* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Handle case when checksum was okay but

passphrase still wrong.  Roman Pavlik found such a case.

* mpicoder.c (mpi_read_from_buffer): Don't abort in case of an
invalid MPI but print a message and return NULL.  Use log_info and
not log_error.

6 files changed, 49 insertions, 8 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index cdda977ae..4213450f6 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@
 
 2004-12-16  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
+	* THANKS: Added John Clizbe for help testing the 1.4.0a W32
+	binary.
+
+2004-12-16  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
 	Released 1.4.0.
 
 2004-12-14  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
diff --git a/THANKS b/THANKS
index 00a1ceec2..d72763a85 100644
--- a/THANKS
+++ b/THANKS
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ Jim Small                  [email protected]
 Joachim Backes		   [email protected]
 Joe Rhett                  [email protected]
 John A. Martin		   [email protected]
+John Clizbe                [email protected]
 Johnny Teve�en		   [email protected]
 J�rg Schilling		   [email protected]
 Jos Backus		   [email protected]
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index b2b395da1..aed7b32f3 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+2004-12-20  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* seckey-cert.c (do_check): Handle case when checksum was okay but
+	passphrase still wrong.  Roman Pavlik found such a case.
+
 2004-12-20  David Shaw  <[email protected]>
 
 	* keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Invisible alias "passwd" as
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
index 84533bd3e..9153b9508 100644
--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
+++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
@@ -147,12 +147,20 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
                 }
             }
 
-            /* must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
+            /* Must check it here otherwise the mpi_read_xx would fail
                because the length may have an arbitrary value */
             if( sk->csum == csum ) {
                 for( ; i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
                     nbytes = ndata;
                     sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer(p, &nbytes, 1 );
+                    if (!sk->skey[i])
+                      {
+                        /* Checksum was okay, but not correctly
+                           decrypted.  */
+                        sk->csum = 0;
+                        csum = 1;
+                        break;
+                      }
                     ndata -= nbytes;
                     p += nbytes;
                 }
@@ -179,8 +187,15 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
                 csum += checksum (buffer, ndata);
                 mpi_free (sk->skey[i]);
                 sk->skey[i] = mpi_read_from_buffer (buffer, &ndata, 1);
-                assert (sk->skey[i]);
 		m_free (buffer);
+                if (!sk->skey[i])
+                  {
+                    /* Checksum was okay, but not correctly
+                       decrypted.  */
+                    sk->csum = 0;
+                    csum = 1;
+                    break;
+                  }
 /*  		csum += checksum_mpi (sk->skey[i]); */
 	    }
 	}
diff --git a/mpi/ChangeLog b/mpi/ChangeLog
index ab9002722..20175f961 100644
--- a/mpi/ChangeLog
+++ b/mpi/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+2004-12-20  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* mpicoder.c (mpi_read_from_buffer): Don't abort in case of an
+	invalid MPI but print a message and return NULL.  Use log_info and
+	not log_error.
+
 2004-10-26  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
 	* config.links: Use HOST instead of TARGET.
diff --git a/mpi/mpicoder.c b/mpi/mpicoder.c
index 0005f21a8..4d4e45553 100644
--- a/mpi/mpicoder.c
+++ b/mpi/mpicoder.c
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ mpi_read(IOBUF inp, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
 
 
 MPI
-mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
+mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned int *ret_nread, int secure)
 {
     int i, j;
     unsigned nbits, nbytes, nlimbs, nread=0;
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
 	goto leave;
     nbits = buffer[0] << 8 | buffer[1];
     if( nbits > MAX_EXTERN_MPI_BITS ) {
-	log_error("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
+	log_info ("mpi too large (%u bits)\n", nbits);
 	goto leave;
     }
     buffer += 2;
@@ -154,10 +154,19 @@ mpi_read_from_buffer(byte *buffer, unsigned *ret_nread, int secure)
     for( ; j > 0; j-- ) {
 	a = 0;
 	for(; i < BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB; i++ ) {
-	    if( ++nread > *ret_nread )
-		log_bug("mpi larger than buffer\n");
-	    a <<= 8;
-	    a |= *buffer++;
+          if( ++nread > *ret_nread ) {
+              /* This (as well as the above error condition) may
+                 happen if we use this function to parse a decrypted
+                 MPI which didn't turn out to be a real MPI - possible
+                 because the supplied key was wrong but the OpenPGP
+                 checksum didn't caught it. */
+		log_info ("mpi larger than buffer\n");
+                mpi_free (val);
+                val = MPI_NULL;
+                goto leave;
+          }
+          a <<= 8;
+          a |= *buffer++;
 	}
 	i = 0;
 	val->d[j-1] = a;