This commit was manufactured by cvs2svn to create branch

'GNUPG-1-9-BRANCH'.

1 files changed, 2611 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1944c2a8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/getkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2611 @@
+/* getkey.c -  Get a key from the database
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+ *               2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include "util.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "iobuf.h"
+#include "keydb.h"
+#include "options.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "trustdb.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
+
+#define MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES   200
+#define MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES  200
+
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES < 2
+#error We need the cache for key creation
+#endif
+
+
+struct getkey_ctx_s {
+    int exact;
+    KBNODE keyblock;
+    KBPOS  kbpos;
+    KBNODE found_key; /* pointer into some keyblock */
+    int last_rc;
+    int req_usage;
+    int req_algo;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE kr_handle;
+    int not_allocated;
+    int nitems;
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC items[1];
+};
+
+#if 0
+static struct {
+    int any;
+    int okay_count;
+    int nokey_count;
+    int error_count;
+} lkup_stats[21];
+#endif
+
+typedef struct keyid_list {
+    struct keyid_list *next;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+} *keyid_list_t;
+
+
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+  typedef struct pk_cache_entry {
+      struct pk_cache_entry *next;
+      u32 keyid[2];
+      PKT_public_key *pk;
+  } *pk_cache_entry_t;
+  static pk_cache_entry_t pk_cache;
+  static int pk_cache_entries;	 /* number of entries in pk cache */
+  static int pk_cache_disabled;
+#endif
+
+#if MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES < 5
+#error we really need the userid cache
+#endif
+typedef struct user_id_db {
+    struct user_id_db *next;
+    keyid_list_t keyids;
+    int len;
+    char name[1];
+} *user_id_db_t;
+static user_id_db_t user_id_db;
+static int uid_cache_entries;	/* number of entries in uid cache */
+
+static void merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock );
+static int lookup( GETKEY_CTX ctx, KBNODE *ret_keyblock, int secmode );
+
+#if 0
+static void
+print_stats()
+{
+    int i;
+    for(i=0; i < DIM(lkup_stats); i++ ) {
+	if( lkup_stats[i].any )
+	    fprintf(stderr,
+		    "lookup stats: mode=%-2d  ok=%-6d  nokey=%-6d  err=%-6d\n",
+		    i,
+		    lkup_stats[i].okay_count,
+		    lkup_stats[i].nokey_count,
+		    lkup_stats[i].error_count );
+    }
+}
+#endif
+
+
+void
+cache_public_key( PKT_public_key *pk )
+{
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+    pk_cache_entry_t ce;
+    u32 keyid[2];
+
+    if( pk_cache_disabled )
+	return;
+
+    if( pk->dont_cache )
+        return;
+
+    if( is_ELGAMAL(pk->pubkey_algo)
+	|| pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
+	|| is_RSA(pk->pubkey_algo) ) {
+	keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid );
+    }
+    else
+	return; /* don't know how to get the keyid */
+
+    for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next )
+	if( ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
+	    if( DBG_CACHE )
+		log_debug("cache_public_key: already in cache\n");
+	    return;
+	}
+
+    if( pk_cache_entries >= MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES ) {
+	/* fixme: use another algorithm to free some cache slots */
+	pk_cache_disabled=1;
+	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
+	    log_info(_("too many entries in pk cache - disabled\n"));
+	return;
+    }
+    pk_cache_entries++;
+    ce = m_alloc( sizeof *ce );
+    ce->next = pk_cache;
+    pk_cache = ce;
+    ce->pk = copy_public_key( NULL, pk );
+    ce->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
+    ce->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Return the user ID from the given keyblock.
+ * We use the primary uid flag which has been set by the merge_selfsigs
+ * function.  The returned value is only valid as long as then given
+ * keyblock is not changed
+ */
+static const char *
+get_primary_uid ( KBNODE keyblock, size_t *uidlen )
+{
+    KBNODE k;
+    const char *s;
+
+    for (k=keyblock; k; k=k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+             && !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data
+             && k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) {
+            *uidlen = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->len;
+            return k->pkt->pkt.user_id->name;
+        }
+    } 
+    /* fixme: returning translatable constants instead of a user ID is 
+     * not good because they are probably not utf-8 encoded. */
+    s = _("[User id not found]");
+    *uidlen = strlen (s);
+    return s;
+}
+
+
+static void
+release_keyid_list ( keyid_list_t k )
+{
+    while (  k ) {
+        keyid_list_t k2 = k->next;
+        m_free (k);
+        k = k2;
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Store the association of keyid and userid
+ * Feed only public keys to this function.
+ */
+static void
+cache_user_id( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    user_id_db_t r;
+    const char *uid;
+    size_t uidlen;
+    keyid_list_t keyids = NULL;
+    KBNODE k;
+
+    for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+             || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            keyid_list_t a = m_alloc_clear ( sizeof *a );
+            /* Hmmm: For a long list of keyids it might be an advantage
+             * to append the keys */
+            keyid_from_pk( k->pkt->pkt.public_key, a->keyid );
+            /* first check for duplicates */
+            for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
+                keyid_list_t b = r->keyids;
+                for ( b = r->keyids; b; b = b->next ) {
+                    if( b->keyid[0] == a->keyid[0]
+                        && b->keyid[1] == a->keyid[1] ) {
+                        if( DBG_CACHE )
+                            log_debug("cache_user_id: already in cache\n");
+                        release_keyid_list ( keyids );
+                        m_free ( a );
+                        return;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            /* now put it into the cache */
+            a->next = keyids;
+            keyids = a;
+        }
+    }
+    if ( !keyids )
+        BUG (); /* No key no fun */
+
+
+    uid = get_primary_uid ( keyblock, &uidlen );
+
+    if( uid_cache_entries >= MAX_UID_CACHE_ENTRIES ) {
+	/* fixme: use another algorithm to free some cache slots */
+	r = user_id_db;
+	user_id_db = r->next;
+        release_keyid_list ( r->keyids );
+	m_free(r);
+	uid_cache_entries--;
+    }
+    r = m_alloc( sizeof *r + uidlen-1 );
+    r->keyids = keyids;
+    r->len = uidlen;
+    memcpy(r->name, uid, r->len);
+    r->next = user_id_db;
+    user_id_db = r;
+    uid_cache_entries++;
+}
+
+
+void
+getkey_disable_caches()
+{
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+    {
+	pk_cache_entry_t ce, ce2;
+
+	for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce2 ) {
+	    ce2 = ce->next;
+	    free_public_key( ce->pk );
+	    m_free( ce );
+	}
+	pk_cache_disabled=1;
+	pk_cache_entries = 0;
+	pk_cache = NULL;
+    }
+#endif
+    /* fixme: disable user id cache ? */
+}
+
+
+static void
+pk_from_block ( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE a = ctx->found_key ? ctx->found_key : keyblock;
+
+    assert ( a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+             ||  a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+     
+    copy_public_key ( pk, a->pkt->pkt.public_key );
+}
+
+static void
+sk_from_block ( GETKEY_CTX ctx,
+                PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE a = ctx->found_key ? ctx->found_key : keyblock;
+
+    assert ( a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+             ||  a->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY );
+     
+    copy_secret_key( sk, a->pkt->pkt.secret_key);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk
+ * can be called with PK set to NULL to just read it into some
+ * internal structures.
+ */
+int
+get_pubkey( PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    int internal = 0;
+    int rc = 0;
+
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+    {	/* Try to get it from the cache */
+	pk_cache_entry_t ce;
+	for( ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next ) {
+	    if( ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
+		if( pk )
+		    copy_public_key( pk, ce->pk );
+		return 0;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+#endif
+    /* more init stuff */
+    if( !pk ) {
+	pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+	internal++;
+    }
+
+
+    /* do a lookup */
+    {	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+        KBNODE kb = NULL;
+	memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+        ctx.exact = 1; /* use the key ID exactly as given */
+	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+        ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
+	ctx.nitems = 1;
+	ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+	ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
+	ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
+        ctx.req_algo  = pk->req_algo;
+        ctx.req_usage = pk->req_usage;
+	rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 0 );
+        if ( !rc ) {
+            pk_from_block ( &ctx, pk, kb );
+        }
+	get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
+        release_kbnode ( kb );
+    }
+    if( !rc )
+	goto leave;
+
+    rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+
+  leave:
+    if( !rc )
+	cache_public_key( pk );
+    if( internal )
+	free_public_key(pk);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk.  This function
+   differs from get_pubkey() in that it does not do a check of the key
+   to avoid recursion.  It should be used only in very certain cases.  */
+int
+get_pubkey_fast (PKT_public_key *pk, u32 *keyid)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+  KBNODE keyblock;
+  
+  assert (pk);
+#if MAX_PK_CACHE_ENTRIES
+  { /* Try to get it from the cache */
+    pk_cache_entry_t ce;
+
+    for (ce = pk_cache; ce; ce = ce->next)
+      {
+        if (ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1])
+          {
+            if (pk)
+              copy_public_key (pk, ce->pk);
+            return 0;
+          }
+      }
+  }
+#endif
+
+  hd = keydb_new (0);
+  rc = keydb_search_kid (hd, keyid);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    {
+      keydb_release (hd);
+      return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+    }
+  rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+  keydb_release (hd);
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+    }
+  
+  assert ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+           ||  keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+  copy_public_key (pk, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key );
+  release_kbnode (keyblock);
+
+  /* Not caching key here since it won't have all of the fields
+     properly set. */
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+KBNODE
+get_pubkeyblock( u32 *keyid )
+{
+    struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+    int rc = 0;
+    KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+
+    memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+    /* no need to set exact here because we want the entire block */
+    ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+    ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
+    ctx.nitems = 1;
+    ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+    ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
+    ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
+    rc = lookup( &ctx, &keyblock, 0 );
+    get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
+
+    return rc ? NULL : keyblock;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get a secret key and store it into sk
+ */
+int
+get_seckey( PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
+{
+    int rc;
+    struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+    KBNODE kb = NULL;
+
+    memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+    ctx.exact = 1; /* use the key ID exactly as given */
+    ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+    ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
+    ctx.nitems = 1;
+    ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+    ctx.items[0].u.kid[0] = keyid[0];
+    ctx.items[0].u.kid[1] = keyid[1];
+    ctx.req_algo  = sk->req_algo;
+    ctx.req_usage = sk->req_usage;
+    rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
+    if ( !rc ) {
+        sk_from_block ( &ctx, sk, kb );
+    }
+    get_seckey_end( &ctx );
+    release_kbnode ( kb );
+
+    if( !rc ) {
+	/* check the secret key (this may prompt for a passprase to
+	 * unlock the secret key
+	 */
+	rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Check whether the secret key is available.  This is just a fast
+ * check and does not tell us whether the secret key is valid.  It
+ * merely tells other whether there is some secret key.
