See ChangeLog: Sat Jan 9 16:02:23 CET 1999 Werner Koch

35 files changed, 829 insertions, 521 deletions

diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index f7a5f88a5..45630accd 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+Sat Jan  9 16:02:23 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* configure.in: Add a way to statically link rndunix
+
 Sun Jan  3 15:28:44 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
 	* acinclude.m4 (GNUPG_CHECK_RDYNAMIC): New.
diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS
index 3d5256027..065f5698b 100644
--- a/NEWS
+++ b/NEWS
@@ -8,6 +8,15 @@
       fixed an infinite loop bug in the 3DES code and in the code
       which looks for trusted signatures.
 
+    * Fixed a bug in the mpi library which caused signatures not to
+      compare okay.
+
+    * Rewrote the handling of cleartext signatures; the code is now
+      better maintainable (I hope so).
+
+    * New status output VALIDSIG only for valid signatures together
+      with the fingerprint of the signer's key.
+
 
 Noteworthy changes in version 0.9.0
 -----------------------------------
diff --git a/THOUGHTS b/THOUGHTS
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..99766ce0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/THOUGHTS
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+
+	/* we still have these if a signed signed more than one
+	 * user ID.  I don't think that is makes sense to sign
+	 * more than one user ID; an exception might be a user ID
+	 * which is to be removed in near future.  Anyway it is
+	 * always good to sign only those user ID which are
+	 * unlikely to change.	It might be good to insert a
+	 * user ID which does not contain an email address and
+	 * mark this one with a special signature flag or let
+	 * sign_key() suggest a user ID w/o an email address
+	 */
+
+
+    * What shall we do if we have a valid subkey revocation certificate
+      but no subkey binding?  Is this a valid but revoked key?
+
+
+Date: Mon, 4 Jan 1999 19:34:29 -0800 (PST)
+From: Matthew Skala <[email protected]>
+
+- Signing with an expired key doesn't work by default, does work with a
+  special option.
+- Verifying a signature that appears to have been made by an expired key
+  after its expiry date but is otherwise good reports the signature as BAD,
+  preferably with a message indicating that it's a key-expiry problem rather
+  than a cryptographically bad signature.
+- Verifying a signature from a key that is now expired, where the
+  signature was made before the expiry date, reports the signature as
+  GOOD, possibly with a warning that the key has since expired.
+- Encrypting to an expired key doesn't work by default, does work with a
+  special option.
+- Decrypting always works, if you have the appropriate secret key and
+  passphrase.
+
+
+
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
+Hash: SHA1
+
+Hi Werner..
+
+I was looking at some of the PROJECTS items in the recent gpg CVS and wanted
+to comment on one of them:
+
+  * Add a way to override the current cipher/md implementations
+    by others (using extensions)
+
+As you know I've been thinking about how to use a PalmPilot or an iButton in
+some useful way in GPG. The two things that seem reasonable are:
+ 1) keep the secret key in the device, only transferring it to the host
+    computer for the duration of the secret-key operation (sign or decrypt).
+    The key is never kept on disk, only in RAM. This removes the chance that
+    casual snooping on your office workstation will reveal your key (it
+    doesn't help against an active attack, but the attacker must leave a
+    tampered version of GPG around or otherwise get their code to run while
+    the key-storage device is attached to attack the key)
+ 2) perform the secret-key operation on the device, so the secret key never
+    leaves the confines of that device. There are still attacks possible,
+    based upon talking to the device while it is connected and trying to
+    convince the device (and possibly the user) that it is the real GPG,
+    but in general this protects the key pretty strongly. Any individual
+    message is still vulnerable, but that's a tradeoff of the convenience of
+    composing that message on a full-sized screen+keyboard (plus the added
+    speed of encryption) vs. the security of writing the message on a
+    secure device.
+
+I think there are a variety of ways of implementing these things, but a few
+extension mechanisms in GPG should be enough to try various ways later on.
+
+1) pass an argument string to loadable extension modules (maybe
+    gpg --load-extension foofish=arg1,arg2,arg3 ?)
+2) allow multiple instances of the same extension module (presumably with
+   different arguments)
+3) allow extension modules to use stdin/stdout/stderr as normal (probably
+   already in there), for giving feedback to the user, or possibly asking them
+   for a password of some sort
+4) have an extension to provide secret keys:
+
+   It looks like most of the hooks for this are already in place, it just
+   needs an extension module which can register itself as a keyblock resource.
+
+   I'm thinking of a module for this that is given an external program name as
+   an argument. When the keyblock resource is asked to enumerate its keys, it
+   runs the external program (first with a "0" argument, then a "1", and so on
+   until the program reports that no more keys are available). The external
+   program returns one (possibly armored) secret key block each time. The
+   program might have some kind of special protocol to talk to the storage
+   device.  One thing that comes to mind is to simply include a random number
+   in the message sent over the serial port: the program would display this
+   number, the Pilot at the other end would display the number it receives, if
+   the user sees that both are the same they instruct the Pilot to release the
+   key, as basic protection against someone else asking for the key while it
+   is attached. More sophisticated schemes are possible depending upon how
+   much processing power and IO is available on the device. But the same
+   extension module should be able to handle as complex a scheme as one could
+   wish.
+
+   The current keyblock-resource interface would work fine, although it
+   might be more convenient if a resource could be asked for a key by id
+   instead of enumerating all of them and then searching through the resulting
+   list for a match. A module that provided public keys would have to work this
+   way (imagine a module that could automatically do an http fetch for a
+   particular key.. easily-added automatic key fetching). Without that ability
+   to fetch by id (which would require it to fall back to the other keyblock
+   resources if it failed), the user's device might be asked to release the
+   key even though some other secret key was the one needed.
+
+
+5) have an extension to perform a secret-key operation without the actual
+   secret key material
+
+ basically something to indicate that any decrypt or sign operations that
+ occur for a specific keyid should call the extension module instead. The
+ secret key would not be extracted (it wouldn't be available anyway). The
+ module is given the keyid and the MPI of the block it is supposed to sign
+ or decrypt.
+
+ The module could then run an external program to do the operation. I'm
+ imagining a Pilot program which receives the data, asks the user if it can go
+ along with the operation (after displaying a hash of the request, which is
+ also displayed by the extension module's program to make sure the Pilot is
+ being asked to do the right operation), performs the signature or decryption,
+ then returns the data. This protocol could be made arbitrarily complex, with
+ a D-H key to encrypt the link, and both sides signing requests to
+ authenticate one to the other (although this transforms the the problem of
+ getting your secret key off your office workstation into the problem of
+ your workstation holding a key tells your Pilot that it is allowed to perform
+ the secret key operation, and if someone gets a hold of that key they may
+ be able to trick your pilot [plugged in somewhere else] to do the same thing
+ for them).
+
+ This is basically red/black separation, with the Pilot or iButton having the
+ perimeter beyond which the red data doesn't pass. Better than the secret-key
+ storage device but requires a lot more power on the device (the new iButtons
+ with the exponentiator could do it, but it would take way too much code space
+ on the old ones, although they would be fine for just carrying the keys).
+
+The signature code might need to be extended to verify the signature you just
+made, since an active intruder pretending to the the Pilot wouldn't be able to
+make a valid signature (but they might sign your message with a different key
+just to be annoying).
+
+Anyway, just wanted to share my thoughts on some possibilities. I've been
+carrying this little Java iButton on my keyring for months now, looking for
+something cool to do with it, and I think that secure storage for my GPG key
+would be just the right application.
+
+cheers,
+ -Brian
+
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+Version: GnuPG v0.4.5 (GNU/Linux)
+Comment: For info finger [email protected]
+
+iD8DBQE2c5oZkDmgv9E5zEwRArAwAKDWV5fpTtbGPiMPgl2Bpp0gvhbfQgCgzJuY
+AmIQTk4s62/y2zMAHDdOzK0=
+=jr7m
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+
+
+About a new Keyserver  (discussion with Allan Clark <[email protected]>):
+=====================
+
+Some ideas:
+
+o  the KS should verify signatures and only accept those
+   which are good.
+
+o  Keep a blacklist of known bad signatures to minimize
+   the time needed to check them
+
+o  Should be fast - I currently designing a new storage
+   system called keybox which takes advantage of the fact
+   that the keyID is higly random and can be directly be
+   used as a hash value and this keyID is (for v4 keys)
+   part of the fingerprint: So it is possible to use the
+   fingerprint as key but do an lookup by the keyID.
+
+o  To be used as the "public keyring" in a LAN so that there
+   is no need to keep one on every machine.
+
+o  Allow more that one file for key storage.
+
+o  Use the HKS protocol and enhance it in a way that binary
+   keyrings can be transmitted.  (I already wrote some
+   http server and client code which can be used for this)
+
+o  Keep a checkcsum (hash) of the entire keyblock so that a
+   client can easy check whether this keyblock has changed.
+   (keyblock = the entire key with all certificates etc.)
+
+o  Allow efficient propagation of new keys and revocation
+   certificates.
+
+
+Probably more things but this keyserver is not a goal for the
+1.0 release. Someone should be able to fix some of the limitations
+of the existing key servers (I think they bail out on some rfc2440
+packet formats).
+
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
index f12549187..5d5370ba2 100644
--- a/TODO
+++ b/TODO
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Important
 
