diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/OPTIONS | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/armor.c | 34 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/build-packet.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/cipher.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/compress.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/decrypt.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/encode.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/export.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/free-packet.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/g10.c | 23 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/getkey.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/gpgd.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/import.c | 44 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/kbnode.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/keydb.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/keygen.c | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/mainproc.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/mdfilter.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/openfile.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/packet.h | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/parse-packet.c | 17 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/pkclist.c | 22 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/revoke.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/ringedit.c | 18 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/seckey-cert.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/seskey.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/sig-check.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/sign.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/trustdb.c | 42 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/trustdb.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/verify.c | 4 |
31 files changed, 169 insertions, 159 deletions
diff --git a/g10/OPTIONS b/g10/OPTIONS index 9620c99f5..28d179940 100644 --- a/g10/OPTIONS +++ b/g10/OPTIONS @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ # This is a sample option file # # Unless you you specify which option file to use with the -# commandline option "--options filename", gpg uses per -# default the file ~/.gnupg/options. +# commandline option "--options filename", gpg uses the +# file ~/.gnupg/options by default. # # An option file can contain all long options which are # available in GNUPG. If the first non white space character of @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ #----------------------------------------------- #------------------- Commands ------------------ #----------------------------------------------- -# With some expections, those cannot be combined +# With some expections, these cannot be combined gen-prime # Generate a prime. diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c index 9fd175fbf..6d39dd9d1 100644 --- a/g10/armor.c +++ b/g10/armor.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ typedef enum { /* if we encounter this armor string with this index, go - * into a mode, which fakes packets and wait for the next armor */ + * into a mode which fakes packets and wait for the next armor */ #define BEGIN_SIGNED_MSG_IDX 3 static char *head_strings[] = { "BEGIN PGP MESSAGE", @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ initialize(void) } /**************** - * Check wether this is a armored file or not + * Check whether this is an armored file or not * See also parse-packet.c for details on this code * Returns: True if it seems to be armored */ @@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ is_armored( byte *buf ) /**************** - * Try to check wether the iobuf is armored + * Try to check whether the iobuf is armored * Returns true if this may be the case; the caller should use the * filter to do further processing. */ @@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ use_armor_filter( IOBUF a ) n = iobuf_peek(a, buf, 1 ); if( n == -1 ) - return 0; /* EOF, doesn't matter wether armored or not */ + return 0; /* EOF, doesn't matter whether armored or not */ if( !n ) return 1; /* can't check it: try armored */ return is_armored(buf); @@ -197,11 +197,11 @@ invalid_armor(void) /**************** - * check wether the armor header is valid on a signed message. + * check whether the armor header is valid on a signed message. * this is for security reasons: the header lines are not included in the * hash and by using some creative formatting rules, Mallory could fake * any text at the beginning of a document; assuming it is read with - * a simple viewer. We do only allow the Hash Header. + * a simple viewer. We only allow the Hash Header. */ static int parse_hash_header( const char *line ) @@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen, do { switch( state ) { case fhdrHASArmor: - /* read at least the first byte to check wether it is armored + /* read at least the first byte to check whether it is armored * or not */ c = 0; for(n=0; n < 28 && (c=iobuf_get2(a)) != -1 && c != '\n'; ) @@ -382,8 +382,8 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen, state = fhdrCHECKDashEscaped3; } else { - /* fixme: we should check wether this line continues - * it is poosible that we have only read ws until here + /* fixme: we should check whether this line continues + * it is possible that we have only read ws until here * and more stuff is to come */ state = fhdrEOF; } @@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen, case fhdrEMPTYClearsig: case fhdrREADClearsig: /* we are at the start of a line: read a clearsig into the buffer - * we have to look for a the header line or dashed escaped text*/ + * we have to look for a header line or dashed escaped text*/ n = 0; c = 0; while( n < buflen && (c=iobuf_get2(a)) != -1 && c != '\n' ) @@ -508,11 +508,11 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen, break; case fhdrTESTSpaces: { - /* but must check wether the rest of the line - * does only contain white spaces; this is problematic - * since we may have to restore the stuffs. simply + /* but must check whether the rest of the line + * only contains white spaces; this is problematic + * since we may have to restore the stuff. simply * counting spaces is not enough, because it may be a - * mix of different white space chacters */ + * mix of different white space characters */ IOBUF b = iobuf_temp(); while( (c=iobuf_get2(a)) != -1 && c != '\n' ) { iobuf_put(b,c); @@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ find_header( fhdr_state_t state, byte *buf, size_t *r_buflen, } -/* figure out wether the data is armored or not */ +/* figure out whether the data is armored or not */ static int check_input( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a ) { @@ -844,7 +844,7 @@ radix64_read( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a, size_t *retn, /**************** - * The filter is used to handle the armor stuff + * This filter is used to handle the armor stuff */ int armor_filter( void *opaque, int control, @@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ armor_filter( void *opaque, int control, * is easy to construct the packets */ /* first a onepass signature packet */ - buf[0] = 0x90; /* old packet forma, type 4, 1 length byte */ + buf[0] = 0x90; /* old packet format, type 4, 1 length byte */ buf[1] = 13; /* length */ buf[2] = 3; /* version */ buf[3] = 0x01; /* sigclass 0x01 (data in canonical text mode)*/ diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c index d1934e8c4..583752eb3 100644 --- a/g10/build-packet.c +++ b/g10/build-packet.c @@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ write_header( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len ) /**************** * if HDRLEN is > 0, try to build a header of this length. - * we need this, so hat we can hash packets without reading them again. + * we need this, so that we can hash packets without reading them again. */ static int write_header2( IOBUF out, int ctb, u32 len, int hdrlen, int blkmode ) diff --git a/g10/cipher.c b/g10/cipher.c index 3fe4e9ea4..c6a43c6b4 100644 --- a/g10/cipher.c +++ b/g10/cipher.c @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ /**************** - * This filter is used to en/de-cipher data with a conventinal algorithm + * This filter is used to en/de-cipher data with a conventional algorithm */ int cipher_filter( void *opaque, int control, diff --git a/g10/compress.c b/g10/compress.c index 75e24b584..8f547dffa 100644 --- a/g10/compress.c +++ b/g10/compress.c @@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ init_uncompress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs ) /**************** * PGP uses a windowsize of 13 bits. Using a negative value for * it forces zlib not to expect a zlib header. This is a - * undocumented feature, Peter Gutmann told me about. + * undocumented feature Peter Gutmann told me about. */ if( (rc = zfx->pgpmode? inflateInit2( zs, -13) : inflateInit( zs )) != Z_OK ) { diff --git a/g10/decrypt.c b/g10/decrypt.c index 1a457f2df..cb1cccd4c 100644 --- a/g10/decrypt.c +++ b/g10/decrypt.c @@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ /**************** * Assume that the input is an encrypted message and decrypt - * (and if signed, verify the signature) it. + * (and if signed, verify the signature on) it. * This command differs from the default operation, as it never - * write to the filename which is included in the file and that it + * writes to the filename which is included in the file and it * rejects files which don't begin with an encrypted message. */ diff --git a/g10/encode.c b/g10/encode.c index b73938070..4852f6e60 100644 --- a/g10/encode.c +++ b/g10/encode.c @@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ static int write_pubkey_enc_from_list( PKC_LIST pkc_list, DEK *dek, IOBUF out ); /**************** - * Encode FILENAME only with the symmetric cipher. Take input from + * Encode FILENAME with only the symmetric cipher. Take input from * stdin if FILENAME is NULL. */ int @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ encode_symmetric( const char *filename ) } /**************** - * Encode FILENAME as literal data packet only. Take input from + * Encode FILENAME as a literal data packet only. Take input from * stdin if FILENAME is NULL. */ int diff --git a/g10/export.c b/g10/export.c index 844098355..87708f08d 100644 --- a/g10/export.c +++ b/g10/export.c @@ -35,9 +35,9 @@ /**************** - * Export the public keys (to standard out or --outout). + * Export the public keys (to standard out or --output). * Depending on opt.armor the output is armored. - * If USERS is NULL, the complete ring wil. be exported. + * If USERS is NULL, the complete ring will be exported. */ int export_pubkeys( STRLIST users ) @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ export_pubkeys( STRLIST users ) all = 2; } - /* use the correct sequence. strlist_last,prev do work correct with + /* use the correct sequence. strlist_last,prev do work correctly with * NULL pointers :-) */ for( sl=strlist_last(users); sl || all ; sl=strlist_prev( users, sl )) { if( all ) { /* get the next user */ diff --git a/g10/free-packet.c b/g10/free-packet.c index 8a484eb25..09971c4cf 100644 --- a/g10/free-packet.c +++ b/g10/free-packet.c @@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ free_seckey_enc( PKT_signature *sig ) /**************** * Return the digest algorithm from the signature packet. - * We need this function because the digeste algo depends on the + * We need this function because the digest algo depends on the * used pubkey algorithm. */ int @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ void free_compressed( PKT_compressed *zd ) { if( zd->buf ) { /* have to skip some bytes */ - /* don't have any informations about the length, so + /* don't have any information about the length, so * we assume this is the last packet */ while( iobuf_get(zd->buf) != -1 ) ; @@ -116,8 +116,12 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = { { 536, "marginals-needed", 1, N_("(default is 3)")}, #ifdef IS_G10 { 527, "cipher-algo", 2 , N_("select default cipher algorithm")}, - { 528, "pubkey-algo", 2 , N_("select default puplic key algorithm")}, + { 528, "pubkey-algo", 2 , N_("select default public key algorithm")}, { 529, "digest-algo", 2 , N_("select default message digest algorithm")}, + #else /* some dummies */ + { 527, "cipher-algo", 2 , "\r"}, + { 528, "pubkey-algo", 2 , "\r"}, + { 529, "digest-algo", 2 , "\r"}, #endif #ifdef IS_G10 @@ -412,7 +416,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv ) #endif } - /* check wether we have a config file on the commandline */ + /* check whether we have a config file on the commandline */ orig_argc = argc; orig_argv = argv; pargs.argc = &argc; @@ -509,7 +513,12 @@ main( int argc, char **argv ) case 540: secmem_set_flags( secmem_get_flags() | 1 ); break; case 542: set_cmd( &cmd, aGenRevoke); break; case 550: set_cmd( &cmd, aVerify); break; - #endif /* IS_G10 */ + #else + case 527: + case 528: + case 529: + break; + #endif /* !IS_G10 */ #ifdef IS_G10MAINT case 513: set_cmd( &cmd, aPrimegen); break; @@ -632,9 +641,9 @@ main( int argc, char **argv ) else { fname = NULL; if( get_passphrase_fd() == 0 ) { - /* reading data and passphrase form stdin: + /* reading data and passphrase from stdin: * we assume the first line is the passphrase, so - * we better should read it now. + * we should read it now. * * We should do it here, but for now it is not needed. * Anyway, this password scheme is not quite good @@ -804,7 +813,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv ) #ifdef IS_G10 case aKeygen: /* generate a key (interactive) */ if( argc ) - wrong_args(_("--gen-key")); + wrong_args("--gen-key"); generate_keypair(); break; #endif @@ -932,7 +941,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv ) case aListPackets: opt.list_packets=1; default: - /* fixme: g10maint should to regular maintenace tasks here */ + /* fixme: g10maint should do regular maintenace tasks here */ if( argc > 1 ) wrong_args(_("[filename]")); if( !(a = iobuf_open(fname)) ) diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c index 966bc5d69..a1dc25239 100644 --- a/g10/getkey.c +++ b/g10/getkey.c @@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ add_secret_keyring( const char *name ) sl->next = secret_keyrings; secret_keyrings = sl; - /* fixme: We should remove much out of this mpdule and + /* fixme: We should remove much out of this module and * combine it with the keyblock stuff from ringedit.c * For now we will simple add the filename as keyblock resource */ @@ -239,7 +239,7 @@ get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid ) int rc = 0; pkc_cache_entry_t ce; - /* lets see wether we checked the keyid already */ + /* let's see whether we checked the keyid already */ for( kl = unknown_keyids; kl; kl = kl->next ) if( kl->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && kl->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY; /* already checked and not found */ @@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ hextobyte( const byte *s ) /**************** - * Try to get the pubkey by the userid. This functions looks for the + * Try to get the pubkey by the userid. This function looks for the * first pubkey certificate which has the given name in a user_id. * if pkc has the pubkey algo set, the function will only return * a pubkey with that algo. @@ -499,7 +499,7 @@ get_seckey( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid ) } /**************** - * Check wether the secret key is available + * Check whether the secret key is available * Returns: 0 := key is available * G10ERR_NO_SECKEY := not availabe */ diff --git a/g10/gpgd.c b/g10/gpgd.c index cb6adada0..bc80721d3 100644 --- a/g10/gpgd.c +++ b/g10/gpgd.c @@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv ) opt.compress = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */ opt.batch = 1; - /* check wether we have a config file on the commandline */ + /* check whether we have a config file on the commandline */ orig_argc = argc; orig_argv = argv; pargs.argc = &argc; @@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ become_daemon() log_fatal("chdir to root failed: %s\n", strerror(errno) ); umask(0); - /* do not let possible childs become zombies */ + /* do not let possible children become zombies */ signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); if( opt.verbose ) log_info("now running as daemon\n"); diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c index 874fa8520..4cb911f51 100644 --- a/g10/import.c +++ b/g10/import.c @@ -52,9 +52,9 @@ static int merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs, /**************** * Import the public keys from the given filename. Input may be armored. - * This function rejects alls keys which are not valid self signed on at + * This function rejects all keys which are not validly self signed on at * least one userid. Only user ids which are self signed will be imported. - * Other signatures are not not checked. + * Other signatures are not checked. * * Actually this functtion does a merge. It works like this: * @@ -62,23 +62,23 @@ static int merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs, * - check self-signatures and remove all userids and their signatures * without/invalid self-signatures. * - reject the keyblock, if we have no valid userid. - * - See wether we have this key already in one of our pubrings. + * - See whether we have this key already in one of our pubrings. * If not, simply add it to the default keyring. * - Compare the key and the self-signatures of the new and the one in - * our keyring. If they are differen something weird is going on; + * our keyring. If they are different something weird is going on; * ask what to do. - * - See wether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not + * - See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not * ask the user what to do. * - compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check * that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user. - * (consider to look at the timestamp and use the newest?) + * (consider looking at the timestamp and use the newest?) * - Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have - * the signatures public key yet; verification is done when putting it + * the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it * into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey * is used. * - Proceed with next signature. * - * Key revocation certificates have a special handling. + * Key revocation certificates have special handling. * */ int @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock ) u32 keyid[2]; int rc = 0; - /* get the key and print some infos about it */ + /* get the key and print some info about it */ node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ); if( !node ) { log_error("%s: Oops; public key not found anymore!