Nuked almost all trailing white space.post-nuke-of-trailing-ws

We better do this once and for all instead of cluttering all future
commits with diffs of trailing white spaces.  In the majority of cases
blank or single lines are affected and thus this change won't disturb
a git blame too much.  For future commits the pre-commit scripts
checks that this won't happen again.

1 files changed, 36 insertions, 37 deletions

diff --git a/dirmngr/validate.c b/dirmngr/validate.c
index de7443e11..8197d0d82 100644
--- a/dirmngr/validate.c
+++ b/dirmngr/validate.c
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ unknown_criticals (ksba_cert_t cert)
     rc = err; /* Such an error takes precendence.  */
 
   return rc;
-} 
+}
 
 
 /* Basic check for supported policies.  */
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert)
   any_critical = !!strstr (policies, ":C");
 
   /* See whether we find ALLOWED (which is an OID) in POLICIES */
-  for (idx=0; allowed[idx]; idx++) 
+  for (idx=0; allowed[idx]; idx++)
     {
       for (haystack=policies; (p=strstr (haystack, allowed[idx]));
            haystack = p+1)
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ check_cert_policy (ksba_cert_t cert)
           return 0;
         }
     }
-  
+
   if (!any_critical)
     {
       log_info (_("note: non-critical certificate policy not allowed"));
@@ -243,9 +243,9 @@ check_revocations (ctrl_t ctrl, chain_item_t chain)
              certificates in case they have been revoked. */
           if (opt.verbose)
             cert_log_name (_("not checking CRL for"), ci->cert);
-          continue; 
+          continue;
         }
-      
+
       if (opt.verbose)
         cert_log_name (_("checking CRL for"), ci->cert);
       err = crl_cache_cert_isvalid (ctrl, ci->cert, 0);
@@ -324,20 +324,20 @@ is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuerdn, const char *subjectdn)
      that is the case this is a root certificate.  */
   ak_name_str = ksba_name_enum (ak_name, 0);
   if (ak_name_str
-      && !strcmp (ak_name_str, issuerdn) 
+      && !strcmp (ak_name_str, issuerdn)
       && !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_sn, serialno))
     {
       result = 1;  /* Right, CERT is self-signed.  */
       goto leave;
-    } 
-   
+    }
+
   /* Similar for the ak_keyid. */
   if (ak_keyid && !ksba_cert_get_subj_key_id (cert, NULL, &subj_keyid)
       && !cmp_simple_canon_sexp (ak_keyid, subj_keyid))
     {
       result = 1;  /* Right, CERT is self-signed.  */
       goto leave;
-    } 
+    }
 
 
  leave:
@@ -346,13 +346,13 @@ is_root_cert (ksba_cert_t cert, const char *issuerdn, const char *subjectdn)
   ksba_name_release (ak_name);
   ksba_free (ak_sn);
   ksba_free (serialno);
-  return result; 
+  return result;
 }
 
 
 /* Validate the certificate CHAIN up to the trust anchor. Optionally
    return the closest expiration time in R_EXPTIME (this is useful for
-   caching issues).  MODE is one of the VALIDATE_MODE_* constants. 
+   caching issues).  MODE is one of the VALIDATE_MODE_* constants.
 
    If R_TRUST_ANCHOR is not NULL and the validation would fail only
    because the root certificate is not trusted, the hexified
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
 
   if (DBG_X509)
     dump_cert ("subject", cert);
-  
+
   /* May the target certificate be used for this purpose?  */
   switch (mode)
     {
@@ -417,8 +417,8 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
     {
       size_t buflen;
       time_t validated_at;
-      
-      err = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "validated_at", 
+
+      err = ksba_cert_get_user_data (cert, "validated_at",
                                      &validated_at, sizeof (validated_at),
                                      &buflen);
       if (err || buflen != sizeof (validated_at) || !validated_at)
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
         }
 
       /* Handle the notBefore and notAfter timestamps.  */
-      { 
+      {
         ksba_isotime_t not_before, not_after;
 
         err = ksba_cert_get_validity (subject_cert, 0, not_before);
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
             log_printf (")\n");
             err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CERT_TOO_YOUNG);
             goto leave;
-          }    
+          }
 
         /* Now check whether the certificate has expired.  */
         if (*not_after && strcmp (current_time, not_after) > 0 )
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
             dump_isotime (not_after);
             log_printf (")\n");
             any_expired = 1;
-          }            
+          }
       }
 
       /* Do we have any critical extensions in the certificate we
@@ -518,14 +518,14 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
       if (gpg_err_code (err) == GPG_ERR_NO_POLICY_MATCH)
         {
           any_no_policy_match = 1;
-          err = 0; 
+          err = 0;
         }
       else if (err)
         goto leave;
 