     * print a warning when a revoked/expired secret key is used.
 
-    * Allow the use of a the faked RNG onyl for keys which are
+    * Allow the use of a the faked RNG only for keys which are
       flagged as INSECURE.
 
 
@@ -55,6 +55,5 @@ Nice to have
     * Burn the buffers used by fopen(), or use read(2). Does this
       really make sense?
     * change the fake_data stuff to mpi_set_opaque
-    * rewrite the ugly armor code.
 
 
diff --git a/cipher/ChangeLog b/cipher/ChangeLog
index 347d3469c..ad7d6f83b 100644
--- a/cipher/ChangeLog
+++ b/cipher/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
+Sat Jan  9 16:02:23 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* rndunix.c (gather_random): check for setuid.
+
+	* Makefile.am: Add a way to staically link random modules
+
 Thu Jan  7 18:00:58 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
 	* md.c (md_stop_debug): Do a flush first.
diff --git a/cipher/Makefile.am b/cipher/Makefile.am
index a27989cb0..4a7171071 100644
--- a/cipher/Makefile.am
+++ b/cipher/Makefile.am
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
 ## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in
 
-gnupg_extensions = tiger twofish rndunix
-
 INCLUDES =  -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/intl
 
 noinst_LIBRARIES = libcipher.a
+
+EXTRA_PROGRAMS	 = tiger twofish rndunix rndlinux
 if ENABLE_GNUPG_EXTENSIONS
-pkglib_PROGRAMS  = $(gnupg_extensions)
+pkglib_PROGRAMS  = @DYNAMIC_CIPHER_MODS@ @DYNAMIC_RANDOM_MODS@
 else
 pkglib_PROGRAMS  =
 endif
 
-DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS = -DIS_MODULE @DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS@
 
+DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS = -DIS_MODULE @DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS@
 
 libcipher_a_SOURCES = cipher.c	\
 		 pubkey.c	\
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ libcipher_a_SOURCES = cipher.c	\
 		 random.h	\
 		 random.c	\
 		 rand-internal.h \
-		 rndlinux.c	\
 		 rmd.h		\
 		 rmd160.c	\
 		 sha1.h 	\
@@ -43,9 +42,14 @@ libcipher_a_SOURCES = cipher.c	\
 		 g10c.c 	\
 		 smallprime.c
 
+
+EXTRA_libcipher_a_SOURCES = rndlinux.c rndunix.c
 EXTRA_tiger_SOURCES = tiger.c
 EXTRA_twofish_SOURCES = twofish.c
 
+libcipher_a_DEPENDENCIES = @STATIC_RANDOM_OBJS@ @STATIC_CIPHER_OBJS@
+libcipher_a_LIBADD =	   @STATIC_RANDOM_OBJS@ @STATIC_CIPHER_OBJS@
+
 
 tiger: $(srcdir)/tiger.c
 	`echo $(COMPILE) $(DYNLINK_MOD_CFLAGS) -o tiger $(srcdir)/tiger.c | \
diff --git a/cipher/md.c b/cipher/md.c
index f7be5e4cc..6e335db80 100644
--- a/cipher/md.c
+++ b/cipher/md.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* md.c  -  message digest dispatcher
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998,1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
diff --git a/cipher/random.c b/cipher/random.c
index 6f8a20aa1..1812467ae 100644
--- a/cipher/random.c
+++ b/cipher/random.c
@@ -122,13 +122,9 @@ initialize()
   #elif USE_RNDUNIX
     rndunix_constructor();
   #elif USE_RNDW32
-    rndw32_constructor();
   #elif USE_RNDOS2
-    rndos2_constructor();
   #elif USE_RNDATARI
-    rndatari_constructor();
   #elif USE_RNDMVS
-    rndmvs_constructor();
   #endif
 }
 
diff --git a/cipher/rndunix.c b/cipher/rndunix.c
index c005afba4..9e49ebc75 100644
--- a/cipher/rndunix.c
+++ b/cipher/rndunix.c
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
  *									    *
  *   BeOS Randomness-Gathering Code					    *
  *   Copyright Peter Gutmann, Paul Kendall, and Chris Wedgwood 1996-1998    *
+ *   Copyright (C) 1998, 1999  Werner Koch
  *									    *
  ****************************************************************************/
 
@@ -678,6 +679,9 @@ gather_random( void (*add)(const void*, size_t, int), int requester,
     size_t n;
 
     if( !gatherer_pid ) {
+	/* make sure we are not setuid */
+	if( getuid() != geteuid() )
+	    BUG();
 	/* time to start the gatherer process */
 	if( pipe( pipedes ) ) {
 	    g10_log_error("pipe() failed: %s\n", strerror(errno));
diff --git a/configure.in b/configure.in
index f7104866b..6fcc58af1 100644
--- a/configure.in
+++ b/configure.in
@@ -259,6 +259,48 @@ else
 fi
 
