See ChangeLog: Fri Apr 9 12:26:25 CEST 1999 Werner Koch

22 files changed, 152 insertions, 139 deletions

diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 03e41cd55..4da83f122 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
 
     * Full Twofish support.  It is now statically linked by default.
-   ---->   Hmmm, still have to check the message format
+      The experimental 128 bit version is now disabled.
+   ---->   Hmmm, there is an internal conflict in the RFC
+
+    * Dropped support for the ancient Blowfish160 which is not OpenPGP.
+
 
 Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.5
 -----------------------------------
diff --git a/README b/README
index 75c769db4..2d02f527b 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,18 +1,17 @@
 Please note that this is only a bug fix release and some things
 do not yet work - see TODO for parts which are problematic
 
-The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
 
 
 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
 
-                    GnuPG - The GNU Privacy Guard
-                   -------------------------------
-                            Version 0.9
+		    GnuPG - The GNU Privacy Guard
+		   -------------------------------
+			    Version 0.9
 
     GnuPG is now in Beta test and you should report all bugs to the
     mailing list (see below).  The 0.9.x versions are released mainly
-    to fix all remaining serious bugs.  As soon as version 1.0 is out,
+    to fix all remaining serious bugs.	As soon as version 1.0 is out,
     development will continue with a 1.1 series and bug fixes for the
     1.0 version as needed.
 
@@ -32,7 +31,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     "Key fingerprint = ECAF 7590 EB34 43B5 C7CF  3ACB 6C7E E1B8 621C C013"
 
     You may want add my new DSA key to your GnuPG pubring and use it in
-    the future to verify new releases.  Because you verified this README
+    the future to verify new releases.	Because you verified this README
     file and _checked_that_it_is_really_my PGP2 key 0C9857A5, you can be
     sure that the above fingerprints are correct.
 
@@ -67,7 +66,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
 
     Here is a quick summary:
 
-    1)  "./configure"
+    1)	"./configure"
 
     2) "make"
 
@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
 
     The normal way to create a key is
 
-        gpg --gen-key
+	gpg --gen-key
 
     This asks some questions and then starts key generation. To create
     good random numbers for the key parameters, GnuPG needs to gather
@@ -120,7 +119,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     Next, you should create a revocation certificate in case someone
     gets knowledge of your secret key or you forgot your passphrase
 
-        gpg --gen-revoke your_user_id
+	gpg --gen-revoke your_user_id
 
     Run this command and store the revocation certificate away.  The output
     is always ASCII armored, so that you can print it and (hopefully
@@ -128,20 +127,20 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
 
     Now you can use your key to create digital signatures
 
-        gpg -s file
+	gpg -s file
 
     This creates a file "file.gpg" which is compressed and has a
     signature attached.
 
-        gpg -sa file
+	gpg -sa file
 
     Same as above, but creates a file "file.asc" which is ASCII armored
-    and and ready for sending by mail.  It is better to use your
+    and and ready for sending by mail.	It is better to use your
     mailers features to create signatures (The mailer uses GnuPG to do
     this) because the mailer has the ability to MIME encode such
     signatures - but this is not a security issue.
 
-        gpg -s -o out file
+	gpg -s -o out file
 
     Creates a signature of "file", but writes the output to the file
     "out".
@@ -150,7 +149,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     your key by putting it on a key server, a web page or in your .plan
     file) is now able to check whether you really signed this text
 
-        gpg --verify file
+	gpg --verify file
 
     GnuPG now checks whether the signature is valid and prints an
     appropriate message.  If the signature is good, you know at least
@@ -161,29 +160,29 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     create a new file that is identical to the original.  gpg can also
     run as a filter, so that you can pipe data to verify trough it
 
-        cat signed-file | gpg | wc -l
+	cat signed-file | gpg | wc -l
 
     which will check the signature of signed-file and then display the
     number of lines in the original file.
 
     To send a message encrypted to someone you can use
 
-        gpg -e -r heine file
+	gpg -e -r heine file
 
     This encrypts "file" with the public key of the user "heine" and
     writes it to "file.gpg"
 
-        echo "hello" | gpg -ea -r heine | mail heine
+	echo "hello" | gpg -ea -r heine | mail heine
 
     Ditto, but encrypts "hello\n" and mails it as ASCII armored message
     to the user with the mail address heine.
 