\n", fname); @@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock ) goto leave; } - /* See wether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not + /* See whether we have only non-self-signature on one user id; if not * ask the user what to do. <--- fixme */ /* now read the original keyblock */ @@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ import_one( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock ) /**************** - * Import a revocation certificate, this is a single signature packet. + * Import a revocation certificate; this is a single signature packet. */ static int import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node ) @@ -436,7 +436,7 @@ import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node ) } - /* check wether we already have this */ + /* check whether we already have this */ for(onode=keyblock->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) { if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) break; @@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ import_revoke_cert( const char *fname, KBNODE node ) /**************** - * loop over the keyblock an check all self signatures. + * loop over the keyblock and check all self signatures. * Mark all user-ids with a self-signature by setting flag bit 0. * Mark all user-ids with an invalid self-signature by setting bit 1. */ @@ -515,8 +515,8 @@ chk_self_sigs( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, } /**************** - * delete all parts which are invalidand those signatures whos - * public key algorithm is not availabe in this implemenation; + * delete all parts which are invalid and those signatures whose + * public key algorithm is not available in this implemenation; * but consider RSA as valid, because parse/build_packets knows * about it. * returns: true if at least one valid user-id is left over. @@ -583,10 +583,10 @@ delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, u32 *keyid ) * * o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check * that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user. - * FIXME: add the check, that we don't have duplicate signatures and the - * warning in cases that the old/new signatures don't match. + * FIXME: add the check that we don't have duplicate signatures and the + * warning in cases where the old/new signatures don't match. * o Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have - * the signatures public key yet; verification is done when putting it + * the signature's public key yet; verification is done when putting it * into the trustdb, which is done automagically as soon as this pubkey * is used. * Note: We indicate newly inserted packets with flag bit 0 @@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ merge_blocks( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock_orig, KBNODE keyblock, break; else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) { - /* check wether we already have this */ + /* check whether we already have this */ found = 0; for(onode=keyblock_orig->next; onode; onode=onode->next ) { if( onode->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) @@ -742,9 +742,9 @@ merge_sigs( KBNODE dst, KBNODE src, int *n_sigs, if( found ) { /* we already have this signature */ /* Hmmm: should we compare the timestamp etc? - * but then we have first to see wether this signature is valid - * - or - simply add it in such a case and let trustdb logic - * decide wether to remove the old one + * but then we have first to see whether this signature is valid + * - or simply add it in such a case and let trustdb logic + * decide whether to remove the old one */ continue; } diff --git a/g10/kbnode.c b/g10/kbnode.c index 3780eb24a..d50d0578c 100644 --- a/g10/kbnode.c +++ b/g10/kbnode.c @@ -70,8 +70,8 @@ release_kbnode( KBNODE n ) /**************** - * Delete NODE from ROOT, ROOT must exist! - * Note: This does only work with walk_kbnode!! + * Delete NODE from ROOT. ROOT must exist! + * Note: This only works with walk_kbnode!! */ void delete_kbnode( KBNODE node ) @@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ delete_kbnode( KBNODE node ) /**************** - * Append NODE to ROOT, ROOT must exist! + * Append NODE to ROOT. ROOT must exist! */ void add_kbnode( KBNODE root, KBNODE node ) @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ find_kbnode( KBNODE node, int pkttype ) /**************** - * Walk through a list of kbnodes. This functions returns + * Walk through a list of kbnodes. This function returns * the next kbnode for each call; before using the function the first * time, the caller must set CONTEXT to NULL (This has simply the effect * to start with ROOT). @@ -213,9 +213,9 @@ clear_kbnode_flags( KBNODE n ) /**************** * Commit changes made to the kblist at ROOT. Note that ROOT my change, - * and it is therefor passed by reference. + * and it is therefore passed by reference. * The function has the effect of removing all nodes marked as deleted. - * returns true, if any node has been changed + * returns true if any node has been changed */ int commit_kbnode( KBNODE *root ) diff --git a/g10/keydb.h b/g10/keydb.h index 6618894a1..d1a7e4571 100644 --- a/g10/keydb.h +++ b/g10/keydb.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ /**************** - * A Keyblock are all packets which form an entire certificate; + * A Keyblock is all packets which form an entire certificate; * i.e. the public key, certificate, trust packets, user ids, * signatures, and subkey. * @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct kbnode_struct { }; /**************** - * A data structre to hold informations about the external position + * A data structre to hold information about the external position * of a keyblock. */ struct keyblock_pos_struct { @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct skc_list { int mark; }; -/* structure to collect all informations which can be used to +/* structure to collect all information which can be used to * identify a public key */ typedef struct pubkey_find_info *PUBKEY_FIND_INFO; struct pubkey_find_info { diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c index 003d54bbb..a4addfc25 100644 --- a/g10/keygen.c +++ b/g10/keygen.c @@ -147,8 +147,8 @@ gen_elg(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek, pkt->pkt.public_cert = pkc; add_kbnode(pub_root, new_kbnode( pkt )); - /* don't know wether it make sense to have the factors, so for now - * we store them in the secret keyring (but they are of secret) */ + /* don't know whether it makes sense to have the factors, so for now + * we store them in the secret keyring (but they are secret) */ pkt = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt); pkt->pkttype = PKT_SECRET_CERT; pkt->pkt.secret_cert = skc; @@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ generate_keypair() nbits = *answer? atoi(answer): 1024; m_free(answer); if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && (nbits < 512 || nbits > 1024) ) - tty_printf(_("DSA does only allow keysizes from 512 to 1024\n")); + tty_printf(_("DSA only allows keysizes from 512 to 1024\n")); else if( nbits < 768 ) tty_printf(_("keysize too small; 768 is smallest value allowed.