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-rw-r--r--g10/ChangeLog21
-rw-r--r--g10/Makefile.am4
-rw-r--r--g10/Makefile.in4
-rw-r--r--g10/armor.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/build-packet.c32
-rw-r--r--g10/cipher.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/compress.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/g10.c4
-rw-r--r--g10/getkey.c8
-rw-r--r--g10/import.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/keygen.c147
-rw-r--r--g10/keyid.c12
-rw-r--r--g10/keylist.c47
-rw-r--r--g10/mainproc.c105
-rw-r--r--g10/packet.h48
-rw-r--r--g10/parse-packet.c199
-rw-r--r--g10/pkclist.c6
-rw-r--r--g10/revoke.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/ringedit.c1
-rw-r--r--g10/seckey-cert.c204
-rw-r--r--g10/sig-check.c18
-rw-r--r--g10/sign.c14
-rw-r--r--g10/signal.c4
-rw-r--r--g10/trustdb.c23
24 files changed, 489 insertions, 422 deletions
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index 66c5b7554..f9f0e3c89 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
+Thu Apr 2 10:38:16 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * keygen.c (generate_keypair): Add valid_days stuff.
+ * trustdb.c (check_trust): Add check for valid_days.
+
+Wed Apr 1 16:15:58 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * keygen.c (generate_keypair): Addional question whether the
+ selected large keysize is really needed.
+
+Wed Apr 1 15:56:33 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * seckey-cert.c (protect_secret_key): merged protect_xxx to here.
+
+Wed Apr 1 10:34:46 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * Makefile.am (g10maint.c): Changed creation rule, so that it works
+ on FreeBSD (missing CFLAGS).
+
+ * parse-packet.c (parse_subkey): Removed.
+
Thu Mar 19 15:22:36 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
* ringedit.c (keyring_enum): Fixed problem with reading too
diff --git a/g10/Makefile.am b/g10/Makefile.am
index baf3d62e0..bbdb598a4 100644
--- a/g10/Makefile.am
+++ b/g10/Makefile.am
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
## Process this file with automake to produce Makefile.in
-INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/include
+INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/intl -I../intl
EXTRA_DIST = OPTIONS pubring.asc
OMIT_DEPENDENCIES = zlib.h zconf.h
BUILT_SOURCES = g10maint.c
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ gpgm_SOURCES = g10maint.c \
LDADD = @INTLLIBS@ $(needed_libs) @ZLIBS@
g10maint.c : g10.c
- $(CPP) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) -DIS_G10MAINT $< > $@ || rm $@
+ $(CPP) $(CFLAGS) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) -DIS_G10MAINT $< > $@ || rm $@
$(PROGRAMS): $(needed_libs)
diff --git a/g10/Makefile.in b/g10/Makefile.in
index a88b10eed..9f6ff08eb 100644
--- a/g10/Makefile.in
+++ b/g10/Makefile.in
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ VERSION = @VERSION@
ZLIBS = @ZLIBS@
l = @l@
-INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/include
+INCLUDES = -I$(top_srcdir)/include -I$(top_srcdir)/intl -I../intl
EXTRA_DIST = OPTIONS pubring.asc
OMIT_DEPENDENCIES = zlib.h zconf.h
BUILT_SOURCES = g10maint.c
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ maintainer-clean-generic clean mostlyclean distclean maintainer-clean
g10maint.c : g10.c
- $(CPP) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) -DIS_G10MAINT $< > $@ || rm $@
+ $(CPP) $(CFLAGS) $(DEFS) $(INCLUDES) -DIS_G10MAINT $< > $@ || rm $@
$(PROGRAMS): $(needed_libs)
diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c
index 848019018..9fd175fbf 100644
--- a/g10/armor.c
+++ b/g10/armor.c
@@ -653,8 +653,6 @@ fake_packet( armor_filter_context_t *afx, IOBUF a,
fhdr_state_t state = afx->parse_state;
unsigned emplines = afx->empty;
- size = 100; /* FIXME: only used for testing (remove it) */
-
len = 2; /* reserve 2 bytes for the length header */
size -= 3; /* and 1 for empline handling and 2 for the term header */
while( !rc && len < size ) {
diff --git a/g10/build-packet.c b/g10/build-packet.c
index 793095e65..85278af1c 100644
--- a/g10/build-packet.c
+++ b/g10/build-packet.c
@@ -267,31 +267,31 @@ do_secret_cert( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
mpi_write(a, skc->d.elg.p );
mpi_write(a, skc->d.elg.g );
mpi_write(a, skc->d.elg.y );
- if( skc->d.elg.is_protected ) {
+ if( skc->is_protected ) {
iobuf_put(a, 0xff );
- iobuf_put(a, skc->d.elg.protect.algo );
- iobuf_put(a, skc->d.elg.protect.s2k );
- iobuf_put(a, skc->d.elg.protect.hash );
- if( skc->d.elg.protect.s2k == 1
- || skc->d.elg.protect.s2k == 3 )
- iobuf_write(a, skc->d.elg.protect.salt, 8 );
- if( skc->d.elg.protect.s2k == 3 )
- iobuf_put(a, skc->d.elg.protect.count );
- iobuf_write(a, skc->d.elg.protect.iv, 8 );
+ iobuf_put(a, skc->protect.algo );
+ iobuf_put(a, skc->protect.s2k );
+ iobuf_put(a, skc->protect.hash );
+ if( skc->protect.s2k == 1
+ || skc->protect.s2k == 3 )
+ iobuf_write(a, skc->protect.salt, 8 );
+ if( skc->protect.s2k == 3 )
+ iobuf_put(a, skc->protect.count );
+ iobuf_write(a, skc->protect.iv, 8 );
}
else
iobuf_put(a, 0 );
mpi_write(a, skc->d.elg.x );
- write_16(a, skc->d.elg.csum );
+ write_16(a, skc->csum );
}
else if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_n );
mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_e );
- if( skc->d.rsa.is_protected ) {
- assert( skc->d.rsa.protect_algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH );
- iobuf_put(a, skc->d.rsa.protect_algo );
- iobuf_write(a, skc->d.rsa.protect.blowfish.iv, 8 );
+ if( skc->is_protected ) {
+ assert( skc->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH );
+ iobuf_put(a, skc->protect.algo );
+ iobuf_write(a, skc->protect.iv, 8 );
}
else
iobuf_put(a, 0 );
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ do_secret_cert( IOBUF out, int ctb, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_p );
mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_q );
mpi_write(a, skc->d.rsa.rsa_u );
- write_16(a, skc->d.rsa.csum );
+ write_16(a, skc->csum );
}
else {
rc = G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
diff --git a/g10/cipher.c b/g10/cipher.c
index 47b9aaffe..52da03b58 100644
--- a/g10/cipher.c
+++ b/g10/cipher.c
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ cipher_filter( void *opaque, int control,
int rc=0;
if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) { /* decrypt */
- rc = -1; /* FIXME:*/
+ rc = -1; /* not yet used */
}
else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH ) { /* encrypt */
assert(a);
diff --git a/g10/compress.c b/g10/compress.c
index 686332b82..75e24b584 100644
--- a/g10/compress.c
+++ b/g10/compress.c
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ do_uncompress( compress_filter_context_t *zfx, z_stream *zs,
log_debug("inflate returned: avail_in=%u, avail_out=%u, zrc=%d\n",
(unsigned)zs->avail_in, (unsigned)zs->avail_out, zrc);
if( zrc == Z_STREAM_END )
- rc = -1; /* eof FIXME: return remaining bytes until EOF */
+ rc = -1; /* eof */
else if( zrc != Z_OK ) {
if( zs->msg )
log_fatal("zlib inflate problem: %s\n", zs->msg );
diff --git a/g10/g10.c b/g10/g10.c
index cf8d31be2..b6aee3e67 100644
--- a/g10/g10.c
+++ b/g10/g10.c
@@ -635,8 +635,10 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
/* reading data and passphrase form stdin:
* we assume the first line is the passphrase, so
* we better should read it now.
