diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10')
-rw-r--r-- | g10/ChangeLog | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | g10/armor.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | g10/trustdb.c | 6 |
3 files changed, 12 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog index ffd014115..05dd0b132 100644 --- a/g10/ChangeLog +++ b/g10/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +Thu Jan 13 19:31:58 CET 2000 Werner Koch <[email protected]> + + * armor.c (is_armored): Check for 1-pass-sig packets. Reported by + David Hallinan <[email protected]>. + (armor_filter): Replaced one LF by the LF macro. Reported by + Wolfgang Redtenbacher. + Wed Jan 5 11:51:17 CET 2000 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * g10.c (main): Reset new global flag opt.pgp2_workarounds diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c index c79927e7e..3a0791841 100644 --- a/g10/armor.c +++ b/g10/armor.c @@ -167,6 +167,7 @@ is_armored( const byte *buf ) switch( pkttype ) { case PKT_MARKER: case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: + case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: case PKT_SECRET_KEY: case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: @@ -1020,7 +1021,7 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control, iobuf_put(a, c); c = bintoasc[radbuf[2]&077]; iobuf_put(a, c); - iobuf_put(a, '\n'); + iobuf_writestr(a, LF ); /* and the the trailer */ if( afx->what >= DIM(tail_strings) ) log_bug("afx->what=%d", afx->what); diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c index 472daf2c1..1791f2882 100644 --- a/g10/trustdb.c +++ b/g10/trustdb.c @@ -1405,7 +1405,7 @@ make_uid_records( KBNODE keyblock, ulong lid, u32 *keyid, u32 *min_expire, /* the next test is really bad because we should modify * out modification timestamps only if we really have a change. - * But becuase we are deleting the uid records first it is somewhat + * But because we are deleting the uid records first it is somewhat * difficult to track those changes. fixme */ if( !( u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_VALID ) || ( u->r.uid.uidflags & UIDF_REVOKED ) ) @@ -2085,8 +2085,8 @@ verify_key( int max_depth, TRUSTREC *drec, const char *namehash, if( namehash && tree->n.k.validity != TRUST_ULTIMATE ) { /* find the matching user id. * We don't do this here if the key is ultimately trusted; in - * this case there will be no lits od user IDs and frankly - * it doe not make sense to compare by the name if we do + * this case there will be no lids for the user IDs and frankly + * it does not make sense to compare by the name if we do * have the secret key. * fixme: the way we handle this is too inefficient */ TN ur; |