\n")); else if( nbits > 2048 ) { @@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ generate_keypair() tty_printf(_("You selected this USER-ID:\n \"%s\"\n\n"), uid); - /* fixme: add a warning if this the user-id already exists */ + /* fixme: add a warning if this user-id already exists */ for(;;) { answer = tty_get(_("Edit (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay? ")); tty_kill_prompt(); @@ -539,8 +539,8 @@ generate_keypair() if( rc == -1 ) { m_free(dek); dek = NULL; tty_printf(_( - "You don't what a passphrase - this is probably a *bad* idea!\n" - "I will do it anyway. You can change your passphrase at anytime,\n" + "You don't want a passphrase - this is probably a *bad* idea!\n" + "I will do it anyway. You can change your passphrase at any time,\n" "using this program with the option \"--change-passphrase\"\n\n")); break; } @@ -558,7 +558,7 @@ generate_keypair() } - /* now check wether we a are allowed to write to the keyrings */ + /* now check whether we are allowed to write to the keyrings */ pub_fname = make_filename(opt.homedir, "pubring.gpg", NULL ); sec_fname = make_filename(opt.homedir, "secring.gpg", NULL ); if( opt.verbose ) { diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c index d8b4310a1..7b82b8165 100644 --- a/g10/mainproc.c +++ b/g10/mainproc.c @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ typedef struct { PKT_user_id *last_user_id; md_filter_context_t mfx; int sigs_only; /* process only signatures and reject all other stuff */ - int encrypt_only; /* process onyl encrytion messages */ + int encrypt_only; /* process only encrytion messages */ STRLIST signed_data; DEK *dek; int last_was_pubkey_enc; @@ -123,12 +123,12 @@ add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) KBNODE node; if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) { - /* This is the first signature for a following datafile. - * G10 does not write such packets, instead it always uses + /* This is the first signature for the following datafile. + * G10 does not write such packets; instead it always uses * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method - * of prepending the signtaure to the data is, + * of prepending the signature to the data is * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read - * from stdin. (Anyway, G10 is able to read these stuff) */ + * from stdin. (G10 is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */ node = new_kbnode( pkt ); c->list = node; return 1; @@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); /* fixme: take the digest algo(s) to use from the * onepass_sig packet (if we have these) - * And look at the sigclass to check wether we should use the + * And look at the sigclass to check whether we should use the * textmode filter (sigclass 0x01) */ c->mfx.md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160, 0); diff --git a/g10/mdfilter.c b/g10/mdfilter.c index 2b3864455..a18636e8b 100644 --- a/g10/mdfilter.c +++ b/g10/mdfilter.c @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ /**************** - * The filter is used to collect a message digest + * This filter is used to collect a message digest */ int md_filter( void *opaque, int control, diff --git a/g10/openfile.c b/g10/openfile.c index f51ee433d..be2702b55 100644 --- a/g10/openfile.c +++ b/g10/openfile.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ /**************** - * Check wether FNAME exists and ask if it's okay to overwrite an + * Check whether FNAME exists and ask if it's okay to overwrite an * existing one. * Returns: -1 : Do not overwrite * 0 : it's okay to overwrite or the file does not exist diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h index 8b1e3c4c0..2393964c2 100644 --- a/g10/packet.h +++ b/g10/packet.h @@ -124,12 +124,12 @@ typedef struct { byte hdrbytes; /* number of header bytes */ byte version; byte pubkey_algo; /* algorithm used for public key scheme */ - byte is_protected; /* The secret infos are protected and must */ - /* be decrypteded before use, the protected */ + byte is_protected; /* The secret info is protected and must */ + /* be decrypted before use, the protected */ /* MPIs are simply (void*) pointers to memory */ /* and should never be passed to a mpi_xxx() */ struct { - byte algo; /* cipher used to protect the secret informations*/ + byte algo; /* cipher used to protect the secret information*/ byte s2k; byte hash; byte salt[8]; diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c index b199ef21d..fb2d74c3a 100644 --- a/g10/parse-packet.c +++ b/g10/parse-packet.c @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ #include "filter.h" #include "options.h" -static mpi_print_mode = 0; -static list_mode = 0; +static int mpi_print_mode = 0; +static int list_mode = 0; static int parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int reqtype, ulong *retpos, int *skip, IOBUF out, int do_skip ); @@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ parse_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt ) } /**************** - * Like parse packet, but do only return packets of the given type. + * Like parse packet, but only return packets of the given type. */ int search_packet( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int pkttype, ulong *retpos ) @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ copy_all_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out ) /**************** * Copy some packets from INP to OUT, thereby removing unused spaces. - * Stop after at offset STOPoff (i.e. don't copy the packet at this offset) + * Stop at offset STOPoff (i.e. don't copy packets at this or later offsets) */ int copy_some_packets( IOBUF inp, IOBUF out, ulong stopoff ) @@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ parse_signature( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, sig->digest_start[0] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--; sig->digest_start[1] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--; - if( is_v4 ) { /*extract required informations */ + if( is_v4 ) { /*extract required information */ const byte *p; p = parse_subpkt( sig->hashed_data, 2 ); if( !p ) @@ -926,7 +926,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, /* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory. * If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key, * we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(. - * So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect him. */ + * So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */ n = pktlen; cert->d.elg.x = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n; cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2; @@ -1056,7 +1056,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, /* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory. * If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key, * we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(. - * So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect him. */ + * So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect it. */ n = pktlen; cert->d.dsa.x = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n; cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2; @@ -1288,11 +1288,12 @@ parse_encrypted( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *pkt ) skip_rest(inp, pktlen); goto leave; } - if( list_mode ) + if( list_mode ) { if( pktlen ) printf(":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: %lu\n", pktlen-10); else printf(":encrypted data packet:\n\tlength: unknown\n"); + } ed->buf = inp; pktlen = 0; diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c index 8de95c3ab..3e6e78d59 100644 --- a/g10/pkclist.c +++ b/g10/pkclist.c @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ #include "i18n.h" /**************** - * Returns true if a ownertrust has changed. + * Returns true if an ownertrust has changed. */ static int query_ownertrust( ulong lid ) @@ -70,14 +70,14 @@ query_ownertrust( ulong lid ) tty_print_string( p, n ), m_free(p); tty_printf(_("\"\n\n" -"Please decide in how far do you trust this user to\n" -"correctly sign other users keys (looking at his passport,\n" -"checking the fingerprints from different sources ...)?\n\n" +"Please decide how far you trust this user to correctly\n" +"verify other users' keys (by looking at passports,\n" +"checking fingerprints from different sources...)?\n\n" " 1 = Don't know\n" " 2 = I do NOT trust\n" " 3 = I trust marginally\n" " 4 = I trust fully\n" -" s = please show me more informations\n\n") ); +" s = please show me more information\n\n") ); for(;;) { p = tty_get(_("Your decision? ")); @@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ add_ownertrust( PKT_public_cert *pkc ) int any=0; tty_printf( -_("Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Lets see, wether we\n" +_("Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Let's see whether we\n" "can assign some missing owner trust values.\n\n")); rc = query_trust_record( pkc ); @@ -160,7 +160,7 @@ _("Could not find a valid trust path to the key. Lets see, wether we\n" } /**************** - * Check wether we can trust this pkc which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL + * Check whether we can trust this pkc which has a trustlevel of TRUSTLEVEL * Returns: true if we trust. */ static int @@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel ) if( rc ) log_fatal("trust check after add_ownertrust failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) ); - /* fixme: this is recursive; we better should unroll it */ + /* fixme: this is recursive; we should unroll it */ return do_we_trust( pkc, trustlevel ); } } @@ -226,7 +226,7 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel ) return 0; /* no */ case TRUST_MARGINAL: - log_info("I'm not sure wether this keys really belongs to the owner\n" + log_info("I'm not sure whether this key really belongs to the owner\n" "but I proceed anyway\n"); return 1; /* yes */ @@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel ) /**************** - * wrapper arounf do_we_trust, so we can ask wether to use the + * wrapper around do_we_trust, so we can ask whether to use the * key anyway. */ static int @@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ do_we_trust_pre( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel ) char *answer; tty_printf(_( -"It is NOT certain, that the key belongs to his owner.\n" +"It is NOT certain that the key belongs to its owner.\n" "If you *really* know what you are doing, you may answer\n" "the next question with yes\n\n") ); diff --git a/g10/revoke.c b/g10/revoke.c index c98bcc336..ca511bcc2 100644 --- a/g10/revoke.c +++ b/g10/revoke.c @@ -176,11 +176,11 @@ gen_revoke( const char *uname ) /* and issue a usage notice */ tty_printf("Revocation certificate created.\n\n" -"Please move it to a media, which you can hide away; if Mallory gets\n" +"Please move it to a medium which you can hide away; if Mallory gets\n" "access to this certificate he can use it to make your key unusable.\n" -"It is clever to print this certificate and store it away, just in the case\n" -"your media gets unreadable. But have some caution: The printer system of\n" -"your machine might store the data and make it availabe to others!\n"); +"It is smart to print this certificate and store it away, just in case\n" +"your media become unreadable. But have some caution: The print system of\n" +"your machine might store the data and make it available to others!\n"); diff --git a/g10/ringedit.c b/g10/ringedit.c index 3193b0012..a7797a358 100644 --- a/g10/ringedit.c +++ b/g10/ringedit.c @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ check_pos( KBPOS *kbpos ) ****************************************************************/ /**************** - * Register a resource (which currently may ionly be a keyring file). + * Register a resource (which currently may only be a keyring file). */ int add_keyblock_resource( const char *filename, int force, int secret ) @@ -165,12 +165,12 @@ get_keyblock_handle( const char *filename, int secret, KBPOS *kbpos ) /**************** - * Search a keyblock which starts with the given packet and put all - * informations into KBPOS, which can be used later to access this key block. + * Search a keyblock which starts with the given packet and puts all + * information into KBPOS, which can be used later to access this key block. * This function looks into all registered keyblock sources. * PACKET must be a packet with either a secret_cert or a public_cert * - * This function is intended to check wether a given certificate + * This function is intended to check whether a given certificate * is already in a keyring or to prepare it for