+ *
+ * We should do it here, but for now it is not needed.
+ * Anyway, this password scheme is not quite good
*/
- /* FIXME: doit */
}
}
diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
index e8d9d15a5..edc5c8355 100644
--- a/g10/getkey.c
+++ b/g10/getkey.c
@@ -81,8 +81,6 @@ add_keyring( const char *name )
STRLIST sl;
int rc;
- /* FIXME: check wether this one is available etc */
- /* maybe we should do this later */
if( *name != '/' ) { /* do tilde expansion etc */
char *p ;
@@ -101,7 +99,7 @@ add_keyring( const char *name )
sl->next = keyrings;
keyrings = sl;
- /* FIXME: We should remove much out of this module and
+ /* fixme: We should remove much out of this module and
* combine it with the keyblock stuff from ringedit.c
* For now we will simple add the filename as keyblock resource
*/
@@ -131,8 +129,6 @@ add_secret_keyring( const char *name )
STRLIST sl;
int rc;
- /* FIXME: check wether this one is available etc */
- /* my be we should do this later */
if( *name != '/' ) { /* do tilde expansion etc */
char *p ;
@@ -151,7 +147,7 @@ add_secret_keyring( const char *name )
sl->next = secret_keyrings;
secret_keyrings = sl;
- /* FIXME: We should remove much out of this mpdule and
+ /* fixme: We should remove much out of this mpdule and
* combine it with the keyblock stuff from ringedit.c
* For now we will simple add the filename as keyblock resource
*/
diff --git a/g10/import.c b/g10/import.c
index 3d5cd2a17..8e4a54710 100644
--- a/g10/import.c
+++ b/g10/import.c
@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ delete_inv_parts( const char *fname, KBNODE keyblock, u32 *keyid )
*
* o compare the signatures: If we already have this signature, check
* that they compare okay; if not, issue a warning and ask the user.
- * FIXME: add the check, that we don` have duplicate signatures and the
+ * FIXME: add the check, that we don't have duplicate signatures and the
* warning in cases that the old/new signatures don't match.
* o Simply add the signature. Can't verify here because we may not have
* the signatures public key yet; verification is done when putting it
diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c
index e8f9382ad..293d70a58 100644
--- a/g10/keygen.c
+++ b/g10/keygen.c
@@ -34,11 +34,6 @@
#include "keydb.h"
#include "i18n.h"
-#if 0
- #define TEST_ALGO 1
- #define TEST_NBITS 256
- #define TEST_UID "Karl Test"
-#endif
#if defined(HAVE_RSA_CIPHER) && 0
#define ENABLE_RSA_KEYGEN 1
@@ -136,7 +131,7 @@ write_selfsig( KBNODE root, KBNODE pub_root, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
static int
gen_elg(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
- byte *salt, PKT_secret_cert **ret_skc )
+ byte *salt, PKT_secret_cert **ret_skc, u16 valid_days )
{
int rc;
int i;
@@ -152,7 +147,7 @@ gen_elg(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
skc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *skc );
pkc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkc );
skc->timestamp = pkc->timestamp = make_timestamp();
- skc->valid_days = pkc->valid_days = 0; /* fixme: make it configurable*/
+ skc->valid_days = pkc->valid_days = valid_days;
skc->pubkey_algo = pkc->pubkey_algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL;
pkc->d.elg.p = pk.p;
pkc->d.elg.g = pk.g;
@@ -161,19 +156,19 @@ gen_elg(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
skc->d.elg.g = sk.g;
skc->d.elg.y = sk.y;
skc->d.elg.x = sk.x;
- skc->d.elg.is_protected = 0;
- skc->d.elg.protect.algo = 0;
+ skc->is_protected = 0;
+ skc->protect.algo = 0;
- skc->d.elg.csum = checksum_mpi( skc->d.elg.x );
+ skc->csum = checksum_mpi( skc->d.elg.x );
/* return an unprotected version of the skc */
*ret_skc = copy_secret_cert( NULL, skc );
if( dek ) {
- skc->d.elg.protect.algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH;
- skc->d.elg.protect.s2k = 1;
- skc->d.elg.protect.hash = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
- memcpy(skc->d.elg.protect.salt, salt, 8);
- randomize_buffer(skc->d.elg.protect.iv, 8, 1);
+ skc->protect.algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH;
+ skc->protect.s2k = 1;
+ skc->protect.hash = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
+ memcpy(skc->protect.salt, salt, 8);
+ randomize_buffer(skc->protect.iv, 8, 1);
rc = protect_secret_key( skc, dek );
if( rc ) {
log_error("protect_secret_key failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
@@ -206,7 +201,7 @@ gen_elg(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
#ifdef ENABLE_RSA_KEYGEN
static int
gen_rsa(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
- byte *salt, PKT_secret_cert **ret_skc )
+ byte *salt, PKT_secret_cert **ret_skc, u16 valid_days )
{
int rc;
PACKET *pkt;
@@ -220,7 +215,7 @@ gen_rsa(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
skc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *skc );
pkc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkc );
skc->timestamp = pkc->timestamp = make_timestamp();
- skc->valid_days = pkc->valid_days = 0; /* fixme: make it configurable*/
+ skc->valid_days = pkc->valid_days = valid_days;
skc->pubkey_algo = pkc->pubkey_algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA;
memset(&pkc->mfx, 0, sizeof pkc->mfx);
pkc->d.rsa.rsa_n = pk.n;
@@ -270,7 +265,7 @@ gen_rsa(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
static int
gen_dsa(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
- byte *salt, PKT_secret_cert **ret_skc )
+ byte *salt, PKT_secret_cert **ret_skc, u16 valid_days )
{
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
}
@@ -278,6 +273,34 @@ gen_dsa(unsigned nbits, KBNODE pub_root, KBNODE sec_root, DEK *dek,
/****************
+ * check valid days:
+ * return 0 on error or the multiplier
+ */
+static int
+check_valid_days( const char *s )
+{
+ if( !isdigit(*s) )
+ return 0;
+ for( s++; *s; s++)
+ if( !isdigit(*s) )
+ break;
+ if( !*s )
+ return 1;
+ if( s[1] )
+ return 0; /* e.g. "2323wc" */
+ if( *s == 'd' || *s == 'D' )
+ return 1;
+ if( *s == 'w' || *s == 'W' )
+ return 7;
+ if( *s == 'm' || *s == 'M' )
+ return 30;
+ if( *s == 'y' || *s == 'Y' )
+ return 365;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
* Generate a keypair
*/
void
@@ -297,8 +320,8 @@ generate_keypair()
int algo;
const char *algo_name;
char *aname, *acomment, *amail;
+ int valid_days=0;
-#ifndef TEST_ALGO
if( opt.batch || opt.answer_yes || opt.answer_no ) {
log_error(_("Key generation can only be used in interactive mode\n"));
return;
@@ -310,21 +333,16 @@ generate_keypair()
#ifdef ENABLE_RSA_KEYGEN
tty_printf(_(" (3) RSA cannot be used in the U.S.\n"));
#endif
-#endif
for(;;) {
- #ifdef TEST_ALGO
- algo = TEST_ALGO;
+ #ifdef ENABLE_RSA_KEYGEN
+ answer = tty_get(_("Your selection? (1,2,3) "));
#else
- #ifdef ENABLE_RSA_KEYGEN
- answer = tty_get(_("Your selection? (1,2,3) "));
- #else
- answer = tty_get(_("Your selection? (1,2) "));
- #endif
+ answer = tty_get(_("Your selection? (1,2) "));
+ #endif
tty_kill_prompt();
algo = *answer? atoi(answer): 1;
m_free(answer);
- #endif
if( algo == 1 ) {
algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL;
algo_name = "ElGamal";
@@ -333,7 +351,7 @@ generate_keypair()
else if( algo == 2 ) {
algo = PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA;
algo_name = "DSA";
- tty_printf(_("Sorry; DSA is not yet supported.\n"));
+ tty_printf(_("Sorry; DSA key generation is not yet supported.\n"));
}
#ifdef ENABLE_RSA_KEYGEN
else if( algo == 3 ) {
@@ -351,14 +369,10 @@ generate_keypair()
" default keysize is 1024 bits\n"
" highest suggested keysize is 2048 bits\n"), algo_name );
for(;;) {
- #ifdef TEST_NBITS
- nbits = TEST_NBITS;
- #else
answer = tty_get(_("What keysize do you want? (1024) "));
tty_kill_prompt();
nbits = *answer? atoi(answer): 1024;
m_free(answer);
- #endif
if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA && (nbits < 512 || nbits > 1024) )
tty_printf(_("DSA does only allow keysizes from 512 to 1024\n"));
else if( nbits < 768 )
@@ -377,6 +391,15 @@ generate_keypair()
