algorithms to use in + that case, so these there are the historical answer. */ + gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160); + gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1); + } + if (DBG_HASHING) + { + gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify"); + if (c->mfx.md2) + gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2"); + } - if (literals_seen>1) - { - log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n")); - - if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages) - { - write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA"); - log_inc_errorcount (); - rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED); - } - } + rc=0; - if(!rc) - { - rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig ); - if ( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only ) - { - /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the - signature. */ - rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig ); - } - } + if (literals_seen > 1) + { + log_info (_("WARNING: multiple plaintexts seen\n")); - if( rc ) - log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); - free_packet(pkt); - c->last_was_session_key = 0; - - /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet. - * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. - */ - n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0)); - if (c->list) - add_kbnode (c->list, n); - else - c->list = n; + if (!opt.flags.allow_multiple_messages) + { + write_status_text (STATUS_ERROR, "proc_pkt.plaintext 89_BAD_DATA"); + log_inc_errorcount (); + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED); + } + } + + if (!rc) + { + rc = handle_plaintext (pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_EACCES && !c->sigs_only) + { + /* Can't write output but we hash it anyway to check the + signature. */ + rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig ); + } + } + + if (rc) + log_error ("handle plaintext failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + + free_packet(pkt); + c->last_was_session_key = 0; + + /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet. + * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. */ + n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0)); + if (c->list) + add_kbnode (c->list, n); + else + c->list = n; } static int -proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info ) +proc_compressed_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info) { if ( ((CTX)info)->signed_data.used && ((CTX)info)->signed_data.data_fd != -1) @@ -746,15 +778,17 @@ proc_compressed_cb( IOBUF a, void *info ) ((CTX)info)->sigfilename ); } + static int -proc_encrypt_cb (IOBUF a, void *info ) +proc_encrypt_cb (iobuf_t a, void *info ) { CTX c = info; return proc_encryption_packets (c->ctrl, info, a ); } + static int -proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) +proc_compressed (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) { PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed; int rc; @@ -786,123 +820,135 @@ proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) return rc; } -/**************** + +/* * check the signature * Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code */ static int -do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig, - int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey ) +do_check_sig (CTX c, kbnode_t node, int *is_selfsig, + int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey) { - PKT_signature *sig; - gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL, md2 = NULL; - int algo, rc; - - assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ); - if( is_selfsig ) - *is_selfsig = 0; - sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; - - algo = sig->digest_algo; - rc = openpgp_md_test_algo(algo); - if (rc) - return rc; - - if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) { - if( c->mfx.md ) - { - if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md )) - BUG (); - } - else /* detached signature */ - { - /* signature_check() will enable the md*/ - if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 )) - BUG (); - } + PKT_signature *sig; + gcry_md_hd_t md = NULL; + gcry_md_hd_t md2 = NULL; + int algo, rc; + + assert (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE); + if (is_selfsig) + *is_selfsig = 0; + sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; + + algo = sig->digest_algo; + rc = openpgp_md_test_algo (algo); + if (rc) + return rc; + + if (sig->sig_class == 0x00) + { + if (c->mfx.md) + { + if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md )) + BUG (); + } + else /* detached signature */ + { + /* signature_check() will enable the md. */ + if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 )) + BUG (); + } } - else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { - /* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text - * in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */ - if( c->mfx.md ) { - if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md )) - BUG (); - if( c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2 )) - BUG (); + else if (sig->sig_class == 0x01) + { + /* How do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text + in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */ + if (c->mfx.md) + { + if (gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md )) + BUG (); + if (c->mfx.md2 && gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2)) + BUG (); } - else { /* detached signature */ - log_debug("Do we really need this here?"); - /* signature_check() will enable the md*/ - if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 )) - BUG (); - if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 )) - BUG (); + else /* detached