editing. * * Returns: 0 if found, -1 if not found or an errorcode. @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ find_secret_keyblock_byname( KBPOS *kbpos, const char *username ) /**************** * Lock the keyblock; wait until it's available * This function may change the internal data in kbpos, in cases - * when the to be locked keyblock has been modified. + * when the keyblock to be locked has been modified. * fixme: remove this function and add an option to search()? */ int @@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ read_keyblock( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root ) /**************** - * This functions can be used to read trough a complete keyring. + * This functions can be used to read through a complete keyring. * Mode is: 0 = open * 1 = read * 2 = close @@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ insert_keyblock( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE root ) /**************** * Delete the keyblock described by KBPOS. * The current code simply changes the keyblock in the keyring - * to packet of type 0 with the correct length. To help detecting errors, + * to packet of type 0 with the correct length. To help detect errors, * zero bytes are written. */ int @@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root, int skipsigs ) break; default: - /* skip pakets at the begin of a keyring, until we find + /* skip pakets at the beginning of a keyring, until we find * a start packet; issue a warning if it is not a comment */ if( !root && pkt->pkttype != PKT_COMMENT ) log_info("keyring_enum: skipped packet of type %d\n", @@ -703,7 +703,7 @@ keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root, int skipsigs ) /**************** - * Peromf insert/delete/update operation. + * Perform insert/delete/update operation. * mode 1 = insert * 2 = delete * 3 = update diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c index 942303fa9..7dc84140b 100644 --- a/g10/seckey-cert.c +++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c @@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert ) default: BUG(); } cipher_close( cipher_hd ); - /* now let's see wether we have used the right passphrase */ + /* now let's see whether we have used the right passphrase */ if( csum != cert->csum ) { if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) { /* very bad kludge to work around an early bug */ @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_cert *cert ) /**************** * Check the secret key certificate - * Ask up to 3 time for a correct passphrase + * Ask up to 3 times for a correct passphrase */ int check_secret_key( PKT_secret_cert *cert ) @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_cert *cert ) } /**************** - * check wether the secret key is protected. + * check whether the secret key is protected. * Returns: 0 not protected, -1 on error or the protection algorithm */ int diff --git a/g10/seskey.c b/g10/seskey.c index 4ce8fe03b..0dcec8d9d 100644 --- a/g10/seskey.c +++ b/g10/seskey.c @@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits ) u16 csum; MPI a; - /* the current limitation is, that we can only use a session key - * which length is a multiple of BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB + /* the current limitation is that we can only use a session key + * whose length is a multiple of BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB * I think we can live with that. */ if( dek->keylen + 7 > nframe || !nframe ) @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ encode_session_key( DEK *dek, unsigned nbits ) * 0 2 RND(n bytes) 0 A DEK(k bytes) CSUM(2 bytes) * * (But how can we store the leading 0 - the external representaion - * of MPIs don't allow leading zeroes =:-) + * of MPIs doesn't allow leading zeroes =:-) * * RND are non-zero random bytes. * A is the cipher algorithm diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c index d366267e7..ecefcf596 100644 --- a/g10/sig-check.c +++ b/g10/sig-check.c @@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest ) /**************** - * check the signature pointed to by NODE. This is a key signatures. + * check the signature pointed to by NODE. This is a key signature. * If the function detects a self-signature, it uses the PKC from - * NODE and does not read the any public key. + * NODE and does not read any public key. */ int check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig ) diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c index 0fffc5f0b..8867916c7 100644 --- a/g10/sign.c +++ b/g10/sign.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ complete_sig( PKT_signature *sig, PKT_secret_cert *skc, MD_HANDLE md ) else BUG(); - /* fixme: should we check wether the signature is okay? + /* fixme: should we check whether the signature is okay? * maybe by using an option */ return rc; diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c index 321f7baa6..c7400c407 100644 --- a/g10/trustdb.c +++ b/g10/trustdb.c @@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ release_lid_table( LOCAL_ID_INFO *tbl ) /**************** * Add a new item to the table or return 1 if we already have this item - * fixme: maybe its a good idea to take items from an unused item list. + * fixme: maybe it's a good idea to take items from an unused item list. */ static int ins_lid_table_item( LOCAL_ID_INFO *tbl, ulong lid, unsigned flag ) @@ -677,7 +677,7 @@ search_record( PKT_public_cert *pkc, TRUSTREC *rec ) /**************** * If we do not have a local_id in a signature packet, find the owner of - * the signature packet in our trustdb or insert him into the trustdb + * the signature packet in our trustdb or insert them into the trustdb */ static int set_signature_packets_local_id( PKT_signature *sig ) @@ -728,7 +728,7 @@ keyid_from_local_id( ulong lid, u32 *keyid ) } /**************** - * Walk throug the signatures of a public key. + * Walk through the signatures of a public key. * The caller must provide a context structure, with all fields set * to zero, but the local_id field set to the requested key; * This function does not change this field. On return the context @@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ walk_sigrecs( SIGREC_CONTEXT *c, int create ) /**************** - * Verify, that all our public keys are in the trustDB. + * Verify that all our public keys are in the trustDB. */ static int verify_own_certs() @@ -848,7 +848,7 @@ verify_own_certs() if( DBG_TRUST ) log_debug("checking secret