}
m_free(answer);
}
+ else if( nbits > 1536 ) {
+ answer = tty_get(_("Do you really need such a large keysize? "));
+ tty_kill_prompt();
+ if( answer_is_yes(answer) ) {
+ m_free(answer);
+ break;
+ }
+ m_free(answer);
+ }
else
break;
}
@@ -390,14 +413,53 @@ generate_keypair()
tty_printf(_("rounded up to %u bits\n"), nbits );
}
- #ifdef TEST_UID
- uid = m_alloc(strlen(TEST_UID)+1);
- strcpy(uid, TEST_UID);
- #else
+ tty_printf(_("Please specify how long the key should be valid.\n"
+ " 0 = key does not expire\n"
+ " <n> = key expires in n days\n"
+ " <n>w = key expires in n weeks\n"
+ " <n>m = key expires in n months\n"
+ " <n>y = key expires in n years\n"));
+ answer = NULL;
+ for(;;) {
+ int mult;
+
+ m_free(answer);
+ answer = tty_get(_("Key is valid for? (0) "));
+ tty_kill_prompt();
+ trim_spaces(answer);
+ if( !*answer )
+ valid_days = 0;
+ else if( (mult=check_valid_days(answer)) ) {
+ valid_days = atoi(answer) * mult;
+ if( valid_days < 0 || valid_days > 32767 )
+ valid_days = 0;
+ }
+ else {
+ tty_printf(_("invalid value\n"));
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if( !valid_days )
+ tty_printf(_("Key does not expire at all\n"));
+ else {
+ tty_printf(_("Key expires at %s\n"), strtimestamp(
+ add_days_to_timestamp( make_timestamp(), valid_days )));
+ }
+
+ m_free(answer);
+ answer = tty_get(_("Is this correct (y/n)? "));
+ tty_kill_prompt();
+ if( answer_is_yes(answer) )
+ break;
+ }
+ m_free(answer);
+
+
+
tty_printf( _("\n"
"You need a User-ID to identify your key; the software constructs the user id\n"
"from Real Name, Comment and Email Address in this form:\n"
-" \"Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) <[email protected]>\"\n\n") );
+" \"Heinrich Heine (Der Dichter) <[email protected]>\"\n\n") );
uid = NULL;
aname=acomment=amail=NULL;
for(;;) {
@@ -469,6 +531,7 @@ generate_keypair()
tty_printf(_("You selected this USER-ID:\n \"%s\"\n\n"), uid);
+ /* fixme: add a warning if this the user-id already exists */
for(;;) {
answer = tty_get(_("Edit (N)ame, (C)omment, (E)mail or (O)kay? "));
tty_kill_prompt();
@@ -499,7 +562,6 @@ generate_keypair()
break;
m_free(uid); uid = NULL;
}
- #endif
tty_printf(_("You need a Passphrase to protect your secret key.\n\n") );
@@ -555,13 +617,13 @@ generate_keypair()
"number generator a better chance to gain enough entropy.\n") );
if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
- rc = gen_elg(nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, salt, &skc );
+ rc = gen_elg(nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, salt, &skc, valid_days );
#ifdef ENABLE_RSA_KEYGEN
else if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
- rc = gen_rsa(nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, salt, &skc );
+ rc = gen_rsa(nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, salt, &skc, valid_days );
#endif
else if( algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
- rc = gen_dsa(nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, salt, &skc );
+ rc = gen_dsa(nbits, pub_root, sec_root, dek, salt, &skc, valid_days );
else
BUG();
if( !rc ) {
@@ -588,7 +650,6 @@ generate_keypair()
int rc2 = -1;
/* we can now write the certificates */
- /* FIXME: should we check wether the user-id already exists? */
if( get_keyblock_handle( pub_fname, 0, &pub_kbpos ) ) {
if( add_keyblock_resource( pub_fname, 1, 0 ) ) {
diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c
index da426aa2a..9f4ccdfb8 100644
--- a/g10/keyid.c
+++ b/g10/keyid.c
@@ -115,16 +115,16 @@ elg_fingerprint_md( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
unsigned nb1, nb3, nb4;
unsigned n;
- nb1 = mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.dsa.p);
- p1 = buf1 = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.dsa.p, &n1, NULL );
+ nb1 = mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.elg.p);
+ p1 = buf1 = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.elg.p, &n1, NULL );
for( ; !*p1 && n1; p1++, n1-- ) /* skip leading null bytes */
;
- nb3 = mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.dsa.g);
- p3 = buf3 = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.dsa.g, &n3, NULL );
+ nb3 = mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.elg.g);
+ p3 = buf3 = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.elg.g, &n3, NULL );
for( ; !*p3 && n3; p3++, n3-- )
;
- nb4 = mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.dsa.y);
- p4 = buf4 = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.dsa.y, &n4, NULL );
+ nb4 = mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.elg.y);
+ p4 = buf4 = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.elg.y, &n4, NULL );
for( ; !*p4 && n4; p4++, n4-- )
;
diff --git a/g10/keylist.c b/g10/keylist.c
index 3d209ecf8..ce4d65aa4 100644
--- a/g10/keylist.c
+++ b/g10/keylist.c
@@ -111,19 +111,20 @@ list_one( const char *name )
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_CERT );
if( !node ) {
- log_error("Oops; public key not found anymore!\n");
+ log_error("Oops; public key lost!\n");
goto leave;
}
pkc = node->pkt->pkt.public_cert;
keyid_from_pkc( pkc, keyid );
if( opt.with_colons )
- printf("pub::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:::",
+ printf("pub::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%u:::",
/* fixme: add trust value here */
nbits_from_pkc( pkc ),
pkc->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
- datestr_from_pkc( pkc )
+ datestr_from_pkc( pkc ),
+ (unsigned)pkc->valid_days
/* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */
);
else
@@ -136,7 +137,7 @@ list_one( const char *name )
if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
if( any ) {
if( opt.with_colons )
- printf("uid::::::::");
+ printf("uid:::::::::");
else
printf("uid%*s", 28, "");
}
@@ -151,6 +152,34 @@ list_one( const char *name )
any = 1;
}
}
+ else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
+ u32 keyid2[2];
+ PKT_public_cert *pkc2 = node->pkt->pkt.public_cert;
+
+ if( !any ) {
+ putchar('\n');
+ if( opt.fingerprint )
+ fingerprint( pkc ); /* of the main key */
+ any = 1;
+ }
+
+ keyid_from_pkc( pkc2, keyid2 );
+ if( opt.with_colons )
+ printf("sub::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%u:::\n",
+ /* fixme: add trust value here */
+ nbits_from_pkc( pkc2 ),
+ pkc2->pubkey_algo,
+ (ulong)keyid2[0],(ulong)keyid2[1],
+ datestr_from_pkc( pkc2 ),
+ (unsigned)pkc2->valid_days
+ /* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */
+ );
+ else
+ printf("sub %4u%c/%08lX %s\n", nbits_from_pkc( pkc2 ),
+ pubkey_letter( pkc2->pubkey_algo ),
+ (ulong)keyid2[1],
+ datestr_from_pkc( pkc2 ) );
+ }
else if( opt.list_sigs && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
int sigrc;
@@ -169,11 +198,13 @@ list_one( const char *name )
fputs("rev", stdout);
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 )
fputs("sig", stdout);
+ else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 )
+ fputs("sig", stdout);
else {
if( opt.with_colons )
- printf("sig:::::::::%02x:\n",sig->sig_class );
+ printf("sig::::::::::%02x:\n",sig->sig_class );
else
- printf("sig "
+ printf("sig "
"[unexpected signature class 0x%02x]\n",sig->sig_class );
continue;
}
@@ -195,7 +226,7 @@ list_one( const char *name )
putchar(':');
if( sigrc != ' ' )
putchar(sigrc);
- printf(":::%08lX%08lX:%s:::", (ulong)sig->keyid[0],
+ printf(":::%08lX%08lX:%s::::", (ulong)sig->keyid[0],
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig));
}
else
@@ -235,7 +266,7 @@ fingerprint( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
p = array = fingerprint_from_pkc( pkc, &n );
if( opt.with_colons ) {
- printf("fpr::::::::");
+ printf("fpr:::::::::");
for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
printf("%02X", *p );
putchar(':');
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index b5ceecef8..86a1716db 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -93,28 +93,23 @@ add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