+ * Returns: 0 := key is available
+ * G10ERR_NO_SECKEY := not availabe
+ */
+int
+seckey_available( u32 *keyid )
+{
+    int rc;
+    KEYDB_HANDLE hd = keydb_new (1);
+
+    rc = keydb_search_kid (hd, keyid);
+    if ( rc == -1 )
+        rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+    keydb_release (hd);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Return the type of the user id:
+ *
+ * Please use the constants KEYDB_SERCH_MODE_xxx
+ *  0 = Invalid user ID
+ *  1 = exact match
+ *  2 = match a substring
+ *  3 = match an email address
+ *  4 = match a substring of an email address
+ *  5 = match an email address, but compare from end
+ *  6 = word match mode
+ * 10 = it is a short KEYID (don't care about keyid[0])
+ * 11 = it is a long  KEYID
+ * 12 = it is a trustdb index (keyid is looked up)
+ * 16 = it is a 16 byte fingerprint
+ * 20 = it is a 20 byte fingerprint
+ * 21 = Unified fingerprint :fpr:pk_algo:
+ *      (We don't use pk_algo yet)
+ *
+ * Rules used:
+ * - If the username starts with 8,9,16 or 17 hex-digits (the first one
+ *   must be in the range 0..9), this is considered a keyid; depending
+ *   on the length a short or complete one.
+ * - If the username starts with 32,33,40 or 41 hex-digits (the first one
+ *   must be in the range 0..9), this is considered a fingerprint.
+ * - If the username starts with a left angle, we assume it is a complete
+ *   email address and look only at this part.
+ * - If the username starts with a colon we assume it is a unified 
+ *   key specfification. 
+ * - If the username starts with a '.', we assume it is the ending
+ *   part of an email address
+ * - If the username starts with an '@', we assume it is a part of an
+ *   email address
+ * - If the userid start with an '=' an exact compare is done.
+ * - If the userid starts with a '*' a case insensitive substring search is
+ *   done (This is the default).
+ * - If the userid starts with a '+' we will compare individual words
+ *   and a match requires that all the words are in the userid.
+ *   Words are delimited by white space or "()<>[]{}.@-+_,;/&!"
+ *   (note that you can't search for these characters). Compare
+ *   is not case sensitive.
+ */
+
+int
+classify_user_id( const char *name, KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC *desc )
+{
+    const char *s;
+    int hexprefix = 0;
+    int hexlength;
+    int mode = 0;   
+    KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC dummy_desc;
+
+    if (!desc)
+        desc = &dummy_desc;
+
+    /* clear the structure so that the mode field is set to zero unless
+     * we set it to the correct value right at the end of this function */
+    memset (desc, 0, sizeof *desc);
+
+    /* skip leading spaces.  Fixme: what is with trailing spaces? */
+    for(s = name; *s && isspace(*s); s++ )
+	;
+
+    switch (*s) {
+	case 0:    /* empty string is an error */
+	    return 0;
+
+	case '.':  /* an email address, compare from end */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILEND;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+	case '<':  /* an email address */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAIL;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+	case '@':  /* part of an email address */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_MAILSUB;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+	case '=':  /* exact compare */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_EXACT;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+	case '*':  /* case insensitive substring search */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+	case '+':  /* compare individual words */
+	    mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_WORDS;
+	    s++;
+            desc->u.name = s;
+	    break;
+
+	case '#':  /* local user id */
+            return 0; /* This is now obsolete and van't not be used anymore*/
+        
+        case ':': /*Unified fingerprint */
+            {  
+                const char *se, *si;
+                int i;
+                
+                se = strchr( ++s,':');
+                if ( !se )
+                    return 0;
+                for (i=0,si=s; si < se; si++, i++ ) {
+                    if ( !strchr("01234567890abcdefABCDEF", *si ) )
+                        return 0; /* invalid digit */
+                }
+                if (i != 32 && i != 40)
+                    return 0; /* invalid length of fpr*/
+                for (i=0,si=s; si < se; i++, si +=2) 
+                    desc->u.fpr[i] = hextobyte(si);
+                for ( ; i < 20; i++)
+                    desc->u.fpr[i]= 0;
+                s = se + 1;
+                mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR;
+            } 
+            break;
+           
+	default:
+	    if (s[0] == '0' && s[1] == 'x') {
+		hexprefix = 1;
+		s += 2;
+	    }
+
+	    hexlength = strspn(s, "0123456789abcdefABCDEF");
+            if (hexlength >= 8 && s[hexlength] =='!') {
+		desc->exact = 1;
+                hexlength++; /* just for the following check */
+            }
+
+	    /* check if a hexadecimal number is terminated by EOS or blank */
+	    if (hexlength && s[hexlength] && !isspace(s[hexlength])) {
+		if (hexprefix)	    /* a "0x" prefix without correct */
+		    return 0;	    /* termination is an error */
+		else		    /* The first chars looked like */
+		    hexlength = 0;  /* a hex number, but really were not. */
+	    }
+
+            if (desc->exact)
+                hexlength--;
+
+	    if (hexlength == 8
+                || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 9 && *s == '0')){
+		/* short keyid */
+		if (hexlength == 9)
+		    s++;
+                desc->u.kid[0] = 0;
+                desc->u.kid[1] = strtoul( s, NULL, 16 );
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID;
+	    }
+	    else if (hexlength == 16
+                     || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 17 && *s == '0')) {
+		/* complete keyid */
+		char buf[9];
+		if (hexlength == 17)
+		    s++;
+		mem2str(buf, s, 9 );
+		desc->u.kid[0] = strtoul( buf, NULL, 16 );
+		desc->u.kid[1] = strtoul( s+8, NULL, 16 );
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID;
+	    }
+	    else if (hexlength == 32 || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 33
+							    && *s == '0')) {
+		/* md5 fingerprint */
+		int i;
+		if (hexlength == 33)
+		    s++;
+                memset(desc->u.fpr+16, 0, 4); 
+                for (i=0; i < 16; i++, s+=2) {
+                    int c = hextobyte(s);
+                    if (c == -1)
+                        return 0;
+                    desc->u.fpr[i] = c;
+                }
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16;
+	    }
+	    else if (hexlength == 40 || (!hexprefix && hexlength == 41
+							      && *s == '0')) {
+		/* sha1/rmd160 fingerprint */
+		int i;
+		if (hexlength == 41)
+		    s++;
+                for (i=0; i < 20; i++, s+=2) {
+                    int c = hextobyte(s);
+                    if (c == -1)
+                        return 0;
+                    desc->u.fpr[i] = c;
+                }
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+	    }
+	    else {
+		if (hexprefix)	/* This was a hex number with a prefix */
+		    return 0;	/* and a wrong length */
+
+		desc->exact = 0;
+                desc->u.name = s;
+		mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SUBSTR;   /* default mode */
+	    }
+    }
+
+    desc->mode = mode;
+    return mode;
+}
+
+
+static int
+skip_disabled(void *dummy,u32 *keyid)
+{
+  int rc,disabled=0;
+  PKT_public_key *pk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(PKT_public_key));
+
+  rc = get_pubkey(pk, keyid);
+  if(rc)
+    {
+      log_error("error checking disabled status of %08lX: %s\n",
+ 		(ulong)keyid[1],g10_errstr(rc));
+      goto leave;
+    }
+ 
+  disabled=pk_is_disabled(pk);
+
+ leave:
+  free_public_key(pk);
+  return disabled;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Try to get the pubkey by the userid. This function looks for the
+ * first pubkey certificate which has the given name in a user_id.