-        gpg -se -r heine file
+	gpg -se -r heine file
 
     This encrypts "file" with the public key of "heine" and writes it
     to "file.gpg" after signing it with your user id.
 
-        gpg -se -r heine -u Suttner file
+	gpg -se -r heine -u Suttner file
 
     Ditto, but sign the file with your alternative user id "Suttner"
 
@@ -191,7 +190,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     GnuPG has some options to help you publish public keys.  This is
     called "exporting" a key, thus
 
-        gpg --export >all-my-keys
+	gpg --export >all-my-keys
 
     exports all the keys in the keyring and writes them (in a binary
     format) to "all-my-keys".  You may then mail "all-my-keys" as an
@@ -202,14 +201,14 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     To mail a public key or put it on a web page you have to create
     the key in ASCII armored format
 
-        gpg --export --armor | mail [email protected]
+	gpg --export --armor | mail [email protected]
 
     This will send all your public keys to your friend panther.
 
     If you have received a key from someone else you can put it
     into your public keyring.  This is called "importing"
 
-        gpg --import [filenames]
+	gpg --import [filenames]
 
     New keys are appended to your keyring and already existing
     keys are updated. Note that GnuPG does not import keys that
@@ -223,7 +222,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     every other program used for management of cryptographic keys)
     provides other solutions.
 
-        gpg --fingerprint <username>
+	gpg --fingerprint <username>
 
     prints the so called "fingerprint" of the given username which
     is a sequence of hex bytes (which you may have noticed in mail
@@ -237,43 +236,43 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     Suppose however that friend of yours knows someone who knows someone
     who has met the owner of the public key at some computer conference.
     Suppose that all the people between you and the public key holder
-    may now act as introducers to you.  Introducers signing keys thereby
+    may now act as introducers to you.	Introducers signing keys thereby
     certify that they know the owner of the keys they sign.  If you then
     trust all the introducers to have correctly signed other keys, you
     can be be sure that the other key really belongs to the one who
     claims to own it..
 
     There are 2 steps to validate a key:
-        1. First check that there is a complete chain
-           of signed keys from the public key you want to use
-           and your key and verify each signature.
-        2. Make sure that you have full trust in the certificates
-           of all the introduces between the public key holder and
-           you.
+	1. First check that there is a complete chain
+	   of signed keys from the public key you want to use
+	   and your key and verify each signature.
+	2. Make sure that you have full trust in the certificates
+	   of all the introduces between the public key holder and
+	   you.
     Step 2 is the more complicated part because there is no easy way
     for a computer to decide who is trustworthy and who is not.  GnuPG
     leaves this decision to you and will ask you for a trust value
     (here also referenced as the owner-trust of a key) for every key
-    needed to check the chain of certificates.  You may choose from:
+    needed to check the chain of certificates.	You may choose from:
       a) "I don't know" - then it is not possible to use any
-         of the chains of certificates, in which this key is used
-         as an introducer, to validate the target key.  Use this if
-         you don't know the introducer.
+	 of the chains of certificates, in which this key is used
+	 as an introducer, to validate the target key.	Use this if
+	 you don't know the introducer.
       b) "I do not trust" - Use this if you know that the introducer
-         does not do a good job in certifying other keys.  The effect
-         is the same as with a) but for a) you may later want to
-         change the value because you got new information about this
-         introducer.
+	 does not do a good job in certifying other keys.  The effect
+	 is the same as with a) but for a) you may later want to
+	 change the value because you got new information about this
+	 introducer.
       c) "I trust marginally" - Use this if you assume that the
-         introducer knows what he is doing.  Together with some
-         other marginally trusted keys, GnuPG validates the target
-         key then as good.
+	 introducer knows what he is doing.  Together with some
+	 other marginally trusted keys, GnuPG validates the target
+	 key then as good.
       d) "I fully trust" - Use this if you really know that this
-         introducer does a good job when certifying other keys.
-         If all the introducer are of this trust value, GnuPG
-         normally needs only one chain of signatures to validate
-         a target key okay. (But this may be adjusted with the help
-         of some options).
+	 introducer does a good job when certifying other keys.
+	 If all the introducer are of this trust value, GnuPG
+	 normally needs only one chain of signatures to validate
+	 a target key okay. (But this may be adjusted with the help
+	 of some options).
     This information is confidential because it gives your personal
     opinion on the trustworthiness of someone else.  Therefore this data
     is not stored in the keyring but in the "trustdb"
@@ -286,7 +285,7 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     Okay, here is how GnuPG helps you with key management.  Most stuff
     is done with the --edit-key command
 