signature */ + { + log_debug ("Do we really need this here?"); + /* signature_check() will enable the md*/ + if (gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 )) + BUG (); + if (gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 )) + BUG (); } } - else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 - || sig->sig_class == 0x18 - || sig->sig_class == 0x1f - || sig->sig_class == 0x20 - || sig->sig_class == 0x28 - || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { - if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY - || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { - return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig ); + else if ((sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 + || sig->sig_class == 0x18 + || sig->sig_class == 0x1f + || sig->sig_class == 0x20 + || sig->sig_class == 0x28 + || sig->sig_class == 0x30) + { + if (c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + { + return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig ); } - else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { - log_error (_("standalone revocation - " - "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n")); - return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED; + else if (sig->sig_class == 0x20) + { + log_error (_("standalone revocation - " + "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n")); + return G10ERR_NOT_PROCESSED; } - else { - log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", - sig->sig_class); - return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; + else + { + log_error ("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", sig->sig_class); + return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; } } - else - return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; - rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL ); - if( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2 ) - rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL ); - gcry_md_close(md); - gcry_md_close(md2); + else + return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS; - return rc; + rc = signature_check2 (sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL); + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2) + rc = signature_check2 (sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL); + + gcry_md_close (md); + gcry_md_close (md2); + + return rc; } static void -print_userid( PACKET *pkt ) +print_userid (PACKET *pkt) { - if( !pkt ) - BUG(); - if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) { - printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype ); - return; + if (!pkt) + BUG(); + + if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID) + { + printf ("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype ); + return; } - if( opt.with_colons ) - { - if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) - printf("%u %lu", - pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs, - pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len); - else - es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, - pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL); - } - else - print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, - pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); + if (opt.with_colons) + { + if (pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) + printf("%u %lu", + pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs, + pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len); + else + es_write_sanitized (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, + pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ":", NULL); + } + else + print_utf8_buffer (es_stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, + pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); } -/**************** - * List the certificate in a user friendly way +/* + * List the keyblock in a user friendly way */ - static void -list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ) +list_node (CTX c, kbnode_t node) { int mainkey; char pkstrbuf[PUBKEY_STRING_SIZE]; @@ -1104,66 +1150,64 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ) } - int -proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a ) +proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a ) { - int rc; - CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c ); + int rc; + CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c); - c->ctrl = ctrl; - c->anchor = anchor; - rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); - xfree( c ); - return rc; -} + c->ctrl = ctrl; + c->anchor = anchor; + rc = do_proc_packets (c, a); + xfree (c); + return rc; +} int -proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a, +proc_signature_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a, strlist_t signedfiles, const char *sigfilename ) { - CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c ); - int rc; - - c->ctrl = ctrl; - c->anchor = anchor; - c->sigs_only = 1; - - c->signed_data.data_fd = -1; - c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles; - c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles; - - c->sigfilename = sigfilename; - rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); - - /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error - messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code. - Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check - error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process - with an error. */ - if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen) - { - write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4"); - log_error (_("no signature found\n")); - rc = G10ERR_NO_DATA; - } + CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c); + int