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-rw-r--r--g10/ChangeLog20
-rw-r--r--g10/build-packet.c7
-rw-r--r--g10/keygen.c253
-rw-r--r--g10/packet.h1
-rw-r--r--g10/sign.c20
5 files changed, 220 insertions, 81 deletions
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index c4485be42..aeb5903c3 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,5 +1,25 @@
2004-04-16 David Shaw <[email protected]>
+ * keygen.c (gen_elg, gen_dsa, gen_rsa, do_create,
+ do_generate_keypair, generate_subkeypair): New is_subkey argument
+ to set whether a generated key is a subkey. Do not overload the
+ ret_sk. This is some early cleanup to do backsigs for signing
+ subkeys.
+
+ * keygen.c (write_keybinding, do_generate_keypair,
+ generate_subkeypair): Keep track of the unprotected subkey secret
+ key so we can make a backsig with it.
+
+ * keygen.c (make_backsig): New function to add a backsig to a
+ binding sig of signing subkeys. Currently disabled.
+ (write_keybinding): Call it here, for signing subkeys only.
+
+ * sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Allow generating 0x19 signatures
+ (same as 0x18 or 0x28, but used for backsigs).
+
+ * packet.h, build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Add new
+ SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE type for embedded signatures.
+
* main.h, misc.c (optsep, argsplit, optlen, parse_options):
Simplify code and properly handle a partial match against an
option with an argument.
diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
index a7d26542a..57d75758a 100644
--- a/g10/build-packet.c
+++ b/g10/build-packet.c
@@ -656,6 +656,7 @@ build_sig_subpkt (PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t type,
case SIGSUBPKT_NOTATION:
case SIGSUBPKT_POLICY:
case SIGSUBPKT_REV_KEY:
+ case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
/* we do allow multiple subpackets */
break;
@@ -725,18 +726,20 @@ build_sig_subpkt (PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t type,
else
nlen = 1; /* just a 1 byte length header */
- switch( type ) {
+ switch( type )
+ {
/* The issuer being unhashed is a historical oddity. It
should work equally as well hashed. Of course, if even an
unhashed issuer is tampered with, it makes it awfully hard
to verify the sig... */
case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
+ case SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE:
hashed = 0;
break;
default:
hashed = 1;
break;
- }
+ }
if( critical )
type |= SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL;
diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c
index 46490e3db..5d319c73b 100644
--- a/g10/keygen.c
+++ b/g10/keygen.c
@@ -624,6 +624,98 @@ keygen_add_revkey(PKT_signature *sig, void *opaque)
}
static int
+make_backsig(PKT_signature *sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
+ PKT_public_key *sub_pk, PKT_secret_key *sub_sk)
+{
+ PKT_signature *backsig;
+ int rc;
+
+ /* This is not enabled yet, as I want to get a bit closer to RFC day
+ before enabling this. I've been burned before :) */
+
+ return 0;
+
+ cache_public_key (sub_pk);
+
+ rc=make_keysig_packet(&backsig,pk,NULL,sub_pk,sub_sk, 0x19, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ NULL,NULL);
+ if( rc )
+ log_error("make_keysig_packet failed for backsig: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+ else
+ {
+ /* get it into a binary packed form. */
+ IOBUF backsig_out=iobuf_temp();
+ PACKET backsig_pkt;
+ byte *buf;
+ size_t pktlen=0;
+
+ init_packet(&backsig_pkt);
+ backsig_pkt.pkttype=PKT_SIGNATURE;
+ backsig_pkt.pkt.signature=backsig;
+ build_packet(backsig_out,&backsig_pkt);
+ free_packet(&backsig_pkt);
+ buf=iobuf_get_temp_buffer(backsig_out);
+
+ /* Remove the packet header */
+ if(buf[0]&0x40)
+ {
+ if(buf[1]<192)
+ {
+ pktlen=buf[1];
+ buf+=2;
+ }
+ else if(buf[1]<224)
+ {
+ pktlen=(buf[1]-192)*256;
+ pktlen+=buf[2]+192;
+ buf+=3;
+ }
+ else if(buf[1]==255)
+ {
+ pktlen =buf[2] << 24;
+ pktlen|=buf[3] << 16;
+ pktlen|=buf[4] << 8;
+ pktlen|=buf[5];
+ buf+=6;
+ }
+ else
+ BUG();
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ int mark=1;
+
+ switch(buf[0]&3)
+ {
+ case 3:
+ BUG();
+ break;
+
+ case 2:
+ pktlen =buf[mark++] << 24;
+ pktlen|=buf[mark++] << 16;
+
+ case 1:
+ pktlen|=buf[mark++] << 8;
+
+ case 0:
+ pktlen|=buf[mark++];
+ }
+
+ buf+=mark;
+ }
+
+ /* now make the binary blob into a subpacket */
+ build_sig_subpkt(sig,SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE,buf,pktlen);
+
+ iobuf_close(backsig_out);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+static int
write_direct_sig( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_key *sk,
struct revocation_key *revkey )
{
@@ -705,15 +797,17 @@ write_selfsig( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_key *sk,