-        gpg --edit-key <keyid or username>
+	gpg --edit-key <keyid or username>
 
     GnuPG displays some information about the key and then prompts
     for a command (enter "help" to see a list of commands and see
@@ -326,37 +325,37 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
 
     * Only by the short keyid (prepend a zero if it begins with A..F):
 
-        "234567C4"
-        "0F34E556E"
-        "01347A56A"
-        "0xAB123456
+	"234567C4"
+	"0F34E556E"
+	"01347A56A"
+	"0xAB123456
 
     * By a complete keyid:
 
-        "234AABBCC34567C4"
-        "0F323456784E56EAB"
-        "01AB3FED1347A5612"
-        "0x234AABBCC34567C4"
+	"234AABBCC34567C4"
+	"0F323456784E56EAB"
+	"01AB3FED1347A5612"
+	"0x234AABBCC34567C4"
 
     * By a fingerprint:
 
-        "1234343434343434C434343434343434"
-        "123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434"
-        "0E12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434"
+	"1234343434343434C434343434343434"
+	"123434343434343C3434343434343734349A3434"
+	"0E12343434343434343434EAB3484343434343434"
 
       The first one is MD5 the others are ripemd160 or sha1.
 
     * By an exact string:
 
-        "=Heinrich Heine <[email protected]>"
+	"=Heinrich Heine <[email protected]>"
 
     * By an email address:
 
-        "<[email protected]>"
+	"<[email protected]>"
 
     * By word match
 
-        "+Heinrich Heine duesseldorf"
+	"+Heinrich Heine duesseldorf"
 
       All words must match excatly (not case sensitive) and appear in
       any order in the user ID.  Words are any sequences of letters,
@@ -364,15 +363,15 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
 
     * By the Local ID (from the trust DB):
 
-        "#34"
+	"#34"
 
       This may be used by a MUA to specify an exact key after selecting
       a key from GnuPG (by using a special option or an extra utility)
 
     * Or by the usual substring:
 
-        "Heine"
-        "*Heine"
+	"Heine"
+	"*Heine"
 
       The '*' indicates substring search explicitly.
 
@@ -400,22 +399,22 @@ The genkey1024 test will fail due to an expect problem :-(
     Esoteric commands
     -----------------
 
-        gpg --list-packets datafile
+	gpg --list-packets datafile
 
     Use this to list the contents of a data file. If the file is encrypted
     you are asked for the passphrase, so that GnuPG is able to look at the
     inner structure of a encrypted packet.  This command should list all
     kinds of rfc2440 messages.
 
-        gpgm --list-trustdb
+	gpgm --list-trustdb
 
     List the contents of the trust DB in a human readable format
 
-        gpgm --list-trustdb  <usernames>
+	gpgm --list-trustdb  <usernames>
 
     List the tree of certificates for the given usernames
 
-        gpgm --list-trust-path  username
+	gpgm --list-trust-path	username
 
     List the possible trust paths for the given username. The length
     of such a trust path is limited by the option --max-cert-depth
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index 356b2893f..bc6ed7705 100644
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -21,18 +21,15 @@
   * Add NO_PUBKEY and NO_SECKEY status lines.
   * Add more NODATA status lines
 
-  * Solaris make as problems with the generated POTFILES - seems to be a
+  * Solaris make has problems with the generated POTFILES - seems to be a
     gettext bug.
 
-  * Need suffix rules for .S to produce .s for some systems
-
-  * do a chmod as soon as the secring is created.  Print a warning if
-    the directory mode is wrong.
 
