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-rw-r--r--g10/export.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/getkey.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/import.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/keyedit.c2
4 files changed, 4 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/g10/export.c b/g10/export.c
index 92235fbf6..8c158684d 100644
--- a/g10/export.c
+++ b/g10/export.c
@@ -1925,7 +1925,7 @@ do_export_stream (ctrl_t ctrl, iobuf_t out, strlist_t users, int secret,
continue;
}
- /* The agent does not yet allow to export v3 packets. It is
+ /* The agent does not yet allow export of v3 packets. It is
actually questionable whether we should allow them at
all. */
if (pk->version == 3)
diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
index 3fe8274d5..90083ba6e 100644
--- a/g10/getkey.c
+++ b/g10/getkey.c
@@ -2514,7 +2514,7 @@ merge_selfsigs_main (KBNODE keyblock, int *r_revoked,
else if ((IS_UID_SIG (sig) || IS_UID_REV (sig))
&& sig->timestamp >= sigdate)
{
- /* Note: we allow to invalidate cert revocations
+ /* Note: we allow invalidation of cert revocations
* by a newer signature. An attacker can't use this
* because a key should be revoked with a key revocation.
* The reason why we have to allow for that is that at
diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
index b83f371ab..3c7edd79b 100644
--- a/g10/import.c
+++ b/g10/import.c
@@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@ import_secret_one (ctrl_t ctrl, kbnode_t keyblock,
#ifdef ENABLE_SELINUX_HACKS
if (1)
{
- /* We don't allow to import secret keys because that may be used
+ /* We don't allow importing secret keys because that may be used
to put a secret key into the keyring and the user might later
be tricked into signing stuff with that key. */
log_error (_("importing secret keys not allowed\n"));
diff --git a/g10/keyedit.c b/g10/keyedit.c
index 9ebd643ad..4c833f855 100644
--- a/g10/keyedit.c
+++ b/g10/keyedit.c
@@ -1338,7 +1338,7 @@ sign_uids (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp,
}
/* Fixme: see whether there is a revocation in which
- * case we should allow to sign it again. */
+ * case we should allow signing it again. */
if (!node->pkt->pkt.signature->flags.exportable && local)
tty_fprintf ( fp,
_("\"%s\" was already locally signed by key %s\n"),