key %08lX\n", (ulong)keyid[1] ); - /* look wether we can access the public key of this secret key */ + /* see whether we can access the public key of this secret key */ memset( pkc, 0, sizeof *pkc ); rc = get_pubkey( pkc, keyid ); if( rc ) { @@ -944,7 +944,7 @@ do_list_sigs( ulong root, ulong pubkey, int depth, else { printf("%6u: %*s%08lX(%lu:%02x) ", *lineno, depth*4, "", (ulong)keyid[1], sx.sig_id, sx.sig_flag ); - /* check wether we already checked this pubkey */ + /* check whether we already checked this pubkey */ if( !qry_lid_table_flag( ultikey_table, sx.sig_id, NULL ) ) { print_user_id("[ultimately trusted]", keyid); ++*lineno; @@ -1023,7 +1023,7 @@ do_list_path( TRUST_INFO *stack, int depth, int max_depth, /*printf("%2lu/%d: scrutinizig\n", stack[depth-1], depth);*/ if( depth >= max_depth || depth >= MAX_LIST_SIGS_DEPTH-1 ) { - /*printf("%2lu/%d: to deeply nested\n", stack[depth-1], depth);*/ + /*printf("%2lu/%d: too deeply nested\n", stack[depth-1], depth);*/ return 0; } memset( &sx, 0, sizeof sx ); @@ -1085,7 +1085,7 @@ do_list_path( TRUST_INFO *stack, int depth, int max_depth, * Check all the sigs of the given keyblock and mark them * as checked. Valid signatures which are duplicates are * also marked [shall we check them at all?] - * FIXME: what shall we do if we have duplicate signatures were only + * FIXME: what shall we do if we have duplicate signatures where only * some of them are bad? */ static int @@ -1204,9 +1204,9 @@ build_sigrecs( ulong pubkeyid ) /* the next function should always succeed, because * we have already checked the signature, and for this * it was necessary to have the pubkey. The only reason - * this can fail are I/o errors of the trustdb or a + * this can fail are I/O errors of the trustdb or a * remove operation on the pubkey database - which should - * not disturb us, because we have to chace them anyway. */ + * not disturb us, because we have to chance them anyway. */ rc = set_signature_packets_local_id( node->pkt->pkt.signature ); if( rc ) log_fatal("set_signature_packets_local_id failed: %s\n", @@ -1339,7 +1339,7 @@ make_tsl( ulong pubkey_id, TRUST_SEG_LIST *ret_tslist ) * to assign a trustvalue to the first segment (which is the requested key) * of each path. * - * FIXME: We have to do more thinks here. e.g. we should never increase + * FIXME: We have to do more thinking here. e.g. we should never increase * the trust value. * * Do not do it for duplicates. @@ -1355,7 +1355,7 @@ propagate_trust( TRUST_SEG_LIST tslist ) if( tsl->dup ) continue; assert( tsl->nseg ); - /* the last segment is always a ultimately trusted one, so we can + /* the last segment is always an ultimately trusted one, so we can * assign a fully trust to the next one */ i = tsl->nseg-1; tsl->seg[i].trust = TRUST_ULTIMATE; @@ -1409,7 +1409,7 @@ do_check( ulong pubkeyid, TRUSTREC *dr, unsigned *trustlevel ) tflags |= TRUST_FLAG_REVOKED; if( !rc && !dr->r.dir.sigrec ) { - /* See wether this is our own key */ + /* See whether this is our own key */ if( !qry_lid_table_flag( ultikey_table, pubkeyid, NULL ) ) *trustlevel = tflags | TRUST_ULTIMATE; return 0; @@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ do_check( ulong pubkeyid, TRUSTREC *dr, unsigned *trustlevel ) } } - /* and look wether there is a trusted path. + /* and see whether there is a trusted path. * We only have to look at the first segment, because * propagate_trust has investigated all other segments */ marginal = fully = 0; @@ -1478,9 +1478,9 @@ do_check( ulong pubkeyid, TRUSTREC *dr, unsigned *trustlevel ) } -/********************************************************* - **************** API Interface ************************ - *********************************************************/ +/*********************************************** + **************** API ************************ + ***********************************************/ /**************** * Perform some checks over the trustdb @@ -1536,11 +1536,11 @@ init_trustdb( int level, const char *dbname ) * in ~/.gnupg/ here */ rc = verify_private_data(); if( !rc ) { - /* verify, that our own certificates are in the trustDB + /* verify that our own certificates are in the trustDB * or move them to the trustdb. */ rc = verify_own_certs(); - /* should we check wether there is no other ultimately trusted + /* should we check whether there is no other ultimately trusted * key in the database? */ } @@ -1769,7 +1769,7 @@ check_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, unsigned *r_trustlevel ) * 3) call this function as long as it does not return -1 * to indicate EOF. LID does contain the next key used to build the web * 4) Always call this function a last time with LID set to NULL, - * so that it can free it's context. + * so that it can free its context. */ int enum_trust_web( void **context, ulong *lid ) @@ -1874,7 +1874,7 @@ query_trust_record( PKT_public_cert *pkc ) /**************** * Insert a trust record into the TrustDB - * This function failes if this record already exists. + * This function fails if this record already exists. */ int insert_trust_record( PKT_public_cert *pkc ) diff --git a/g10/trustdb.h b/g10/trustdb.h index 3c81b2b2b..7ffcd4426 100644 --- a/g10/trustdb.h +++ b/g10/trustdb.h @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ #define TRUST_MASK 15 #define TRUST_UNKNOWN 0 /* not yet calculated */ #define TRUST_EXPIRED 1 /* calculation may be invalid */ -#define TRUST_UNDEFINED 2 /* not enough informations for calculation */ +#define TRUST_UNDEFINED 2 /* not enough information for calculation */ #define TRUST_NEVER 3 /* never trust this pubkey */ #define TRUST_MARGINAL 4 /* marginally trusted */ #define TRUST_FULLY 5 /* fully trusted */ diff --git a/g10/verify.c b/g10/verify.c index 3398c2ed4..7a2f73130 100644 --- a/g10/verify.c +++ b/g10/verify.c @@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ /**************** * Assume that the input is a signature and verify it without - * generating any output. With no arguments, the sigature packet + * generating any output. With no arguments, the signature packet * is read from stdin (it may be a detached signature when not - * used in batch mode). If only a sigfile is given, is maybe a complete + * used in batch mode). If only a sigfile is given, it may be a complete * signature or a detached signature in which case the signed stuff * is expected from stdin. With more than 1 argument, the first should * be a detached signature and the remaining files are the signed stuff. |