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* cipher/random.c (mix_pool): Store the first hash at the end of the
pool.
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This fixes a long standing bug (since 1998) in Libgcrypt and GnuPG.
An attacker who obtains 580 bytes of the random number from the
standard RNG can trivially predict the next 20 bytes of output.
This bug does not affect the default generation of
keys because running gpg for key creation creates at most 2 keys from
the pool: For a single 4096 bit RSA key 512 byte of random are
required and thus for the second key (encryption subkey), 20 bytes
could be predicted from the the first key. However, the security of
an OpenPGP key depends on the primary key (which was generated first)
and thus the 20 predictable bytes should not be a problem. For the
default key length of 2048 bit nothing will be predictable.
For the former default of DSA+Elgamal key it is complicate to give an
answer: For 2048 bit keys a pool of 30 non-secret candidate primes of
about 300 bits each are first created. This reads at least 1140 bytes
from the pool and thus parts could be predicted. At some point a 256
bit secret is read from the pool; which in the worst case might be
partly predictable.
The bug was found and reported by Felix Dörre and Vladimir Klebanov,
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology. A paper describing the problem in
detail will shortly be published.
CVE-id: CVE-2016-6313
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
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* cipher/random.c (mix_pool): Use DIGESTLEN instead of 20.
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
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* cipher/random.c (randomize_mpi): New.
* g10/gpgv.c (randomize_mpi): New stub.
* cipher/rsa.c (USE_BLINDING): Define macro.
(secret): Implement blinding.
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GPG 1.x has never used any protection against timing attacks on the
RSA secret operation. The rationale for this has been that there was
no way to mount a remote timing attack on GnuPG. With the turning up
of Acoustic Cryptanalysis (http://cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/acoustic) this
assumption no longer holds true and thus we need to do do something
about it. Blinding seems to be a suitable mitigation to the threat of
key extraction. It does not help against distinguishing used keys,
though.
Note that GPG 2.x uses Libgcrypt which does blinding by default.
The performance penalty is negligible: Modifying the core pubkey_sign
or pubkey_decrypt function to run 100 times in a loop, the entire
execution times for signing or decrypting a small message using a 4K
RSA key on a Thinkpad X220 are
Without blinding: 5.2s (8.9s)
With blinding: 5.6s (9.3s)
The numbers in parentheses give the values without the recently
implemented k-ary exponentiation code. Thus for the next release the
user will actually experience faster signing and decryption. A
drawback of blinding is that we need random numbers even for
decryption (albeit at low quality).
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <[email protected]>
CVE-id: CVE-2013-4576
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* cipher/random.c (read_seed_file): Distinguish between errors and
short reads.
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This should help to avoid program aborts due to races. Nevertheless a
better and cross-platform locking would be a more solid solution.
GnuPG-bug-id: 1439
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Fixes provided by Gilles Espinasse.
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Updated gettext.
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Vender.
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Windows compilers. Requested by Brian Gladman. From Werner on stable
branch.
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Use NAME_OF_DEV_URANDOM.
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rijndael.c, rndunix.c, sha256.c, cast5.c, idea-stub.c, rmd160.c, rndw32.c,
sha512.c, md5.c, rmd160test.c, rsa.c, tiger.c: Edit all preprocessor
instructions to remove whitespace before the '#'. This is not required by
C89, but there are some compilers out there that don't like it.
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* random.c (fast_random_poll): Only use times() if we HAVE_TIMES.
* sha512.c, tiger.c: Use the U64_C() macro to specify 64-bit constants.
U64_C is defined in include/types.h and uses the correct suffix depending
on the underlying type of u64.
* idea-stub.c (load_module): Catch an error if the idea module file is
unloadable for some reason (unreadable, bad permissions, etc.)
* md.c (string_to_digest_algo): Give a warning about TIGER192 not being
part of OpenPGP.
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anymore. (From Werner)
* random.c (read_seed_file,update_random_seed_file): Use binary mode for
__CYGWIN__. (From Werner)
* blowfish.c (burn_stack), cast5.c (burn_stack), des.c (burn_stack), md5.c
(burn_stack), random.c (burn_stack, read_pool, fast_random_poll),
rijndael.c (burn_stack), rmd160.c (burn_stack), rndegd.c
(rndegd_gather_random), rndlinux.c (rndlinux_gather_random), sha1.c
(burn_stack), tiger.c (burn_stack), twofish.c (burn_stack): Replace
various calls to memset() with the more secure wipememory().
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configure so.
* rndegd.c (rndegd_connect_socket): New. Factored out from ..
(rndegd_gather_random): here and call it.
(do_read): Update the counter variables correctly. This was not a
problem due to the way EGD works. Bug found by Christian Biere.
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repository
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random modules.
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