From 76cb368202383d28308b6a688348e11d4f5b507b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Moritz Schulte Date: Sun, 9 Apr 2006 11:31:37 +0000 Subject: 2006-04-09 Moritz Schulte * command-ssh.c (ssh_request_process): Removed FIXME mentioning a possible DoS attack. --- agent/command-ssh.c | 13 ++++++++----- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) (limited to 'agent/command-ssh.c') diff --git a/agent/command-ssh.c b/agent/command-ssh.c index be2a8385d..23f083c2f 100644 --- a/agent/command-ssh.c +++ b/agent/command-ssh.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /* command-ssh.c - gpg-agent's ssh-agent emulation layer - * Copyright (C) 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * Copyright (C) 2004, 2005, 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * @@ -2677,10 +2677,13 @@ ssh_request_process (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t stream_sock) secret key material. The response does not have to be stored in secure memory, since we never give out secret keys. - FIXME: This is a pretty good DoS. We only have a limited amount - of secure memory, we can't throw in everything we get from a - client -wk */ - + Note: we only have little secure memory, but there is NO + possibility of DoS here; only trusted clients are allowed to + connect to the agent. What could happen is that the agent + returns out-of-secure-memory errors on requests in case the + agent's owner floods his own agent with many large messages. + -moritz */ + /* Retrieve request. */ err = stream_read_string (stream_sock, 1, &request_data, &request_data_size); if (err) -- cgit v1.2.3