return rc;
}
+/* sub_sk is currently unused (reserved for backsigs) */
static int
-write_keybinding( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+write_keybinding( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root,
+ PKT_secret_key *pri_sk, PKT_secret_key *sub_sk,
unsigned int use )
{
PACKET *pkt;
PKT_signature *sig;
int rc=0;
KBNODE node;
- PKT_public_key *pk, *subpk;
+ PKT_public_key *pri_pk, *sub_pk;
struct opaque_data_usage_and_pk oduap;
if( opt.verbose )
@@ -723,30 +817,38 @@ write_keybinding( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_key *sk,
node = find_kbnode( pub_root, PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
if( !node )
BUG();
- pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+ pri_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
/* we have to cache the key, so that the verification of the signature
* creation is able to retrieve the public key */
- cache_public_key (pk);
+ cache_public_key (pri_pk);
/* find the last subkey */
- subpk = NULL;
+ sub_pk = NULL;
for(node=pub_root; node; node = node->next ) {
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
- subpk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+ sub_pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key;
}
- if( !subpk )
+ if( !sub_pk )
BUG();
/* and make the signature */
oduap.usage = use;
- oduap.pk = subpk;
- rc = make_keysig_packet( &sig, pk, NULL, subpk, sk, 0x18, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire, &oduap );
+ oduap.pk = sub_pk;
+ rc=make_keysig_packet(&sig, pri_pk, NULL, sub_pk, pri_sk, 0x18, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ keygen_add_key_flags_and_expire, &oduap );
if( rc ) {
log_error("make_keysig_packet failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
return rc;
}
+ /* make a backsig */
+ if(use&PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG)
+ {
+ rc=make_backsig(sig,pri_pk,sub_pk,sub_sk);
+ if(rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
pkt = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkt );
pkt->pkttype = PKT_SIGNATURE;
pkt->pkt.signature = sig;
@@ -757,7 +859,7 @@ write_keybinding( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_key *sk,
static int
gen_elg(int algo, unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
- STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk, u32 expireval )
+ STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk, u32 expireval, int is_subkey)
{
int rc;
int i;
@@ -804,7 +906,7 @@ gen_elg(int algo, unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
sk->protect.algo = 0;
sk->csum = checksum_mpi( sk->skey[3] );
- if( ret_sk ) /* not a subkey: return an unprotected version of the sk */
+ if( ret_sk ) /* return an unprotected version of the sk */
*ret_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
if( dek ) {
@@ -820,14 +922,14 @@ gen_elg(int algo, unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
}
pkt = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
- pkt->pkttype = ret_sk ? PKT_PUBLIC_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+ pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
/* don't know whether it makes sense to have the factors, so for now
* we store them in the secret keyring (but they are not secret) */
pkt = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
- pkt->pkttype = ret_sk ? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
+ pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY : PKT_SECRET_KEY;
pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
add_kbnode(sec_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
for(i=0; factors[i]; i++ )
@@ -843,7 +945,7 @@ gen_elg(int algo, unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
*/
static int
gen_dsa(unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
- STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk, u32 expireval )
+ STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk, u32 expireval, int is_subkey)
{
int rc;
int i;
@@ -890,7 +992,7 @@ gen_dsa(unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
sk->protect.algo = 0;
sk->csum = checksum_mpi ( sk->skey[4] );
- if( ret_sk ) /* not a subkey: return an unprotected version of the sk */
+ if( ret_sk ) /* return an unprotected version of the sk */
*ret_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
if( dek ) {
@@ -906,7 +1008,7 @@ gen_dsa(unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
}
pkt = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
- pkt->pkttype = ret_sk ? PKT_PUBLIC_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+ pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
@@ -917,7 +1019,7 @@ gen_dsa(unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
* are known.