rc; + + c->ctrl = ctrl; + c->anchor = anchor; + c->sigs_only = 1; - /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on - success so that we won't issue the nodata status several - times. */ - if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen) - c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1; + c->signed_data.data_fd = -1; + c->signed_data.data_names = signedfiles; + c->signed_data.used = !!signedfiles; - xfree( c ); - return rc; + c->sigfilename = sigfilename; + rc = do_proc_packets ( c, a ); + + /* If we have not encountered any signature we print an error + messages, send a NODATA status back and return an error code. + Using log_error is required because verify_files does not check + error codes for each file but we want to terminate the process + with an error. */ + if (!rc && !c->any.sig_seen) + { + write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "4"); + log_error (_("no signature found\n")); + rc = G10ERR_NO_DATA; + } + + /* Propagate the signature seen flag upward. Do this only on success + so that we won't issue the nodata status several times. */ + if (!rc && c->anchor && c->any.sig_seen) + c->anchor->any.sig_seen = 1; + + xfree (c); + return rc; } int proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl, - void *anchor, IOBUF a, int signed_data_fd ) + void *anchor, iobuf_t a, int signed_data_fd ) { int rc; CTX c; @@ -1205,17 +1249,17 @@ proc_signature_packets_by_fd (ctrl_t ctrl, int -proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, IOBUF a ) +proc_encryption_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, void *anchor, iobuf_t a ) { - CTX c = xmalloc_clear( sizeof *c ); - int rc; - - c->ctrl = ctrl; - c->anchor = anchor; - c->encrypt_only = 1; - rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); - xfree( c ); - return rc; + CTX c = xmalloc_clear (sizeof *c); + int rc; + + c->ctrl = ctrl; + c->anchor = anchor; + c->encrypt_only = 1; + rc = do_proc_packets (c, a); + xfree (c); + return rc; } @@ -1233,152 +1277,168 @@ check_nesting (CTX c) write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "1"); return GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA; } + return 0; } static int -do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a ) +do_proc_packets (CTX c, iobuf_t a) { - PACKET *pkt; - int rc = 0; - int any_data = 0; - int newpkt; - - rc = check_nesting (c); - if (rc) - return rc; - - pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt ); - c->iobuf = a; - init_packet(pkt); - while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) { - any_data = 1; - if( rc ) { - free_packet(pkt); - /* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered - * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */ - if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET - && opt.list_packets != 2 ) - break; - continue; + PACKET *pkt; + int rc = 0; + int any_data = 0; + int newpkt; + + rc = check_nesting (c); + if (rc) + return rc; + + pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt ); + c->iobuf = a; + init_packet(pkt); + while ((rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1) + { + any_data = 1; + if (rc) + { + free_packet (pkt); + /* Stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered + * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packets. */ + if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET + && opt.list_packets != 2 ) + break; + continue; } - newpkt = -1; - if( opt.list_packets ) { - switch( pkt->pkttype ) { - case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; - default: newpkt = 0; break; + newpkt = -1; + if (opt.list_packets) + { + switch (pkt->pkttype) + { + case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break; + default: newpkt = 0; break; } } - else if( c->sigs_only ) { - switch( pkt->pkttype ) { - case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: - case PKT_SECRET_KEY: - case PKT_USER_ID: - case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: - case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: - write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); - rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; - goto leave; - case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; - default: newpkt = 0; break; + else if (c->sigs_only) + { + switch (pkt->pkttype) + { + case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: + case PKT_SECRET_KEY: + case PKT_USER_ID: + case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: + case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: + write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); + rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; + goto leave; + + case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break; + default: newpkt = 0; break; } } - else if( c->encrypt_only ) { - switch( pkt->pkttype ) { - case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: - case PKT_SECRET_KEY: - case PKT_USER_ID: - write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); - rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; - goto leave; - case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; - default: newpkt = 0; break; + else if (c->encrypt_only) + { + switch (pkt->pkttype) + { + case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: + case PKT_SECRET_KEY: + case PKT_USER_ID: + write_status_text (STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0"); + rc = G10ERR_UNEXPECTED; + goto leave; + + case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control (c, pkt); break; + default: newpkt = 0; break; } } - else { - switch( pkt->pkttype ) { - case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: - case PKT_SECRET_KEY: - release_list( c ); - c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); - newpkt = 