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* gpg: Avoid wrong decryption_failed for signed+OCB msg w/o pubkey.Werner Koch2024-09-191-5/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/decrypt-data.c (struct decode_filter_context_s): Add flag checktag_failed. (aead_checktag): Set flag. (decrypt_data): Initially clear that flag and check the flag after the decryption. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Revert the log_get_errorcount based check. -- This fixes a bug where for an OCB encrypted and signed message with the signing key missing during decryption the DECRYPTION_FAILED status line was printed along with "WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated". This was because we use log_error to show that the signature could not be verified due to the missing pubkey; the original fix looked at the error counter and thus triggered the decryption failed status. Fixes-commit: 82b39fe254703776209cebb88f428bf2d1eb596b GnuPG-bug-id: 7042
* gpg: New option --proc-all-sigsWerner Koch2024-08-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/options.h (flags): Add proc_all_sigs. * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Do not stop signature checking if this new option is used. * g10/gpg.c (oProcAllSigs): New. (opts): Add "proc-all-sigs". (main): Set it. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 7261 Backported-from-master: 1eb382fb1f431575872b47dc160807858b7df3e5 (cherry picked from commit cb739bb2a5796b8d48cbb92c615538bf53bcd482)
* gpg: Make sure a DECRYPTION_OKAY is never issued for a bad OCB tag.Werner Koch2024-03-141-1/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Force a decryption failure if any error has been seen. * g10/decrypt-data.c (aead_checktag): Issue an ERROR line. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 7042 Note that gpg in any case returns a failure exit code but due to double forking GPGME would not see it.
* gpg: Do not require --status-fd along with --require-compliance.Werner Koch2023-01-201-1/+1
| | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Do not check whether status is enabled when checking compliance.
* gpg: Make --require-compliance work with out --status-fdWerner Koch2022-11-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Set complaince_de_vs also if require-compliance is set. -- Without this fix require-compliance would fail if no --status-fd was used.
* gpg: Don't consider unknown keys as non-compliant while decrypting.Werner Koch2022-09-221-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Change compliance logic. -- For the description of the proplem see https://dev.gnupg.org/T6205#163306 GnuPG-bug-id: 6205
* gpg: Emit STATUS_FAILURE for --require-compliance errorsWerner Koch2022-08-311-5/+2
| | | | | | | | * g10/misc.c (compliance_failure): Do not fallback to CO_GNUPG. Print compliance failure error and status for CO_DE_VS. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Call compliance_failure in the require-compliance error case. * g10/encrypt.c (check_encryption_compliance): Ditto.
* gpg: Make symmetric + pubkey encryption de-vs compliant.Werner Koch2022-08-021-5/+46
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Make symmetric + pubkey encryption de-vs compliant. * g10/mainproc.c (struct symlist_item): New. (struct mainproc_context): Add field symenc_list. (release_list): Free that list. (proc_symkey_enc): Record infos from symmetric session packet. (proc_encrypted): Check symkey packet algos -- The original check was too strong because it is in fact compliant to encrypt with a symmetric key and and public key. Thus decryption should issue a compliance status. In addition we now check that the cipher algorithms used to symmetrically encrypt the session key are all compliant. This is similar to our check for all public key encrypted session key packets. GnuPG-bug-id: 6119 Fixes-commit: b03fab09e188f7bb10237d4f20455e4026737e4e
* gpg: Emit an ERROR status as hint for a bad passphrase.Werner Koch2022-04-251-8/+20
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Issue new error code. (proc_encrypted): Ditto. -- This allows GPGME to return a better error message than "bad session key" to the user. Technically we could get run into these errors also in other cases but this more unlikley. For the command line use we don't do anything to not change the expected output of the command line interface. GnuPG-bug-id: 5943
* gpg: Allow decryption of symencr even for non-compliant cipher.Werner Koch2022-03-181-10/+21
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/decrypt-data.c (decrypt_data): Add arg compliance_error. Adjust all callers. Fail on compliance error only in --require-compliance mode. Make sure to return an error if the buffer is missing; actually that should be an assert. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Delay printing of the compliance mode status. Consult the compliance error now returned by decrypt_data. -- The actual case here is that we fail hard if a message has been AEAD encrypted with one AEAD capable key and also with one passphrase. In general the preference system takes care of not using AEAD if one recipient's key does not support it. However, if the sender uses her own AEAD-capable key _and_ a passphrase the message will be AEAD encrypted. This change allows to decrypt that anyway along with a warning message. Note that this does currently not work in 2.3 due to a non-compliant libgcrypt. We will however, backport this to 2.2.