*/
pkt = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
- pkt->pkttype = ret_sk ? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
+ pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY : PKT_SECRET_KEY;
pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
add_kbnode(sec_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
for(i=1; factors[i]; i++ ) /* the first one is q */
@@ -933,7 +1035,7 @@ gen_dsa(unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
*/
static int
gen_rsa(int algo, unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
- STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk, u32 expireval )
+ STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **ret_sk, u32 expireval, int is_subkey)
{
int rc;
PACKET *pkt;
@@ -983,7 +1085,7 @@ gen_rsa(int algo, unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
sk->csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[3] );
sk->csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[4] );
sk->csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[5] );
- if( ret_sk ) /* not a subkey: return an unprotected version of the sk */
+ if( ret_sk ) /* return an unprotected version of the sk */
*ret_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, sk );
if( dek ) {
@@ -999,12 +1101,12 @@ gen_rsa(int algo, unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
}
pkt = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
- pkt->pkttype = ret_sk ? PKT_PUBLIC_KEY : PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+ pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY : PKT_PUBLIC_KEY;
pkt->pkt.public_key = pk;
add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
pkt = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt);
- pkt->pkttype = ret_sk ? PKT_SECRET_KEY : PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
+ pkt->pkttype = is_subkey ? PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY : PKT_SECRET_KEY;
pkt->pkt.secret_key = sk;
add_kbnode(sec_root, new_kbnode( pkt ));
@@ -1517,37 +1619,41 @@ do_ask_passphrase( STRING2KEY **ret_s2k )
static int
do_create( int algo, unsigned int nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root,
- DEK *dek, STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **sk, u32 expiredate )
+ DEK *dek, STRING2KEY *s2k, PKT_secret_key **sk, u32 expiredate,
+ int is_subkey )
{
- int rc=0;
+ int rc=0;
- if( !opt.batch )
- tty_printf(_(
+ if( !opt.batch )
+ tty_printf(_(
"We need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform\n"
"some other action (type on the keyboard, move the mouse, utilize the\n"
"disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random number\n"
"generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.\n") );
- if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E )
- rc = gen_elg(algo, nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, s2k, sk, expiredate);
- else if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
- rc = gen_dsa(nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, s2k, sk, expiredate);
- else if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
- rc = gen_rsa(algo, nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, s2k, sk, expiredate);
- else
- BUG();
+ if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E )
+ rc = gen_elg(algo, nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, s2k, sk, expiredate,
+ is_subkey);
+ else if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
+ rc = gen_dsa(nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, s2k, sk, expiredate,
+ is_subkey);
+ else if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
+ rc = gen_rsa(algo, nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, s2k, sk, expiredate,
+ is_subkey);
+ else
+ BUG();
#ifdef ENABLE_COMMENT_PACKETS
- if( !rc ) {
- add_kbnode( pub_root,
+ if( !rc ) {
+ add_kbnode( pub_root,
make_comment_node("#created by GNUPG v" VERSION " ("
- PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ")"));
- add_kbnode( sec_root,
+ PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ")"));
+ add_kbnode( sec_root,
make_comment_node("#created by GNUPG v" VERSION " ("
- PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ")"));