+ * if pk/sk has the pubkey algo set, the function will only return
+ * a pubkey with that algo.
+ * The caller should provide storage for either the pk or the sk.
+ * If ret_kb is not NULL the function will return the keyblock there.
+ */
+
+static int
+key_byname( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, STRLIST namelist,
+	    PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+	    int secmode, int include_disabled,
+            KBNODE *ret_kb, KEYDB_HANDLE *ret_kdbhd )
+{
+    int rc = 0;
+    int n;
+    STRLIST r;
+    GETKEY_CTX ctx;
+    KBNODE help_kb = NULL;
+    
+    if( retctx ) {/* reset the returned context in case of error */
+        assert (!ret_kdbhd);  /* not allowed because the handle is
+                                 stored in the context */
+	*retctx = NULL;
+    }
+    if (ret_kdbhd)
+        *ret_kdbhd = NULL;
+
+    /* build the search context */
+    for(n=0, r=namelist; r; r = r->next )
+	n++;
+    ctx = m_alloc_clear (sizeof *ctx + (n-1)*sizeof ctx->items );
+    ctx->nitems = n;
+
+    for(n=0, r=namelist; r; r = r->next, n++ ) {
+	classify_user_id (r->d, &ctx->items[n]);
+        
+        if (ctx->items[n].exact)
+            ctx->exact = 1;
+        if (!ctx->items[n].mode) {
+	    m_free (ctx);
+	    return G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
+	}
+	if(!include_disabled
+ 	   && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_SHORT_KID
+ 	   && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_LONG_KID
+ 	   && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+	   && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20
+	   && ctx->items[n].mode!=KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR)
+ 	  ctx->items[n].skipfnc=skip_disabled;
+    }
+
+    ctx->kr_handle = keydb_new (secmode);
+    if ( !ret_kb ) 
+        ret_kb = &help_kb;
+
+    if( secmode ) {
+        if (sk) {
+            ctx->req_algo  = sk->req_algo;
+            ctx->req_usage = sk->req_usage;
+        }
+	rc = lookup( ctx, ret_kb, 1 );
+        if ( !rc && sk ) {
+            sk_from_block ( ctx, sk, *ret_kb );
+        }
+    }
+    else {
+        if (pk) {
+            ctx->req_algo  = pk->req_algo;
+            ctx->req_usage = pk->req_usage;
+        }
+	rc = lookup( ctx, ret_kb, 0 );
+        if ( !rc && pk ) {
+            pk_from_block ( ctx, pk, *ret_kb );
+        }
+    }
+
+    release_kbnode ( help_kb );
+
+    if (retctx) /* caller wants the context */
+	*retctx = ctx;
+    else {
+        if (ret_kdbhd) {
+            *ret_kdbhd = ctx->kr_handle;
+            ctx->kr_handle = NULL;
+        }
+        get_pubkey_end (ctx);
+    }
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find a public key from NAME and returh the keyblock or the key.
+ * If ret_kdb is not NULL, the KEYDB handle used to locate this keyblock is
+ * returned and the caller is responsible for closing it.
+ */
+int
+get_pubkey_byname (PKT_public_key *pk,
+		   const char *name, KBNODE *ret_keyblock,
+                   KEYDB_HANDLE *ret_kdbhd, int include_disabled ) 
+{
+    int rc;
+    STRLIST namelist = NULL;
+
+    add_to_strlist( &namelist, name );
+    rc = key_byname( NULL, namelist, pk, NULL, 0,
+		     include_disabled, ret_keyblock, ret_kdbhd);
+    free_strlist( namelist );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int
+get_pubkey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, PKT_public_key *pk,
+		    STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
+{
+    return key_byname( retctx, names, pk, NULL, 0, 1, ret_keyblock, NULL);
+}
+
+int
+get_pubkey_next( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_public_key *pk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = lookup( ctx, ret_keyblock, 0 );
+    if ( !rc && pk && ret_keyblock )
+        pk_from_block ( ctx, pk, *ret_keyblock );
+    
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+void
+get_pubkey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx )
+{
+    if( ctx ) {
+        memset (&ctx->kbpos, 0, sizeof ctx->kbpos);
+        keydb_release (ctx->kr_handle);
+	if( !ctx->not_allocated )
+	    m_free( ctx );
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Search for a key with the given fingerprint.
+ * FIXME:
+ * We should replace this with the _byname function.  Thiscsan be done
+ * by creating a userID conforming to the unified fingerprint style. 
+ */
+int
+get_pubkey_byfprint( PKT_public_key *pk,
+                     const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
+	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+        KBNODE kb = NULL;
+
+	memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+        ctx.exact = 1 ;
+	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+        ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
+	ctx.nitems = 1;
+	ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+                                          : KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+	memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
+	rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 0 );
+        if (!rc && pk )
+            pk_from_block ( &ctx, pk, kb );
+        release_kbnode ( kb );
+	get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
+    }
+    else
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/* Get a public key and store it into the allocated pk.  This function
+   differs from get_pubkey_byfprint() in that it does not do a check
+   of the key to avoid recursion.  It should be used only in very
+   certain cases.  PK may be NULL to check just for the existance of
+   the key. */
+int
+get_pubkey_byfprint_fast (PKT_public_key *pk,
+                          const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
+{
+  int rc = 0;
+  KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+  KBNODE keyblock;
+  byte fprbuf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN];
+  int i;
+  
+  for (i=0; i < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN && i < fprint_len; i++)
+    fprbuf[i] = fprint[i];
+  while (i < MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN) 
+    fprbuf[i++] = 0;
+
+  hd = keydb_new (0);
+  rc = keydb_search_fpr (hd, fprbuf);
+  if (rc == -1)
+    {
+      keydb_release (hd);
+      return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+    }
+  rc = keydb_get_keyblock (hd, &keyblock);
+  keydb_release (hd);
+  if (rc) 
+    {
+      log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+      return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+    }
+  
+  assert ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+           ||  keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+  if (pk)
+    copy_public_key (pk, keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key );
+  release_kbnode (keyblock);
+
+  /* Not caching key here since it won't have all of the fields
+     properly set. */
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Search for a key with the given fingerprint and return the
+ * complete keyblock which may have more than only this key.
+ */
+int
+get_keyblock_byfprint( KBNODE *ret_keyblock, const byte *fprint,
+						size_t fprint_len )
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
+	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+
+	memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+        ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (0);
+	ctx.nitems = 1;
+	ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+                                          : KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+	memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
+	rc = lookup( &ctx, ret_keyblock, 0 );
+	get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
+    }
+    else
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Get a secret key by name and store it into sk
+ * If NAME is NULL use the default key
+ */
+static int
+get_seckey_byname2( GETKEY_CTX *retctx,
+                   PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *name, int unprotect,
+                   KBNODE *retblock )
+{
+    STRLIST namelist = NULL;
+    int rc;
+
+    if( !name && opt.def_secret_key && *opt.def_secret_key ) {
+	add_to_strlist( &namelist, opt.def_secret_key );
+	rc = key_byname( retctx, namelist, NULL, sk, 1, 1, retblock, NULL );
+    }
+    else if( !name ) { /* use the first one as default key */
+	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+        KBNODE kb = NULL;
+
+        assert (!retctx ); /* do we need this at all */
+        assert (!retblock);
+	memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+        ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
+	ctx.nitems = 1;
+	ctx.items[0].mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST;
+	rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
+        if (!rc && sk )
+            sk_from_block ( &ctx, sk, kb );
+        release_kbnode ( kb );
+	get_seckey_end( &ctx );
+    }
+    else {
+	add_to_strlist( &namelist, name );
+	rc = key_byname( retctx, namelist, NULL, sk, 1, 1, retblock, NULL );
+    }
+
+    free_strlist( namelist );
+
+    if( !rc && unprotect )
+	rc = check_secret_key( sk, 0 );
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+int 
+get_seckey_byname( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *name, int unlock )
+{
+    return get_seckey_byname2 ( NULL, sk, name, unlock, NULL );
+}
+
+
+int
+get_seckey_bynames( GETKEY_CTX *retctx, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		    STRLIST names, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
+{
+    return key_byname( retctx, names, NULL, sk, 1, 1, ret_keyblock, NULL );
+}
+
+
+int
+get_seckey_next( GETKEY_CTX ctx, PKT_secret_key *sk, KBNODE *ret_keyblock )
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = lookup( ctx, ret_keyblock, 1 );
+    if ( !rc && sk && ret_keyblock )
+        sk_from_block ( ctx, sk, *ret_keyblock );
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+void
+get_seckey_end( GETKEY_CTX ctx )
+{
+    get_pubkey_end( ctx );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Search for a key with the given fingerprint.
+ * FIXME:
+ * We should replace this with the _byname function.  Thiscsan be done
+ * by creating a userID conforming to the unified fingerprint style. 
