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* Added a copyright year for files changed this year.Werner Koch2002-04-2939-38/+42
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* fixed comment styleWerner Koch2002-04-291-1/+1
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* g10/Werner Koch2002-04-255-0/+157
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10.c, options.h: New options --display, --ttyname, --ttytype, --lc-ctype, --lc-messages to be used with future versions of the gpg-agent. * passphrase.c (agent_send_option,agent_send_all_options): New. (agent_open): Send options to the agent. * trustdb.c (update_ownertrust, clear_ownertrust): Do an explicit do_sync because revalidation_mark does it only if when the timestamp actually changes. / * configure.ac: Check for locale.h and setlocale
* After generating a new key, show the key information (name, keyid,David Shaw2002-04-235-43/+103
| | | | | | | | | | | | fingerprint, etc.) Do not print uncheckable signatures (missing key..) in --check-sigs. Print statistics (N missing keys, etc.) after --check-sigs. When signing a key with an expiration date on it, the "Do you want your signature to expire at the same time?" question should default to YES
* * parse-packet.c (parse_plaintext), packet.h, plaintext.cDavid Shaw2002-04-238-13/+49
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | (handle_plaintext): Fix bug in handling literal packets with zero-length data (no data was being confused with partial body length). * misc.c (pct_expando), options.skel: %t means extension ("jpg"). %T means MIME type ("image/jpeg"). * import.c (import_one): Only trigger trust update if the keyring is actually changed. * export.c (do_export_stream): Missing a m_free.
* po/Werner Koch2002-04-222-1/+6
| | | | | * et.po, tr.po, cs.po, it.po, id.po: Updated.
* RISC OS specific changesStefan Bellon2002-04-223-3/+12
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* * keygen.c (generate_subkeypair): 2440bis04 adds that creating subkeys onDavid Shaw2002-04-203-4/+16
| | | | | | | | | v3 keys is a MUST NOT. * getkey.c (finish_lookup): The --pgp6 "use the primary key" behavior should only apply while data signing and not encryption. Noted by Roger Sondermann.
* * keyedit.c (menu_deluid): Only cause a trust update if we delete aDavid Shaw2002-04-197-22/+39
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | non-revoked user id. * hkp.c (hkp_ask_import), keyserver.c (parse_keyserver_options, keyserver_spawn), options.h: Remove fast-import keyserver option (no longer meaningful). * g10.c (main), keyedit.c (sign_uids), options.h: Change --default-check-level to --default-cert-check-level as it makes clear what it operates on. * g10.c (main): --pgp6 also implies --no-ask-sig-expire. * delkey.c (do_delete_key): Comment.
* * keyedit.c (sign_uids, keyedit_menu, menu_deluid, menu_delsig,David Shaw2002-04-193-18/+41
| | | | | | | | | menu_expire, menu_revsig, menu_revkey): Only force a trustdb check if we did something that changes it. * g10.c: add "--auto-check-trustdb" to override a "--no-auto-check-trustdb"
* * tdbio.c (tdbio_write_nextcheck): Return a status whether theWerner Koch2002-04-197-21/+98
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | stamp was actually changed. * trustdb.c (revalidation_mark): Sync the changes. Removed the sync operation done by its callers. (get_validity): Add logic for maintaining a pending_check flag. (clear_ownertrust): New. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Don't call revalidation_mark depending on primary_pk. (keyedit_menu): Call revalidation_mark after "trust". (show_key_with_all_names): Print a warning on the wrong listed key validity. * delkey.c (do_delete_key): Clear the owenertrust information when deleting a public key.
* * seskey.c (encode_md_value): Print an error message if a wrongWerner Koch2002-04-184-6/+30
| | | | | | digest algorithm is used with DSA. Changed all callers to cope with a NULL return. Problem noted by Imad R. Faiad.
* * trustdb.c (validate_keys): Never schedule a nextcheck into theWerner Koch2002-04-182-17/+108
| | | | | | | | | past. (validate_key_list): New arg curtime use it to set next_expire. (validate_one_keyblock): Take the current time from the caller. (clear_validity, reset_unconnected_keys): New. (validate_keys): Reset all unconnected keys.
* * trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Properly handle nonrevocableDavid Shaw2002-04-183-21/+59
| | | | | | | | | | | signatures that can expire. In short, the only thing that can override an unexpired nonrevocable signature is another unexpired nonrevocable signature. * getkey.c (finish_lookup): Always use primary signing key for signatures when --pgp6 is on since pgp6 and 7 do not understand signatures made by signing subkeys.
* * trustdb.c (validate_keys): Never schedule a nextcheck into theWerner Koch2002-04-182-2/+12
| | | | | past.
* * getkey.c (lookup): Advance the searchmode after a search FIRST.Werner Koch2002-04-182-0/+7
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* * getkey.c (premerge_public_with_secret): Fixed 0x12345678! syntaxWerner Koch2002-04-185-17/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | for use with secret keys. * seckey-cert.c (do_check): Always calculate the old checksum for use after unprotection. * g10.c, options.skel: New option --no-escape-from. Made --escape-from and --force-v3-sigs the default and removed them from the options skeleton.
* * parse-packet.c (parse_key): Support a SHA1 checksum as perWerner Koch2002-04-177-34/+98
| | | | | | | | | | draft-rfc2440-bis04. * packet.h (PKT_secret_key): Add field sha1chk. * seckey-cert.c (do_check): Check the SHA1 checksum (protect_secret_key): And create it. * build-packet.c (do_secret_key): Mark it as sha-1 protected. * g10.c, options.h: New option --simple-sk-checksum.
* * parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Minor fix - signatures should expireDavid Shaw2002-04-145-4/+25
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | at their expiration time and not one second later. * keygen.c (proc_parameter_file): Allow specifying preferences string (i.e. "s5 s2 z1 z2", etc) in a batchmode key generation file. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Print standard error message when signing a revoked key (no new translation). * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs): Get the default set of key prefs from the real (not attribute) primary uid.
* * pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Fix bug that allowed a key to be selectedDavid Shaw2002-04-134-6/+52
| | | | | | | | | | | | | twice in batch mode if one instance was the default recipient and the other was an encrypt-to. Noted by Stefan Bellon. * parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Show data in trust and regexp sig subpackets. * keyedit.c (keyedit_menu): Use new function real_uids_left to prevent deleting the last real (i.e. non-attribute) uid. Again, according to the attribute draft. (menu_showphoto): Make another string translatable.
* * build-packet.c (build_sig_subpkt): Delete subpackets from both hashedDavid Shaw2002-04-124-114/+101
| | | | | | | | | | | | | and unhashed area on update. (find_subpkt): No longer needed. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): With --pgp2 on, refuse to sign a v3 key with a v4 signature. As usual, --expert overrides. Try to tweak some strings to a closer match so they can all be translated in one place. Use different helptext keys to allow different help text for different questions. * keygen.c (keygen_upd_std_prefs): Remove preferences from both hashed and unhashed areas if they are not going to be used.
* * misc.c (pct_expando), options.skel: Use %t to indicate type of a photoDavid Shaw2002-04-116-25/+65
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ID (in this version, it's always "jpeg"). Also tweak string expansion loop to minimize reallocs. * mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Variable type fix. * keyedit.c (menu_set_primary_uid): Differentiate between true user IDs and attribute user IDs when making one of them primary. That is, if we are making a user ID primary, we alter user IDs. If we are making an attribute packet primary, we alter attribute packets. This matches the language in the latest attribute packet draft. * keyedit.c (sign_uids): No need for the empty string hack. * getkey.c (fixup_uidnode): Only accept preferences from the hashed segment of the self-sig.
* * tdbio.c (migrate_from_v2): Fixed the offset to read the oldWerner Koch2002-04-102-2/+8
| | | | | | ownertrust value and only add entries to the table if we really have a value.
* Add KEYEXPIRED, EXPSIG, and EXPKEYSIG. AddDavid Shaw2002-04-107-43/+80
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | "deprecated-use-keyexpired-instead" to SIGEXPIRED. Start transition from SIGEXPIRED to KEYEXPIRED, since the actual event is signature verification by an expired key and not an expired signature. Rename do_signature_check as signature_check2, make public, and change all callers. Use status EXPSIG for an expired, but good, signature. Add the expiration time (or 0) to the VALIDSIG status line. Use status KEYEXPSIG for a good signature from an expired key. Remove checks for no arguments now that argparse does it.
