From e8598390becaedb54c4eba31d5e3e047a091d45f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Werner Koch Date: Thu, 19 Sep 2024 10:00:24 +0200 Subject: gpg: Avoid wrong decryption_failed for signed+OCB msg w/o pubkey. * g10/decrypt-data.c (struct decode_filter_context_s): Add flag checktag_failed. (aead_checktag): Set flag. (decrypt_data): Initially clear that flag and check the flag after the decryption. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Revert the log_get_errorcount based check. -- This fixes a bug where for an OCB encrypted and signed message with the signing key missing during decryption the DECRYPTION_FAILED status line was printed along with "WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated". This was because we use log_error to show that the signature could not be verified due to the missing pubkey; the original fix looked at the error counter and thus triggered the decryption failed status. Fixes-commit: 122803bf1ac9ee720d9fc214f5ae5c2a0ec22bf5 GnuPG-bug-id: 7042 --- g10/decrypt-data.c | 9 +++++++++ g10/mainproc.c | 6 +----- 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/g10/decrypt-data.c b/g10/decrypt-data.c index ea4d48955..e94550922 100644 --- a/g10/decrypt-data.c +++ b/g10/decrypt-data.c @@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ struct decode_filter_context_s * 3 = premature EOF (general) */ unsigned int eof_seen : 2; + /* Flag to convey an error from aead_checktag. */ + unsigned int checktag_failed : 1; + /* The actually used cipher algo for AEAD. */ byte cipher_algo; @@ -206,6 +209,7 @@ aead_checktag (decode_filter_ctx_t dfx, int final, const void *tagbuf) log_error ("gcry_cipher_checktag%s failed: %s\n", final? " (final)":"", gpg_strerror (err)); write_status_error ("aead_checktag", err); + dfx->checktag_failed = 1; return err; } if (DBG_FILTER) @@ -478,6 +482,7 @@ decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek, dfx->refcount++; dfx->partial = !!ed->is_partial; dfx->length = ed->len; + dfx->checktag_failed = 0; if (ed->aead_algo) iobuf_push_filter ( ed->buf, aead_decode_filter, dfx ); else if (ed->mdc_method) @@ -523,6 +528,10 @@ decrypt_data (ctrl_t ctrl, void *procctx, PKT_encrypted *ed, DEK *dek, ed->buf = NULL; if (dfx->eof_seen > 1 ) rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET); + else if (dfx->checktag_failed) + { + rc = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE); + } else if ( ed->mdc_method ) { /* We used to let parse-packet.c handle the MDC packet but this diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c index 40b90479f..739ad0a35 100644 --- a/g10/mainproc.c +++ b/g10/mainproc.c @@ -781,13 +781,9 @@ proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) compliance_de_vs |= 2; } - /* Trigger the deferred error. The second condition makes sure that a - * log_error printed in the cry_cipher_checktag never gets ignored. */ + /* Trigger the deferred error. */ if (!result && early_plaintext) result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_DATA); - else if (!result && pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo - && log_get_errorcount (0)) - result = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE); if (result == -1) ; -- cgit v1.2.3