1; - break; - case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY: - case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: - newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt ); - break; - case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; - case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break; - default: newpkt = 0; break; + else + { + switch (pkt->pkttype) + { + case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: + case PKT_SECRET_KEY: + release_list (c); + c->list = new_kbnode (pkt); + newpkt = 1; + break; + case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY: + case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: + newpkt = add_subkey (c, pkt); + break; + case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; + case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust (c, pkt); break; + default: newpkt = 0; break; } } - if (rc) - goto leave; - - /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why - * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack. - * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted - * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right - * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just - * an extra layer. - * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here?? - */ - if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC ) - c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT); - - if( newpkt == -1 ) - ; - else if( newpkt ) { - pkt = xmalloc( sizeof *pkt ); - init_packet(pkt); + if (rc) + goto leave; + + /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why + * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack. + * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted + * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right + * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just + * an extra layer. + * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here?? + */ + if (pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC) + c->any.data = (pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT); + + if (newpkt == -1) + ; + else if (newpkt) + { + pkt = xmalloc (sizeof *pkt); + init_packet (pkt); } - else - free_packet(pkt); + else + free_packet(pkt); } - if( rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET ) - write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" ); - if( any_data ) - rc = 0; - else if( rc == -1 ) - write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" ); - - - leave: - release_list( c ); - xfree(c->dek); - free_packet( pkt ); - xfree( pkt ); - free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); - return rc; + + if (rc == G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET) + write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "3"); + + if (any_data) + rc = 0; + else if (rc == -1) + write_status_text (STATUS_NODATA, "2"); + + + leave: + release_list (c); + xfree(c->dek); + free_packet (pkt); + xfree (pkt); + free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx); + return rc; } @@ -1476,7 +1536,7 @@ print_good_bad_signature (int statno, const char *keyid_str, kbnode_t un, static int -check_sig_and_print (CTX c, KBNODE node) +check_sig_and_print (CTX c, kbnode_t node) { PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; const char *astr; @@ -1520,7 +1580,7 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, KBNODE node) introduce a bug here. */ { - KBNODE n; + kbnode_t n; int n_onepass, n_sig; /* log_debug ("checking signature packet composition\n"); */ @@ -1975,206 +2035,231 @@ check_sig_and_print (CTX c, KBNODE node) } -/**************** +/* * Process the tree which starts at node */ static void -proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ) +proc_tree (CTX c, kbnode_t node) { - KBNODE n1; - int rc; - - if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only ) - return; - - /* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase - they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in - addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */ - while ( node - && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL - && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control - == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) { - node = node->next; + kbnode_t n1; + int rc; + + if (opt.list_packets || opt.list_only) + return; + + /* We must skip our special plaintext marker packets here because + they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in + addional checks and skipping them here doesn't matter. */ + while (node + && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK) + { + node = node->next; } - if (!node) - return; + if (!node) + return; - c->trustletter = ' '; - if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY - || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { - merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); - list_node( c, node ); + c->trustletter = ' '; + if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY + || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) + { + merge_keys_and_selfsig (node); + list_node (c, node); } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) { - merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); - list_node( c, node ); + else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) + { + merge_keys_and_selfsig (node); + list_node (c, node); } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) { - /* check all signatures */ - if( !c->any.data ) { - int use_textmode = 0; - - free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); - /* prepare to create all requested message digests */ - if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0)) - BUG (); - - /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the - one-pass packet? */ - for ( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) - { - gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, - n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo); - } - - if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01) - use_textmode = 1; - - /* Ask for file and hash it. */ - if( c->sigs_only ) { - if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1) - rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL, - c->signed_data.data_fd, - use_textmode); - else - rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL, - c->signed_data.data_names, - c->sigfilename, - use_textmode ); + else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG) + { + /* Check all signatures. */ + if (!c->any.data) + { + int use_textmode = 0; + + free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx); + /* Prepare to create all requested message digests. */ + if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0)) + BUG (); + + /* Fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not the + one-pass packet? */ + for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));) + gcry_md_enable (c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo); + + if (n1 && n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01) + use_textmode = 1; + + /* Ask for file and hash it. */ + if (c->sigs_only) + { + if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1) + rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, NULL, + c->signed_data.data_fd, + use_textmode); + else + rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, NULL, + c->signed_data.data_names, + c->sigfilename, + use_textmode); } - else { - rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, - iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf), - use_textmode ); + else + { + rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, + iobuf_get_real_fname (c->iobuf), + use_textmode); } - if( rc ) { - log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); - return; + + if (rc) + { + log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr (rc)); + return; } } - else if ( c->signed_data.used ) { - log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); - return; + else if (c->signed_data.used) + { + log_error (_("not a detached signature\n")); + return; } - for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) - check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); + for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));) + check_sig_and_print (c, n1); + } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL - && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control - == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { - /* clear text signed message */ - if( !c->any.data ) { - log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" ); - return; + else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL + && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START) + { + /* Clear text signed message. */ + if (!c->any.data) + { + log_error ("cleartext signature without data\n"); + return; } - else if ( c->signed_data.used ) { - log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); - return; + else if (c->signed_data.used) + { + log_error (_("not a detached signature\n")); + return; } - for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) - check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); + for (n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode (n1, PKT_SIGNATURE));) + check_sig_and_print (c, n1); + } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { - PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; - int multiple_ok=1; - - n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE); - if(n1) - { - byte class=sig->sig_class; - byte hash=sig->digest_algo; - - for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE))) - { - /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of - different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have - to run a different hash context for each), but if - they are all the same, make an exception. */ - if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class - || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash) - { - multiple_ok=0; - log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. " - "Only the first will be checked.\n")); - break; - } - } - } - - if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 ) - log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), - sig->sig_class); - else if( !c->any.data ) { - /* detached signature */ - free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); - if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0)) - BUG (); - - if (RFC2440 || RFC4880) - ; /* Strict RFC mode. */ - else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 - && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA - && sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { - /* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the - * detached signature has been created in textmode. */ + else if (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE) + { + PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; + int multiple_ok = 1; + + n1 = find_next_kbnode (node, PKT_SIGNATURE); + if (n1) + { + byte class = sig->sig_class; + byte hash = sig->digest_algo; + + for (; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE))) + { + /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of + different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have + to run a different hash context for each), but if + they are all the same, make an exception. */ + if (n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class != class + || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo != hash) + { + multiple_ok = 0; + log_info (_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. " + "Only the first will be checked.