 
+dnl
+dnl Figure how to link the random modules
+dnl
+if test "$ac_cv_have_dev_random" = yes; then
+    AC_DEFINE(USE_RNDLINUX)
+    STATIC_RANDOM_OBJS="rndlinux.o"
+    DYNAMIC_RANDOM_MODS=""
+else
+    case "${target}" in
+        i386--mingw32)
+            AC_DEFINE(USE_RNDW32)
+            STATIC_RANDOM_OBJS=""
+            DYNAMIC_RANDOM_MODS=""
+            ;;
+        m68k-atari-mint)
+            AC_DEFINE(USE_RNDATARI)
+            STATIC_RANDOM_OBJS=""
+            DYNAMIC_RANDOM_MODS=""
+            ;;
+        *)
+            AC_DEFINE(USE_RNDUNIX)
+            STATIC_RANDOM_OBJS="rndunix.o"
+            DYNAMIC_RANDOM_MODS=""
+           ;;
+    esac
+fi
+
+AC_SUBST(STATIC_RANDOM_OBJS)
+AC_SUBST(DYNAMIC_RANDOM_MODS)
+
+
+dnl
+dnl Figure how to link the cipher modules
+dnl
+dnl (form now these are only dynamic)
+STATIC_CIPHER_OBJS=""
+DYNAMIC_CIPHER_MODS="twofish tiger"
+AC_SUBST(STATIC_CIPHER_OBJS)
+AC_SUBST(DYNAMIC_CIPHER_MODS)
+
+
+
 dnl setup assembler stuff
 AC_MSG_CHECKING(for mpi assembler functions)
 if test -f $srcdir/mpi/config.links ; then
diff --git a/debian/README.Debian b/debian/README.Debian
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f59643715
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/README.Debian
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+Due to a bug in the way secret keys were encrypted in versions prior
+to 0.3.3, later version of gnupg are not backwards compatible and you
+will have to convert your secret keys before using old secret keys
+with recent versions of gnupg.
+
+The upgrade strategy is described in /usr/doc/gnupg/NEWS.gz, please
+refer to it for more details, but it requires an old copy of the gpg
+and gpgm binaries.  They may be on your system as gpg.old and
+gpgm.old, but if they're not you can find gnupg 0.3.2 source and
+binaries for i386, m68k, alpha, powerpc and hurd-i386 at:
+
+  <URL:http://james.nocrew.org/gnupg/>
+
+-- 
+James Troup <[email protected]>, Bradford, UK
+Sun,  8 Nov 1998 19:11:40 +0000
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f8f9eebd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+gnupg (0.9.0-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * g10/armor.c (armor_filter): add missing new line in comment string; as
+    noticed by Stainless Steel Rat <[email protected]>.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Tue, 29 Dec 1998 20:22:43 +0000
+
+gnupg (0.4.5-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * debian/rules (clean): force removal of intl/libintl.h which the
+    Makefiles fail to remove properly.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Tue,  8 Dec 1998 22:40:23 +0000
+
+gnupg (0.4.4-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Sat, 21 Nov 1998 01:34:29 +0000
+
+gnupg (0.4.3-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * debian/README.Debian: new file; contains same information as is in the
+    preinst.  Suggested by Wichert Akkerman <[email protected]>.
+  * debian/rules (binary-arch): install `README.Debian'
+  * debian/control (Standards-Version): updated to 2.5.0.0.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Sun,  8 Nov 1998 19:08:12 +0000
+
+gnupg (0.4.2-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * debian/preinst: improve message about the NEWS file which isn't
+    actually installed when it's referred to, thanks to Martin Mitchell
+    <[email protected]>.  
+  * debian/rules (binary-arch): don't install the now non-existent `rfcs',
+    but do install `OpenPGP'.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Sun, 18 Oct 1998 22:48:34 +0100
+
+gnupg (0.4.1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * debian/rules (binary-arch): fix the gpgm manpage symlink now installed
+    by `make install'.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Sun, 11 Oct 1998 17:01:21 +0100
+
+gnupg (0.4.0-1) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  * New upstream version. [#26717]
+  * debian/copyright: tone down warning about alpha nature of gnupg.
+  * debian/copyright: new maintainer address.
+  * debian/control: update extended description.
+  * debian/rules (binary-arch): install FAQ and all ChangeLogs.
+  * debian/preinst: new; check for upgrade from (<= 0.3.2-1) and warn about
+    incompatabilites in keyring format and offer to move old copy out of
+    gpg out of the way for transistion strategy and inform the user about
+    the old copies of gnupg available on my web page.
+  * debian/rules (binary-arch) install preinst.
+  * debian/rules (binary-arch): don't depend on the test target as it is
+    now partially interactive (tries to generate a key, which requires
+    someone else to be using the computer).
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Thu,  8 Oct 1998 00:47:07 +0100
+
+gnupg (0.3.2-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * debian/control (Maintainer): new address.
+  * debian/copyright: updated list of changes.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Thu,  9 Jul 1998 21:06:07 +0200
+
+gnupg (0.3.1-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Tue,  7 Jul 1998 00:26:21 +0200
+
+gnupg (0.3.0-2) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * Applied bug-fix patch from Werner.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Fri, 26 Jun 1998 12:18:29 +0200
+
+gnupg (0.3.0-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * debian/control: rewrote short and long description.
+  * cipher/Makefile.am: link tiger with -lc.
+  * debian/rules (binary-arch): strip loadable modules.
+  * util/secmem.c (lock_pool): get rid of errant test code; fix from
+    Werner Koch <[email protected]>.
+  * debian/rules (test): new target which runs gnupg's test suite.
+    binary-arch depends on it, to ensure it's run whenever the package is
+    built.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Thu, 25 Jun 1998 16:04:57 +0200
+
+gnupg (0.2.19-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * debian/control: Updated long description.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Sat, 30 May 1998 12:12:35 +0200
+
+gnupg (0.2.18-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Sat, 16 May 1998 11:52:47 +0200
+
+gnupg (0.2.17-1) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * debian/control (Standards-Version): updated to 2.4.1.0.
+  * debian/control: tone down warning about alpha nature of gnupg, as per
+    README.
+  * debian/copyright: ditto.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Mon,  4 May 1998 22:36:51 +0200
+
+gnupg (0.2.15-1) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  * New upstream version.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Fri, 10 Apr 1998 01:12:20 +0100
+
+gnupg (0.2.13-1) unstable; urgency=high
+
+  * New upstream version.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Wed, 11 Mar 1998 01:52:51 +0000
+
+gnupg (0.2.12-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Sat,  7 Mar 1998 13:52:40 +0000
+
+gnupg (0.2.11-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Wed,  4 Mar 1998 01:32:12 +0000
+
+gnupg (0.2.10-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * New upstream version.
+  * Name changed upstream.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Mon,  2 Mar 1998 07:32:05 +0000
+
+g10 (0.2.7-1) unstable; urgency=low
+
+  * Initial release.
+
+ -- James Troup <[email protected]>  Fri, 20 Feb 1998 02:05:34 +0000
+
+Local variables:
+mode: debian-changelog
+End:
diff --git a/debian/control b/debian/control
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c5f906e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/control
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+Source: gnupg
+Section: utils
+Priority: optional
+Maintainer: James Troup <[email protected]>
+Standards-Version: 2.5.0.0
+
+Package: gnupg
+Architecture: any
+Depends: ${shlibs:Depends}
+Description: GNU privacy guard - a free PGP replacement.
+ GNUPG is the GNU encryption and signing tool.  As you can see from the 
+ version number, the program may have some bugs and some features may not 
+ work at all.
+ .
+ Due to the fact that GNUPG does not use use any patented algorithm,
+ it cannot be compatible to old PGP versions, because those use
+ IDEA (which is worldwide patented) and RSA (which is patented in
+ the United States until Sep 20, 2000).  
+ .
+ GNUPG is in almost all aspects compatible with other OpenPGP
+ implementations. The default algorithms are DSA and ELGamal.  
+ Symmetric algorithms are: Blowfish and CAST5, Digest algorithms are
+ MD5, RIPEMD160, SHA1 and TIGER/192.
diff --git a/debian/copyright b/debian/copyright
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bf1042084
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/copyright
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+This is Debian/GNU Linux's prepackaged version of GNUPG, a free PGP
+replacement. As you can see from the version number, the program may
+have some bugs and some features may not work at all.
+
+This package was put together by me, James Troup
+<[email protected]>, from the sources, which I obtained from
+ftp://ftp.guug.de/pub/gcrypt/gnupg-0.9.0.tar.gz.  The changes were
+minimal, namely:
+
+- adding support for the Debian package maintenance scheme, by adding
+  various debian/* files.  
+
+Program Copyright (C) 1997, 1998 Werner Koch (dd9jn).
+Modifications for Debian Copyright (C) 1998 James Troup.
+
+GNUPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option)
+any later version.
+
+GNUPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+General Public License for more details.
+
+You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License with
+your Debian GNU/Linux system, in /usr/doc/copyright/GPL, or with the
+Debian GNU/Linux gnupg source package as the file COPYING.  If not,
+write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite
+330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA.
diff --git a/debian/distfiles b/debian/distfiles
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..df6fac50c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/distfiles
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+README.Debian
+changelog
+control
+copyright
+distfiles
+preinst
+rules
diff --git a/debian/preinst b/debian/preinst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8369e2013
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/preinst
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+set -e
+
+case "$1" in
+    upgrade|install)
+	# Try to gracefully handle upgrades from a pre-0.3.3 version
+
+	if [ ! -z $2 ]; then
+	    set +e
+	    dpkg --compare-versions $2 \<= 0.3.2-1
+	    result=$?
+	    set -e
+	    if [ $result = 0 ]; then
+		cat <<EOF
+Due to a bug in the way secret keys were encrypted in versions prior
+to 0.3.3, this version of gnupg is not backwards compatible with $2
+which you have (had) installed on your system.  
+
+There is an upgrade strategy (see /usr/doc/gnupg/NEWS.gz after this
+version is installed), but it requires an old copy of the gpg and gpgm
+EOF
+		echo -n "binaries; shall I make copies of them for you (Y/n)? "
+		read answer
+		if [ ! "$answer" = "n" -a ! "$answer" = "N" ]; then
+		    cp /usr/bin/gpg /usr/bin/gpg.old
+		    cp /usr/bin/gpgm /usr/bin/gpgm.old
+		    echo "Okay, done.  The old versions are /usr/bin/gpg*.old"
+		else
+		    echo "Okay, I haven't made backups."
+		fi;	
+		cat <<EOF
+
+If at any stage you need a pre-0.3.3 gnupg, you can find source and
+binaries for i386, m68k, alpha, powerpc and hurd-i386 at 
+
+   http://james.nocrew.org/gnupg/
+
+Press return to continue
+EOF
+		read foo
+	    fi;
+	fi;
+	;;
+    abort-upgrade)
+	;;
+esac
diff --git a/debian/rules b/debian/rules
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..aa074754f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/rules
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#!/usr/bin/make -f
+# debian/rules file - for GNUPG (0.9.0)
+# Based on sample debian/rules file - for GNU Hello (1.3).
+# Copyright 1994,1995 by Ian Jackson.
+# Copyright 1998 James Troup
+# I hereby give you perpetual unlimited permission to copy,
+# modify and relicense this file, provided that you do not remove
+# my name from the file itself.  (I assert my moral right of
+# paternity under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.)
+# This file may have to be extensively modified
+
+build:
+	$(checkdir)
+	./configure --prefix=/usr --with-included-gettext
+	$(MAKE) CFLAGS="-O2 -g -Wall"
+	touch build
+
+test: build
+	$(checkdir)
+	make -C checks check || exit 127
+	touch test
+
+clean:
+	$(checkdir)
+	-rm -f build
+	-$(MAKE) -i distclean || $(MAKE) -f Makefile.in distclean
+	-rm -rf debian/tmp debian/*~ debian/files* debian/substvars
+	# Cruft not removed by `make clean'
+	-rm -f intl/libintl.h
+
+binary-indep:
+
+binary-arch:	checkroot build # test
+	$(checkdir)
+	-rm -rf debian/tmp
+	install -d debian/tmp/DEBIAN/
+	install -m 755 debian/preinst debian/tmp/DEBIAN/preinst
+	$(MAKE) prefix=`pwd`/debian/tmp/usr install
+	rm debian/tmp/usr/man/man1/gpgm.1
+	gzip -9v debian/tmp/usr/man/man1/*
+	ln -s gpg.1.gz debian/tmp/usr/man/man1/gpgm.1.gz
+	strip debian/tmp/usr/bin/*
+	strip --strip-unneeded debian/tmp/usr/lib/gnupg/*
+	install -d debian/tmp/usr/doc/gnupg/
+	install -m 644 debian/changelog debian/tmp/usr/doc/gnupg/changelog.Debian
+	install -m 644 debian/README.Debian README NEWS THANKS TODO doc/DETAILS \
+		doc/FAQ doc/OpenPGP debian/tmp/usr/doc/gnupg/
+	for i in po util mpi cipher tools g10 checks include; do \
+		install -m 644 $$i/ChangeLog debian/tmp/usr/doc/gnupg/changelog.$$i; done
+	install -m 644 ChangeLog debian/tmp/usr/doc/gnupg/changelog.toplevel
+	gzip -9v debian/tmp/usr/doc/gnupg/*
+	ln -s changelog.g10.gz debian/tmp/usr/doc/gnupg/changelog.gz
+	install -m 644 debian/copyright debian/tmp/usr/doc/gnupg/
+	dpkg-shlibdeps g10/gpg
+	dpkg-gencontrol -isp
+	chown -R root.root debian/tmp
+	chmod -R go=rX debian/tmp
+	dpkg --build debian/tmp ..
+
+define checkdir
+	test -f g10/g10.c -a -f debian/rules
+endef
+
+# Below here is fairly generic really
+
+binary:		binary-indep binary-arch
+
+checkroot:
+	$(checkdir)
+	test root = "`whoami`"
+
+.PHONY: binary binary-arch binary-indep clean checkroot
diff --git a/doc/DETAILS b/doc/DETAILS
index 554139653..346e809af 100644
--- a/doc/DETAILS
+++ b/doc/DETAILS
@@ -40,6 +40,62 @@ ssb::1536:20:5CE086B5B5A18FF4:1998-07-07:0:::
 More fields may be added later.
 