       /* Is this a self-signed certificate? */
       if (is_root_cert ( subject_cert, issuer, subject))
-        {  
+        {
           /* Yes, this is our trust anchor.  */
           if (check_cert_sig (subject_cert, subject_cert) )
             {
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
           err = allowed_ca (subject_cert, NULL);
           if (err)
             goto leave;  /* No. */
-          
+
           err = is_trusted_cert (subject_cert);
           if (!err)
             ; /* Yes we trust this cert.  */
@@ -560,7 +560,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
               else
                 xfree (fpr);
             }
-          else 
+          else
             {
               log_error (_("checking trustworthiness of "
                            "root certificate failed: %s\n"),
@@ -572,7 +572,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
           /* Prepend the certificate to our list.  */
           {
             chain_item_t ci;
-            
+
             ci = xtrycalloc (1, sizeof *ci);
             if (!ci)
               {
@@ -666,7 +666,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
                     {
                       do_list (0, lm, fp, _("found another possible matching "
                                             "CA certificate - trying again"));
-                      ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert); 
+                      ksba_cert_release (issuer_cert);
                       issuer_cert = tmp_cert;
                       goto try_another_cert;
                     }
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
       err = cert_use_cert_p (issuer_cert);
       if (err)
         goto leave;  /* No.  */
-      
+
       /* Prepend the certificate to our list.  */
       {
         chain_item_t ci;
@@ -743,10 +743,10 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
       for (citem = chain; citem; citem = citem->next)
         cert_log_name ("  certificate", citem->cert);
     }
-  
+
   if (!err && mode != VALIDATE_MODE_CRL)
     { /* Now that everything is fine, walk the chain and check each
-         certificate for revocations. 
+         certificate for revocations.
 
          1. item in the chain  - The root certificate.
          2. item               - the CA below the root
@@ -772,7 +772,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
   else if (err && opt.verbose)
     log_info ("target certificate is NOT valid\n");
 
-  
+
  leave:
   if (!err && !(r_trust_anchor && *r_trust_anchor))
     {
@@ -792,7 +792,7 @@ validate_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t r_exptime,
           if (err)
             {
               log_error ("set_user_data(validated_at) failed: %s\n",
-                         gpg_strerror (err)); 
+                         gpg_strerror (err));
               err = 0;
             }
         }
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ check_cert_sig (ksba_cert_t issuer_cert, ksba_cert_t cert)
   s = gcry_md_algo_name (algo);
   for (i=0; *s && i < sizeof algo_name - 1; s++, i++)
     algo_name[i] = tolower (*s);
-  algo_name[i] = 0;   
+  algo_name[i] = 0;
 
   err = gcry_md_open (&md, algo, 0);
   if (err)
@@ -984,9 +984,9 @@ check_cert_sig (ksba_cert_t issuer_cert, ksba_cert_t cert)
       if ( gcry_sexp_build (&s_hash, NULL, "(data(flags pkcs1)(hash %s %b))",
                             algo_name, (int)digestlen, digest) )
         BUG ();
-      
+
     }
-      
+
   err = gcry_pk_verify (s_sig, s_hash, s_pkey);
   if (DBG_X509)
     log_debug ("gcry_pk_verify: %s\n", gpg_strerror (err));
@@ -1052,7 +1052,7 @@ cert_usage_p (ksba_cert_t cert, int mode)
                     extusemask |= (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE
                                    | KSBA_KEYUSAGE_NON_REPUDIATION);
                 }
-              
+
               /* This is a hack to cope with OCSP.  Note that we do
                  not yet fully comply with the requirements and that
                  the entire CRL/OCSP checking thing should undergo a
@@ -1065,7 +1065,7 @@ cert_usage_p (ksba_cert_t cert, int mode)
             }
           ksba_free (extkeyusages);
           extkeyusages = NULL;
-          
+
           if (!any_critical)
             extusemask = ~0; /* Reset to the don't care mask. */
         }
@@ -1085,12 +1085,12 @@ cert_usage_p (ksba_cert_t cert, int mode)
 
     }
   if (err)
-    { 
+    {
       log_error (_("error getting key usage information: %s\n"),
                  gpg_strerror (err));
       ksba_free (extkeyusages);
       return err;
-    } 
+    }
 
   if (mode == 4)
     {
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ cert_usage_p (ksba_cert_t cert, int mode)
 
   if (mode == 5)
     {
-      if (use != ~0 
+      if (use != ~0
           && (have_ocsp_signing
               || (use & (KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN
                          |KSBA_KEYUSAGE_CRL_SIGN))))
@@ -1157,4 +1157,3 @@ cert_use_crl_p (ksba_cert_t cert)
 {
   return cert_usage_p (cert, 6);
 }
-