\n")); + break; + } + } + } + + if (sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01) + { + log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), sig->sig_class); + } + else if (!c->any.data) + { + /* Detached signature */ + free_md_filter_context (&c->mfx); + if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0)) + BUG (); + + if (RFC2440 || RFC4880) + ; /* Strict RFC mode. */ + else if (sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 + && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA + && sig->sig_class == 0x01) + { + /* Enable a workaround for a pgp5 bug when the detached + * signature has been created in textmode. */ if (gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0 )) BUG (); } - /* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp - * 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached - * signatures; this would let the first signature check - * (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an - * extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash. - * This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in - * some cases (and break others). - * c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) - */ - - if ( DBG_HASHING ) { - gcry_md_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); - if ( c->mfx.md2 ) - gcry_md_debug( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); + /* Here we used to have another hack to work around a pgp + * 2 bug: It worked by not using the textmode for detached + * signatures; this would let the first signature check + * (on md) fail but the second one (on md2), which adds an + * extra CR would then have produced the "correct" hash. + * This is very, very ugly hack but it may haved help in + * some cases (and break others). + * c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) + */ + + if (DBG_HASHING) + { + gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md, "verify"); + if (c->mfx.md2) + gcry_md_debug (c->mfx.md2, "verify2"); } - if( c->sigs_only ) { - if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1) - rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, - c->signed_data.data_fd, - (sig->sig_class == 0x01)); - else - rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, - c->signed_data.data_names, - c->sigfilename, - (sig->sig_class == 0x01)); + + if (c->sigs_only) + { + if (c->signed_data.used && c->signed_data.data_fd != -1) + rc = hash_datafile_by_fd (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, + c->signed_data.data_fd, + (sig->sig_class == 0x01)); + else + rc = hash_datafiles (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, + c->signed_data.data_names, + c->sigfilename, + (sig->sig_class == 0x01)); } - else { - rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, - iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf), - (sig->sig_class == 0x01) ); + else + { + rc = ask_for_detached_datafile (c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, + iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf), + (sig->sig_class == 0x01)); } - if( rc ) { - log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); - return; + + if (rc) + { + log_error ("can't hash datafile: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc)); + return; } } - else if ( c->signed_data.used ) { - log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); - return; + else if (c->signed_data.used) + { + log_error (_("not a detached signature\n")); + return; + } + else if (!opt.quiet) + log_info (_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n")); + + if (multiple_ok) + { + for (n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE))) + check_sig_and_print (c, n1); } - else if (!opt.quiet) - log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n")); - - if(multiple_ok) - for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) ) - check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); - else - check_sig_and_print( c, node ); + else + check_sig_and_print (c, node); + } - else { - dump_kbnode (c->list); - log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n")); - dump_kbnode (node); + else + { + dump_kbnode (c->list); + log_error ("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n"); + dump_kbnode (node); } } diff --git a/g10/openfile.c b/g10/openfile.c index 5a436485b..ab27f44e3 100644 --- a/g10/openfile.c +++ b/g10/openfile.c @@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ /* FIXME: Implement opt.interactive. */ -/**************** +/* * Check whether FNAME exists and ask if it's okay to overwrite an * existing one. * Returns: True: it's okay to overwrite or the file does not exist @@ -92,35 +92,37 @@ overwrite_filep( const char *fname ) } -/**************** +/* * Strip known extensions from iname and return a newly allocated * filename. Return NULL if we can't do that. */ char * -make_outfile_name( const char *iname ) +make_outfile_name (const char *iname) { - size_t n; - - if ( iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname) ) - return xstrdup("-"); - - n = strlen(iname); - if( n > 4 && ( !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG) - || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "pgp") - || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "sig") - || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "asc") ) ) { - char *buf = xstrdup( iname ); - buf[n-4] = 0; - return buf; + size_t n; + + if (iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname)) + return xstrdup ("-"); + + n = strlen (iname); + if (n > 4 && (!CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG) + || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "pgp") + || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "sig") + || !