+ */
+int
+get_seckey_byfprint( PKT_secret_key *sk,
+                     const byte *fprint, size_t fprint_len)
+{
+    int rc;
+
+    if( fprint_len == 20 || fprint_len == 16 ) {
+	struct getkey_ctx_s ctx;
+        KBNODE kb = NULL;
+
+	memset( &ctx, 0, sizeof ctx );
+        ctx.exact = 1 ;
+	ctx.not_allocated = 1;
+        ctx.kr_handle = keydb_new (1);
+	ctx.nitems = 1;
+	ctx.items[0].mode = fprint_len==16? KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR16
+                                          : KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FPR20;
+	memcpy( ctx.items[0].u.fpr, fprint, fprint_len );
+	rc = lookup( &ctx, &kb, 1 );
+        if (!rc && sk )
+            sk_from_block ( &ctx, sk, kb );
+        release_kbnode ( kb );
+	get_pubkey_end( &ctx );
+    }
+    else
+	rc = G10ERR_GENERAL; /* Oops */
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/************************************************
+ ************* Merging stuff ********************
+ ************************************************/
+
+/****************
+ * merge all selfsignatures with the keys.
+ * FIXME: replace this at least for the public key parts
+ *        by merge_selfsigs.
+ *        It is still used in keyedit.c and
+ *        at 2 or 3 other places - check whether it is really needed.
+ *        It might be needed by the key edit and import stuff because
+ *        the keylock is changed.
+ */
+void
+merge_keys_and_selfsig( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+    PKT_secret_key *sk = NULL;
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    KBNODE k;
+    u32 kid[2] = { 0, 0 };
+    u32 sigdate = 0;
+
+    if (keyblock && keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+        /* divert to our new function */
+        merge_selfsigs (keyblock);
+        return;
+    }
+    /* still need the old one because the new one can't handle secret keys */
+
+    for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+	if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+	    || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+	    pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key; sk = NULL;
+	    if( pk->version < 4 )
+		pk = NULL; /* not needed for old keys */
+	    else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+		keyid_from_pk( pk, kid );
+	    else if( !pk->expiredate ) { /* and subkey */
+		/* insert the expiration date here */
+		/*FIXME!!! pk->expiredate = subkeys_expiretime( k, kid );*/
+	    }
+	    sigdate = 0;
+	}
+	else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+	    || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+	    pk = NULL; sk = k->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+	    if( sk->version < 4 )
+		sk = NULL;
+	    else if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY )
+		keyid_from_sk( sk, kid );
+	    sigdate = 0;
+	}
+	else if( (pk || sk ) && k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+		 && (sig=k->pkt->pkt.signature)->sig_class >= 0x10
+		 && sig->sig_class <= 0x30 && sig->version > 3
+		 && !(sig->sig_class == 0x18 || sig->sig_class == 0x28)
+		 && sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1] == kid[1] ) {
+	    /* okay this is a self-signature which can be used.
+	     * This is not used for subkey binding signature, becuase this
+	     * is done above.
+	     * FIXME: We should only use this if the signature is valid
+	     *	      but this is time consuming - we must provide another
+	     *	      way to handle this
+	     */
+	    const byte *p;
+	    u32 ed;
+
+	    p = parse_sig_subpkt( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL );
+	    if( pk ) {
+		ed = p? pk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
+		if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
+		    pk->expiredate = ed;
+		    sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else {
+		ed = p? sk->timestamp + buffer_to_u32(p):0;
+		if( sig->timestamp > sigdate ) {
+		    sk->expiredate = ed;
+		    sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if(pk && (pk->expiredate==0 ||
+		  (pk->max_expiredate && pk->expiredate>pk->max_expiredate)))
+	  pk->expiredate=pk->max_expiredate;
+
+	if(sk && (sk->expiredate==0 ||
+		  (sk->max_expiredate && sk->expiredate>sk->max_expiredate)))
+	  sk->expiredate=sk->max_expiredate;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply information from SIGNODE (which is the valid self-signature
+ * associated with that UID) to the UIDNODE:
+ * - wether the UID has been revoked
+ * - assumed creation date of the UID
+ * - temporary store the keyflags here
+ * - temporary store the key expiration time here
+ * - mark whether the primary user ID flag hat been set.
+ * - store the preferences
+ */
+static void
+fixup_uidnode ( KBNODE uidnode, KBNODE signode, u32 keycreated )
+{
+    PKT_user_id   *uid = uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+    PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+    const byte *p, *sym, *hash, *zip;
+    size_t n, nsym, nhash, nzip;
+
+    uid->created = 0; /* not created == invalid */
+    if ( IS_UID_REV ( sig ) ) {
+        uid->is_revoked = 1;
+        return; /* has been revoked */
+    }
+
+    uid->created = sig->timestamp; /* this one is okay */
+    uid->selfsigversion = sig->version;
+    /* If we got this far, it's not expired :) */
+    uid->is_expired = 0;
+    uid->expiredate = sig->expiredate;
+
+    /* store the key flags in the helper variable for later processing */
+    uid->help_key_usage = 0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, &n );
+    if ( p && n ) {
+        /* first octet of the keyflags */   
+        if ( (*p & 3) )
+            uid->help_key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+        if ( (*p & 12) )    
+            uid->help_key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+        /* Note: we do not set the CERT flag here because it can be assumed
+         * that thre is no real policy to set it. */
+    }
+
+    /* ditto or the key expiration */
+    uid->help_key_expire = 0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
+    if ( p ) { 
+        uid->help_key_expire = keycreated + buffer_to_u32(p);
+    }
+
+    /* Set the primary user ID flag - we will later wipe out some
+     * of them to only have one in our keyblock */
+    uid->is_primary = 0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PRIMARY_UID, NULL );
+    if ( p && *p )
+        uid->is_primary = 2;
+    /* We could also query this from the unhashed area if it is not in
+     * the hased area and then later try to decide which is the better
+     * there should be no security problem with this.
+     * For now we only look at the hashed one. 
+     */
+
+    /* Now build the preferences list.  These must come from the
+       hashed section so nobody can modify the ciphers a key is
+       willing to accept. */
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_SYM, &n );
+    sym = p; nsym = p?n:0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_HASH, &n );
+    hash = p; nhash = p?n:0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt ( sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_PREF_COMPR, &n );
+    zip = p; nzip = p?n:0;
+    if (uid->prefs) 
+        m_free (uid->prefs);
+    n = nsym + nhash + nzip;
+    if (!n)
+        uid->prefs = NULL;
+    else {
+        uid->prefs = m_alloc (sizeof (*uid->prefs) * (n+1));
+        n = 0;
+        for (; nsym; nsym--, n++) {
+            uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_SYM;
+            uid->prefs[n].value = *sym++;
+        }
+        for (; nhash; nhash--, n++) {
+            uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_HASH;
+            uid->prefs[n].value = *hash++;
+        }
+        for (; nzip; nzip--, n++) {
+            uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_ZIP;
+            uid->prefs[n].value = *zip++;
+        }
+        uid->prefs[n].type = PREFTYPE_NONE; /* end of list marker */
+        uid->prefs[n].value = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* see whether we have the MDC feature */
+    uid->mdc_feature = 0;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_FEATURES, &n);
+    if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x01))
+        uid->mdc_feature = 1;
+
+    /* and the keyserver modify flag */
+    uid->ks_modify = 1;
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KS_FLAGS, &n);
+    if (p && n && (p[0] & 0x80))
+        uid->ks_modify = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+merge_selfsigs_main( KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *pk = NULL;
+    KBNODE k;
+    u32 kid[2];
+    u32 sigdate, uiddate, uiddate2;
+    KBNODE signode, uidnode, uidnode2;
+    u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
+    unsigned int key_usage = 0;
+    u32 keytimestamp = 0;
+    u32 key_expire = 0;
+    int key_expire_seen = 0;
+    byte sigversion = 0;
+
+    *r_revoked = 0;
+    if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY )
+        BUG ();
+    pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    keytimestamp = pk->timestamp;
+
+    keyid_from_pk( pk, kid );
+    pk->main_keyid[0] = kid[0];
+    pk->main_keyid[1] = kid[1];
+
+    if ( pk->version < 4 ) {
+        /* before v4 the key packet itself contains the expiration
+         * date and there was no way to change it, so we start with
+         * the one from the key packet */
+        key_expire = pk->max_expiredate;
+        key_expire_seen = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* first pass: find the latest direct key self-signature.
+     * We assume that the newest one overrides all others
+     */
+
+    /* In case this key was already merged */
+    m_free(pk->revkey);
+    pk->revkey=NULL;
+    pk->numrevkeys=0;
+
+    signode = NULL;
+    sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature */
+    for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+            PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+            if ( sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==kid[1] ) { 
+           	if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
+                    ; /* signature did not verify */
+                else if ( IS_KEY_REV (sig) ){
+                    /* key has been revoked - there is no way to override
+                     * such a revocation, so we theoretically can stop now.
+                     * We should not cope with expiration times for revocations
+                     * here because we have to assume that an attacker can
+                     * generate all kinds of signatures.  However due to the
+                     * fact that the key has been revoked it does not harm
+                     * either and by continuing we gather some more info on 
+                     * that key.