* gpg: New option --require-compliance.Werner Koch2022-03-081-6/+35
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/options.h (opt): Add field flags.require_compliance. * g10/gpg.c (oRequireCompliance): New. (opts): Add --require-compliance. (main): Set option. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Emit error if non de-vs compliant. (check_sig_and_print): Ditto. * g10/encrypt.c (encrypt_crypt): Ditto. -- Note that in the --encrypt and --verify cased other checks may kick in earlier than this new --require-compliance controlled one.
* g10: Avoid extra hash contexts when decrypting MDC inputJussi Kivilinna2022-02-241-2/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (mainproc_context): New member 'seen_pkt_encrypted_mdc'. (release_list): Clear 'seen_pkt_encrypted_mdc'. (proc_encrypted): Set 'seen_pkt_encrypted_mdc'. (have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead): Rename to... (have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead_or_mdc): ...this and add check for 'seen_pkt_encrypted_mdc'. (proc_plaintext): Do not enable extra hash contexts when decrypting MDC input. -- Avoiding extra hash contexts speeds up CFB/MDC decryption quite a lot. For example, decrypting symmetric-key AES-256 encrypted 4 GiB file from RAM to /dev/null sees ~3.4x speed increase on AMD Ryzen 5800X: AES256.CFB encryption: 783 MB/s AES256.CFB decryption: 386 MB/s (before) AES256.CFB encryption: 1.3 GB/s (after patch) Note, AEAD is still significantly faster: AES256.OCB encryption: 2.2 GB/s AES256.OCB decryption: 3.0 GB/s GnuPG-bug-id: T5820 Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit ab177eed514f7f3432d78e7e6521ad24cc0f4762) Even 2.2 with the older Libgcrypt 1.8 gets a threefold speedup; see https://dev.gnupg.org/T5820#155447 (AES-128 vs. AES-256 does not make a substanial difference) Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Use a more descriptive prompt for symmetric decryption.Werner Koch2021-05-171-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | * g10/keydb.h (GETPASSWORD_FLAG_SYMDECRYPT): New. (passphrase_to_dek_ext): Remove this obsolete prototype. * g10/passphrase.c (passphrase_get): Add arg flags. Use new flag value. (passphrase_to_dek): Add arg flags and pass it on. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Use new flag. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Lookup a missing public key of the current card via LDAP.Werner Koch2021-05-031-3/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/getkey.c (get_seckey_default_or_card): Lookup a missing public key from the current card via LDAP. * g10/call-dirmngr.c: Include keyserver-intetnal.h. (gpg_dirmngr_ks_get): Rename arg quick into flags. Take care of the new LDAP flag. * g10/keyserver-internal.h (KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_QUICK): New. Replace the use of the value 1 for the former quick arg. (KEYSERVER_IMPORT_FLAG_LDAP): New. * g10/keyserver.c (keyserver_get_chunk): Increase the reserved line length. * dirmngr/ks-action.c (ks_action_get): Add arg ldap_only. * dirmngr/server.c (cmd_ks_get): Add option --ldap. -- This change makes it easy to start working with gnupg: Just insert the smartcard or token provided to you and the first time you sign a message the public key associated with the current card will be imported and everything is set without any configuration. This works only with an LDAP directory because it can be expected that the public key has been put into the LDAP during card personalization. Of course an LDAP server needs to be configured; in a Windows AD domain this can be a mere "keyserver ldap:///" in dirmngr.conf. Other configured keyservers are ignored. Requirements for the card driver: The $SIGNKEYID attribute must exists and a query for the KEY-FPR attribute needs to return the OpenPGP fingerprint for that key. This is currently supported for OpenPGP cards and certain PKCS#15 cards. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit d7e707170fbe2956deb3d81e2802d21352079722)
* Include the library version in the compliance checks.Werner Koch2021-01-281-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * common/compliance.c (gnupg_gcrypt_is_compliant): New. (gnupg_rng_is_compliant): Also check library version. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Use new function. (check_sig_and_print): Ditto. * sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Ditto. * sm/encrypt.c (gpgsm_encrypt): Ditto. * sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Ditto -- This will eventually allow us to declare Libgcrypt 1.9 to be de-vs compliant. GnuPG can use this information then for its own checks. As of now GnuPG tests the version of the used library but that is a bit cumbersome to maintain. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 90c514868ff5fcf6d39490d4874ac3a31ba9e85f)