 
+Format of the "--status-fd" output
+==================================
+Every line is prefixed with "[GNUPG:] ", followed by a keyword with
+the type of the status line and a some arguments depending on the
+type (maybe none); an application should always be prepared to see
+more argumnents in future versions.
+
+
+    GOODSIG	<long keyid>  <username>
+	The signature with the keyid is good.
+
+    BADSIG	<long keyid>  <username>
+	The signature with the keyid has not been verified okay.
+
+    ERRSIG
+	It was not possible to check the signature.  This may be
+	caused by a missing public key or an unsupported algorithm.
+	No argumens yet.
+
+    VALIDSIG	<fingerprint in hex>
+	The signature with the keyid is good. This is the same
+	as GOODSIG but has the fingerprint as the argument. Both
+	status lines ere emmited for a good signature.
+
+    TRUST_UNDEFINED
+    TRUST_NEVER
+    TRUST_MARGINAL
+    TRUST_FULLY
+    TRUST_ULTIMATE
+	For good signatures one of these status lines are emitted
+	to indicate how trustworthy the signatur is.  No arguments yet.
+
+    SIGEXPIRED
+	The signature key has expired.	No arguments yet.
+
+    KEYREVOKED
+	The used key has been revoked by his owner.  No arguments yet.
+
+    BADARMOR
+	The ascii armor is corrupted.  No arguments yet.
+
+    RSA_OR_IDEA
+	The RSA or IDEA algorithms has been used in the data.  A
+	program might want to fallback to another program to handle
+	the data if GnuPG failed.
+
+    SHM_INFO
+    SHM_GET
+    SHM_GET_BOOL
+    SHM_GET_HIDDEN
+    NEED_PASSPHRASE
+	[Needs documentation]
+
+
+
+
 Key generation
 ==============
     Key generation shows progress by printing different characters to
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index 532fa472b..f42b743b1 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+Sat Jan  9 16:02:23 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* sig-check.c (do_check): Output time diff on error
+
+	* status.c (STATUS_VALIDSIG): New.
+	(is_status_enabled): New.
+	* mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Issue that status message.
+
+	* plaintext.c (special_md_putc): Removed
+
+	* armor.c (armor_filter): print error for truncated lines.
+
+	* free-packet.c (free_encrypted): Revomed call to set_block_mode.
+	(free_plaintext): Ditto.
+
 Thu Jan  7 18:00:58 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
 	* pkclist.c (add_ownertrust): Fixed return value.
diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c
index be0e69bf0..1d58c4146 100644
--- a/g10/armor.c
+++ b/g10/armor.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* armor.c - Armor flter
- *	Copyright (C) 1998,1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -254,415 +254,6 @@ parse_hash_header( const char *line )
 
 
 
