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-rw-r--r--g10/ChangeLog35
-rw-r--r--g10/Makefile.am3
-rw-r--r--g10/Makefile.in13
-rw-r--r--g10/armor.c1
-rw-r--r--g10/cipher.c4
-rw-r--r--g10/dsa.c5
-rw-r--r--g10/g10.c6
-rw-r--r--g10/getkey.c656
-rw-r--r--g10/keydb.h5
-rw-r--r--g10/keyid.c88
-rw-r--r--g10/keylist.c1
-rw-r--r--g10/main.h3
-rw-r--r--g10/mainproc.c2
-rw-r--r--g10/packet.h1
-rw-r--r--g10/parse-packet.c16
-rw-r--r--g10/ringedit.c56
-rw-r--r--g10/sig-check.c22
-rw-r--r--g10/sign.c4
-rw-r--r--g10/signal.c74
-rw-r--r--g10/trustdb.c10
20 files changed, 633 insertions, 372 deletions
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index c64144117..66c5b7554 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,38 @@
+Thu Mar 19 15:22:36 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * ringedit.c (keyring_enum): Fixed problem with reading too
+ many packets. Add support to read secret keyrings.
+
+ * getkey.c (scan_keyring): Removed
+ (lookup): New to replace scan_keyring.
+ (scan_secret_keyring): Removed.
+ (lookup_skc): New.
+
+Wed Mar 18 11:47:34 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * ringedit.c (enum_keyblocks): New read mode 11.
+
+ * keyid.c (elg_fingerprint_md): New and changed all other functions
+ to call this if the packet version is 4 or above.
+
+Tue Mar 17 20:46:16 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * parse-packet.c (parse_certificate): Add listing support for subkeys.
+
+Tue Mar 17 20:32:22 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * armor.c (is_armored): Allow marker packet.
+
+Thu Mar 12 13:36:49 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * trustdb.c (check_trust): Checks timestamp of pubkey.
+ * sig-check. (do_check): Compares timestamps.
+
+Tue Mar 10 17:01:56 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
+
+ * g10.c (main): Add call to init_signals.
+ * signal.c: New.
+
Mon Mar 9 12:43:42 1998 Werner Koch ([email protected])
* dsa.c: New
diff --git a/g10/Makefile.am b/g10/Makefile.am
index edfdba412..baf3d62e0 100644
--- a/g10/Makefile.am
+++ b/g10/Makefile.am
@@ -50,7 +50,8 @@ common_source = \
encode.c \
revoke.c \
keylist.c \
- sig-check.c
+ sig-check.c \
+ signal.c
gpg_SOURCES = g10.c \
$(common_source) \
diff --git a/g10/Makefile.in b/g10/Makefile.in
index cc4b69b36..a88b10eed 100644
--- a/g10/Makefile.in
+++ b/g10/Makefile.in
@@ -142,7 +142,8 @@ common_source = \
encode.c \
revoke.c \
keylist.c \
- sig-check.c
+ sig-check.c \
+ signal.c
gpg_SOURCES = g10.c \
$(common_source) \
@@ -170,7 +171,8 @@ pkclist.o skclist.o ringedit.o kbnode.o mainproc.o armor.o mdfilter.o \
textfilter.o cipher.o elg.o dsa.o rsa.o openfile.o keyid.o trustdb.o \
parse-packet.o passphrase.o pubkey-enc.o seckey-cert.o seskey.o \
import.o export.o comment.o status.o sign.o plaintext.o encr-data.o \
-encode.o revoke.o keylist.o sig-check.o verify.o decrypt.o keygen.o
+encode.o revoke.o keylist.o sig-check.o signal.o verify.o decrypt.o \
+keygen.o
gpg_LDADD = $(LDADD)
gpg_DEPENDENCIES = ../cipher/libcipher.a ../mpi/libmpi.a \
../util/libutil.a
@@ -180,7 +182,8 @@ free-packet.o getkey.o pkclist.o skclist.o ringedit.o kbnode.o \