}
-static int
-add_public_cert( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
-{
- release_list( c );
- c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
- return 1;
-}
static int
-add_secret_cert( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
- release_list( c );
- c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
+ if( !c->list ) {
+ log_error("orphaned user id\n" );
+ return 0;
+ }
+ add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
return 1;
}
-
static int
-add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
+add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt )
{
if( !c->list ) {
- log_error("orphaned user id\n" );
+ log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" );
return 0;
}
add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
@@ -309,30 +304,11 @@ do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node )
md = md_open( 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will enable the md*/
}
else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10
+ || sig->sig_class == 0x18
|| sig->sig_class == 0x20
|| sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { /* classes 0x10..0x13,0x20,0x30 */
- if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
- #if 0
- KBNODE n1;
-
- if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) {
- md = md_open( algo, 0 );
- hash_public_cert( md, c->list->pkt->pkt.public_cert );
- }
- else if( (n1=find_prev_kbnode( c->list, node, PKT_USER_ID )) ) {
- md = md_open( algo, 0 );
- hash_public_cert( md, c->list->pkt->pkt.public_cert );
- if( sig->sig_class != 0x20 )
- md_write( md, n1->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
- n1->pkt->pkt.user_id->len);
- }
- else {
- log_error("invalid parent packet for sigclass %02x\n",
- sig->sig_class);
- return G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
- }
- #endif
-
+ if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT
+ || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
return check_key_signature( c->list, node, NULL );
}
else {
@@ -374,7 +350,7 @@ print_fingerprint( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_secret_cert *skc )
p = array = skc? fingerprint_from_skc( skc, &n )
: fingerprint_from_pkc( pkc, &n );
if( opt.with_colons ) {
- printf("fpr::::::::");
+ printf("fpr:::::::::");
for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++ )
printf("%02X", *p );
putchar(':');
@@ -409,26 +385,32 @@ static void
list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
{
int any=0;
+ int mainkey;
if( !node )
;
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
+ else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT) )
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
PKT_public_cert *pkc = node->pkt->pkt.public_cert;
if( opt.with_colons ) {
u32 keyid[2];
keyid_from_pkc( pkc, keyid );
- printf("pub::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:::",
+ printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%u:::",
+ mainkey? "pub":"sub",
/* fixme: add trust value here */
nbits_from_pkc( pkc ),
pkc->pubkey_algo,
(ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1],
- datestr_from_pkc( pkc )
+ datestr_from_pkc( pkc ),
+ (unsigned)pkc->valid_days
/* fixme: add LID and ownertrust here */
);
}
else
- printf("pub %4u%c/%08lX %s ", nbits_from_pkc( pkc ),
+ printf("%s %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
+ mainkey? "pub":"sub",
+ nbits_from_pkc( pkc ),
pubkey_letter( pkc->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid_from_pkc( pkc, NULL ),
datestr_from_pkc( pkc ) );
@@ -449,7 +431,7 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
if( any ) {
if( opt.with_colons )
- printf("uid::::::::");
+ printf("uid:::::::::");
else
printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" );
}
@@ -467,17 +449,29 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
}
any=2;
}
+ else if( mainkey && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
+ if( !any ) {
+ putchar('\n');
+ any = 1;
+ }
+ list_node(c, node );
+ }
}
- if( any != 2 )
+ if( any != 2 && mainkey )
printf("ERROR: no user id!\n");
+ else if( any != 2 )
+ putchar('\n');
}
- else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT ) {
+ else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT) )
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT ) {
PKT_secret_cert *skc = node->pkt->pkt.secret_cert;
- printf("sec %4u%c/%08lX %s ", nbits_from_skc( skc ),
+ printf("%s %4u%c/%08lX %s ",
+ mainkey? "sec":"ssb",
+ nbits_from_skc( skc ),
pubkey_letter( skc->pubkey_algo ),
(ulong)keyid_from_skc( skc, NULL ),
- datestr_from_skc( skc ) );
+ datestr_from_skc( skc ) );
/* and now list all userids */
while( (node = find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_USER_ID)) ) {
print_userid( node->pkt );
@@ -486,8 +480,10 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
print_fingerprint( NULL, skc );
any=1;
}
- if( !any )
+ if( !any && mainkey )
printf("ERROR: no user id!\n");
+ else if( !any )
+ putchar('\n');
}
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) {
PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature;
@@ -516,7 +512,7 @@ list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node )
putchar(':');
if( sigrc != ' ' )
putchar(sigrc);
- printf(":::%08lX%08lX:%s:::", (ulong)sig->keyid[0],
+ printf(":::%08lX%08lX:%s::::", (ulong)sig->keyid[0],
(ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig));
}
else
@@ -638,8 +634,16 @@ do_proc_packets( CTX c, IOBUF a )
}
else {
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
- case PKT_PUBLIC_CERT: newpkt = add_public_cert( c, pkt ); break;
- case PKT_SECRET_CERT: newpkt = add_secret_cert( c, pkt ); break;
+ case PKT_PUBLIC_CERT:
+ case PKT_SECRET_CERT:
+ release_list( c );
+ c->list = new_kbnode( pkt );
+ newpkt = 1;
+ break;
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT:
+ case PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT:
+ newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt );
+ break;
case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break;
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break;
@@ -730,7 +734,8 @@ proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node )
if( opt.list_packets )
return;
- if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT )
+ if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT
+ || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT )
list_node( c, node );
else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT )
list_node( c, node );
diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h
index 5f29b83e5..0e6a188c9 100644
--- a/g10/packet.h
+++ b/g10/packet.h
@@ -130,24 +130,24 @@ typedef struct {
byte hdrbytes; /* number of header bytes */
byte version;
byte pubkey_algo; /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
+ byte is_protected; /* The secret infos are protected and must */
+ /* be decrypteded before use, the protected */
+ /* MPIs are simply (void*) pointers to memory */
+ /* and should never be passed to a mpi_xxx() */
+ struct {
+ byte algo; /* cipher used to protect the secret informations*/
+ byte s2k;
+ byte hash;
+ byte salt[8];
+ byte count;
+ byte iv[8]; /* initialization vector for CFB mode */
+ } protect;
union {
struct {
MPI p; /* prime */
MPI g; /* group generator */
MPI y; /* g^x mod p */
MPI x; /* secret exponent */
- u16 csum; /* checksum */
- byte is_protected; /* The above infos are protected and must */
- /* be decrypteded before use. */
- struct {
- byte algo; /* cipher used to protect the secret informations*/
- byte s2k;
- byte hash;
- byte salt[8];
- byte count;
- byte iv[8]; /* initialization vector for CFB mode */
- } protect; /* when protected, the MPIs above are pointers
- * to plain storage */
} elg;
struct {
MPI p; /* prime */
@@ -155,18 +155,6 @@ typedef struct {
MPI g; /* group generator */
MPI y; /* g^x mod p */
MPI x; /* secret exponent */
- u16 csum; /* checksum */