-#if 0 /* old code */
-/****************
- * parse an ascii armor.
- * Returns: the state,
- *	    the remaining bytes in BUF are returned in RBUFLEN.
- *	    r_empty return the # of empty lines before the buffer
- */
-static fhdr_state_t
-find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen,
-	     IOBUF a, size_t n, unsigned *r_empty, int *r_hashes,
-	     int only_keyblocks, int *not_dashed )
-{
-    int c=0, i;
-    const char *s;
-    byte *p;
-    size_t buflen;
-    int cont;
-    int clearsig=0;
-    int hdr_line=0;
-    unsigned empty = 0;
-
-    buflen = *r_buflen;
-    assert(buflen >= 100 );
-    buflen -= 4; /* reserved room for CR,LF, and two extra */
-    do {
-	switch( state ) {
-	  case fhdrHASArmor:
-	    /* read at least the first byte to check whether it is armored
-	     * or not */
-	    c = 0;
-	    for(n=0; n < 28 && (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 && c != '\n'; )
-		buf[n++] = c;
-	    if( !n && c == '\n' )
-		state = fhdrCHECKBegin;
-	    else if( !n  || c == -1 )
-		state = fhdrNOArmor; /* too short */
-	    else if( !is_armored( buf ) ) {
-		state = fhdrNOArmor;
-		if( c == '\n' )
-		    buf[n++] = c;
-	    }
-	    else if( c == '\n' )
-		state = fhdrCHECKBegin;
-	    else
-		state = fhdrINITCont;
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrINIT: /* read some stuff into buffer */
-	    n = 0;
-	  case fhdrINITCont: /* read more stuff into buffer */
-	    c = 0;
-	    for(; n < buflen && (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 && c != '\n'; )
-		buf[n++] = c;
-	    state = c == '\n' ? fhdrCHECKBegin :
-		     c == -1  ? fhdrEOF : fhdrINITSkip;
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrINITSkip:
-	    if( c == '\n' )
-		n = 0;
-	    else {
-		while( (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 && c != '\n' )
-		    ;
-	    }
-	    state =  c == -1? fhdrEOF : fhdrINIT;
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrSKIPHeader:
-	    while( (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 && c != '\n' )
-		;
-	    state =  c == -1? fhdrEOF : fhdrWAITHeader;
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrWAITHeader: /* wait for Header lines */
-	    c = 0;
-	    for(n=0; n < buflen && (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 && c != '\n'; )
-		buf[n++] = c;
-	    buf[n] = 0;
-	    if( n < buflen || c == '\n' ) {
-		if( n && buf[0] != '\r') { /* maybe a header */
-		    if( strchr( buf, ':') ) { /* yes */
-			int hashes=0;
-			if( buf[n-1] == '\r' )
-			    buf[--n] = 0;
-			if( opt.verbose ) {
-			    log_info(_("armor header: "));
-			    print_string( stderr, buf, n, 0 );
-			    putc('\n', stderr);
-			}
-			if( clearsig && !(hashes=parse_hash_header( buf )) ) {
-			    if( strlen(buf) > 15
-				&& !memcmp( buf, "NotDashEscaped:", 15 ) ) {
-				*not_dashed = 1;
-				state = fhdrWAITHeader;
-			    }
-			    else {
-				log_error(_("invalid clearsig header\n"));
-				state = fhdrERROR;
-			    }
-			}
-			else {
-			    state = fhdrWAITHeader;
-			    if( r_hashes )
-				*r_hashes |= hashes;
-			}
-		    }
-		    else if( clearsig && n > 15 && !memcmp(buf, "-----", 5 ) )
-			state = fhdrNullClearsig;
-		    else
-			state = fhdrCHECKDashEscaped3;
-		}
-		else if( !n || (buf[0] == '\r' && !buf[1]) ) { /* empty line */
-		    if( clearsig )
-			state = fhdrWAITClearsig;
-		    else {
-			/* this is not really correct: if we do not have
-			 * a clearsig and no armor lines we are not allowed
-			 * to have an empty line */
-			n = 0;
-			state = fhdrTEXT;
-		    }
-		}
-		else {
-		    log_error(_("invalid armor header: "));
-		    print_string( stderr, buf, n, 0 );
-		    putc('\n', stderr);
-		    state = fhdrERROR;
-		}
-	    }
-	    else if( c != -1 ) {
-		if( strchr( buf, ':') ) { /* buffer to short, but this is okay*/
-		    if( opt.verbose ) {
-			log_info(_("armor header: "));
-			print_string( stderr, buf, n, 0 );
-			fputs("[...]\n", stderr);  /* indicate it is truncated */
-		    }
-		    state = fhdrSKIPHeader;  /* skip rest of line */
-		}
-		else /* line too long */
-		    state = fhdrERROR;
-	    }
-	    else
-		state = fhdrEOF;
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrWAITClearsig: /* skip the empty line (for clearsig) */
-	    c = 0;
-	    for(n=0; n < buflen && (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 && c != '\n'; )
-		buf[n++] = c;
-	    if( c != -1 ) {
-		if( n > 15 && !memcmp(buf, "-----", 5 ) )
-		    state = fhdrNullClearsig;
-		else if( c != '\n' )
-		    state = fhdrREADClearsigNext;
-		else
-		    state = fhdrCHECKDashEscaped3;
-	    }
-	    else {
-		/* fixme: we should check whether this line continues
-		 *   it is possible that we have only read ws until here
-		 *   and more stuff is to come */
-		state = fhdrEOF;
-	    }
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrNullClearsig: /* zero length cleartext */
-	    state = fhdrENDClearsig;
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrENDClearsig:
-	  case fhdrCHECKBegin:
-	    state = state == fhdrCHECKBegin ? fhdrINITSkip : fhdrERRORShow;
-	    if( n < 15 )
-		break;	/* too short */
-	    if( memcmp( buf, "-----", 5 ) )
-		break;
-	    buf[n] = 0;
-	    p = strstr(buf+5, "-----");
-	    if( !p )
-		break;
-	    *p = 0;
-	    p += 5;
-	    if( *p == '\r' )
-		p++;
-	    if( *p )
-		break; /* garbage after dashes */
-	    p = buf+5;
-	    for(i=0; (s=head_strings[i]); i++ )
-		if( !strcmp(s, p) )
-		    break;
-	    if( !s )
-		break; /* unknown begin line */
-	    if( only_keyblocks && i != 1 && i != 5 && i != 6 )
-		break; /* not a keyblock armor */
-
-	    /* found the begin line */
-	    hdr_line = i;
-	    state = fhdrWAITHeader;
-	    *not_dashed = 0;
-	    if( hdr_line == BEGIN_SIGNED_MSG_IDX )
-		clearsig = 1;
-	    if( opt.verbose > 1 )
-		log_info(_("armor: %s\n"), head_strings[hdr_line]);
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrCLEARSIGSimple:
-	    /* we are at the begin of a new line */
-	  case fhdrCLEARSIGSimpleNext:
-	    n = 0;
-	    c = 0;
-	    while( n < buflen && (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 ) {
-		buf[n++] = c;
-		if( c == '\n' )
-		    break;
-	    }
-	    buf[n] = 0;
-	    if( c == -1 )
-		state = fhdrEOF;
-	    else if( state == fhdrCLEARSIGSimple
-		     && n > 15 && !memcmp(buf, "-----", 5 ) ) {
-		if( c == '\n' )
-		    buf[n-1] = 0;
-		state = fhdrENDClearsig;
-	    }
-	    else if( c == '\n' )
-		state = fhdrCLEARSIGSimple;
-	    else
-		state = fhdrCLEARSIGSimpleNext;
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrCLEARSIG:
-	  case fhdrEMPTYClearsig:
-	  case fhdrREADClearsig:
-	    /* we are at the start of a line: read a clearsig into the buffer
-	     * we have to look for a header line or dashed escaped text*/
-	    n = 0;
-	    c = 0;
-	    while( n < buflen && (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 && c != '\n' )
-		buf[n++] = c;
-	    buf[n] = 0;
-	    if( c == -1 )
-		state = fhdrEOF;
-	    else if( !n || ( buf[0]=='\r' && !buf[1] ) ) {
-		state = fhdrEMPTYClearsig;
-		empty++;
-	    }
-	    else if( c == '\n' )
-		state = fhdrCHECKClearsig2;
-	    else
-		state = fhdrCHECKClearsig;
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrCHECKDashEscaped3:
-	    if( *not_dashed ) {
-		state = fhdrTEXTSimple;
-		break;
-	    }
-	    if( !(n > 1 && buf[0] == '-' && buf[1] == ' ' ) ) {
-		state = fhdrTEXT;
-		break;
-	    }
-	    /* fall through */
-	  case fhdrCHECKDashEscaped2:
-	  case fhdrCHECKDashEscaped:
-	    /* check dash escaped line */
-	    if( buf[2] == '-' || ( n > 6 && !memcmp(buf+2, "From ", 5))) {
-		for(i=2; i < n; i++ )
-		    buf[i-2] = buf[i];
-		n -= 2;
-		buf[n] = 0; /* not really needed */
-		state = state == fhdrCHECKDashEscaped3 ? fhdrTEXT :
-			state == fhdrCHECKDashEscaped2 ?
-				 fhdrREADClearsig : fhdrTESTSpaces;
-	    }
-	    else {
-		log_error(_("invalid dash escaped line: "));
-		print_string( stderr, buf, n, 0 );
-		putc('\n', stderr);
-		state = fhdrERROR;
-	    }
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrCHECKClearsig:
-	    /* check the clearsig line */
-	    if( n > 15 && !memcmp(buf, "-----", 5 ) )
-		state = fhdrENDClearsig;
-	    else if( buf[0] == '-' && buf[1] == ' ' && !*not_dashed )
-		state = fhdrCHECKDashEscaped;
-	    else {
-		state = fhdrTESTSpaces;
-	    }
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrCHECKClearsig2:
-	    /* check the clearsig line */
-	    if( n > 15 && !memcmp(buf, "-----", 5 ) )
-		state = fhdrENDClearsig;
-	    else if( buf[0] == '-' && buf[1] == ' ' && !*not_dashed )
-		state = fhdrCHECKDashEscaped2;
-	    else {
-		state = fhdrREADClearsig;
-	    }
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrREADClearsigNext:
-	    /* Read to the end of the line, do not care about checking
-	     * for dashed escaped text of headers */
-	    c = 0;
-	    n = 0;
-	    while( n < buflen && (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 && c != '\n' )
-		buf[n++] = c;
-	    buf[n] = 0;
-	    if( c == -1 )
-		state = fhdrEOF;
-	    else if( c == '\n' )
-		state = fhdrREADClearsig;
-	    else
-		state = fhdrTESTSpaces;
-	    break;
-
-	  case fhdrTESTSpaces: {
-	    /* but must check whether the rest of the line
-	     * only contains white spaces; this is problematic
-	     * since we may have to restore the stuff.	simply
-	     * counting spaces is not enough, because it may be a
-	     * mix of different white space characters */
-	    IOBUF b = iobuf_temp();
-	    while( (c=iobuf_get(a)) != -1 && c != '\n' ) {
-		iobuf_put(b,c);
-		if( c != ' ' && c != '\t' && c != '\r' )
-		    break;
-	    }
-	    if( c == '\n' ) {
-		/* okay we can skip the rest of the line */
-		iobuf_close(b);
-		state = fhdrREADClearsig;
-	    }
-	    else {
-		iobuf_unget_and_close_temp(a,b);
-		state = fhdrREADClearsigNext;
-	    }
-	  } break;
-
-	  case fhdrERRORShow:
-	    log_error(_("invalid clear text header: "));
-	    print_string( stderr, buf, n, 0 );
-	    putc('\n', stderr);
-	    state = fhdrERROR;
-	    break;
-
-	  default: BUG();
-	}
-	switch( state ) {
-	  case fhdrINIT:
-	  case fhdrINITCont:
-	  case fhdrINITSkip:
-	  case fhdrCHECKBegin:
-	  case fhdrWAITHeader:
-	  case fhdrWAITClearsig:
-	  case fhdrSKIPHeader:
-	  case fhdrEMPTYClearsig:
-	  case fhdrCHECKClearsig:
-	  case fhdrCHECKClearsig2:
-	  case fhdrCHECKDashEscaped:
-	  case fhdrCHECKDashEscaped2:
-	  case fhdrCHECKDashEscaped3:
-	  case fhdrTESTSpaces:
-	  case fhdrERRORShow:
-	    cont = 1;
-	    break;
-	  default: cont = 0;
-	}
-    } while( cont );
-
-    if( clearsig && state == fhdrTEXT ) {
-	state = fhdrCLEARSIG;
-    }
-    else if( clearsig && state == fhdrTEXTSimple ) {
-	state = fhdrCLEARSIGSimple;
-	buf[n] = '\n';
-	n++;
-    }
-
-    if( state == fhdrCLEARSIG || state == fhdrREADClearsig ) {
-	/* append CR,LF after removing trailing wspaces */
-	for(p=buf+n-1; n; n--, p-- ) {
-	    assert( *p != '\n' );
-	    if( *p != ' ' && *p != '\t' && *p != '\r' ) {
-		p[1] = '\r';
-		p[2] = '\n';
-		n += 2;
-		break;
-	    }
-	}
-	if( !n ) {
-	    buf[0] = '\r';
-	    buf[1] = '\n';
-	    n = 2;
-	}
-    }
-
-  fprintf(stderr,"ARMOR READ (state=%d): %.*s", state, n, buf );
-
-    *r_buflen = n;
-    *r_empty = empty;
-    return state;
-}
-#endif
-
 