* gpg: Fix ugly error message for an unknown symkey algorithm.Werner Koch2021-01-271-1/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc): Do not continue with an unknown algorithm. -- Trying to encrypt data created with printf "\x8c\x49\x05\x0e\x0a\x03\x01" fails in version 2.2.19 with gpg: packet(3) with unknown version 5 but with later versions with gpg: encrypted with unknown algorithm 14 gpg: Ohhhh jeeee: ... this is a bug \ ([...]/passphrase.c:433:passphrase_to_dek) so we better catch this case earlier. Reported-by: Tavis Ormandy Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Provide better diagnostic for replaced card keys.Werner Koch2020-11-131-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * agent/divert-scd.c (divert_pksign): Add arg 'grip'. Replace OPENPGP key reference to keygrips. (divert_pkdecrypt): Ditto. * agent/protect.c (parse_shadow_info): Trim spaces. * agent/pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Pass the keygrip. * agent/pksign.c (agent_pksign_do): Ditto. * g10/mainproc.c (print_pkenc_list): Print extra info for an invalid id error. * g10/sign.c (do_sign): Ditto. -- Using the keygrip instead of the identifier works on OpenPGP cards and thus we use that to make sure that we are working on the right card. For other cards we better don't do that to avoid regressions. Those other cards are also usually provided and do not allow to self-generate the keys. Note that old versions of the code (gpg 1.4) used the fingerprint as additional check but that was eventually removed and now that we use the keygrip all over the place, it is best to use this to identify a key. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* sm: Exclude rsaPSS from de-vs compliance mode.Werner Koch2020-07-031-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * common/compliance.h (PK_ALGO_FLAG_RSAPSS): New. * common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Add arg alog_flags and test rsaPSS. Adjust all callers. * common/util.c (pubkey_algo_to_string): New. (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Ditto. * sm/misc.c (gpgsm_ksba_cms_get_sig_val): New wrapper function. (gpgsm_get_hash_algo_from_sigval): New. * sm/certcheck.c (gpgsm_check_cms_signature): Change type of sigval arg. Add arg pkalgoflags. Use the PK_ALGO_FLAG_RSAPSS. * sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Use the new wrapper and new fucntion to also get the algo flags. Pass algo flags along. Change some of the info output to be more like current master. -- Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> This backport from master commit 969abcf40cdfc65f3ee859c5e62889e1a8ccde91 also includes some changes taken from commit a759fa963a42e0652134130029217270b6d5d00b (sm: Improve readability of the data verification output.) Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Support decryption of the new AEAD packetWerner Koch2020-04-161-38/+150
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * common/openpgpdefs.h (aead_algo_t): New. (pkttype_t): Add PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD. * g10/decrypt-data.c (struct decode_filter_context_s): Add fields for AEAD. (aead_set_nonce_and_ad): New. (aead_checktag): New. (decrypt_data): Support AEAD. (aead_underflow): New. (aead_decode_filter): New. * g10/dek.h (DEK): Add field use_aead. Turn use_mdc, algo_info_printed, and symmetric into bit flags. * g10/mainproc.c (struct mainproc_context): Add field seen_pkt_encrypted_aead. (release_list): Clear it. (have_seen_pkt_encrypted_aead): New. (symkey_decrypt_seskey): Support AEAD. (proc_symkey_enc): Ditto. (proc_encrypted): Ditto. (proc_plaintext): Ditto. * g10/misc.c (MY_GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_EAX): New. (openpgp_aead_test_algo): New. (openpgp_aead_algo_name): New. (openpgp_aead_algo_info): New. * g10/packet.h (PKT_symkey_enc): Add field use_aead. (PKT_user_id): Add field flags.aead (PKT_public_key): Ditto. (PKT_encrypted): Add fields for AEAD. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse): Handle PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD. (parse_symkeyenc): Support AEAD. (parse_encrypted): Ditto. (dump_sig_subpkt): Dump AEAD preference packet. (parse_encrypted_aead): New. -- This patch allows to decrypt data encrypted using the new AEAD mechanism as specified in rfc4880bis. Although preferences are used to enable this new mode, it is useful to have at least a decryption option in case a user switches between GnuPG 2.2 and newer versions. The new AEAD mechanism is much faster than the current CFB+MDC and thus 2.2 will allow faster decryption of symmetric only decryption. This patch is based on the current master (2.3) code base and includes a few other patches. In particular commit 44be675b759d27bac310c2de8bae1b7882a26b65 (gpg: More check for symmetric key encryption.) is included. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: New option --auto-key-importWerner Koch2020-03-141-7/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/gpg.c (opts): New options --auto-key-import, --no-auto-key-import, and --no-include-key-block. (gpgconf_list): Add them. * g10/options.h (opt): Add field flags.auto_key_import. * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Use flag to enable that feature. * tools/gpgconf-comp.c: Give the new options a Basic config level. -- Note that the --no variants of the options are intended for easy disabling at the command line. GnuPG-bug-id: 4856 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> Backported from master. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Make use of the included key block in a signature.Werner Koch2020-03-141-11/+61