- byte is_protected; /* The above infos are protected and must */
- /* be decrypteded before use. */
- struct {
- byte algo; /* cipher used to protect the secret informations*/
- byte s2k;
- byte hash;
- byte salt[8];
- byte count;
- byte iv[8]; /* initialization vector for CFB mode */
- } protect; /* when protected, the MPIs above are pointers
- * to plain storage */
} dsa;
struct {
MPI rsa_n; /* public modulus */
@@ -175,19 +163,9 @@ typedef struct {
MPI rsa_p; /* secret first prime number */
MPI rsa_q; /* secret second prime number */
MPI rsa_u; /* secret multiplicative inverse */
- u16 csum; /* checksum */
- byte is_protected; /* The above infos are protected and must */
- /* be decrypteded before use */
- byte protect_algo; /* cipher used to protect the secret informations*/
- union { /* information for the protection */
- struct {
- byte iv[8]; /* initialization vector for CFB mode */
- /* when protected, the MPIs above are pointers
- * to plain storage */
- } blowfish;
- } protect;
} rsa;
} d;
+ u16 csum; /* checksum */
} PKT_secret_cert;
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
index 4281ef173..fe2c63c5b 100644
--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@ static int parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
byte *hdr, int hdrlen, PACKET *packet );
static int parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
-static void parse_subkey( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen );
static int parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
PACKET *packet );
static void parse_trust( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen );
@@ -289,6 +288,7 @@ parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int reqtype, ulong *retpos,
rc = G10ERR_UNKNOWN_PACKET; /* default error */
switch( pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_CERT:
+ case PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT:
pkt->pkt.public_cert = m_alloc_clear(sizeof *pkt->pkt.public_cert );
rc = parse_certificate(inp, pkttype, pktlen, hdr, hdrlen, pkt );
break;
@@ -311,9 +311,6 @@ parse( IOBUF inp, PACKET *pkt, int reqtype, ulong *retpos,
case PKT_USER_ID:
rc = parse_user_id(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt );
break;
- case PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT:
- parse_subkey(inp, pkttype, pktlen);
- break;
case PKT_COMMENT:
rc = parse_comment(inp, pkttype, pktlen, pkt);
break;
@@ -767,19 +764,37 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
int is_v4=0;
int rc=0;
-
- if( pktlen < 12 ) {
- log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
- goto leave;
- }
version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- if( version == 4 )
+ if( pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT && version == '#' ) {
+ /* early versions of G10 use old comments packets; luckily all those
+ * comments are started by a hash */
+ if( list_mode ) {
+ printf(":old comment packet: \"" );
+ for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- ) {
+ int c;
+ c = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+ if( c >= ' ' && c <= 'z' )
+ putchar(c);
+ else
+ printf("\\x%02x", c );
+ }
+ printf("\"\n");
+ }
+ skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if( version == 4 )
is_v4=1;
else if( version != 2 && version != 3 ) {
log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
goto leave;
}
+ if( pktlen < 11 ) {
+ log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
+ goto leave;
+ }
+
timestamp = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
if( is_v4 )
valid_period = 0;
@@ -795,7 +810,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT? "public sub" :
pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT? "secret sub" : "??",
version, timestamp, valid_period );
- if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT ) {
+ if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT || pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT ) {
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->timestamp = timestamp;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->valid_days = valid_period;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->hdrbytes = hdrlen;
@@ -824,7 +839,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
mpi_print(stdout, elg_y, mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
- if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
+ if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT || pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.elg.p = elg_p;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.elg.g = elg_g;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.elg.y = elg_y;
@@ -836,27 +851,27 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.elg.p = elg_p;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.elg.g = elg_g;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.elg.y = elg_y;
- cert->d.elg.protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- if( cert->d.elg.protect.algo ) {
- cert->d.elg.is_protected = 1;
- cert->d.elg.protect.count = 0;
- if( cert->d.elg.protect.algo == 255 ) {
+ cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ if( cert->protect.algo ) {
+ cert->is_protected = 1;
+ cert->protect.count = 0;
+ if( cert->protect.algo == 255 ) {
if( pktlen < 3 ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
- cert->d.elg.protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- cert->d.elg.protect.s2k = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- cert->d.elg.protect.hash = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- switch( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k ) {
+ cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ cert->protect.s2k = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ cert->protect.hash = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ switch( cert->protect.s2k ) {
case 1:
case 3:
for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
- memcpy(cert->d.elg.protect.salt, temp, 8 );
+ memcpy(cert->protect.salt, temp, 8 );
break;
}
- switch( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k ) {
+ switch( cert->protect.s2k ) {
case 0: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsimple S2K" );
break;
case 1: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsalted S2K" );
@@ -866,30 +881,30 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
default:
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
- cert->d.elg.protect.s2k );
+ cert->protect.s2k );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( list_mode ) {
printf(", algo: %d, hash: %d",
- cert->d.elg.protect.algo,
- cert->d.elg.protect.hash );
- if( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 1
- || cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 3 ) {
+ cert->protect.algo,
+ cert->protect.hash );
+ if( cert->protect.s2k == 1
+ || cert->protect.s2k == 3 ) {
printf(", salt: ");
for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
- printf("%02x", cert->d.elg.protect.salt[i]);
+ printf("%02x", cert->protect.salt[i]);
}
putchar('\n');
}
- if( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 3 ) {
+ if( cert->protect.s2k == 3 ) {
if( !pktlen ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
- cert->d.elg.protect.count = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+ cert->protect.count = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
pktlen--;
}
@@ -897,12 +912,12 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
else {
if( list_mode )
printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n",
- cert->d.elg.protect.algo);
+ cert->protect.algo);
/* old version, we don't have a S2K, so we fake one */
- cert->d.elg.protect.s2k = 0;
+ cert->protect.s2k = 0;
/* We need this kludge to cope with old GNUPG versions */
- cert->d.elg.protect.hash =
- cert->d.elg.protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH?
+ cert->protect.hash =
+ cert->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH?
DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 : DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
}
if( pktlen < 8 ) {
@@ -917,20 +932,20 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
printf(" %02x", temp[i] );
putchar('\n');
}
- memcpy(cert->d.elg.protect.iv, temp, 8 );
+ memcpy(cert->protect.iv, temp, 8 );
}
else
- cert->d.elg.is_protected = 0;
+ cert->is_protected = 0;
/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
* If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
* we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect him. */
n = pktlen; cert->d.elg.x = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
- cert->d.elg.csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
+ cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\t[secret value x is not shown]\n"
- "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->d.elg.csum);
+ "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->csum);
}
/*log_mpidump("elg p=", cert->d.elg.p );
log_mpidump("elg g=", cert->d.elg.g );
@@ -955,7 +970,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
mpi_print(stdout, dsa_y, mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
- if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
+ if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT || pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.dsa.p = dsa_p;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.dsa.q = dsa_q;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.dsa.g = dsa_g;
@@ -969,27 +984,27 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.dsa.q = dsa_q;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.dsa.g = dsa_g;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.dsa.y = dsa_y;
- cert->d.dsa.protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- if( cert->d.dsa.protect.algo ) {
- cert->d.dsa.is_protected = 1;
- cert->d.dsa.protect.count = 0;
- if( cert->d.dsa.protect.algo == 255 ) {
+ cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ if( cert->protect.algo ) {
+ cert->is_protected = 1;
+ cert->protect.count = 0;
+ if( cert->protect.algo == 255 ) {
if( pktlen < 3 ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
- cert->d.dsa.protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- cert->d.dsa.protect.hash = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- switch( cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k ) {
+ cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ cert->protect.s2k = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ cert->protect.hash = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ switch( cert->protect.s2k ) {
case 1:
case 3:
for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
- memcpy(cert->d.dsa.protect.salt, temp, 8 );
+ memcpy(cert->protect.salt, temp, 8 );
break;
}
- switch( cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k ) {
+ switch( cert->protect.s2k ) {
case 0: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsimple S2K" );
break;
case 1: if( list_mode ) printf( "\tsalted S2K" );
@@ -998,42 +1013,39 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
break;
default:
if( list_mode )
- printf( "\tunknown S2K %d\n",
- cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k );
+ printf( "\tunknown S2K %d\n", cert->protect.s2k );
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
if( list_mode ) {
printf(", algo: %d, hash: %d",
- cert->d.dsa.protect.algo,
- cert->d.dsa.protect.hash );
- if( cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k == 1
- || cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k == 3 ) {
+ cert->protect.algo,
+ cert->protect.hash );
+ if( cert->protect.s2k == 1 || cert->protect.s2k == 3 ){
printf(", salt: ");
for(i=0; i < 8; i++ )
- printf("%02x", cert->d.dsa.protect.salt[i]);
+ printf("%02x", cert->protect.salt[i]);
}
putchar('\n');
}
- if( cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k == 3 ) {
+ if( cert->protect.s2k == 3 ) {
if( !pktlen ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
goto leave;
}
- cert->d.dsa.protect.count = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
+ cert->protect.count = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
pktlen--;
}
}
else {
if( list_mode )
- printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n",
- cert->d.dsa.protect.algo);
+ printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n", cert->protect.algo);
/* old version, we don't have a S2K, so we fake one */
- cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k = 0;
- cert->d.dsa.protect.hash = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
+ cert->protect.s2k = 0;
+ cert->protect.hash = DIGEST_ALGO_MD5;
}
if( pktlen < 8 ) {
rc = G10ERR_INVALID_PACKET;
@@ -1047,20 +1059,20 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
printf(" %02x", temp[i] );
putchar('\n');
}
- memcpy(cert->d.dsa.protect.iv, temp, 8 );
+ memcpy(cert->protect.iv, temp, 8 );
}
else
- cert->d.dsa.is_protected = 0;
+ cert->is_protected = 0;
/* It does not make sense to read it into secure memory.
* If the user is so careless, not to protect his secret key,
* we can assume, that he operates an open system :=(.
* So we put the key into secure memory when we unprotect him. */
n = pktlen; cert->d.dsa.x = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
- cert->d.dsa.csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
+ cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\t[secret value x is not shown]\n"
- "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->d.dsa.csum);
+ "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->csum);
}
/*log_mpidump("dsa p=", cert->d.dsa.p );
log_mpidump("dsa q=", cert->d.dsa.q );
@@ -1081,7 +1093,7 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
mpi_print(stdout, rsa_pub_exp, mpi_print_mode );
putchar('\n');
}
- if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
+ if( pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT || pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.rsa.rsa_n = rsa_pub_mod;
pkt->pkt.public_cert->d.rsa.rsa_e = rsa_pub_exp;
}
@@ -1091,11 +1103,11 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.rsa.rsa_n = rsa_pub_mod;
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->d.rsa.rsa_e = rsa_pub_exp;
- cert->d.rsa.protect_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ cert->protect.algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( list_mode )
- printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n", cert->d.rsa.protect_algo);
- if( cert->d.rsa.protect_algo ) {
- cert->d.rsa.is_protected = 1;
+ printf( "\tprotect algo: %d\n", cert->protect.algo);
+ if( cert->protect.algo ) {
+ cert->is_protected = 1;
for(i=0; i < 8 && pktlen; i++, pktlen-- )
temp[i] = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
if( list_mode ) {
@@ -1104,21 +1116,21 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
printf(" %02x", temp[i] );
putchar('\n');
}
- if( cert->d.rsa.protect_algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH )
- memcpy(cert->d.rsa.protect.blowfish.iv, temp, 8 );
+ if( cert->protect.algo == CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH )
+ memcpy(cert->protect.iv, temp, 8 );
}
else
- cert->d.rsa.is_protected = 0;
+ cert->is_protected = 0;
/* (See comments at the code for elg keys) */
n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_d = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_p = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_q = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
n = pktlen; cert->d.rsa.rsa_u = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0 ); pktlen -=n;
- cert->d.rsa.csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
+ cert->csum = read_16(inp); pktlen -= 2;
if( list_mode ) {
printf("\t[secret values d,p,q,u are not shown]\n"
- "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->d.rsa.csum);
+ "\tchecksum: %04hx\n", cert->csum);
}
/* log_mpidump("rsa n=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_n );
log_mpidump("rsa e=", cert->d.rsa.rsa_e );
@@ -1164,37 +1176,6 @@ parse_user_id( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
}
-static void
-parse_subkey( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen )
-{
- int version;
-
- version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- if( pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT && version == '#' ) {
- /* early versions of G10 use old comments packets; luckily all those
- * comments are started by a hash */
- if( list_mode ) {
- printf(":old comment packet: \"" );
- for( ; pktlen; pktlen-- ) {
- int c;
- c = iobuf_get_noeof(inp);
- if( c >= ' ' && c <= 'z' )
- putchar(c);
- else
- printf("\\x%02x", c );
- }
- printf("\"\n");
- }
- skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
- return;
- }
-
- if( list_mode )
- printf(":public subkey packet: \"" );
- skip_rest(inp, pktlen);
-}
-
-
static int
parse_comment( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
diff --git a/g10/pkclist.c b/g10/pkclist.c
index a47747f0b..d4e8133ae 100644
--- a/g10/pkclist.c