 static unsigned
 trim_trailing_spaces( byte *line, unsigned len )
@@ -909,8 +500,10 @@ fake_packet( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a,
 	else {
 	    while( len < size && afx->buffer_pos < afx->buffer_len )
 		buf[len++] = afx->buffer[afx->buffer_pos++];
-	    buf[len++] = '\r';
-	    buf[len++] = '\n';
+	    if( afx->buffer_pos >= afx->buffer_len ) {
+		buf[len++] = '\r';
+		buf[len++] = '\n';
+	    }
 	    if( len >= size )
 		continue;
 	}
@@ -948,8 +541,8 @@ fake_packet( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a,
 		    putc('\n', stderr);
 		}
 		lastline = 1;
-		assert( len >= 4 );
-		len -= 2; /* remove the last CR,LF */
+		if( len >= 2 )
+		    len -= 2; /* remove the last CR,LF */
 		rc = -1;
 	    }
 	}
@@ -958,7 +551,7 @@ fake_packet( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a,
     buf[0] = (len-2) >> 8;
     buf[1] = (len-2);
     if( lastline ) { /* write last (ending) length header */
-	if( buf[0] && buf[1] ) { /* only if we have some text */
+	if( buf[0] || buf[1] ) { /* only if we have some text */
 	    buf[len++] = 0;
 	    buf[len++] = 0;
 	}
@@ -1134,7 +727,7 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
     int  idx, idx2;
     size_t n=0;
     u32 crc;
-  #if 1
+  #if 0
     static FILE *fp ;
 
     if( !fp ) {
@@ -1232,7 +825,7 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
 	}
 	else
 	    rc = radix64_read( afx, a, &n, buf, size );
-      #if 1
+      #if 0
 	if( n )
 	    if( fwrite(buf, n, 1, fp ) != 1 )
 		BUG();
@@ -1367,6 +960,9 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control,
 	}
 	else if( !afx->any_data && !afx->inp_bypass )
 	    log_error(_("no valid OpenPGP data found.\n"));
+	if( afx->truncated )
+	    log_info(_("invalid armor: line longer than %d characters\n"),
+		      MAX_LINELEN );
 	m_free( afx->buffer );
 	afx->buffer = NULL;
     }
diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
index 5b952f153..a1eb12623 100644
--- a/g10/build-packet.c
+++ b/g10/build-packet.c
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ do_plaintext( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_plaintext *pt )
 {
     int i, rc = 0;
     u32 n;
-    byte buf[1000]; /* FIXME: this buffer has the plaintext! */
+    byte buf[1000]; /* this buffer has the plaintext! */
     int nbytes;
 
     write_header(out, ctb, calc_plaintext( pt ) );
diff --git a/g10/encr-data.c b/g10/encr-data.c
index d44d6c245..c5967c23b 100644
--- a/g10/encr-data.c
+++ b/g10/encr-data.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* encr-data.c -  process an encrypted data packet
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -79,10 +79,12 @@ decrypt_data( PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek )
     cipher_setiv( dfx.cipher_hd, NULL );
 