- }
+ PRINTABLE_OS_NAME ")"));
+ }
#endif
- return rc;
+ return rc;
}
@@ -2264,7 +2370,7 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
{
KBNODE pub_root = NULL;
KBNODE sec_root = NULL;
- PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
+ PKT_secret_key *pri_sk = NULL, *sub_sk = NULL;
const char *s;
struct revocation_key *revkey;
int rc;
@@ -2343,8 +2449,8 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
pub_root, sec_root,
get_parameter_dek( para, pPASSPHRASE_DEK ),
get_parameter_s2k( para, pPASSPHRASE_S2K ),
- &sk,
- get_parameter_u32( para, pKEYEXPIRE ) );
+ &pri_sk,
+ get_parameter_u32( para, pKEYEXPIRE ), 0 );
}
else
{
@@ -2352,16 +2458,16 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
get_parameter_u32 (para, pKEYEXPIRE), para);
if (!rc)
{
- sk = sec_root->next->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
- assert (sk);
+ pri_sk = sec_root->next->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+ assert (pri_sk);
}
}
if(!rc && (revkey=get_parameter_revkey(para,pREVOKER)))
{
- rc=write_direct_sig(pub_root,pub_root,sk,revkey);
+ rc=write_direct_sig(pub_root,pub_root,pri_sk,revkey);
if(!rc)
- write_direct_sig(sec_root,pub_root,sk,revkey);
+ write_direct_sig(sec_root,pub_root,pri_sk,revkey);
}
if( !rc && (s=get_parameter_value(para, pUSERID)) ) {
@@ -2369,10 +2475,10 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
if( !rc )
write_uid(sec_root, s );
if( !rc )
- rc = write_selfsig(pub_root, pub_root, sk,
+ rc = write_selfsig(pub_root, pub_root, pri_sk,
get_parameter_uint (para, pKEYUSAGE));
if( !rc )
- rc = write_selfsig(sec_root, pub_root, sk,
+ rc = write_selfsig(sec_root, pub_root, pri_sk,
get_parameter_uint (para, pKEYUSAGE));
}
@@ -2385,8 +2491,8 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
pub_root, sec_root,
get_parameter_dek( para, pPASSPHRASE_DEK ),
get_parameter_s2k( para, pPASSPHRASE_S2K ),
- NULL,
- get_parameter_u32( para, pSUBKEYEXPIRE ) );
+ &sub_sk,
+ get_parameter_u32( para, pSUBKEYEXPIRE ), 1 );
}
else
{
@@ -2395,10 +2501,10 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
}
if( !rc )
- rc = write_keybinding(pub_root, pub_root, sk,
+ rc = write_keybinding(pub_root, pub_root, pri_sk, sub_sk,
get_parameter_uint (para, pSUBKEYUSAGE));
if( !rc )
- rc = write_keybinding(sec_root, pub_root, sk,
+ rc = write_keybinding(sec_root, pub_root, pri_sk, sub_sk,
get_parameter_uint (para, pSUBKEYUSAGE));
did_sub = 1;
}
@@ -2409,9 +2515,9 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
get_parameter_u32 (para, pKEYEXPIRE), para);
if (!rc)
- rc = write_keybinding (pub_root, pub_root, sk, PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH);
+ rc = write_keybinding (pub_root, pub_root, pri_sk, sub_sk, PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH);
if (!rc)
- rc = write_keybinding (sec_root, pub_root, sk, PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH);
+ rc = write_keybinding (sec_root, pub_root, pri_sk, sub_sk, PUBKEY_USAGE_AUTH);
}
if( !rc && outctrl->use_files ) { /* direct write to specified files */
@@ -2518,8 +2624,11 @@ do_generate_keypair( struct para_data_s *para,
}
release_kbnode( pub_root );
release_kbnode( sec_root );
- if( sk && !card) /* the unprotected secret key unless we have a */
- free_secret_key(sk); /* shallow copy in card mode. */
+
+ if( pri_sk && !card) /* the unprotected secret key unless we have a */
+ free_secret_key(pri_sk); /* shallow copy in card mode. */
+ if( sub_sk )
+ free_secret_key(sub_sk);
}
@@ -2532,7 +2641,7 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
{
int okay=0, rc=0;
KBNODE node;
- PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL; /* this is the primary sk */
+ PKT_secret_key *pri_sk = NULL, *sub_sk = NULL;
int algo;
unsigned int use;
u32 expire;
@@ -2550,11 +2659,11 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
}
/* make a copy of the sk to keep the protected one in the keyblock */
- sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+ pri_sk = copy_secret_key( NULL, node->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
cur_time = make_timestamp();
- if( sk->timestamp > cur_time ) {
- ulong d = sk->timestamp - cur_time;