+                     */ 
+                    *r_revoked = 1;
+                }
+                else if ( IS_KEY_SIG (sig) ) {
+		  /* Add any revocation keys onto the pk.  This is
+		     particularly interesting since we normally only
+		     get data from the most recent 1F signature, but
+		     you need multiple 1F sigs to properly handle
+		     revocation keys (PGP does it this way, and a
+		     revocation key could be sensitive and hence in a
+		     different signature). */
+		  if(sig->revkey) {
+		    int i;
+
+		    pk->revkey=
+		      m_realloc(pk->revkey,sizeof(struct revocation_key)*
+				(pk->numrevkeys+sig->numrevkeys));
+
+		    for(i=0;i<sig->numrevkeys;i++)
+		      memcpy(&pk->revkey[pk->numrevkeys++],
+			     sig->revkey[i],
+			     sizeof(struct revocation_key));
+		  }
+
+		  if( sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
+		    if(sig->flags.expired)
+                        ; /* signature has expired - ignore it */
+                    else {
+                        sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+                        signode = k;
+			if( sig->version > sigversion )
+			  sigversion = sig->version;
+
+		    }
+		  }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Remove dupes from the revocation keys */
+
+    if(pk->revkey)
+      {
+	int i,j,x,changed=0;
+
+	for(i=0;i<pk->numrevkeys;i++)
+	  {
+	    for(j=i+1;j<pk->numrevkeys;j++)
+	      {
+		if(memcmp(&pk->revkey[i],&pk->revkey[j],
+			  sizeof(struct revocation_key))==0)
+		  {
+		    /* remove j */
+
+		    for(x=j;x<pk->numrevkeys-1;x++)
+		      pk->revkey[x]=pk->revkey[x+1];
+
+		    pk->numrevkeys--;
+		    j--;
+		    changed=1;
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+
+	if(changed)
+	  pk->revkey=m_realloc(pk->revkey,
+			       pk->numrevkeys*sizeof(struct revocation_key));
+      }
+
+    if ( signode ) {
+        /* some information from a direct key signature take precedence
+         * over the same information given in UID sigs.
+         */
+        PKT_signature *sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+        const byte *p;
+        size_t n;
+        
+        p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, &n );
+        if ( p && n ) {
+            /* first octet of the keyflags */   
+            if ( (*p & 3) )
+                key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+            if ( (*p & 12) )    
+                key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+        }
+
+	p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
+	if ( p ) {
+	  key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
+	  key_expire_seen = 1;
+        }
+
+        /* mark that key as valid: one direct key signature should 
+         * render a key as valid */
+        pk->is_valid = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* pass 1.5: look for key revocation signatures that were not made
+       by the key (i.e. did a revocation key issue a revocation for
+       us?).  Only bother to do this if there is a revocation key in
+       the first place. */
+
+    if(pk->revkey)
+      for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID; k = k->next )
+	{
+	  if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE )
+	    {
+	      PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+
+	      if(IS_KEY_REV(sig) &&
+		 (sig->keyid[0]!=kid[0] || sig->keyid[1]!=kid[1]))
+		{ 
+		  /* Failure here means the sig did not verify, is was
+		     not issued by a revocation key, or a revocation
+		     key loop was broken. */
+
+		  if(check_revocation_keys(pk,sig)==0)
+		    *r_revoked=1;
+
+		  /* In the future handle subkey and cert revocations?
+                     PGP doesn't, but it's in 2440. */
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+    /* second pass: look at the self-signature of all user IDs */
+    signode = uidnode = NULL;
+    sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature in one user ID */
+    for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next ) {
+	if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+            if ( uidnode && signode ) 
+	      {
+                fixup_uidnode ( uidnode, signode, keytimestamp );
+		pk->is_valid=1;
+	      }
+            uidnode = k;
+            signode = NULL;
+            sigdate = 0;
+      	}
+        else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode ) {
+            PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+            if ( sig->keyid[0] == kid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==kid[1] ) { 
+                if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
+                    ; /* signature did not verify */
+                else if ( (IS_UID_SIG (sig) || IS_UID_REV (sig))
+                          && sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
+                    /* Note: we allow to invalidate cert revocations
+                     * by a newer signature.  An attacker can't use this
+                     * because a key should be revoced with a key revocation.
+                     * The reason why we have to allow for that is that at
+                     * one time an email address may become invalid but later
+                     * the same email address may become valid again (hired,
+                     * fired, hired again).
+                     */
+		    if(sig->flags.expired) {
+		      /* Expired uids don't get to be primary unless
+                         they are the only uid there is. */
+		      uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=0;
+		      uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired=1;
+		      uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->expiredate=sig->expiredate;
+		    }
+                    else {
+                        sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+                        signode = k;
+			if( sig->version > sigversion )
+			  sigversion = sig->version;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    if ( uidnode && signode ) {
+        fixup_uidnode ( uidnode, signode, keytimestamp );
+        pk->is_valid = 1;
+    }
+
+    /* If the key isn't valid yet, and we have
+       --allow-non-selfsigned-uid set, then force it valid. */
+    if(!pk->is_valid && opt.allow_non_selfsigned_uid)
+      {
+	if(opt.verbose)
+	  log_info(_("Invalid key %08lX made valid by "
+		     "--allow-non-selfsigned-uid\n"),
+		   (ulong)keyid_from_pk(pk,NULL));
+
+	pk->is_valid = 1;
+      }
+
+    /* The key STILL isn't valid, so try and find an ultimately
+       trusted signature. */
+    if(!pk->is_valid)
+      {
+	uidnode=NULL;
+
+	for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k=k->next)
+	  {
+	    if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+	      uidnode = k;
+	    else if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && uidnode )
+	      {
+		PKT_signature *sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+		u32 dummy;
+		int dum2;
+
+		if(sig->keyid[0] != kid[0] || sig->keyid[1]!=kid[1])
+		  {
+		    PKT_public_key *ultimate_pk;
+
+		    ultimate_pk=m_alloc_clear(sizeof(*ultimate_pk));
+
+                    /* We don't want to use the full get_pubkey to
+                       avoid infinite recursion in certain cases.
+                       There is no reason to check that an ultimately
+                       trusted key is still valid - if it has been
+                       revoked or the user should also renmove the
+                       ultimate trust flag.  */
+		    if(get_pubkey_fast(ultimate_pk,sig->keyid)==0
+		       && check_key_signature2(keyblock,k,ultimate_pk,
+					       NULL,&dummy,&dum2)==0
+		       && get_ownertrust(ultimate_pk)==TRUST_ULTIMATE)
+		      {
+			free_public_key(ultimate_pk);
+			pk->is_valid=1;
+			break;
+		      }
+
+		    free_public_key(ultimate_pk);
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+
+    /* Record the highest selfsig version so we know if this is a v3
+       key through and through, or a v3 key with a v4 selfsig
+       somewhere.  This is useful in a few places to know if the key
+       must be treated as PGP2-style or OpenPGP-style.  Note that a
+       selfsig revocation with a higher version number will also raise
+       this value.  This is okay since such a revocation must be
+       issued by the user (i.e. it cannot be issued by someone else to
+       modify the key behavior.) */
+
+    pk->selfsigversion=sigversion;
+
+    /* Now that we had a look at all user IDs we can now get some information
+     * from those user IDs.