     if( ed->len ) {
-	/*iobuf_set_limit( ed->buf, ed->len );*/
-
-	for(i=0; i < (blocksize+2) && ed->len; i++, ed->len-- )
-	    temp[i] = iobuf_get(ed->buf);
+	for(i=0; i < (blocksize+2) && ed->len; i++, ed->len-- ) {
+	    if( (c=iobuf_get(ed->buf)) == -1 )
+		break;
+	    else
+		temp[i] = c;
+	}
     }
     else {
 	for(i=0; i < (blocksize+2); i++ )
@@ -100,13 +102,6 @@ decrypt_data( PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek )
     }
     iobuf_push_filter( ed->buf, decode_filter, &dfx );
     proc_packets(ed->buf);
-  #if 0
-    iobuf_pop_filter( ed->buf, decode_filter, &dfx );
-    if( ed->len )
-	iobuf_set_limit( ed->buf, 0 ); /* disable the readlimit */
-    else
-	iobuf_clear_eof( ed->buf );
-  #endif
     ed->buf = NULL;
     cipher_close(dfx.cipher_hd);
     return 0;
diff --git a/g10/free-packet.c b/g10/free-packet.c
index 3e3c9d054..e953b0d45 100644
--- a/g10/free-packet.c
+++ b/g10/free-packet.c
@@ -264,7 +264,6 @@ free_encrypted( PKT_encrypted *ed )
 	if( iobuf_in_block_mode(ed->buf) ) {
 	    while( iobuf_get(ed->buf) != -1 )
 		;
-	    iobuf_set_block_mode(ed->buf, 0);
 	}
 	else {
 	    for( ; ed->len; ed->len-- ) /* skip the packet */
@@ -282,7 +281,6 @@ free_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt )
 	if( iobuf_in_block_mode(pt->buf) ) {
 	    while( iobuf_get(pt->buf) != -1 )
 		;
-	    iobuf_set_block_mode(pt->buf, 0);
 	}
 	else {
 	    for( ; pt->len; pt->len-- ) /* skip the packet */
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index f1df39f2c..6b69eefa1 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
 	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
 	md_enable( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 );
     }
-    md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );
+    /*md_start_debug( c->mfx.md, "verify" );*/
     rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig );
     if( rc == G10ERR_CREATE_FILE && !c->sigs_only) {
 	/* can't write output but we hash it anyway to
@@ -849,6 +849,24 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
 	print_keyid( stderr, sig->keyid );
 	putc('\"', stderr);
 	putc('\n', stderr);
+	if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) {
+	    /* print a status response with the fingerprint */
+	    PKT_public_key *pk = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pk );
+
+	    if( !get_pubkey( pk, sig->keyid ) ) {
+		byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p;
+		char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*2+1];
+		size_t i, n;
+
+		fingerprint_from_pk( pk, array, &n );
+		p = array;
+		for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
+		    sprintf(buf+2*i, "%02X", *p );
+		write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf );
+	    }
+	    free_public_key( pk );
+	}
+
 	if( !rc )
 	    rc = check_signatures_trust( sig );
 	if( rc )
diff --git a/g10/plaintext.c b/g10/plaintext.c
index c5c6685f4..887b583f6 100644
--- a/g10/plaintext.c
+++ b/g10/plaintext.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* plaintext.c -  process an plaintext packet
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -35,46 +35,6 @@
 #include "i18n.h"
 
 
-/****************
- * Defer the last CR,LF
- */
-static void
-special_md_putc( MD_HANDLE md, int c, int *state )
-{
-    if( c == -1 ) { /* flush */
-	if( *state == 1 ) {
-	    md_putc(md, '\r');
-	}
-
-	*state = 0;
-	return;
-    }
-  again:
-    switch( *state ) {
-      case 0:
-	if( c == '\r' )
-	    *state = 1;
-	else
-	    md_putc(md, c );
-	break;
-      case 1:
-	if( c == '\n' )
-	    *state = 2;
-	else {
-	    md_putc(md, '\r');
-	    *state = 0;
-	    goto again;
-	}
-	break;
-      case 2:
-	md_putc(md, '\r');
-	md_putc(md, '\n');
-	*state = 0;
-	goto again;
-      default: BUG();
-    }
-}
-
 
 /****************
  * Handle a plaintext packet.  If MFX is not NULL, update the MDs
@@ -91,7 +51,6 @@ handle_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt, md_filter_context_t *mfx,
     int rc = 0;
     int c;
     int convert = pt->mode == 't';
-    int special_state = 0;
 
     /* create the filename as C string */
     if( nooutput )
@@ -137,12 +96,8 @@ handle_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt, md_filter_context_t *mfx,
 		rc = G10ERR_READ_FILE;
 		goto leave;
 	    }
-	    if( mfx->md ) {
-		if( 0 && convert && clearsig )
-		    special_md_putc(mfx->md, c, &special_state );
-		else
-		    md_putc(mfx->md, c );
-	    }
+	    if( mfx->md )
+		md_putc(mfx->md, c );
 	    if( convert && !clearsig && c == '\r' )
 		continue; /* fixme: this hack might be too simple */
 	    if( fp ) {
@@ -157,12 +112,8 @@ handle_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt, md_filter_context_t *mfx,
     }
     else {
 	while( (c = iobuf_get(pt->buf)) != -1 ) {
-	    if( mfx->md ) {
-		if( 0 && convert && clearsig )
-		    special_md_putc(mfx->md, c, &special_state	);
-		else
-		    md_putc(mfx->md, c );
-	    }
+	    if( mfx->md )
+		md_putc(mfx->md, c );
 	    if( convert && !clearsig && c == '\r' )
 		continue; /* fixme: this hack might be too simple */
 	    if( fp ) {
@@ -176,8 +127,6 @@ handle_plaintext( PKT_plaintext *pt, md_filter_context_t *mfx,
 	}
 	pt->buf = NULL;
     }
-    if( 0 && mfx->md && convert && clearsig )
-	special_md_putc(mfx->md, -1, &special_state  ); /* flush */
 
     if( fp && fp != stdout && fclose(fp) ) {
 	log_error("Error closing `%s': %s\n", fname, strerror(errno) );
diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c
index 2e9fd47eb..2460cd09a 100644
--- a/g10/sig-check.c
+++ b/g10/sig-check.c
@@ -162,7 +162,10 @@ do_check( PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
 
     cur_time = make_timestamp();
     if( pk->timestamp > cur_time ) {
-	log_info(_("public key created in future (time warp or clock problem)\n"));
+	ulong d = pk->timestamp - cur_time;
+	log_info(_("public key created %lu %s "
+		   "in future (time warp or clock problem)\n"),
+		    d, d==1? _("second"):_("seconds") );
 	return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
     }
 
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
index 0fac451bf..abb6e9d44 100644
--- a/g10/sign.c
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -637,7 +637,7 @@ clearsign_file( const char *fname, STRLIST locusr, const char *outfile )
 	PKT_secret_key *sk = sk_rover->sk;
 	md_enable(textmd, hash_for(sk->pubkey_algo));
     }
-    md_start_debug( textmd, "create" );
+    /*md_start_debug( textmd, "create" );*/
     if( !opt.not_dash_escaped )
 	iobuf_push_filter( inp, text_filter, &tfx );
     rc = write_dash_escaped( inp, out, textmd );
diff --git a/g10/status.c b/g10/status.c
index 71a4e8341..4ed91d2d9 100644
--- a/g10/status.c
+++ b/g10/status.c
@@ -56,6 +56,11 @@ set_status_fd ( int newfd )
     fd = newfd;
 }
 
+int
+is_status_enabled()
+{
+    return fd != -1;
+}
 
 void
 write_status ( int no )
@@ -92,6 +97,7 @@ write_status_text ( int no, const char *text)
       case STATUS_SHM_GET_BOOL	 : s = "SHM_GET_BOOL\n"; break;
       case STATUS_SHM_GET_HIDDEN : s = "SHM_GET_HIDDEN\n"; break;
       case STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE: s = "NEED_PASSPHRASE\n"; break;
+      case STATUS_VALIDSIG	 : s = "VALIDSIG\n"; break;
       default: s = "?\n"; break;
     }
 
diff --git a/g10/status.h b/g10/status.h
index fa1583687..e0f552b60 100644
--- a/g10/status.h
+++ b/g10/status.h
@@ -48,9 +48,11 @@
 #define STATUS_SHM_GET_HIDDEN  19
 