 
 Nice to have
 ------------
   * use DEL and ^H for erasing the previous character (util/ttyio.c).
+  * Print a warning if the directory mode is wrong.
   * replace the keyserver stuff either by a call to a specialized
     utility or SOCKSify the stuff.
   * Do a real fix for bug #7 or document that it is a PGP 5 error.
diff --git a/checks/genkey1024.test b/checks/genkey1024.test
index bd79bcb89..81cb24fce 100755
--- a/checks/genkey1024.test
+++ b/checks/genkey1024.test
@@ -91,14 +91,7 @@ expect {
     timeout { exit 1 } }
 set timeout 600
 expect {
-  -ex "\r                   \rWe need to generate a lot of random bytes. It is a good idea to perform\r
-some other action (work in another window, move the mouse, utilize the\r
-the disks) during the prime generation; this gives the random\r
-number generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.\r" {}
-    timeout { exit 1 } }
-set timeout 600
-expect {
-    -ex "public and secret key created and signed.\r" { exit 0 }
+    -re "^.*\r\npublic and secret key" { exit 0 }
     eof  { exit 1 }
 }
 exit 1
diff --git a/cipher/ChangeLog b/cipher/ChangeLog
index 4ecdbc488..9b16f12ae 100644
--- a/cipher/ChangeLog
+++ b/cipher/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+Fri Apr  9 12:26:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* cipher.c (cipher_open): Reversed the changes for AUTO_CFB.
+
+	* blowfish.c: Dropped the Blowfish 160 mode.
+	* cipher.c (cipher_open): Ditto.
+	(setup_cipher_table): Ditto.  And removed support of twofish128
+
 Wed Apr  7 20:51:39 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
 	* random.c (get_random_bits): Can now handle requests > POOLSIZE
diff --git a/cipher/blowfish.c b/cipher/blowfish.c
index 8bfce67c9..5a829d413 100644
--- a/cipher/blowfish.c
+++ b/cipher/blowfish.c
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@
 
 
 #define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH	 4  /* blowfish 128 bit key */
-#define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 42  /* blowfish 160 bit key (not in OpenPGP)*/
 
 #define FNCCAST_SETKEY(f)  (int(*)(void*, byte*, unsigned))(f)
 #define FNCCAST_CRYPT(f)   (void(*)(void*, byte*, byte*))(f)
@@ -582,7 +581,7 @@ blowfish_get_info( int algo, size_t *keylen,
 		   void (**r_decrypt)( void *c, byte *outbuf, byte *inbuf )
 		 )
 {
-    *keylen = algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH ? 128 : 160;
+    *keylen = 128;
     *blocksize = BLOWFISH_BLOCKSIZE;
     *contextsize = sizeof(BLOWFISH_context);
     *r_setkey = FNCCAST_SETKEY(bf_setkey);
@@ -591,8 +590,6 @@ blowfish_get_info( int algo, size_t *keylen,
 
     if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH )
 	return "BLOWFISH";
-    if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 )
-	return "BLOWFISH160";
     return NULL;
 }
 
