* build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Comments.

* exec.c (exec_write): Cast NULL to void* to properly terminate varargs
list.

* keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Just for safety, catch an invalid
pk algorithm.

* sign.c (make_keysig_packet): Crucial that the call to mksubpkt comes
LAST before the calls to finalize the sig as that makes it possible for
the mksubpkt function to get a reliable pointer to the subpacket area.

* pkclist.c (do_we_trust_pre): If an untrusted key was chosen by a
particular user ID, use that ID as the one to ask about when prompting
whether to use the key anyway. (build_pk_list): Similar change here when
adding keys to the recipient list.

* trustdb.c (update_validity): Fix bug that prevented more than one
validity record per trust record. (get_validity): When retrieving validity
for a (user) supplied user ID, return the validity for that user ID only,
and do not fall back to the general key validity. (validate_one_keyblock):
Some commentary on whether non-self-signed user IDs belong in the web of
trust (arguably, they do).

1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
index 92e357f7e..3fec9a84c 100644
--- a/g10/build-packet.c
+++ b/g10/build-packet.c
@@ -794,6 +794,10 @@ build_sig_subpkt (PKT_signature *sig, sigsubpkttype_t type,
       case SIGSUBPKT_PRIV_VERIFY_CACHE: /*(obsolete)*/
 	BUG();
 	break;
+	/* The issuer being unhashed is a historical oddity.  It
+	   should work equally as well hashed.  Of course, if even an
+	   unhashed issuer is tampered with, it makes it awfully hard
+	   to verify the sig... */
       case SIGSUBPKT_ISSUER:
         hashed = 0;
         break;