diff options
Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/ChangeLog | 11 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/export.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/keyedit.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/keylist.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/keyserver.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/pkclist.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/sign.c | 4 |
7 files changed, 39 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog index c0cd820f6..5ae9582e9 100644 --- a/g10/ChangeLog +++ b/g10/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,14 @@ +2002-08-20 David Shaw <[email protected]> + + * keylist.c, keyedit.c, keyserver.c, sign.c: Some TODOs and + comments. + + * export.c (do_export_stream): Fix noop bug in exporting sensitive + revocation keys. + + * pkclist.c (do_edit_ownertrust): Comment out the option for + showing trust paths until it can be implemented. + 2002-08-19 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * getkey.c (get_user_id_native): Renamed to .. diff --git a/g10/export.c b/g10/export.c index a77a967e3..f982def6f 100644 --- a/g10/export.c +++ b/g10/export.c @@ -275,7 +275,10 @@ do_export_stream( IOBUF out, STRLIST users, int secret, for(i=0;i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys;i++) if(node->pkt->pkt.signature->revkey[i]->class & 0x40) - continue; + break; + + if(i<node->pkt->pkt.signature->numrevkeys) + continue; } /* delete our verification cache */ diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c index 19da4256c..6e62ac450 100644 --- a/g10/keyedit.c +++ b/g10/keyedit.c @@ -100,6 +100,9 @@ print_and_check_one_sig( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int rc, sigrc; int is_rev = sig->sig_class == 0x30; + /* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has the pk that + issued it. See also keylist.c:list_keyblock_print */ + switch( (rc = check_key_signature( keyblock, node, is_selfsig)) ) { case 0: node->flag &= ~(NODFLG_BADSIG|NODFLG_NOKEY|NODFLG_SIGERR); diff --git a/g10/keylist.c b/g10/keylist.c index cca574ef9..d588865db 100644 --- a/g10/keylist.c +++ b/g10/keylist.c @@ -517,6 +517,11 @@ list_keyblock_print ( KBNODE keyblock, int secret, int fpr, void *opaque ) case G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY: stats->no_key++; continue; default: stats->oth_err++; sigrc = '%'; break; } + + /* TODO: Make sure a cached sig record here still has + the pk that issued it. See also + keyedit.c:print_and_check_one_sig */ + } else { rc = 0; diff --git a/g10/keyserver.c b/g10/keyserver.c index 59e87c8c2..f20e492fe 100644 --- a/g10/keyserver.c +++ b/g10/keyserver.c @@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ keyserver_refresh(STRLIST users) return 0; } -int +int keyserver_search(STRLIST tokens) { if(tokens) @@ -987,7 +987,12 @@ keyserver_search(STRLIST tokens) /* Count and searchstr are just for cosmetics. If the count is too small, it will grow safely. If negative it disables the "Key x-y of z" messages. */ -void + +/* TODO: do this as a list sent to keyserver_work rather than calling + it once for each key to get the correct counts after the import + (cosmetics, really) and to better take advantage of the keyservers + that can do multiple fetches in one go (LDAP). */ +void keyserver_search_prompt(IOBUF buffer,int count,const char *searchstr) { int i=0,validcount=1; diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c index cf6eca659..3790e38bf 100644 --- a/g10/pkclist.c +++ b/g10/pkclist.c @@ -276,7 +276,10 @@ do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust fully\n"), 4); if (mode) tty_printf (_(" %d = I trust ultimately\n"), 5); +#if 0 + /* not yet implemented */ tty_printf (_(" i = please show me more information\n") ); +#endif if( mode ) tty_printf(_(" m = back to the main menu\n")); else @@ -320,12 +323,15 @@ do_edit_ownertrust (PKT_public_key *pk, int mode, break; } } +#if 0 + /* not yet implemented */ else if( *p == ans[0] || *p == ans[1] ) { tty_printf(_("Certificates leading to an ultimately trusted key:\n")); show = 1; break; } +#endif else if( mode && (*p == ans[2] || *p == ans[3] || *p == CONTROL_D ) ) { break ; /* back to the menu */ diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c index e4fcc5f34..fe242b8da 100644 --- a/g10/sign.c +++ b/g10/sign.c @@ -1165,7 +1165,9 @@ make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk, /* If you are making a signature on a v4 key using your v3 key, it doesn't make sense to generate a v3 sig. After all, no v3-only PGP implementation could understand the v4 key in the first - place. */ + place. Note that this implies that a signature on an attribute + uid is usually going to be v4 as well, since they are not + generally found on v3 keys. */ if (sigversion < pk->version) sigversion = pk->version; |