diff --git a/cipher/cipher.c b/cipher/cipher.c
index 0306c378d..cba011be1 100644
--- a/cipher/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher/cipher.c
@@ -127,28 +127,6 @@ setup_cipher_table(void)
     if( !cipher_table[i].name )
 	BUG();
     i++;
-    cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160;
-    cipher_table[i].name = blowfish_get_info( cipher_table[i].algo,
-					 &cipher_table[i].keylen,
-					 &cipher_table[i].blocksize,
-					 &cipher_table[i].contextsize,
-					 &cipher_table[i].setkey,
-					 &cipher_table[i].encrypt,
-					 &cipher_table[i].decrypt     );
-    if( !cipher_table[i].name )
-	BUG();
-    i++;
-    cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD;
-    cipher_table[i].name = twofish_get_info( cipher_table[i].algo,
-					 &cipher_table[i].keylen,
-					 &cipher_table[i].blocksize,
-					 &cipher_table[i].contextsize,
-					 &cipher_table[i].setkey,
-					 &cipher_table[i].encrypt,
-					 &cipher_table[i].decrypt     );
-    if( !cipher_table[i].name )
-	BUG();
-    i++;
     cipher_table[i].algo = CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY;
     cipher_table[i].name = "DUMMY";
     cipher_table[i].blocksize = 8;
@@ -362,8 +340,7 @@ cipher_open( int algo, int mode, int secure )
     if( algo == CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY )
 	hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_DUMMY;
     else if( mode == CIPHER_MODE_AUTO_CFB ) {
-	if( hd->blocksize > 8
-	    || algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 || algo >= 100 )
+	if( algo >= 100 )
 	    hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_CFB;
 	else
 	    hd->mode = CIPHER_MODE_PHILS_CFB;
diff --git a/cipher/twofish.c b/cipher/twofish.c
index 94a31de71..6ab5ebaed 100644
--- a/cipher/twofish.c
+++ b/cipher/twofish.c
@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@
  * By Matthew Skala <[email protected]>, July 26, 1998
  * 256-bit key length added March 20, 1999
  *
+ * The original author has disclaimed all copyright interest in this
+ * code and thus putting it in the public domain.
+ *
  * This code is a "clean room" implementation, written from the paper
  * _Twofish: A 128-Bit Block Cipher_ by Bruce Schneier, John Kelsey,
  * Doug Whiting, David Wagner, Chris Hall, and Niels Ferguson, available
diff --git a/doc/DETAILS b/doc/DETAILS
index 618c2a0e4..4641bf7a4 100644
--- a/doc/DETAILS
+++ b/doc/DETAILS
@@ -111,13 +111,26 @@ more arguments in future versions.
     NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM <cipher_algo> <s2k_mode> <s2k_hash>
 	Issued whenever a passphrase for symmetric encryption is needed.
 
+    MISSING_PASSPHRASE
+
     BAD_PASSPHRASE <long keyid>
 	The supplied passphrase was wrong
 
+    GOOD_PASSPHRASE
+	The supplied passphrase was good and the secret key material
+	is therefore usuable.
+
     DECRYPTION_FAILED
 	The symmetric decryption failed - one reason could be a wrong
 	passphrase for a symmetrical encrypted message.
 
+    DECRYPTION_OKAY
+	The decryption process succeeded.  This means, that either the
+	correct secret key has been used or the correct passphrase
+	for a conventional encrypted message was given.  The program
+	itself may return an errorcode becuase it may not be possible to
+	verify a signature for some reasons.
+
     NO_PUBKEY  <long keyid>
     NO_SECKEY  <long keyid>
 	The key is not available
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index 217367ec9..fd8e718c7 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@
+Fri Apr  9 12:26:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* status.c (write_status_text): Some more status codes.
+	* passphrase_to_dek (passphrase_to_dek): add a status code.
+	* seckey_cert.c (check_secret_key): Likewise.
+
+	* encr-data.c (decrypt_data): Reverse the last changes
+	* cipher.c (write_header): Ditto.
+
+	* parse-packet.c (parse_key): Dropped kludge for ancient blowfish mode.
+
 Thu Apr  8 09:35:53 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
 	* mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Add a new status output
diff --git a/g10/cipher.c b/g10/cipher.c
index 98c5e8403..5a7229f24 100644
--- a/g10/cipher.c
+++ b/g10/cipher.c
@@ -58,10 +58,7 @@ write_header( cipher_filter_context_t *cfx, IOBUF a )
     blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize( cfx->dek->algo );
     if( blocksize < 8 || blocksize > 16 )
 	log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
-    /* FIXME: remove the kludge for the experimental twofish128 mode:
-     * we always use the 10 byte prefix and not one depending on the blocksize
-     */
-    nprefix = cfx->dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD? blocksize : 8;
+    nprefix = blocksize;
     randomize_buffer( temp, nprefix, 1 );
     temp[nprefix] = temp[nprefix-2];
     temp[nprefix+1] = temp[nprefix-1];
diff --git a/g10/encr-data.c b/g10/encr-data.c
index 8ae6949d8..ff0930775 100644
--- a/g10/encr-data.c
+++ b/g10/encr-data.c
@@ -66,10 +66,7 @@ decrypt_data( PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek )
     blocksize = cipher_get_blocksize(dek->algo);
     if( !blocksize || blocksize > 16 )
 	log_fatal("unsupported blocksize %u\n", blocksize );
-    /* FIXME: remove the kludge for the experimental twofish128 mode:
-     * we always use the 10 byte prefix and not one depending on the blocksize
-     */
-    nprefix = dek->algo == CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD? blocksize : 8;
+    nprefix = blocksize;
     if( ed->len && ed->len < (nprefix+2) )
 	BUG();
 
diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
index 5a739b922..31965dcb9 100644
--- a/g10/import.c
+++ b/g10/import.c
@@ -988,6 +988,10 @@ merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock,
 /****************
  * append the userid starting with NODE and all signatures to KEYBLOCK.
  * Mark all new and copied packets by setting flag bit 0.
+ * FIXME: It may happen that two identical user ID gets imported; should we
+ *	  add another check and how can we handle the signature?  Maybe
+ *	  we have to collapse both UIDs into one and then remove duplicated
+ *	  signatures.
  */
 static int
 append_uid( KBNODE keyblock, KBNODE node, int *n_sigs,
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index 45acb3838..5d33f4edc 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
     if( result == -1 )
 	;
     else if( !result ) {
+	write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY );
 	if( opt.verbose > 1 )
 	    log_info(_("decryption okay\n"));
     }
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
index bf22f10dc..1683df0a2 100644
--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
@@ -1305,11 +1305,7 @@ parse_key( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
 	    }
 	    else { /* old version; no S2K, so we set mode to 0, hash MD5 */
 		sk->protect.s2k.mode = 0;
-		/* We need a kludge to cope with old GNUPG versions */
-		sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo =
-			     ( sk->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160
-			       && algorithm == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E ) ?
-				      DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 : DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+		sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
 		if( list_mode )
 		    printf(  "\tprotect algo: %d  (hash algo: %d)\n",
 			 sk->protect.algo, sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo );
diff --git a/g10/passphrase.c b/g10/passphrase.c
index 3cc8e009d..400e60696 100644
--- a/g10/passphrase.c
+++ b/g10/passphrase.c
@@ -201,6 +201,10 @@ passphrase_to_dek( u32 *keyid, int cipher_algo, STRING2KEY *s2k, int mode )
 	    m_free(pw2);
 	}
     }
+
+    if( !pw || !*pw )
+	write_status( STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE );
+
     dek = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *dek );
     dek->algo = cipher_algo;
     if( !*pw && mode == 2 )
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
index 4ee0485ca..d875e6333 100644
--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
+++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
@@ -187,6 +187,9 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, int n )
 	    break;
     }
 
+    if( !rc )
+	write_status( STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE );
+
     return rc;
 }
 
diff --git a/g10/status.c b/g10/status.c
index 889c63b0c..9af3c9a5f 100644
--- a/g10/status.c
+++ b/g10/status.c
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@ write_status_text ( int no, const char *text)
       case STATUS_NO_SECKEY	 : s = "NO_SECKEY\n"; break;
       case STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM: s = "NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM\n"; break;
       case STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED: s = "DECRYPTION_FAILED\n"; break;
+      case STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY: s = "DECRYPTION_OKAY\n"; break;
+      case STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE: s = "MISSING_PASSPHRASE\n"; break;
+      case STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE : s = "GOOD_PASSPHRASE\n"; break;
       default: s = "?\n"; break;
     }
 
diff --git a/g10/status.h b/g10/status.h
index a4622f817..083d7ce41 100644
--- a/g10/status.h
+++ b/g10/status.h
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
 #define STATUS_NO_SECKEY       27
 #define STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE_SYM 28
 #define STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED 29
+#define STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY	 30
+#define STATUS_MISSING_PASSPHRASE 31
+#define STATUS_GOOD_PASSPHRASE	32
 