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-4, EXTSEP_S "asc"))) + { + char *buf = xstrdup (iname); + buf[n-4] = 0; + return buf; } - else if( n > 5 && !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-5, EXTSEP_S "sign") ) { - char *buf = xstrdup( iname ); - buf[n-5] = 0; - return buf; + else if (n > 5 && !CMP_FILENAME(iname+n-5, EXTSEP_S "sign")) + { + char *buf = xstrdup (iname); + buf[n-5] = 0; + return buf; } - log_info(_("%s: unknown suffix\n"), iname ); - return NULL; + log_info (_("%s: unknown suffix\n"), iname); + return NULL; } @@ -168,7 +170,7 @@ ask_outfile_name( const char *name, size_t namelen ) } -/**************** +/* * Make an output filename for the inputfile INAME. * Returns an IOBUF and an errorcode * Mode 0 = use ".gpg" @@ -308,117 +310,132 @@ open_outfile (int inp_fd, const char *iname, int mode, int restrictedperm, } -/**************** +/* * Try to open a file without the extension ".sig" or ".asc" * Return NULL if such a file is not available. */ IOBUF open_sigfile( const char *iname, progress_filter_context_t *pfx ) { - IOBUF a = NULL; - size_t len; - - if( !iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname) ) { - len = strlen(iname); - if( len > 4 && ( !strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "sig") - || ( len > 5 && !strcmp(iname + len - 5, EXTSEP_S "sign") ) - || !strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "asc")) ) { - char *buf; - buf = xstrdup(iname); - buf[len-(buf[len-1]=='n'?5:4)] = 0 ; - a = iobuf_open( buf ); - if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a))) - { - iobuf_close (a); - a = NULL; - gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); - } - if( a && opt.verbose ) - log_info(_("assuming signed data in '%s'\n"), buf ); - if (a && pfx) - handle_progress (pfx, a, buf); - xfree(buf); + IOBUF a = NULL; + size_t len; + + if (!iobuf_is_pipe_filename (iname)) + { + len = strlen(iname); + if( len > 4 && (!strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "sig") + || (len > 5 && !strcmp(iname + len - 5, EXTSEP_S "sign")) + || !strcmp(iname + len - 4, EXTSEP_S "asc"))) + { + char *buf; + + buf = xstrdup(iname); + buf[len-(buf[len-1]=='n'?5:4)] = 0 ; + a = iobuf_open( buf ); + if (a && is_secured_file (iobuf_get_fd (a))) + { + iobuf_close (a); + a = NULL; + gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); + } + if (a && opt.verbose) + log_info (_("assuming signed data in '%s'\n"), buf); + if (a && pfx) + handle_progress (pfx, a, buf); + xfree (buf); } } - return a; + + return a; } + /**************** * Copy the option file skeleton to the given directory. */ static void -copy_options_file( const char *destdir ) +copy_options_file (const char *destdir) { - const char *datadir = gnupg_datadir (); - char *fname; - FILE *src, *dst; - int linefeeds=0; - int c; - mode_t oldmask; - int esc = 0; - int any_option = 0; - - if( opt.dry_run ) - return; - - fname = xmalloc( strlen(datadir) + strlen(destdir) + 15 ); - strcpy(stpcpy(fname, datadir), DIRSEP_S "gpg-conf" SKELEXT ); - src = fopen( fname, "r" ); - if (src && is_secured_file (fileno (src))) - { - fclose (src); - src = NULL; - gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); - } - if( !src ) { - log_info (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) ); - xfree(fname); - return; + const char *datadir = gnupg_datadir (); + char *fname; + FILE *src, *dst; + int linefeeds=0; + int c; + mode_t oldmask; + int esc = 0; + int any_option = 0; + + if (opt.dry_run) + return; + + fname = xmalloc (strlen(datadir) + strlen(destdir) + 15); + strcpy (stpcpy(fname, datadir), DIRSEP_S "gpg-conf" SKELEXT); + src = fopen (fname, "r"); + if (src && is_secured_file (fileno (src))) + { + fclose (src); + src = NULL; + gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); + } + if (!src) + { + log_info (_("can't open '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno)); + xfree(fname); + return; } - strcpy(stpcpy(fname, destdir), DIRSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG EXTSEP_S "conf" ); - oldmask=umask(077); - if ( is_secured_filename (fname) ) - { - dst = NULL; - gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); - } - else - dst = fopen( fname, "w" ); - umask(oldmask); - if( !dst ) { - log_info (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) ); - fclose( src ); - xfree(fname); - return; + strcpy (stpcpy (fname, destdir), DIRSEP_S GPGEXT_GPG EXTSEP_S "conf"); + + oldmask = umask (077); + if (is_secured_filename (fname)) + { + dst = NULL; + gpg_err_set_errno (EPERM); + } + else + dst = fopen( fname, "w" ); + umask (oldmask); + + if (!dst) + { + log_info (_("can't create '%s': %s\n"), fname, strerror(errno) ); + fclose (src); + xfree (fname); + return; } - while( (c=getc(src)) != EOF ) { - if( linefeeds < 3 ) { - if( c == '\n' ) - linefeeds++; + while ((c = getc (src)) != EOF) + { + if (linefeeds < 3) + { + if (c == '\n') + linefeeds++; } - else { - putc( c, dst ); - if (c== '\n') - esc = 1; - else if (esc == 1) { - if (c == ' ' || c == '\t') - ; - else if (c == '#') - esc = 2; - else - any_option = 1; + else + { + putc (c, dst); + if (c== '\n') + esc = 1; + else if (esc == 1) + { + if (c == ' ' || c == '\t') + ; + else if (c == '#') + esc = 2; + else + any_option = 1; } } } - fclose( dst ); - fclose( src ); - log_info(_("new configuration file '%s' created\n"), fname ); - if (any_option) - log_info (_("WARNING: options in '%s'" - " are not yet active during this run\n"), - fname); - xfree(fname); + + fclose (dst); + fclose (src); + + log_info (_("new configuration file '%s' created\n"), fname); + if (any_option) + log_info (_("WARNING: options in '%s'" + " are not yet active during this run\n"), + fname); + xfree (fname); } |