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/import.c (read_key_from_file): Rename to ... (read_key_from_file_or_buffer): this and add new parameters. Adjust callers. (import_included_key_block): New. * g10/packet.h (PKT_signature): Add field flags.key_block. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_signature): Set that flags. * g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Add parm forced_pk and change all callers. * g10/mainproc.c (do_check_sig): Ditto. (check_sig_and_print): Try the included key block if no key is available. -- This is is the second part to support the new Key Block subpacket. The idea is that after having received a signed mail, it is instantly possible to reply encrypted - without the need for any centralized infrastructure. There is one case where this does not work: A signed mail is received using a specified signer ID (e.g. using gpg --sender option) and the key block with only that user ID is thus imported. The next time a mail is received using the same key but with a different user ID; the signatures checks out using the key imported the last time. However, the new user id is not imported. Now when trying to reply to that last mail, no key will be found. We need to see whether we can update a key in such a case. GnuPG-bug-id: 4856 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> Backported from master Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: With --auto-key-retrieve prefer WKD over keyservers.Werner Koch2019-07-051-50/+63
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a hint on how to make use of the preferred keyserver. Remove keyserver lookup just by the keyid. Try a WKD lookup before a keyserver lookup. -- The use of the the keyid for lookups does not make much sense anymore since for quite some time we do have the fingerprint as part of the signature. GnuPG-bug-id: 4595 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 96bf8f477805bae58cfb77af8ceba418ff8aaad9)
* g10/mainproc: disable hash contexts when --skip-verify is usedJussi Kivilinna2018-12-051-3/+8
| | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Do not enable hash contexts when opt.skip_verify is set. -- Signed-off-by: Jussi Kivilinna <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 73e74de0e33bbb76300f96a4174024779047df06)
* gpg: Allow decryption using several passphrases in may cases.Werner Koch2018-07-061-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (symkey_decrypt_seskey): Check for a valid algorithm. (proc_symkey_enc): Clear passpharse on error from above function. -- This does not work reliable as stated in bug 3795 but we can try to fix ~95% of all cases. The real fix is to use AEAD which will come with 2.3 GnuPG-bug-id: 3795, 4050 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Prepare for signatures with ISSUER_FPR but without ISSUER.Werner Koch2018-07-051-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/getkey.c (get_pubkey_for_sig): New. (get_pubkeyblock_for_sig): New. * g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_raw): Give global scope. (check_sig_and_print): Use get_pubkeyblock_for_sig. * g10/pkclist.c (check_signatures_trust): Use get_pubkey_for_sig. * g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Ditto. (check_signature_over_key_or_uid): Ditto. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 4046 The whole getkey stuff is still a mess with way to much duplication and missing caching of already fetched data. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit f7526c7bc754acf68bde0b79c785e875a9365d60)
* gpg: Allow building with older libgpg-error.Werner Koch2018-06-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Use constant from logging.h -- Because the log levels are enums I had to change there names in libgpg-error to avoid clashes. Master uses the new names but 2.2 needs to stick to the old names. Fixes-commit: 825909e9cd5f344ece6c0b0ea3a9475df1d643de Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Sanitize diagnostic with the original file name.Werner Koch2018-06-081-1/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_plaintext): Sanitize verbose output. -- This fixes a forgotten sanitation of user supplied data in a verbose mode diagnostic. The mention CVE is about using this to inject status-fd lines into the stderr output. Other harm good as well be done. Note that GPGME based applications are not affected because GPGME does not fold status output into stderr. CVE-id: CVE-2018-12020 GnuPG-bug-id: 4012 (cherry picked from commit 13f135c7a252cc46cff96e75968d92b6dc8dce1b)