 /*-- status.c --*/
 void set_status_fd ( int fd );
diff --git a/include/ChangeLog b/include/ChangeLog
index 0fa6e9916..930b954c5 100644
--- a/include/ChangeLog
+++ b/include/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+Fri Apr  9 12:26:25 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* cipher.h (BLOWFISH160): Removed.
+
 Tue Apr  6 19:58:12 CEST 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
 	* cipher.h (DEK): increased max. key length to 32 bytes
diff --git a/include/cipher.h b/include/cipher.h
index 75a7b7175..cae310cfb 100644
--- a/include/cipher.h
+++ b/include/cipher.h
@@ -34,7 +34,6 @@
 #define CIPHER_ALGO_SAFER_SK128  5
 #define CIPHER_ALGO_DES_SK	 6
 #define CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH	10  /* twofish 256 bit */
-#define CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH160 42  /* blowfish 160 bit key (not in OpenPGP)*/
 #define CIPHER_ALGO_SKIPJACK   101  /* experimental: skipjack */
 #define CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH_OLD 102 /* experimental: twofish 128 bit */
 #define CIPHER_ALGO_DUMMY      110  /* no encryption at all */
diff --git a/util/memory.c b/util/memory.c
index 4370c72ec..9f9f6c81f 100644
--- a/util/memory.c
+++ b/util/memory.c
@@ -123,20 +123,19 @@ static void check_allmem( const char *info );
 static void
 add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
 {
-    unsigned index;
+    unsigned idx;
     struct memtbl_entry *e;
     struct info_entry *ie;
 
     if( memtbl_len < memtbl_size  )
-	index = memtbl_len++;
+	idx = memtbl_len++;
     else {
-	struct memtbl_entry *e;
 	/* look for a used entry in the table.	We take the first one,
 	 * so that freed entries remain as long as possible in the table
 	 * (free appends a new one)
 	 */
 	if( (e = memtbl_unused) ) {
-	    index = e - memtbl;
+	    idx = e - memtbl;
 	    memtbl_unused = e->next;
 	    e->next = NULL;
 	}
@@ -145,32 +144,33 @@ add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
 		memtbl_size = 100;
 		if( !(memtbl = calloc( memtbl_size, sizeof *memtbl )) )
 		    membug("memory debug table malloc failed\n");
-		index = 0;
+		idx = 0;
 		memtbl_len = 1;
 		atexit( dump_table_at_exit );
 	    }
 	    else { /* realloc */
-		unsigned n = memtbl_size / 4; /* enlarge by 25% */
-		if(!(memtbl = realloc(memtbl, (memtbl_size+n)*sizeof *memtbl)))
+		unsigned nn = memtbl_size / 4; /* enlarge by 25% */
+		if(!(memtbl = realloc(memtbl, (memtbl_size+nn)*sizeof *memtbl)))
 		    membug("memory debug table realloc failed\n");
 		memset(memtbl+memtbl_size, 0, n*sizeof *memtbl );
-		memtbl_size += n;
-		index = memtbl_len++;
+		memtbl_size += nn;
+		idx = memtbl_len++;
 	    }
 	}
     }
-    e = memtbl+index;
+    e = memtbl+idx;
     if( e->inuse )
-	membug("Ooops: entry %u is flagged as in use\n", index);
+	membug("Ooops: entry %u is flagged as in use\n", idx);
     e->user_p = p + 4;
     e->user_n = n;
     e->count++;
     if( e->next )
 	membug("Ooops: entry is in free entry list\n");
     /* do we already have this info string */
-    for( ie = info_strings[info_hash(info)]; ie; ie = ie->next )
+    for( ie = info_strings[info_hash(info)]; ie; ie = ie->next ) {
 	if( ie->info == info )
 	    break;
+    }
     if( !ie ) { /* no: make a new entry */
 	if( !(ie = malloc( sizeof *ie )) )
 	    membug("can't allocate info entry\n");
@@ -184,9 +184,9 @@ add_entry( byte *p, unsigned n, int mode, const char *info, const char *by )
     e->inuse = 1;
 
     /* put the index at the start of the memory */
-    p[0] = index;
-    p[1] = index >> 8 ;
-    p[2] = index >> 16 ;
+    p[0] = idx;
+    p[1] = idx >> 8 ;
+    p[2] = idx >> 16 ;
     p[3] = mode? MAGIC_SEC_BYTE : MAGIC_NOR_BYTE  ;
     if( DBG_MEMORY )
 	log_debug( "%s allocates %u bytes using %s\n", info, e->user_n, by );