| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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* be.po: New.
* de.po: Updated.
* ru.po: Added. New version by Maxim Britov.
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Reverts change from 2003-10-03.
* THANKS: Added Phong Nguyen, who found the Elgamal signing key
problem.
* configure.ac (ALL_LINGUAS): Added a Russian translation; thanks
to Maxim Britov. Added Belarusion; thanks to Ales Nyakhaychyk.
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alternate strings when not needed so we don't have to re-translate them.
Hopefully the comment will be enough to indicate multiple match strings.
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Move it here. (handle_bzip2): Add this to handle BZIP2 compressed
messages.
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trust.
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output.
* trustdb.c (mark_usable_uid_certs): Disallow signatures to and from an
Elgamal signing key in the trustdb.
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K*BSD (GNU userland with BSD kernel).
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keys.
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sign+encrypt key is a revocation.
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revocation is generated.
* getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main, merge_selfsigs_subkey,
get_seckey_byname2): Disallow use of sign+encrypt Elgamal keys for
anything except revocations.
* sign.c (do_sign): Catchall for any Elgamal signatures except
revocations.
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to false (do_encrypt): and here with SMALL_K set to true. From Werner on
devel branch.
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any ultimately trusted keys. This ensures that if we lose all our
ultimately trusted keys, we don't leave behind the old validity
calculations.
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string.
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* misc.c (compress_algo_to_string): Translate "Uncompressed". Requested by
Tommi Vainikainen.
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string with tokens separated by |. (answer_is_yes_no_default,
answer_is_yes_no_quit): Use it here to enable alternate translations.
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syntax.
* gpg.sgml: Document --compress-level. Some minor tweaks to other
entries.
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either.
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for bzip2.
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--quiet is set. Suggested by Duncan Harris. Also don't fail with BUG()
when processing a --symmetric message with a cipher we don't have.
* pkclist.c (build_pk_list): Revert last change. There are too many side
effects for stable.
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recipient as they are added.
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* g10.c (main): Add read-only warning.
* compress.c (compress_filter): Make static to help force the use of
push_compress_filter. Remove default algorithm setting since that is done
in push_compress_filter now.
* main.h: Use named algorithm.
* filter.h, compress.c (push_compress_filter, push_compress_filter2): New.
Figure out which is the appropriate compression filter to use, and push it
into place.
* compress.c (handle_compressed), encode.c (encode_simple, encode_crypt),
sign.c (sign_file, sign_symencrypt_file), import.c (read_block), export.c
(do_export): Use push_compress_filter instead of pushing the compression
filter ourselves.
* compress-bz2.c: New. Bzlib versions of the compression filter routines.
* Makefile.am: Include compress-bz2.c if bz2lib is available.
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friends are in libc instead of libdl.
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of passphrases that can decrypt a symmetric or mixed symmetric/pk message
and include it in the list of keys shown to the user.
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difference here between a bad passphrase and a cipher algorithm that we
don't have, so use a error message that makes that clear. Use the actual
list of ciphers when checking whether a cipher is invalid. Return error
if the decrypted cipher algorithm is invalid. (proc_symkey_enc): In a
mixed passphrase/pk message, if a valid dek already exists from decrypting
via pk, do not try to process the passphrase. (proc_symkey_enc): Indicate
when we're decrypting a session key as opposed to decrypting data. If a
passphrase is invalid, discard the dek so we'll keep trying.
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Hurd; Robert Millan reported that the uname test is now
sufficient.
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enabled it yet.
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--export.
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* primegen.c (gen_prime): Bail out if we try to generate a prime
with less than 16 bits.
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Debian bug #213989 reported by Max <[email protected]>.
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0x. Requested by Nelson H. F. Beebe.
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* gpg.sgml: Document --no-groups.
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* encode.c (encode_simple): Allow for 32 bytes (256 bits) of symmetrically
encrypted session key. Use --s2k-cipher-algo to choose cipher, rather
than --cipher-algo. This code is never actually called in stable, but
better to fix it here in case we branch in the future.
* parse-packet.c (parse_subkeyenc): Call it a "symmetrically encrypted
session key" since "session key decryption key" is just baffling. Neaten
--list-packets output.
* pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Always show cipher-not-in-prefs warning unless
--quiet is set.
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photos mean big keys. Document --rfc2440.
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decryption key is seen without salt. Show in --list-packets if a session
key decryption key is present.
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don't support it yet (--sign, --clearsign, --detach-sign, --symmetric, and
--store).
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