+     */
+    
+    if ( !key_usage ) {
+        /* find the latest user ID with key flags set */
+        uiddate = 0; /* helper to find the latest user ID */
+        for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+            k = k->next ) {
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+                PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+                if ( uid->help_key_usage && uid->created > uiddate ) {
+                    key_usage = uid->help_key_usage;
+                    uiddate = uid->created;
+                }
+            }
+      	}
+    }
+    if ( !key_usage ) { /* no key flags at all: get it from the algo */
+        key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( pk->pubkey_algo );
+    }
+    else { /* check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo */
+        int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( pk->pubkey_algo );
+        if ( x ) /* mask it down to the actual allowed usage */
+            key_usage &= x; 
+    }
+    pk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
+
+    if ( !key_expire_seen ) {
+        /* find the latest valid user ID with a key expiration set 
+         * Note, that this may be a different one from the above because
+         * some user IDs may have no expiration date set */
+        uiddate = 0; 
+        for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+            k = k->next ) {
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
+                PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+                if ( uid->help_key_expire && uid->created > uiddate ) {
+                    key_expire = uid->help_key_expire;
+                    uiddate = uid->created;
+                }
+            }
+      	}
+    }
+
+    /* Currently only v3 keys have a maximum expiration date, but I'll
+       bet v5 keys get this feature again. */
+    if(key_expire==0 || (pk->max_expiredate && key_expire>pk->max_expiredate))
+      key_expire=pk->max_expiredate;
+
+    pk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
+    pk->expiredate = key_expire;
+
+    /* Fixme: we should see how to get rid of the expiretime fields  but
+     * this needs changes at other places too. */
+
+    /* and now find the real primary user ID and delete all others */
+    uiddate = uiddate2 = 0;
+    uidnode = uidnode2 = NULL;
+    for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+	     !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) {
+            PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+            if (uid->is_primary)
+	      {
+		if(uid->created > uiddate)
+		  {
+		    uiddate = uid->created;
+		    uidnode = k;
+		  }
+		else if(uid->created==uiddate && uidnode)
+		  {
+		    /* The dates are equal, so we need to do a
+		       different (and arbitrary) comparison.  This
+		       should rarely, if ever, happen.  It's good to
+		       try and guarantee that two different GnuPG
+		       users with two different keyrings at least pick
+		       the same primary. */
+		    if(cmp_user_ids(uid,uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id)>0)
+		      uidnode=k;
+		  }
+	      }
+	    else
+	      {
+		if(uid->created > uiddate2)
+		  {
+		    uiddate2 = uid->created;
+		    uidnode2 = k;
+		  }
+		else if(uid->created==uiddate2 && uidnode2)
+		  {
+		    if(cmp_user_ids(uid,uidnode2->pkt->pkt.user_id)>0)
+		      uidnode2=k;
+		  }
+	      }
+        }
+    }
+    if ( uidnode ) {
+        for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+            k = k->next ) {
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID &&
+		 !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) {
+                PKT_user_id *uid = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+                if ( k != uidnode ) 
+                    uid->is_primary = 0;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    else if( uidnode2 ) {
+        /* none is flagged primary - use the latest user ID we have,
+	   and disambiguate with the arbitrary packet comparison. */
+        uidnode2->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary = 1;
+    }
+    else
+      {
+	/* None of our uids were self-signed, so pick the one that
+	   sorts first to be the primary.  This is the best we can do
+	   here since there are no self sigs to date the uids. */
+
+	uidnode = NULL;
+
+	for(k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+	    k = k->next )
+	  {
+	    if(k->pkt->pkttype==PKT_USER_ID
+	       && !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data)
+	      {
+		if(!uidnode)
+		  {
+		    uidnode=k;
+		    uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=1;
+		    continue;
+		  }
+		else
+		  {
+		    if(cmp_user_ids(k->pkt->pkt.user_id,
+				    uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id)>0)
+		      {
+			uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=0;
+			uidnode=k;
+			uidnode->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=1;
+		      }
+		    else
+		      k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary=0; /* just to be
+							    safe */
+		  }
+	      }
+	  }
+      }
+}
+
+
+static void
+merge_selfsigs_subkey( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE subnode )
+{
+    PKT_public_key *mainpk = NULL, *subpk = NULL;
+    PKT_signature *sig;
+    KBNODE k;
+    u32 mainkid[2];
+    u32 sigdate = 0;
+    KBNODE signode;
+    u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
+    unsigned int key_usage = 0;
+    u32 keytimestamp = 0;
+    u32 key_expire = 0;
+    const byte *p;
+    size_t n;
+
+    if ( subnode->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+        BUG ();
+    mainpk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    if ( mainpk->version < 4 )
+        return; /* (actually this should never happen) */
+    keyid_from_pk( mainpk, mainkid );
+    subpk = subnode->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    keytimestamp = subpk->timestamp;
+
+    subpk->is_valid = 0;
+    subpk->main_keyid[0] = mainpk->main_keyid[0];
+    subpk->main_keyid[1] = mainpk->main_keyid[1];
+
+    /* find the latest key binding self-signature. */
+    signode = NULL;
+    sigdate = 0; /* helper to find the latest signature */
+    for(k=subnode->next; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+                                                        k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
+            sig = k->pkt->pkt.signature;
+            if ( sig->keyid[0] == mainkid[0] && sig->keyid[1]==mainkid[1] ) { 
+           	if ( check_key_signature( keyblock, k, NULL ) )
+                    ; /* signature did not verify */
+                else if ( IS_SUBKEY_REV (sig) ) {
+		  /* Note that this means that the date on a
+                     revocation sig does not matter - even if the
+                     binding sig is dated after the revocation sig,
+                     the subkey is still marked as revoked.  This
+                     seems ok, as it is just as easy to make new
+                     subkeys rather than re-sign old ones as the
+                     problem is in the distribution.  Plus, PGP (7)
+                     does this the same way.  */
+                    subpk->is_revoked = 1;
+                    /* although we could stop now, we continue to 
+                     * figure out other information like the old expiration
+                     * time */
+                }
+                else if ( IS_SUBKEY_SIG (sig) && sig->timestamp >= sigdate ) {
+		    if(sig->flags.expired)
+                        ; /* signature has expired - ignore it */
+                    else {
+                        sigdate = sig->timestamp;
+                        signode = k;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ( !signode ) {
+        return;  /* no valid key binding */
+    }
+
+    subpk->is_valid = 1;
+    sig = signode->pkt->pkt.signature;
+        
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_FLAGS, &n );
+    if ( p && n ) {
+        /* first octet of the keyflags */   
+        if ( (*p & 3) )
+            key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+        if ( (*p & 12) )    
+            key_usage |= PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+    }
+    if ( !key_usage ) { /* no key flags at all: get it from the algo */
+        key_usage = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( subpk->pubkey_algo );
+    }
+    else { /* check that the usage matches the usage as given by the algo */
+        int x = openpgp_pk_algo_usage ( subpk->pubkey_algo );
+        if ( x ) /* mask it down to the actual allowed usage */
+            key_usage &= x; 
+    }
+    subpk->pubkey_usage = key_usage;
+    
+    p = parse_sig_subpkt (sig->hashed, SIGSUBPKT_KEY_EXPIRE, NULL);
+    if ( p ) 
+        key_expire = keytimestamp + buffer_to_u32(p);
+    else
+        key_expire = 0;
+    subpk->has_expired = key_expire >= curtime? 0 : key_expire;
+    subpk->expiredate = key_expire;
+}
+
+
+
+/* 
+ * Merge information from the self-signatures with the key, so that
+ * we can later use them more easy.
+ * The function works by first applying the self signatures to the
+ * primary key and the to each subkey.
+ * Here are the rules we use to decide which inormation from which
+ * self-signature is used:
+ * We check all self signatures or validity and ignore all invalid signatures.
+ * All signatures are then ordered by their creation date ....
+ * For the primary key:
+ *   FIXME the docs    
+ */
+static void
+merge_selfsigs( KBNODE keyblock )
+{
+    KBNODE k;
+    int revoked;
+    PKT_public_key *main_pk;
+    prefitem_t *prefs;
+    int mdc_feature;
+
+    if ( keyblock->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+        if (keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) {
+            log_error ("expected public key but found secret key "
+                       "- must stop\n");
+            /* we better exit here becuase a public key is expected at
+               other places too.  FIXME: Figure this out earlier and
+               don't get to here at all */
+            g10_exit (1);
+        }
+        BUG ();
+    }
+
+    merge_selfsigs_main ( keyblock, &revoked );
+
+    /* now merge in the data from each of the subkeys */
+    for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+	if (  k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            merge_selfsigs_subkey ( keyblock, k );
+        }
+    }
+
+    main_pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+    if ( revoked || main_pk->has_expired || !main_pk->is_valid ) {
+        /* if the primary key is revoked, expired, or invalid we
+         * better set the appropriate flags on that key and all
+         * subkeys */
+        for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+                || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+                PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+		if(!main_pk->is_valid)
+		  pk->is_valid = 0;
+		if(revoked)
+		  pk->is_revoked = 1;
+                if(main_pk->has_expired)
+		  pk->has_expired = main_pk->has_expired;
+            }
+	}
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* set the preference list of all keys to those of the primary real
+     * user ID.  Note: we use these preferences when we don't know by
+     * which user ID the key has been selected.
+     * fixme: we should keep atoms of commonly used preferences or
+     * use reference counting to optimize the preference lists storage.
+     * FIXME: it might be better to use the intersection of 
+     * all preferences.
+     * Do a similar thing for the MDC feature flag.
+     */
+    prefs = NULL;
+    mdc_feature = 0;
+    for (k=keyblock; k && k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY; k = k->next) {
+        if (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+	    && !k->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data
+            && k->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary) {
+            prefs = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->prefs;
+            mdc_feature = k->pkt->pkt.user_id->mdc_feature;
+            break;
+        }
+    }    
+    for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+        if ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+             || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            PKT_public_key *pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+            if (pk->prefs)
+                m_free (pk->prefs);
+            pk->prefs = copy_prefs (prefs);
+            pk->mdc_feature = mdc_feature;
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Merge the secret keys from secblock into the pubblock thereby
+ * replacing the public (sub)keys with their secret counterparts Hmmm:
+ * It might be better to get away from the concept of entire secret
+ * keys at all and have a way to store just the real secret parts
+ * from the key.