+ if( pri_sk->timestamp > cur_time ) {
+ ulong d = pri_sk->timestamp - cur_time;
log_info( d==1 ? _("key has been created %lu second "
"in future (time warp or clock problem)\n")
: _("key has been created %lu seconds "
@@ -2565,14 +2674,14 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
}
}
- if (sk->version < 4) {
+ if (pri_sk->version < 4) {
log_info (_("NOTE: creating subkeys for v3 keys "
"is not OpenPGP compliant\n"));
goto leave;
}
/* unprotect to get the passphrase */
- switch( is_secret_key_protected( sk ) ) {
+ switch( is_secret_key_protected( pri_sk ) ) {
case -1:
rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
break;
@@ -2581,7 +2690,7 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
break;
default:
tty_printf("Key is protected.\n");
- rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
+ rc = check_secret_key( pri_sk, 0 );
if( !rc )
passphrase = get_last_passphrase();
break;
@@ -2589,7 +2698,6 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
if( rc )
goto leave;
-
algo = ask_algo( 1, &use );
assert(algo);
nbits = ask_keysize( algo );
@@ -2608,11 +2716,11 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
}
rc = do_create( algo, nbits, pub_keyblock, sec_keyblock,
- dek, s2k, NULL, expire );
+ dek, s2k, &sub_sk, expire, 1 );
if( !rc )
- rc = write_keybinding(pub_keyblock, pub_keyblock, sk, use);
+ rc = write_keybinding(pub_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk, use);
if( !rc )
- rc = write_keybinding(sec_keyblock, pub_keyblock, sk, use);
+ rc = write_keybinding(sec_keyblock, pub_keyblock, pri_sk, sub_sk, use);
if( !rc ) {
okay = 1;
write_status_text (STATUS_KEY_CREATED, "S");
@@ -2624,8 +2732,11 @@ generate_subkeypair( KBNODE pub_keyblock, KBNODE sec_keyblock )
m_free( passphrase );
m_free( dek );
m_free( s2k );
- if( sk ) /* release the copy of the (now unprotected) secret key */
- free_secret_key(sk);
+ /* release the copy of the (now unprotected) secret keys */
+ if( pri_sk )
+ free_secret_key(pri_sk);
+ if( sub_sk )
+ free_secret_key(sub_sk);
set_next_passphrase( NULL );
return okay;
}
diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h
index 8d018e079..558a6030a 100644
--- a/g10/packet.h
+++ b/g10/packet.h
@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ typedef enum {
SIGSUBPKT_SIGNERS_UID =28, /* signer's user id */
SIGSUBPKT_REVOC_REASON =29, /* reason for revocation */
SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES =30, /* feature flags */
+ SIGSUBPKT_SIGNATURE =32, /* embedded signature */
SIGSUBPKT_FLAG_CRITICAL=128
} sigsubpkttype_t;
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
index 5260ce3ba..8e995483d 100644
--- a/g10/sign.c
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -1245,7 +1245,7 @@ make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
MD_HANDLE md;
assert( (sigclass >= 0x10 && sigclass <= 0x13) || sigclass == 0x1F
- || sigclass == 0x20 || sigclass == 0x18
+ || sigclass == 0x20 || sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x19
|| sigclass == 0x30 || sigclass == 0x28 );
if (opt.force_v4_certs)
@@ -1284,14 +1284,19 @@ make_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig, PKT_public_key *pk,
md = md_open( digest_algo, 0 );
- /* hash the public key certificate and the user id */
+ /* hash the public key certificate */
hash_public_key( md, pk );
- if( sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x28 ) { /* subkey binding/revocation*/
+
+ if( sigclass == 0x18 || sigclass == 0x19 || sigclass == 0x28 )
+ {
+ /* hash the subkey binding/backsig/revocation */
hash_public_key( md, subpk );
- }
- else if( sigclass != 0x1F && sigclass != 0x20 ) {
+ }
+ else if( sigclass != 0x1F && sigclass != 0x20 )
+ {
+ /* hash the user id */
hash_uid (md, sigversion, uid);
- }
+ }
/* and make the signature packet */
sig = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *sig );
sig->version = sigversion;
@@ -1347,8 +1352,7 @@ update_keysig_packet( PKT_signature **ret_sig,
PKT_public_key *subpk,
PKT_secret_key *sk,
int (*mksubpkt)(PKT_signature *, void *),
- void *opaque
- )
+ void *opaque )
{
PKT_signature *sig;
int rc=0;
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-05-09 19:39:08 +0000