 #define STATUS_NEED_PASSPHRASE 20
+#define STATUS_VALIDSIG        21
 
 /*-- status.c --*/
 void set_status_fd ( int fd );
+int  is_status_enabled ( void );
 void write_status ( int no );
 void write_status_text ( int no, const char *text );
 
diff --git a/mpi/ChangeLog b/mpi/ChangeLog
index 9d79660e3..2a49d403b 100644
--- a/mpi/ChangeLog
+++ b/mpi/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+Sat Jan  9 16:02:23 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* mpi-cmp.c (mpi_cmp_ui): Normalized the arg.
+
 Thu Jan  7 18:00:58 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
 	* mpi-bit.c (mpi_normalize): New.
diff --git a/mpi/mpi-bit.c b/mpi/mpi-bit.c
index 227a929bb..00aa5d086 100644
--- a/mpi/mpi-bit.c
+++ b/mpi/mpi-bit.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* mpi-bit.c  -  MPI bit level fucntions
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
diff --git a/mpi/mpi-cmp.c b/mpi/mpi-cmp.c
index 3c3c76b7c..2a6cdbf1c 100644
--- a/mpi/mpi-cmp.c
+++ b/mpi/mpi-cmp.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* mpi-cmp.c  -  MPI functions
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ mpi_cmp_ui( MPI u, unsigned long v )
 {
     mpi_limb_t limb = v;
 
+    mpi_normalize( u );
     if( !u->nlimbs && !limb )
 	return 0;
     if( u->sign )
diff --git a/util/ChangeLog b/util/ChangeLog
index 641d6231d..596dd8f2c 100644
--- a/util/ChangeLog
+++ b/util/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
+Sat Jan  9 16:02:23 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
+
+	* secmem.c (lock_pool): add another check that setuid() worked.
+	(secmem_init): Ditto.
+
 Thu Jan  7 18:00:58 CET 1999  Werner Koch  <[email protected]>
 
 	* iobuf.c (iobuf_clear_eof): Removed.
diff --git a/util/iobuf.c b/util/iobuf.c
index 755da1d82..b6314527a 100644
--- a/util/iobuf.c
+++ b/util/iobuf.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* iobuf.c  -  file handling
- *	Copyright (C) 1998,1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998, 1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -401,6 +401,24 @@ block_filter(void *opaque, int control, IOBUF chain, byte *buf, size_t *ret_len)
 }
 
 
+static void
+print_chain( IOBUF a )
+{
+    if( !DBG_IOBUF )
+	return;
+    for(; a; a = a->chain ) {
+	size_t dummy_len = 0;
+	const char *desc = "[none]";
+
+	if( a->filter )
+	    a->filter( a->filter_ov, IOBUFCTRL_DESC, NULL,
+						(byte*)&desc, &dummy_len );
+
+	log_debug("iobuf chain: %d.%d `%s' filter_eof=%d start=%d len=%d\n",
+		   a->no, a->subno, desc, a->filter_eof,
+		   a->d.start, a->d.len );
+    }
+}
 
 /****************
  * Allocate a new io buffer, with no function assigned.
@@ -709,8 +727,7 @@ iobuf_push_filter( IOBUF a,
 
     if( DBG_IOBUF ) {
 	log_debug("iobuf-%d.%d: push `%s'\n", a->no, a->subno, a->desc );
-	for(b=a; b; b = b->chain )
-	    log_debug("\tchain: %d.%d `%s'\n", b->no, b->subno, b->desc );
+	print_chain( a );
     }
 
     /* now we can initialize the new function if we have one */
@@ -804,14 +821,15 @@ underflow(IOBUF a)
 	return -1; /* EOF because a temp buffer can't do an underflow */
 
     if( a->filter_eof ) {
-	if( a->chain ) {
+	if( a->chain && a->filter_eof == 1 ) {
 	    IOBUF b = a->chain;
+	    if( DBG_IOBUF )
+		log_debug("iobuf-%d.%d: pop `%s' in underflow\n",
+					a->no, a->subno, a->desc );
 	    m_free(a->d.buf);
 	    memcpy(a, b, sizeof *a);
 	    m_free(b);
-	    if( DBG_IOBUF )
-		log_debug("iobuf-%d.%d: popped filter in underflow\n",
-							 a->no, a->subno );
+	    print_chain(a);
 	}
 	else
 	    a->filter_eof = 0;
@@ -844,9 +862,17 @@ underflow(IOBUF a)
 	len = a->d.size;
 	rc = a->filter( a->filter_ov, IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW, a->chain,
 			a->d.buf, &len );
-	if( DBG_IOBUF )
+	if( DBG_IOBUF ) {
 	    log_debug("iobuf-%d.%d: underflow: req=%lu got=%lu rc=%d\n",
 		    a->no, a->subno, (ulong)a->d.size, (ulong)len, rc );
+	  #if 0
+	    if( a->no == 7 ) {
+		print_string(stderr, a->d.buf, len, 0 );
+		putc('\n', stderr );
+	    }
+	  #endif
+
+	}
 	if( a->usage == 1 && rc == -1 ) { /* EOF: we can remove the filter */
 	    size_t dummy_len;
 
@@ -860,12 +886,16 @@ underflow(IOBUF a)
 	    a->filter_eof = 1;
 	    if( !len && a->chain ) {
 		IOBUF b = a->chain;
+		if( DBG_IOBUF )
+		    log_debug("iobuf-%d.%d: pop `%s' in underflow (!len)\n",
+					       a->no, a->subno, a->desc );
+		print_chain(a);
 		m_free(a->d.buf);
 		memcpy(a,b, sizeof *a);
 		m_free(b);
-		if( DBG_IOBUF )
-		    log_debug("iobuf-%d.%d: popped filter in underflow (!len)\n",
-							     a->no, a->subno );
+		print_chain(a);
+
+
 	    }
 	}
 	else if( rc )
@@ -1009,6 +1039,7 @@ iobuf_peek(IOBUF a, byte *buf, unsigned buflen )
 
     if( a->filter_eof )
 	return -1;
+
     if( !(a->d.start < a->d.len) ) {
 	if( underflow(a) == -1 )
 	    return -1;
@@ -1275,7 +1306,8 @@ iobuf_set_block_mode( IOBUF a, size_t n )
     assert( a->usage == 1 || a->usage == 2 );
     ctx->usage = a->usage;
     if( !n ) {
-	log_debug("pop_filter called in set_block_mode - please report\n");
+	if( a->usage == 1 )
+	    log_debug("pop_filter called in set_block_mode - please report\n");
 	pop_filter(a, block_filter, NULL );
     }
     else {
@@ -1296,7 +1328,9 @@ iobuf_set_partial_block_mode( IOBUF a, size_t len )
     assert( a->usage == 1 || a->usage == 2 );
     ctx->usage = a->usage;
     if( !len ) {
-	log_debug("pop_filter called in set_partial_block_mode - please report\n");
+	if( a->usage == 1 )
+	    log_debug("pop_filter called in set_partial_block_mode"
+						    " - please report\n");
 	pop_filter(a, block_filter, NULL );
     }
     else {
diff --git a/util/secmem.c b/util/secmem.c
index 30396f3c3..e9bc05abd 100644
--- a/util/secmem.c
+++ b/util/secmem.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 /* secmem.c  -	memory allocation from a secure heap
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998,1999 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ lock_pool( void *p, size_t n )
   #endif
 
     if( uid && !geteuid() ) {
-	if( setuid( uid ) )
+	if( setuid( uid ) || getuid() != geteuid()  )
 	    log_fatal("failed to reset uid: %s\n", strerror(errno));
     }
 
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ secmem_init( size_t n )
 	disable_secmem=1;
 	uid = getuid();
 	if( uid != geteuid() ) {
-	    if( setuid( uid ) )
+	    if( setuid( uid ) || getuid() != geteuid() )
 		log_fatal("failed to drop setuid\n" );
 	}
       #endif