+ */
+static void
+merge_public_with_secret ( KBNODE pubblock, KBNODE secblock )
+{
+    KBNODE pub;
+
+    assert ( pubblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    assert ( secblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    
+    for (pub=pubblock; pub; pub = pub->next ) {
+        if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) {
+             PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+             PKT_secret_key *sk = secblock->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+             assert ( pub == pubblock ); /* only in the first node */
+             /* there is nothing to compare in this case, so just replace
+              * some information */
+             copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
+             free_public_key ( pk );
+             pub->pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_KEY;
+             pub->pkt->pkt.secret_key = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
+        }
+        else if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            KBNODE sec;
+            PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+            /* this is more complicated: it may happen that the sequence
+             * of the subkeys dosn't match, so we have to find the
+             * appropriate secret key */
+            for (sec=secblock->next; sec; sec = sec->next ) {
+                if ( sec->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+                    PKT_secret_key *sk = sec->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+                    if ( !cmp_public_secret_key ( pk, sk ) ) {
+                        copy_public_parts_to_secret_key ( pk, sk );
+                        free_public_key ( pk );
+                        pub->pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY;
+                        pub->pkt->pkt.secret_key = copy_secret_key (NULL, sk);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if ( !sec ) 
+                BUG(); /* already checked in premerge */
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/* This function checks that for every public subkey a corresponding
+ * secret subkey is available and deletes the public subkey otherwise.
+ * We need this function because we can't delete it later when we
+ * actually merge the secret parts into the pubring.
+ * The function also plays some games with the node flags.
+ */
+static void
+premerge_public_with_secret ( KBNODE pubblock, KBNODE secblock )
+{
+    KBNODE last, pub;
+
+    assert ( pubblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+    assert ( secblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY );
+    
+    for (pub=pubblock,last=NULL; pub; last = pub, pub = pub->next ) {
+        pub->flag &= ~3; /* reset bits 0 and 1 */
+        if ( pub->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) {
+            KBNODE sec;
+            PKT_public_key *pk = pub->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+
+            for (sec=secblock->next; sec; sec = sec->next ) {
+                if ( sec->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) {
+                    PKT_secret_key *sk = sec->pkt->pkt.secret_key;
+                    if ( !cmp_public_secret_key ( pk, sk ) ) {
+                        if ( sk->protect.s2k.mode == 1001 ) {
+                            /* The secret parts are not available so
+                               we can't use that key for signing etc.
+                               Fix the pubkey usage */
+                            pk->pubkey_usage &= ~PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG;
+                        }
+                        /* transfer flag bits 0 and 1 to the pubblock */
+                        pub->flag |= (sec->flag &3);
+                        break;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+            if ( !sec ) {
+                KBNODE next, ll;
+
+                if (opt.verbose)
+                  log_info ( _("no secret subkey "
+                               "for public subkey %08lX - ignoring\n"),  
+                           (ulong)keyid_from_pk (pk,NULL) );
+                /* we have to remove the subkey in this case */
+                assert ( last );
+                /* find the next subkey */
+                for (next=pub->next,ll=pub;
+                     next && pub->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY;
+                     ll = next, next = next->next ) 
+                    ;
+                /* make new link */
+                last->next = next;
+                /* release this public subkey with all sigs */
+                ll->next = NULL;
+                release_kbnode( pub );
+                /* let the loop continue */
+                pub = last;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    /* We need to copy the found bits (0 and 1) from the secret key to
+       the public key.  This has already been done for the subkeys but
+       got lost on the primary key - fix it here *. */
+    pubblock->flag |= (secblock->flag & 3);
+}
+
+
+
+
+/* See see whether the key fits
+ * our requirements and in case we do not
+ * request the primary key, we should select
+ * a suitable subkey.
+ * FIXME: Check against PGP 7 whether we still need a kludge
+ *        to favor type 16 keys over type 20 keys when type 20
+ *        has not been explitely requested.
+ * Returns: True when a suitable key has been found.
+ *
+ * We have to distinguish four cases:  FIXME!
+ *  1. No usage and no primary key requested
+ *     Examples for this case are that we have a keyID to be used
+ *     for decrytion or verification.
+ *  2. No usage but primary key requested
+ *     This is the case for all functions which work on an
+ *     entire keyblock, e.g. for editing or listing
+ *  3. Usage and primary key requested
+ *     FXME
+ *  4. Usage but no primary key requested
+ *     FIXME
+ * FIXME: Tell what is going to happen here and something about the rationale
+ * Note: We don't use this function if no specific usage is requested;
+ *       This way the getkey functions can be used for plain key listings.
+ *
+ * CTX ist the keyblock we are investigating, if FOUNDK is not NULL this
+ * is the key we actually found by looking at the keyid or a fingerprint and
+ * may eitehr point to the primary or one of the subkeys.
+ */
+
+static int
+finish_lookup (GETKEY_CTX ctx)
+{
+    KBNODE keyblock = ctx->keyblock;
+    KBNODE k;
+    KBNODE foundk = NULL;
+    PKT_user_id *foundu = NULL;
+#define USAGE_MASK  (PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC)
+    unsigned int req_usage = ( ctx->req_usage & USAGE_MASK );
+    /* Request the primary if we're certifying another key, and also
+       if signing data while --pgp6 or --pgp7 is on since pgp 6 and 7
+       do not understand signatures made by a signing subkey.  PGP 8
+       does. */
+    int req_prim = (ctx->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_CERT) ||
+      ((PGP6 || PGP7) && (ctx->req_usage & PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG));
+    u32 latest_date;
+    KBNODE latest_key;
+    u32 curtime = make_timestamp ();
+
+    assert( keyblock->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY );
+   
+    ctx->found_key = NULL;
+
+    if (ctx->exact) {
+        for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next) {
+            if ( (k->flag & 1) ) {
+                assert ( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY
+                         || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY );
+                foundk = k;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (k=keyblock; k; k = k->next) {
+        if ( (k->flag & 2) ) {
+            assert (k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID);
+            foundu = k->pkt->pkt.user_id;
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+
+    if ( DBG_CACHE )
+        log_debug( "finish_lookup: checking key %08lX (%s)(req_usage=%x)\n",
+                   (ulong)keyid_from_pk( keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
+                   foundk? "one":"all", req_usage);
+
+    if (!req_usage) {
+        latest_key = foundk? foundk:keyblock;
+        goto found;
+    }
+    
+    if (!req_usage) {
+        PKT_public_key *pk = foundk->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+        if (pk->user_id)
+            free_user_id (pk->user_id);
+        pk->user_id = scopy_user_id (foundu);
+        ctx->found_key = foundk;
+        cache_user_id( keyblock );
+        return 1; /* found */
+    }
+    
+    latest_date = 0;
+    latest_key  = NULL;
+    /* do not look at subkeys if a certification key is requested */
+    if ((!foundk || foundk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY) && !req_prim) {
+        KBNODE nextk;
+        /* either start a loop or check just this one subkey */
+        for (k=foundk?foundk:keyblock; k; k = nextk ) {
+            PKT_public_key *pk;
+            nextk = k->next;
+            if ( k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY )
+                continue;
+            if ( foundk )
+                nextk = NULL;  /* what a hack */
+            pk = k->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tchecking subkey %08lX\n",
+                           (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL));
+            if ( !pk->is_valid ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tsubkey not valid\n");
+                continue;
+            }
+            if ( pk->is_revoked ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tsubkey has been revoked\n");
+                continue;
+            }
+            if ( pk->has_expired ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tsubkey has expired\n");
+                continue;
+            }
+            if ( pk->timestamp > curtime && !opt.ignore_valid_from ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tsubkey not yet valid\n");
+                continue;
+            }
+            
+            if ( !((pk->pubkey_usage&USAGE_MASK) & req_usage) ) {
+                if (DBG_CACHE)
+                    log_debug( "\tusage does not match: want=%x have=%x\n",
+                               req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage );
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tsubkey looks fine\n");
+            if ( pk->timestamp > latest_date ) {
+                latest_date = pk->timestamp;
+                latest_key  = k;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* Okay now try the primary key unless we want an exact 
+     * key ID match on a subkey */
+    if ((!latest_key && !(ctx->exact && foundk != keyblock)) || req_prim) {
+        PKT_public_key *pk;
+        if (DBG_CACHE && !foundk && !req_prim )
+            log_debug( "\tno suitable subkeys found - trying primary\n");
+        pk = keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+        if ( !pk->is_valid ) {
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key not valid\n");
+        }
+        else if ( pk->is_revoked ) {
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key has been revoked\n");
+        }
+        else if ( pk->has_expired ) {
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key has expired\n");
+        }
+        else  if ( !((pk->pubkey_usage&USAGE_MASK) & req_usage) ) {
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key usage does not match: "
+                           "want=%x have=%x\n",
+                           req_usage, pk->pubkey_usage );
+        }
+        else { /* okay */
+            if (DBG_CACHE)
+                log_debug( "\tprimary key may be used\n");
+            latest_key = keyblock;
+            latest_date = pk->timestamp;
+        }
+    }
+    
+    if ( !latest_key ) {
+        if (DBG_CACHE)
+            log_debug("\tno suitable key found -  giving up\n");
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+ found:
+    if (DBG_CACHE)
+        log_debug( "\tusing key %08lX\n",
+                (ulong)keyid_from_pk( latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL) );
+
+    if (latest_key) {
+        PKT_public_key *pk = latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key;
+        if (pk->user_id)
+            free_user_id (pk->user_id);
+        pk->user_id = scopy_user_id (foundu);
+    }    
+        
+    ctx->found_key = latest_key;
+
+    if (latest_key != keyblock && opt.verbose) {
+        log_info(_("using secondary key %08lX "
+                   "instead of primary key %08lX\n"),
+                 (ulong)keyid_from_pk( latest_key->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL),
+                 (ulong)keyid_from_pk( keyblock->pkt->pkt.public_key, NULL) );
+    }
+
+    cache_user_id( keyblock );
+    
+    return 1; /* found */
+}
+
+
+static int
+lookup( GETKEY_CTX ctx, KBNODE *ret_keyblock, int secmode )
+{
+    int rc;
+    KBNODE secblock = NULL; /* helper */
+    int no_suitable_key = 0;
+    
+    rc = 0;
+    while (!(rc = keydb_search (ctx->kr_handle, ctx->items, ctx->nitems))) {
+        /* If we are searching for the first key we have to make sure
+           that the next interation does not no an implicit reset.