* gpg: Also detect a plaintext packet before an encrypted packet.Werner Koch2018-06-061-0/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Print warning and later force an error. -- Note that when this error is triggered the plaintext from the literal data packet has already been outputted before the BEGIN_DECRYPTION status line. We fail only later to get more information. Callers need to check and act upon the decryption error code anyway. Thanks to Marcus for pointing out this case. GnuPG-bug-id: 4000 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 344b548dc71657d0285d93f78f17a2663b5e586f)
* gpg: Print a hint on how to decrypt a non-mdc message anyway.Werner Koch2018-05-311-2/+19
| | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Print a hint for legacy ciphers w/o MDC. Also print a dedicated status error code Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 874e391665405fc413a69f2ffacdb94bb08da7ff)
* gpg: Detect multiple literal plaintext packets more reliable.Werner Koch2018-05-311-2/+15
| | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Bump LITERALS_SEEN. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 4000 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 97183b5c0fae05fcda942caa7df14ee6a133d846)
* gpg: Hard fail on a missing MDC even for legacy algorithms.Werner Koch2018-05-311-8/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Require an MDC or AEAD * tests/openpgp/defs.scm (create-gpghome): Use --ignore-mdc-error to allow testing with the current files. -- Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit d1431901f0143cdc7af8d1a23387e0c6b5bb613f) Resolved Conflicts: g10/mainproc.c - Remove AEAD stuff.
* gpg: Turn --no-mdc-warn into a NOP.Werner Koch2018-05-311-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/gpg.c (oNoMDCWarn): Remove. (opts): Make --no-mdc-warn a NOP. (main): Don't set var. * g10/options.h (struct opt): Remove 'no_mdc_var'. * g10/cipher-cfb.c (write_header): Assume opt.no_mdc_warn is false. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Ditto. -- Users should not be allowed to suppress the warning that they are shooting into their foot. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]> (cherry picked from commit 96350c5d5afcbc7f66c535e38b9fcc7355622855)
* g10: Fix memory leak in check_sig_and_print.NIIBE Yutaka2018-04-131-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Free the public key. -- GnuPG-bug-id: 3900 Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]>
* gpg: Extend the "sig" record in --list-mode.Werner Koch2018-04-121-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/getkey.c (get_user_id_string): Add arg R_NOUID. Change call callers. (get_user_id): Add arg R_NOUID. Change call callers. * g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_string): Make global. * g10/keylist.c (list_keyblock_colon): Print a '?' for a missing key also in --list-mode. Print the "issuer fpr" field also if there is an issuer fingerprint subpacket. -- Scripts used to rely on the "User ID not found" string even in the --with-colons listing. However, that is not a good idea because that string is subject to translations etc. Now we have an explicit way of telling that a key is missing. For example: gpg --list-sigs --with-colons | \ awk -F: '$1=="sig" && $2=="?" {if($13){print $13}else{print $5}}' Prints all keyids or fingerprint of signing keys for which we do not have the key in our local keyring. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Extend the ERRSIG status line with a fingerprint.Werner Koch2018-04-121-19/+38
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (issuer_fpr_raw): New. (issuer_fpr_string): Re-implement using issuer_fpr_rtaw. (check_sig_and_print): Don't free ISSUER_FPR. Use ISSUER_FPR_RAW. Use write_status_printf. Extend ERRSIG status. -- Modern OpenPGP implementations put the ISSUER_FPR into the signature to make it easier to discover the, public needed to check the signature. This is also useful in error messages and thus we add it. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Print all keys with --decrypt --list-only.Werner Koch2018-01-081-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_pubkey_enc): Use dedicated error code for list-only and put the key into PKENC_LIST. (print_pkenc_list): Take care of the new error code. -- If the secret keys exist in --list-only mode it was not printed in --list-only mode. GnuPG-bug-id: 3718 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Tweak compliance checking for verificationWerner Koch2017-07-271-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Rework to always allow verification. * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Print a con-compliant warning. * g10/sig-check.c (check_signature2): Use log_error instead of log_info. -- We should be able to verify all signatures. So we only print a warning. That is the same beheavour as for untrusted keys etc. GnuPG-bug-id: 3311 Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* g10: Avoid caching passphrase for failed symmetric encryption.Marcus Brinkmann2017-07-211-1/+2
| | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): If error code is GPG_ERR_CIPHER_ALGO, assume the symmetric passphrase was wrong and invalidate the cache. Signed-off-by: Marcus Brinkmann <[email protected]> GnuPG-bug-id: 2270
* gpg: Avoid asking by fpr and then by keyid during auto-key-retrieve.Werner Koch2017-07-191-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (check_sig_and_print): Track key server request via fingerprint. -- New signatures carry the fingerprint and thus --auto-key-retrieve tries to lookup the key by fingerprint. If that failed it used to also ask the same thing by KEYID - but the keyid is part of the fingerprint and thus it will either get no response or the wrong key back. We can easily avoid this. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg,gpgsm: Fix compliance check for DSA and avoid an assert.Werner Koch2017-06-191-6/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Swap P and Q for DSA check. Explicitly check for allowed ECC algos. (gnupg_pk_is_allowed): Swap P and Q for DSA check. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Simplify SYMKEYS check. Replace assert by debug message. -- Note that in mainproc.c SYMKEYS is unsigned and thus a greater than 0 condition is surprising because it leads to the assumption SYMKEYS could be negative. Better use a boolean test. The assert could have lead to a regression for no good reason. Not being compliant is better than breaking existing users. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Fix computation of compliance with CO_DE_VS.Justus Winter2017-06-081-3/+4
| | | | | | | | * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Symmetric encryption is also in compliance with CO_DE_VS. GnuPG-bug-id: 3059 Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <[email protected]>
* common: Add cipher mode to compliance predicate.Justus Winter2017-06-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | * common/compliance.c (gnupg_cipher_is_compliant): Add mode parameter. * common/compliance.h (gnupg_cipher_is_compliant): Likewise. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Adapt callsite. * sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Likewise. GnuPG-bug-id: 3059 Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <[email protected]>
* gpg: Report compliance with CO_DE_VS.Justus Winter2017-06-011-0/+48
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * common/compliance.c (gnupg_pk_is_compliant): Add DSA with certain parameters. (gnupg_cipher_is_compliant): New function. (gnupg_digest_is_compliant): Likewise. * common/compliance.h (gnupg_cipher_is_compliant): New prototype. (gnupg_digest_is_compliant): Likewise. * common/status.h (STATUS_DECRYPTION_COMPLIANCE_MODE): New status. (STATUS_VERIFICATION_COMPLIANCE_MODE): Likewise. * doc/DETAILS: Document the new status lines. * g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Compute compliance with CO_DE_VS and report that using the new status line. (check_sig_and_print): Likewise. * sm/decrypt.c (gpgsm_decrypt): Likewise. * sm/verify.c (gpgsm_verify): Likewise. -- When decrypting data and verifying signatures, report whether the operations are in compliance with the criteria for data classified as VS-NfD. This information will be picked up by the frontend and presented to the user. GnuPG-bug-id: 3059 Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <[email protected]>
* gpg: Fix typos.Justus Winter2017-05-301-2/+2
| | | | | -- Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <[email protected]>
* gpg: Pass CTRL to many more functions.Werner Koch2017-03-311-15/+15
| | | | | | | | | | -- For proper operations as a server we need to avoid global variables. Thus we need to pass the session state CTRL to most functions. Quite a lot of changes but fortunately straightforward to do. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Revamp reading and writing of ring trust packets.Werner Koch2017-03-301-15/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_trust): Rename to ... (parse_ring_trust): this. Change args and implement new ring trust packet format. (parse): Add special ring trust packet handling. * g10/packet.h (PKT_user_id): New fields KEYUPDATE, UPDATEURL, and KEYSRC. (PKT_public_key): Ditto. (RING_TRUST_SIG, RING_TRUST_KEY, RING_TRUST_UID): New consts. (PKT_ring_trust): New. (struct packet_struct): Remove member RING_TRUST. (strcu parse_packet_ctx_s): Add field SKIP_META. (init_parse_packet): Init SKIPT_META. * g10/free-packet.c (release_public_key_parts): Free UDPATEURL. (free_user_id): Ditto. * g10/mainproc.c (list_node): Remove printing of non-documented "rtv" lines. * g10/build-packet.c (build_packet_and_meta): New. (do_ring_trust): New. * g10/export.c (write_keyblock_to_output): Use build_packet_and_meta in backup mode. (do_export_one_keyblock): Ditto. * g10/import.c (read_block): Add arg WITH_META. Skip ring trust packets if that ism not set. (import): Call read_block WITH_META in restore mode. * g10/keydb.h (KEYSRC_UNKNOWN, KEYSRC_FILE, KEYSRC_KS, KEYSRC_PREF_KS) (KEYSRC_WKD, KEYSRC_WKD_SD, KEYSRC_DANE): New constants. They are not yet used, though. * g10/keydb.c (parse_keyblock_image): Allow ring trust packets. (build_keyblock_image): Ditto. Use build_packet_and_meta. * g10/keyring.c (keyring_get_keyblock): Remove specila treatment of ring trust packets. (write_keyblock): Use build_packet_and_meta. Remove special treatment of ring trust packets and initialization of the signature caches. -- This patch introduced the framework to store meta data for keys and user ids in the keyrings/keyboxes. Ring trust packets are implementation defined and have always been used in gpg to cache the signature verification status. Ring trust packets are only exported with the export option "backup" and only imported with the import option "restore". The new code uses a cleaner way to handle the ring trust packets: When the parser reads a ring trust packet and the previously read packet matches the type of that ring trust packet, the information is stored in that previously read packet (signature, user id, or primary key) and the next packet is read immediately. Thus only the parser sees the ring trust packets. Ring trust packets are written by using the new function build_packet_and_meta instead of build_packet. That function writes a ring trust packet when the needed information is available. As a side-effect of this patch the signature status cache works again and "gpg --check-sigs" is thus much faster. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Extend free_packet to handle a packet parser context.Werner Koch2017-03-291-8/+9
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/packet.h (struct parse_packet_ctx_s): Add fields LAST_PKT and FREE_LAST_PKT. (init_parse_packet): Clear them. (deinit_parse_packet): New macro. Change all users if init_parse_packet to also call this macro. * g10/free-packet.c (free_packet): Add arg PARSECTX and handle shallow packet copies in the context. Change all callers. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse): Store certain packets in the parse context. -- Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* gpg: Change parse_packet to take a context.Werner Koch2017-03-291-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/packet.h (struct parse_packet_ctx_s): New. (parse_packet_ctx_t): New type. (init_parse_packet): New macro. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_packet, dbg_parse_packet): Change to take a parse context. Change all callers to provide a context instead of directly supplying the input stream. (search_packet, dbg_search_packet): Ditto. (copy_all_packets, dbg_copy_all_packets): Init an use a parse context. (copy_some_packets, dbg_copy_some_packets): Ditto. (skip_some_packets, dbg_skip_some_packets): Ditto. -- We will need this change to handle ring packets inside the parser. Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* g10: Move more flags into the flag bitfield.Justus Winter2017-03-081-8/+8
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | * g10/packet.h (PKT_user_id): Move 'is_primary', 'is_revoked', and 'is_expired' into the flags bitfield, and drop the prefix. * g10/call-dirmngr.c: Adapt accordingly. * g10/export.c: Likewise. * g10/getkey.c: Likewise. * g10/import.c: Likewise. * g10/kbnode.c: Likewise. * g10/keyedit.c: Likewise. * g10/keylist.c: Likewise. * g10/keyserver.c: Likewise. * g10/mainproc.c: Likewise. * g10/pkclist.c: Likewise. * g10/pubkey-enc.c: Likewise. * g10/tofu.c: Likewise. * g10/trust.c: Likewise. * g10/trustdb.c: Likewise. -- This patch has been created by applying the following semantic patch: @@ expression E; @@ -E->is_expired +E->flags.expired @@ expression E; @@ -E->is_primary +E->flags.primary @@ expression E; @@ -E->is_revoked +E->flags.revoked Signed-off-by: Justus Winter <[email protected]>
* Remove -I option to common.NIIBE Yutaka2017-03-071-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | * dirmngr/Makefile.am (AM_CPPFLAGS): Remove -I$(top_srcdir)/common. * g10/Makefile.am (AM_CPPFLAGS): Ditto. * g13/Makefile.am (AM_CPPFLAGS): Ditto. * kbx/Makefile.am (AM_CPPFLAGS): Ditto. * scd/Makefile.am (AM_CPPFLAGS): Ditto. * sm/Makefile.am (AM_CPPFLAGS): Ditto. * tools/Makefile.am (AM_CPPFLAGS): Ditto. * Throughout: Follow the change. Signed-off-by: NIIBE Yutaka <[email protected]>
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