* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Handle case when checksum was okay but

passphrase still wrong.  Roman Pavlik found such a case.

* mpicoder.c (mpi_read_from_buffer): Don't abort in case of an
invalid MPI but print a message and return NULL.  Use log_info and
not log_error.

1 files changed, 15 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/mpi/mpicoder.c b/mpi/mpicoder.c
index 0005f21a8..4d4e45553 100644
--- a/mpi/mpicoder.c
+++ b/mpi/mpicoder.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ mpi_read(IOBUF inp, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
 
 
 MPI
-mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
+mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned int *ret_nread, int secure)
 {
     int i, j;
     unsigned nbits, nbytes, nlimbs, nread=0;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
 	goto leave;
     nbits = buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1];
     if( nbits > MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS ) {
-	log_error("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
+	log_info ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
 	goto leave;
     }
     buffer += 2;
@@ -154,10 +154,19 @@ mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
     for( ; j > 0; j-- ) {
 	a = 0;
 	for(; i < BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB; i++ ) {
-	    if( ++nread > *ret_nread )
-		log_bug("mpi larger than buffer\n");
-	    a <<= 8;
-	    a |= *buffer++;
+          if( ++nread > *ret_nread ) {
+              /* This (as well as the above error condition) may
+                 happen if we use this function to parse a decrypted
+                 MPI which didn't turn out to be a real MPI - possible
+                 because the supplied key was wrong but the OpenPGP
+                 checksum didn't caught it. */
+		log_info ("mpi larger than buffer\n");
+                mpi_free (val);
+                val = MPI_NULL;
+                goto leave;
+          }
+          a <<= 8;
+          a |= *buffer++;
 	}
 	i = 0;
 	val->d[j-1] = a;