+           This can be triggered by an empty key ring. */
+        if (ctx->nitems && ctx->items->mode == KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_FIRST)
+            ctx->items->mode = KEYDB_SEARCH_MODE_NEXT;
+
+        rc = keydb_get_keyblock (ctx->kr_handle, &ctx->keyblock);
+        if (rc) {
+            log_error ("keydb_get_keyblock failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+            rc = 0;
+            goto skip;
+        }
+                       
+        if ( secmode ) {
+            /* find the correspondig public key and use this 
+             * this one for the selection process */
+            u32 aki[2];
+            KBNODE k = ctx->keyblock;
+            
+            if (k->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SECRET_KEY)
+                BUG();
+
+            keyid_from_sk (k->pkt->pkt.secret_key, aki);
+            k = get_pubkeyblock (aki);
+            if( !k ) {
+                if (!opt.quiet)
+                    log_info(_("key %08lX: secret key without public key "
+                               "- skipped\n"),  (ulong)aki[1] );
+                goto skip;
+            }
+            secblock = ctx->keyblock;
+            ctx->keyblock = k;
+
+            premerge_public_with_secret ( ctx->keyblock, secblock );
+        }
+
+        /* warning: node flag bits 0 and 1 should be preserved by
+         * merge_selfsigs.  For secret keys, premerge did tranfer the
+         * keys to the keyblock */
+        merge_selfsigs ( ctx->keyblock );
+        if ( finish_lookup (ctx) ) {
+            no_suitable_key = 0;
+            if ( secmode ) {
+                merge_public_with_secret ( ctx->keyblock,
+                                           secblock);
+                release_kbnode (secblock);
+                secblock = NULL;
+            }
+            goto found;
+        }
+        else
+            no_suitable_key = 1;
+        
+      skip:
+        /* release resources and continue search */
+        if ( secmode ) {
+            release_kbnode( secblock );
+            secblock = NULL;
+        }
+        release_kbnode( ctx->keyblock );
+        ctx->keyblock = NULL;
+    }
+
+  found:
+    if( rc && rc != -1 )
+	log_error("keydb_search failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+
+    if( !rc ) {
+        *ret_keyblock = ctx->keyblock; /* return the keyblock */
+        ctx->keyblock = NULL;
+    }
+    else if (rc == -1 && no_suitable_key)
+        rc = secmode ? G10ERR_UNU_SECKEY : G10ERR_UNU_PUBKEY;
+    else if( rc == -1 )
+	rc = secmode ? G10ERR_NO_SECKEY : G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+
+    if ( secmode ) {
+        release_kbnode( secblock );
+        secblock = NULL;
+    }
+    release_kbnode( ctx->keyblock );
+    ctx->keyblock = NULL;
+
+    ctx->last_rc = rc;
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * FIXME: Replace by the generic function 
+ *        It does not work as it is right now - it is used at 
+ *        2 places:  a) to get the key for an anonyous recipient
+ *                   b) to get the ultimately trusted keys.
+ *        The a) usage might have some problems.
+ *
+ * set with_subkeys true to include subkeys
+ * set with_spm true to include secret-parts-missing keys
+ *
+ * Enumerate all primary secret keys.  Caller must use these procedure:
+ *  1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
+ *  2) pass this void pointer by reference to this function
+ *     and provide space for the secret key (pass a buffer for sk)
+ *  3) call this function as long as it does not return -1
+ *     to indicate EOF.
+ *  4) Always call this function a last time with SK set to NULL,
+ *     so that can free it's context.
+ */
+int
+enum_secret_keys( void **context, PKT_secret_key *sk,
+		  int with_subkeys, int with_spm )
+{
+    int rc=0;
+    struct {
+	int eof;
+        int first;
+	KEYDB_HANDLE hd;
+        KBNODE keyblock;
+        KBNODE node;
+    } *c = *context;
+
+
+    if( !c ) { /* make a new context */
+	c = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *c );
+	*context = c;
+	c->hd = keydb_new (1);
+        c->first = 1;
+        c->keyblock = NULL;
+        c->node = NULL;
+    }
+
+    if( !sk ) { /* free the context */
+        keydb_release (c->hd);
+        release_kbnode (c->keyblock);
+	m_free( c );
+	*context = NULL;
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    if( c->eof )
+	return -1;
+
+    do {
+        /* get the next secret key from the current keyblock */
+        for (; c->node; c->node = c->node->next) {
+            if ((c->node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY
+                || (with_subkeys
+                    && c->node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY) )
+		&& !(c->node->pkt->pkt.secret_key->protect.s2k.mode==1001
+		     && !with_spm)) {
+                copy_secret_key (sk, c->node->pkt->pkt.secret_key );
+                c->node = c->node->next;
+                return 0; /* found */
+            }
+        }
+        release_kbnode (c->keyblock);
+        c->keyblock = c->node = NULL;
+        
+        rc = c->first? keydb_search_first (c->hd) : keydb_search_next (c->hd);
+        c->first = 0;
+        if (rc) {
+            keydb_release (c->hd); c->hd = NULL;
+            c->eof = 1;
+            return -1; /* eof */
+        }
+        
+        rc = keydb_get_keyblock (c->hd, &c->keyblock);
+        c->node = c->keyblock;
+    } while (!rc);
+
+    return rc; /* error */
+}
+
+
+
+/*********************************************
+ ***********  user ID printing helpers *******
+ *********************************************/
+
+/****************
+ * Return a string with a printable representation of the user_id.
+ * this string must be freed by m_free.
+ */
+char*
+get_user_id_string( u32 *keyid )
+{
+    user_id_db_t r;
+    char *p;
+    int pass=0;
+    /* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
+    do {
+	for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
+            keyid_list_t a;
+            for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
+                if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
+                    p = m_alloc( r->len + 10 );
+                    sprintf(p, "%08lX %.*s",
+                            (ulong)keyid[1], r->len, r->name );
+                    return p;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
+    p = m_alloc( 15 );
+    sprintf(p, "%08lX [?]", (ulong)keyid[1] );
+    return p;
+}
+
+
+char*
+get_user_id_string_printable ( u32 *keyid )
+{
+    char *p = get_user_id_string( keyid );
+    char *p2 = utf8_to_native( p, strlen(p), 0 );
+    m_free(p);
+    p = make_printable_string (p2, strlen (p2), 0);
+    m_free (p2);
+    return p;
+}
+
+
+char*
+get_long_user_id_string( u32 *keyid )
+{
+    user_id_db_t r;
+    char *p;
+    int pass=0;
+    /* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
+    do {
+	for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
+            keyid_list_t a;
+            for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
+                if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
+                    p = m_alloc( r->len + 20 );
+                    sprintf(p, "%08lX%08lX %.*s",
+                            (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1],
+                            r->len, r->name );
+                    return p;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
+    p = m_alloc( 25 );
+    sprintf(p, "%08lX%08lX [?]", (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1] );
+    return p;
+}
+
+char*
+get_user_id( u32 *keyid, size_t *rn )
+{
+    user_id_db_t r;
+    char *p;
+    int pass=0;
+
+    /* try it two times; second pass reads from key resources */
+    do {
+	for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next ) {
+            keyid_list_t a;
+            for (a=r->keyids; a; a= a->next ) {
+                if( a->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && a->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
+                    p = m_alloc( r->len );
+                    memcpy(p, r->name, r->len );
+                    *rn = r->len;
+                    return p;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } while( ++pass < 2 && !get_pubkey( NULL, keyid ) );
+    p = m_strdup( _("[User id not found]") );
+    *rn = strlen(p);
+    return p;
+}
+
+char*
+get_user_id_printable( u32 *keyid )
+{
+    size_t rn;
+    char *p = get_user_id( keyid, &rn );
+    char *p2 = utf8_to_native( p, rn, 0 );
+    m_free(p);
+    p = make_printable_string (p2, strlen (p2), 0);
+    m_free (p2);
+    return p;
+}
+
+KEYDB_HANDLE
+get_ctx_handle(GETKEY_CTX ctx)
+{
+  return ctx->kr_handle;
+}