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authorDaniel Kahn Gillmor <[email protected]>2017-08-11 06:26:52 +0000
committerDaniel Kahn Gillmor <[email protected]>2017-08-11 06:26:52 +0000
commite6f84116abca2ed49bf14b2e28c3c811a3717227 (patch)
treedf568252f8decc0b54772c93c3c369566d9cee9e /tests/gpgscm/scheme.c
parentpo: Update Russian translation (diff)
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gpg: default to --no-auto-key-retrieve.
* g10/gpg.c (main): remove KEYSERVER_AUTO_KEY_RETRIEVE from the default keyserver options. * doc/gpg.texi: document this change. -- This is a partial reversion of 7e1fe791d188b078398bf83c9af992cb1bd2a4b3. Werner and i discussed it earlier today, and came to the conclusion that: * the risk of metadata leakage represented by a default --auto-key-retrieve, both in e-mail (as a "web bug") and in other contexts where GnuPG is used to verified signatures, is quite high. * the advantages of --auto-key-retrieve (in terms of signature verification) can sometimes be achieved in other ways, such as when a signed message includes a copy of its own key. * when those other ways are not useful, a graphical, user-facing application can still offer the user the opportunity to choose to fetch the key; or it can apply its own policy about when to set --auto-key-retrieve, without needing to affect the defaults. Note that --auto-key-retrieve is specifically about signature verification. Decisions about how and whether to look up a key during message encryption are governed by --auto-key-locate. This change does not touch the --auto-key-locate default of "local,wkd". The user deliberately asking gpg to encrypt to an e-mail address is a different scenario than having an incoming e-mail trigger a potentially unique network request. Signed-off-by: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <[email protected]>
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