+++ b/g10/pkclist.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel )
return do_we_trust( pkc, trustlevel );
case TRUST_EXPIRED:
- log_info("trust has expired: NOT yet implemented\n");
+ log_info("key has expired\n");
return 0; /* no */
case TRUST_UNDEFINED:
@@ -215,11 +215,11 @@ do_we_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int trustlevel )
if( rc )
log_fatal("trust check after add_ownertrust failed: %s\n",
g10_errstr(rc) );
- /* FIXME: this is recursive; we better should unroll it */
+ /* fixme: this is recursive; we better should unroll it */
return do_we_trust( pkc, trustlevel );
}
}
- return 0; /* no FIXME: add "Proceed anyway?" */
+ return 0;
case TRUST_NEVER:
log_info("We do NOT trust this key\n");
diff --git a/g10/revoke.c b/g10/revoke.c
index 86d465cc0..c98bcc336 100644
--- a/g10/revoke.c
+++ b/g10/revoke.c
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ gen_revoke( const char *uname )
goto leave;
}
- /* FIXME: should make a function out of this stuff,
+ /* fixme: should make a function out of this stuff,
* it's used all over the source */
skc = node->pkt->pkt.secret_cert;
keyid_from_skc( skc, skc_keyid );
diff --git a/g10/ringedit.c b/g10/ringedit.c
index 49e46ecde..8eade961a 100644
--- a/g10/ringedit.c
+++ b/g10/ringedit.c
@@ -674,6 +674,7 @@ keyring_read( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
rc = G10ERR_INV_KEYRING;
goto ready;
}
+ log_info("read_keyblock: read error: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
kbpos->count++;
free_packet( pkt );
init_packet( pkt );
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
index f126ba01b..49870dcd9 100644
--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
+++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
@@ -67,19 +67,18 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
ELG_secret_key skey;
char save_iv[8];
- if( cert->d.elg.is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
+ if( cert->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
DEK *dek = NULL;
MPI test_x;
BLOWFISH_context *blowfish_ctx=NULL;
- switch( cert->d.elg.protect.algo ) {
+ switch( cert->protect.algo ) {
case CIPHER_ALGO_NONE: BUG(); break;
case CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH:
keyid_from_skc( cert, keyid );
- if( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 1
- || cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 3 )
+ if( cert->protect.s2k == 1 || cert->protect.s2k == 3 )
dek = get_passphrase_hash( keyid, NULL,
- cert->d.elg.protect.salt );
+ cert->protect.salt );
else
dek = get_passphrase_hash( keyid, NULL, NULL );
@@ -87,10 +86,9 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
blowfish_setkey( blowfish_ctx, dek->key, dek->keylen );
m_free(dek); /* pw is in secure memory, so m_free() burns it */
blowfish_setiv( blowfish_ctx, NULL );
- memcpy(save_iv, cert->d.elg.protect.iv, 8 );
- blowfish_decode_cfb( blowfish_ctx,
- cert->d.elg.protect.iv,
- cert->d.elg.protect.iv, 8 );
+ memcpy(save_iv, cert->protect.iv, 8 );
+ blowfish_decode_cfb( blowfish_ctx, cert->protect.iv,
+ cert->protect.iv, 8 );
mpi_set_secure(cert->d.elg.x );
/*fixme: maybe it is better to set the buffer secure with a
* new get_buffer_secure() function */
@@ -103,9 +101,9 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
m_free( buffer );
m_free( blowfish_ctx );
/* now let's see wether we have used the right passphrase */
- if( csum != cert->d.elg.csum ) {
+ if( csum != cert->csum ) {
mpi_free(test_x);
- memcpy( cert->d.elg.protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
+ memcpy( cert->protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
}
@@ -117,16 +115,16 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
if( !res ) {
mpi_free(test_x);
- memcpy( cert->d.elg.protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
+ memcpy( cert->protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
}
mpi_set(cert->d.elg.x, test_x);
mpi_free(test_x);
- cert->d.elg.is_protected = 0;
+ cert->is_protected = 0;
break;
default:
- return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
+ return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupported protection algorithm */
}
}
else { /* not protected */
@@ -134,7 +132,7 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
csum = checksum_u16( nbytes*8 );
csum += checksum( buffer, nbytes );
m_free( buffer );
- if( csum != cert->d.elg.csum )
+ if( csum != cert->csum )
return G10ERR_CHECKSUM;
}
@@ -143,39 +141,6 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
static int
-protect_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert, DEK *dek )
-{
- byte *buffer;
- unsigned nbytes;
-
- if( !cert->d.elg.is_protected ) { /* add the protection */
- BLOWFISH_context *blowfish_ctx=NULL;
-
- switch( cert->d.elg.protect.algo ) {
- case CIPHER_ALGO_NONE: BUG(); break;
- case CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH:
- blowfish_ctx = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *blowfish_ctx );
- blowfish_setkey( blowfish_ctx, dek->key, dek->keylen );
- blowfish_setiv( blowfish_ctx, NULL );
- blowfish_encode_cfb( blowfish_ctx,
- cert->d.elg.protect.iv,
- cert->d.elg.protect.iv, 8 );
- buffer = mpi_get_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, &nbytes, NULL );
- blowfish_encode_cfb( blowfish_ctx, buffer, buffer, nbytes );
- mpi_set_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, buffer, nbytes, 0 );
- m_free( buffer );
- m_free( blowfish_ctx );
- cert->d.elg.is_protected = 1;
- break;
-
- default:
- return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int
check_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
{
byte *buffer;
@@ -186,19 +151,18 @@ check_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
DSA_secret_key skey;
char save_iv[8];
- if( cert->d.dsa.is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
+ if( cert->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
DEK *dek = NULL;
MPI test_x;
BLOWFISH_context *blowfish_ctx=NULL;
- switch( cert->d.dsa.protect.algo ) {
+ switch( cert->protect.algo ) {
case CIPHER_ALGO_NONE: BUG(); break;
case CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH:
keyid_from_skc( cert, keyid );
- if( cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k == 1
- || cert->d.dsa.protect.s2k == 3 )
+ if( cert->protect.s2k == 1 || cert->protect.s2k == 3 )
dek = get_passphrase_hash( keyid, NULL,
- cert->d.dsa.protect.salt );
+ cert->protect.salt );
else
dek = get_passphrase_hash( keyid, NULL, NULL );
@@ -206,10 +170,10 @@ check_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
blowfish_setkey( blowfish_ctx, dek->key, dek->keylen );
m_free(dek); /* pw is in secure memory, so m_free() burns it */
blowfish_setiv( blowfish_ctx, NULL );
- memcpy(save_iv, cert->d.dsa.protect.iv, 8 );
+ memcpy(save_iv, cert->protect.iv, 8 );
blowfish_decode_cfb( blowfish_ctx,
- cert->d.dsa.protect.iv,
- cert->d.dsa.protect.iv, 8 );
+ cert->protect.iv,
+ cert->protect.iv, 8 );
mpi_set_secure(cert->d.dsa.x );
/*fixme: maybe it is better to set the buffer secure with a
* new get_buffer_secure() function */
@@ -222,9 +186,9 @@ check_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
m_free( buffer );
m_free( blowfish_ctx );
/* now let's see wether we have used the right passphrase */
- if( csum != cert->d.dsa.csum ) {
+ if( csum != cert->csum ) {
mpi_free(test_x);
- memcpy( cert->d.dsa.protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
+ memcpy( cert->protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
}
@@ -237,12 +201,12 @@ check_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey );
if( !res ) {
mpi_free(test_x);
- memcpy( cert->d.dsa.protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
+ memcpy( cert->protect.iv, save_iv, 8 );
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
}
mpi_set(cert->d.dsa.x, test_x);
mpi_free(test_x);
- cert->d.dsa.is_protected = 0;
+ cert->is_protected = 0;
break;
default:
@@ -254,7 +218,7 @@ check_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
csum = checksum_u16( nbytes*8 );
csum += checksum( buffer, nbytes );
m_free( buffer );
- if( csum != cert->d.dsa.csum )
+ if( csum != cert->csum )
return G10ERR_CHECKSUM;
}
@@ -262,39 +226,6 @@ check_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
}
-static int
-protect_dsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert, DEK *dek )
-{
- byte *buffer;
- unsigned nbytes;
-
- if( !cert->d.dsa.is_protected ) { /* add the protection */
- BLOWFISH_context *blowfish_ctx=NULL;
-
- switch( cert->d.dsa.protect.algo ) {
- case CIPHER_ALGO_NONE: BUG(); break;
- case CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH:
- blowfish_ctx = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *blowfish_ctx );
- blowfish_setkey( blowfish_ctx, dek->key, dek->keylen );
- blowfish_setiv( blowfish_ctx, NULL );
- blowfish_encode_cfb( blowfish_ctx,
- cert->d.dsa.protect.iv,
- cert->d.dsa.protect.iv, 8 );
- buffer = mpi_get_buffer( cert->d.dsa.x, &nbytes, NULL );
- blowfish_encode_cfb( blowfish_ctx, buffer, buffer, nbytes );
- mpi_set_buffer( cert->d.dsa.x, buffer, nbytes, 0 );