* Merged in my changes, after disk crash. Fortunately the CVS was notWerner Koch2002-04-0818-45/+116
| | | | | | affected - but everything else and it seems that there is no backup of the BTS data is available :-(
* Fix auto-key-retrieve to actually work as a keyserver-option (noted byDavid Shaw2002-04-043-7/+16
| | | | | | | | Roger Sondermann). Do not reorder the primary attribute packet - the first user ID must be a genuine one.
* Fix ownertrust display with --with-colons.David Shaw2002-03-318-28/+82
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Properly initialize the user ID refcount for user and photo IDs. Tweak a few prompts to change "y/n" to "y/N", which is how most other prompts are written. Warn the user if they are about to revoke an expired sig (not a problem, but they should know). Control-d escapes the keyserver search prompt. If a subkey is considered revoked solely because the parent key is revoked, print the revocation reason from the parent key. Allow revocation/expiration to apply to a uid/key with no entry in the trustdb.
* Quote and unquote backslashes from keyserver search responses.David Shaw2002-03-293-2/+19
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* Minor tweak to importing to allow more non-signed uids (now thatDavid Shaw2002-03-245-16/+40
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | --allow-non-selfsigned-uid allows for completey unsigned uids). Do not choose an attribute packet (i.e. photo) as primary uid. This prevents oddities like "Good signature from [image of size 2671]". This is still not perfect (one can still select an attribute packet as primary in --edit), but is closer to the way the draft is going. The algorithms list should include #110. --pgp2 implies --no-ask-sig-expire and --no-ask-cert-expire as those would cause a v4 sig/cert. Be more lenient in what constitutes a valid armor header (i.e. -----BEGIN blah blah-----) as some Windows programs seem to add spaces at the end. --openpgp makes it strict again
* Properly handle a "no keys found" case from the internal HKP codeDavid Shaw2002-03-193-16/+28
| | | | | | | | (external HKP is ok). Also, make a COUNT -1 (i.e. streamed) keyserver response a little more efficient. Add --no-allow-non-selfsigned-uid
* --openpgp implies --allow-non-selfsigned-uidDavid Shaw2002-03-177-40/+76
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If none of the uids are primary (because none are valid) then pick the first to be primary (but still invalid). This is for cosmetics in case some display needs to print a user ID from a non-selfsigned key. Also use --allow-non-selfsigned-uid to make such a key valid and not --always-trust. The key is *not* automatically trusted via --allow-non-selfsigned-uid. Make sure non-selfsigned uids print [uncertain] on verification even though one is primary now. If the main key is not valid, then neither are the subkeys. Allow --allow-non-selfsigned-uid to work on completely unsigned keys. Print the uids in UTF8. Remove mark_non_selfsigned_uids_valid() Show revocation key as UTF8. Allow --not-dash-escaped to work with v3 keys.
* Show which user ID a bad self-sig (invald sig or unsupported public keyDavid Shaw2002-03-132-4/+14
| | | | | algorithm) resides on.
* any valid self-sig should mark a user ID or subkey as valid - otherwise,David Shaw2002-03-132-13/+22
| | | | | | an attacker could DoS the user by inventing a bogus invalid self-signature.
* Some minor fixes for revocation keys: print a warning if a key is importedDavid Shaw2002-03-079-30/+162
| | | | | | | | | | that has been revoked by designated revoker, but the designated revoker is not present to verify the revocation (whew!). This applies to all ways to get a key into the system: --import --recv-keys, and --search-keys. If auto-key-retrieve is set, try and retrieve the revocation key. Also, auto-key-retrieve is now a keyserver-option.
* Some minor bug fixes.David Shaw2002-03-055-17/+64
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | do not prompt for revocation reason for v3 revocations (unless force-v4-certs is on) since they wouldn't be used anyway. show the status of the sigs (exportable? revocable?) to the user before prompting for which sig to revoke. Also, make sure that local signatures get local revocations. Add "exec-path" variable to override PATH for execing programs. properly check return code from classify_user_id to catch unclassifiable keys.