- m_free( buffer );
- m_free( blowfish_ctx );
- cert->d.dsa.is_protected = 1;
- break;
-
- default:
- return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
#ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
static int
@@ -307,11 +238,11 @@ check_rsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
u32 keyid[2];
RSA_secret_key skey;
- if( cert->d.rsa.is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
+ if( cert->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
DEK *dek = NULL;
BLOWFISH_context *blowfish_ctx=NULL;
- switch( cert->d.rsa.protect_algo ) {
+ switch( cert->protect.algo ) {
/* FIXME: use test variables to check for the correct key */
case CIPHER_ALGO_NONE: BUG(); break;
case CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH:
@@ -321,9 +252,8 @@ check_rsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
blowfish_setkey( blowfish_ctx, dek->key, dek->keylen );
m_free(dek); /* pw is in secure memory, so m_free() burns it */
blowfish_setiv( blowfish_ctx, NULL );
- blowfish_decode_cfb( blowfish_ctx,
- cert->d.rsa.protect.blowfish.iv,
- cert->d.rsa.protect.blowfish.iv, 8 );
+ blowfish_decode_cfb( blowfish_ctx, cert->protect.iv,
+ cert->protect.iv, 8 );
csum = 0;
#define X(a) do { \
mpi_set_secure(cert->d.rsa.rsa_##a); \
@@ -339,10 +269,10 @@ check_rsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
X(q);
X(u);
#undef X
- cert->d.rsa.is_protected = 0;
+ cert->is_protected = 0;
m_free( blowfish_ctx );
/* now let's see wether we have used the right passphrase */
- if( csum != cert->d.rsa.csum )
+ if( csum != cert->csum )
return G10ERR_BAD_PASS;
skey.d = cert->d.rsa.rsa_d;
@@ -377,7 +307,7 @@ check_rsa( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
csum += checksum_u16( nbytes*8 );
csum += checksum( buffer, nbytes );
m_free( buffer );
- if( csum != cert->d.rsa.csum )
+ if( csum != cert->csum )
return G10ERR_CHECKSUM;
}
@@ -424,16 +354,35 @@ check_secret_key( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
int
is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
{
- if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
- return cert->d.elg.is_protected? cert->d.elg.protect.algo : 0;
- else if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
- return cert->d.dsa.is_protected? cert->d.dsa.protect.algo : 0;
- #ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER
- else if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA )
- return cert->d.rsa.is_protected? cert->d.rsa.protect_algo : 0;
- #endif
- else
- return -1; /* unsupported */
+ return cert->is_protected? cert->protect.algo : 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_protect( void (*fnc)(void *, byte *, byte *, unsigned),
+ void *fncctx, PKT_secret_cert *cert )
+{
+ byte *buffer;
+ unsigned nbytes;
+
+ switch( cert->pubkey_algo ) {
+ case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
+ buffer = mpi_get_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, &nbytes, NULL );
+ (*fnc)( fncctx, buffer, buffer, nbytes );
+ mpi_set_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, buffer, nbytes, 0 );
+ m_free( buffer );
+ break;
+
+ case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
+ buffer = mpi_get_buffer( cert->d.dsa.x, &nbytes, NULL );
+ (*fnc)( fncctx, buffer, buffer, nbytes );
+ mpi_set_buffer( cert->d.dsa.x, buffer, nbytes, 0 );
+ m_free( buffer );
+ break;
+
+ default: return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
@@ -443,14 +392,33 @@ is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_cert *cert )
int
protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_cert *cert, DEK *dek )
{
+ int rc=0;
+
if( !dek )
return 0;
- if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL )
- return protect_elg( cert, dek );
- else if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
- return protect_dsa( cert, dek );
- else
- return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+ if( !cert->is_protected ) { /* okay, apply the protection */
+ BLOWFISH_context *blowfish_ctx=NULL;
+
+ switch( cert->protect.algo ) {
+ case CIPHER_ALGO_NONE: BUG(); break;
+ case CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH:
+ blowfish_ctx = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *blowfish_ctx );
+ blowfish_setkey( blowfish_ctx, dek->key, dek->keylen );
+ blowfish_setiv( blowfish_ctx, NULL );
+ blowfish_encode_cfb( blowfish_ctx, cert->protect.iv,
+ cert->protect.iv, 8 );
+ if( !do_protect( (void (*)(void*,byte*,byte*,unsigned))
+ &blowfish_encode_cfb, blowfish_ctx, cert ) )
+ cert->is_protected = 1;
+ m_free( blowfish_ctx );
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ rc = G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; /* unsupport protection algorithm */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return rc;
}
diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c
index 27e166ace..2e0159348 100644
--- a/g10/sig-check.c
+++ b/g10/sig-check.c
@@ -251,7 +251,6 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
int
check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )
{
- KBNODE unode;
MD_HANDLE md;
PKT_public_cert *pkc;
PKT_signature *sig;
@@ -283,8 +282,23 @@ check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )
rc = do_check( pkc, sig, md );
md_close(md);
}
+ else if( sig->sig_class == 0x18 ) {
+ KBNODE snode = find_prev_kbnode( root, node, PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT );
+
+ if( snode ) {
+ md = md_open( algo, 0 );
+ hash_public_cert( md, pkc );
+ hash_public_cert( md, snode->pkt->pkt.public_cert );
+ rc = do_check( pkc, sig, md );
+ md_close(md);
+ }
+ else {
+ log_error("no subkey for key signature packet\n");
+ rc = G10ERR_SIG_CLASS;
+ }
+ }
else {
- unode = find_prev_kbnode( root, node, PKT_USER_ID );
+ KBNODE unode = find_prev_kbnode( root, node, PKT_USER_ID );
if( unode ) {
PKT_user_id *uid = unode->pkt->pkt.user_id;
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
index fffee0870..9f06680db 100644
--- a/g10/sign.c
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -57,7 +57,8 @@ complete_sig( PKT_signature *sig, PKT_secret_cert *skc, MD_HANDLE md )
else
BUG();
- /* fixme: should we check wether the signature is okay? */
+ /* fixme: should we check wether the signature is okay?
+ * maybe by using an option */
return rc;
}
@@ -1072,12 +1073,11 @@ change_passphrase( const char *username )
break;
}
else { /* okay */
- /* FIXME: what about dsa */
- skc->d.elg.protect.algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH;
- skc->d.elg.protect.s2k = 1;
- skc->d.elg.protect.hash = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
- memcpy(skc->d.elg.protect.salt, salt, 8);
- randomize_buffer(skc->d.elg.protect.iv, 8, 1);
+ skc->protect.algo = CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH;
+ skc->protect.s2k = 1;
+ skc->protect.hash = DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160;
+ memcpy(skc->protect.salt, salt, 8);
+ randomize_buffer(skc->protect.iv, 8, 1);
rc = protect_secret_key( skc, dek );
if( rc )
log_error("protect_secret_key failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
diff --git a/g10/signal.c b/g10/signal.c
index 9d57b6258..b508e515b 100644
--- a/g10/signal.c
+++ b/g10/signal.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
#include "ttyio.h"
-
+#if 0
static RETSIGTYPE
print_and_exit( int sig )
{
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ print_and_exit( int sig )
secmem_term();
exit(2); /* not correct but .. */
}
-
+#endif
void
init_signals()
diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
index 9bea383c7..8a9c959ed 100644
--- a/g10/trustdb.c
+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
#include "options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "main.h"
+#include "i18n.h"
#define TRUST_RECORD_LEN 40
@@ -1708,6 +1709,7 @@ check_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, unsigned *r_trustlevel )
TRUSTREC rec;
unsigned trustlevel = TRUST_UNKNOWN;
int rc=0;
+ int cur_time;
if( DBG_TRUST )
log_info("check_trust() called.\n");
@@ -1736,16 +1738,25 @@ check_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, unsigned *r_trustlevel )
pkc->local_id );
}
}
- if( pkc->timestamp > make_timestamp() ) {
+ cur_time = make_timestamp();
+ if( pkc->timestamp > cur_time ) {
log_info("public key created in future (time warp or clock problem)\n");
return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
}
-
- rc = do_check( pkc->local_id, &rec, &trustlevel );
- if( rc ) {
- log_error("check_trust: do_check failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
- return rc;
+ if( pkc->valid_days && add_days_to_timestamp(pkc->timestamp,
+ pkc->valid_days) < cur_time ) {
+ log_info(_("key expiration date is %s\n"), strtimestamp(
+ add_days_to_timestamp(pkc->timestamp,
+ pkc->valid_days)));
+ trustlevel = TRUST_EXPIRED;
+ }
+ else {
+ rc = do_check( pkc->local_id, &rec, &trustlevel );
+ if( rc ) {
+ log_error("check_trust: do_check failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
+ return rc;
+ }
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-06-17 16:53:09 +0000