* variable type tweak for RISC OS (from Stefan)David Shaw2002-03-042-6/+12
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* Solved conflictWerner Koch2002-03-032-13/+28
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* This is the first half of revocation key / designated revokerDavid Shaw2002-02-289-29/+331
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | support. That is, it handles all the data to mark a key as revoked if it has been revoked by a designated revoker. The second half (coming later) will contain the code to make someones key your designated revoker and to issue revocations for someone else. Note that this is written so that a revoked revoker can still issue revocations: i.e. If A revokes B, but A is revoked, B is still revoked. I'm not completely convinced this is the proper behavior, but it matches how PGP does it. It does at least have the advantage of much simpler code - my first version of this had lots of loop maintaining code so you could chain revokers many levels deep and if D was revoked, C was not, which meant that B was, and so on. It was sort of scary, actually. This also changes importing to allow bringing in more revocation keys, and exporting to not export revocation keys marked "sensitive". The --edit menu information will show if a revocation key is present.
* Do not include v3 keys in a --export-secret-subkeys export.David Shaw2002-02-282-0/+11
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* If a key isn't valid (say, because of no self-signature), allowDavid Shaw2002-02-272-0/+18
| | | | | --always-trust to force it valid so it can be trusted.
* Treat key lists internally as fingerprints when possible. All this is viaDavid Shaw2002-02-268-118/+160
| | | | | | | | | | | | KEYDB_SEARCH_DESC - no point in reinventing the wheel. This allows the helper program to search the keyserver by fingerprint if desired (and the keyserver supports it). Note that automatic fingerprint promotion during refresh only applies to v4 keys as a v4 fingerprint can be easily changed into a long or short key id, and a v3 cannot. Take two copies of hextobyte() from pubkey-enc.c and getkey.c and make them into one copy in misc.c.
* Detect a "no keys found" case even if the keyserver helper program doesDavid Shaw2002-02-223-10/+32
| | | | | | | not explicitly say how many keys were found. Bug fix - don't report non-revoked keys as revoked in HKP key searches.
* Catch corruption in HKP index lines (can be caused by broken or maliciousDavid Shaw2002-02-193-0/+26
| | | | | | | | | | keyservers). Add KEYSERVER_NOT_SUPPORTED for unsupported actions (say, a keyserver that has no way to search, or a readonly keyserver that has no way to add). Also add a USE_EXTERNAL_HKP define to disable the internal HKP keyserver code.
* * pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Always print the warning forWerner Koch2002-02-143-9/+17
| | | | | | | | unknown and undefined trust. Removed the did_add cruft. Reported by Janusz A. Urbanowicz. * g10.c: New option --no-use-agent. Hmmm, is this a a good name? --do-not-use-agent seems a bit to long.
* Bug fix - properly handle user IDs with colons (":") in them while HKPDavid Shaw2002-02-122-5/+36
| | | | | searching.
* For --sig-policy-url and --cert-policy-url, clarify what is a sig and whatDavid Shaw2002-02-1012-39/+118
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | is a cert. A sig has sigclass 0x00, 0x01, 0x02, or 0x40, and everything else is a cert. Add a "nrlsign" for nonrevocable and local key signatures. Add a --no-force-mdc to undo --force-mdc. Add a knob to force --disable-mdc/--no-disable-mdc. Off by default, of course, but is used in --pgp2 and --pgp6 modes. Allow specifying multiple users in the "Enter the user ID" loop. Enter a blank line to stop. Show each key+id as it is added. It is not illegal (though possibly silly) to have multiple policy URLs in a given signature, so print all that are present. More efficient implementation of URL-ifying code for --search on an HKP keyserver.
* Allow policy URLs with %-expandos in them. This allows policy URLs likeDavid Shaw2002-02-057-100/+179
| | | | | | | | | "http://notary.jabberwocky.com/keysign/%K" to create a per-signature policy URL. Use the new generic %-handler for the photo ID stuff as well. Display policy URLs and notations during signature generation if --show-policy-url/--show-notation is set.
* Workaround for the pksd and OKS keyserver bug that calculates v4 RSADavid Shaw2002-02-043-4/+48
| | | | | | | | keyids as if they were v3. The workaround/hack is to fetch both the v4 (e.g. 99242560) and v3 (e.g. 68FDDBC7) keyids. This only happens for key refresh while using the HKP scheme and the refresh-add-fake-v3-keyids keyserver option must be set. This should stay off by default.
* Bug fix - do not append keys to each other when --sending more than one.David Shaw2002-02-042-1/+6
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* Split "--set-policy-url" into "--cert-policy-url" and "--sig-policy-url"David Shaw2002-02-035-8/+42
| | | | | | so the user can set different policies for key and data signing. For backwards compatibility, "--set-policy-url" sets both, as before.
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