mainproc.o armor.o mdfilter.o textfilter.o cipher.o elg.o dsa.o rsa.o \
openfile.o keyid.o trustdb.o parse-packet.o passphrase.o pubkey-enc.o \
seckey-cert.o seskey.o import.o export.o comment.o status.o sign.o \
-plaintext.o encr-data.o encode.o revoke.o keylist.o sig-check.o
+plaintext.o encr-data.o encode.o revoke.o keylist.o sig-check.o \
+signal.o
gpgm_LDADD = $(LDADD)
gpgm_DEPENDENCIES = ../cipher/libcipher.a ../mpi/libmpi.a \
../util/libutil.a
@@ -204,8 +207,8 @@ DEP_FILES = .deps/armor.P .deps/build-packet.P .deps/cipher.P \
.deps/openfile.P .deps/parse-packet.P .deps/passphrase.P \
.deps/pkclist.P .deps/plaintext.P .deps/pubkey-enc.P .deps/revoke.P \
.deps/ringedit.P .deps/rsa.P .deps/seckey-cert.P .deps/seskey.P \
-.deps/sig-check.P .deps/sign.P .deps/skclist.P .deps/status.P \
-.deps/textfilter.P .deps/trustdb.P .deps/verify.P
+.deps/sig-check.P .deps/sign.P .deps/signal.P .deps/skclist.P \
+.deps/status.P .deps/textfilter.P .deps/trustdb.P .deps/verify.P
SOURCES = $(gpg_SOURCES) $(gpgm_SOURCES)
OBJECTS = $(gpg_OBJECTS) $(gpgm_OBJECTS)
diff --git a/g10/armor.c b/g10/armor.c
index 3192e95b3..848019018 100644
--- a/g10/armor.c
+++ b/g10/armor.c
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@ is_armored( byte *buf )
return 1; /* invalid packet: assume it is armored */
pkttype = ctb & 0x40 ? (ctb & 0x3f) : ((ctb>>2)&0xf);
switch( pkttype ) {
+ case PKT_MARKER:
case PKT_PUBLIC_CERT:
case PKT_SECRET_CERT:
case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC:
diff --git a/g10/cipher.c b/g10/cipher.c
index 43f0afb21..47b9aaffe 100644
--- a/g10/cipher.c
+++ b/g10/cipher.c
@@ -47,10 +47,10 @@ cipher_filter( void *opaque, int control,
cipher_filter_context_t *cfx = opaque;
int rc=0;
- if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) { /* decrypted */
+ if( control == IOBUFCTRL_UNDERFLOW ) { /* decrypt */
rc = -1; /* FIXME:*/
}
- else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH ) { /* encrypted */
+ else if( control == IOBUFCTRL_FLUSH ) { /* encrypt */
assert(a);
if( !cfx->header ) {
PACKET pkt;
diff --git a/g10/dsa.c b/g10/dsa.c
index 1c4f8945d..fa0cb271b 100644
--- a/g10/dsa.c
+++ b/g10/dsa.c
@@ -54,7 +54,10 @@ g10_dsa_sign( PKT_secret_cert *skc, PKT_signature *sig,
sig->digest_start[1] = dp[1];
sig->d.dsa.r = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(skc->d.dsa.p) );
sig->d.dsa.s = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(skc->d.dsa.p) );
- frame = encode_md_value( md, mpi_get_nbits(skc->d.dsa.p));
+ frame = mpi_alloc( (md_digest_length(digest_algo)+BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)
+ / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+ mpi_set_buffer( frame, md_read(md, digest_algo),
+ md_digest_length(digest_algo), 0 );
skey.p = skc->d.elg.p;
skey.g = skc->d.elg.g;
skey.y = skc->d.elg.y;
diff --git a/g10/g10.c b/g10/g10.c
index d2683c95c..cf8d31be2 100644
--- a/g10/g10.c
+++ b/g10/g10.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+
#include "packet.h"
#include "iobuf.h"
#include "memory.h"
@@ -99,7 +100,7 @@ static ARGPARSE_OPTS opts[] = {
#endif
{ 'o', "output", 2, N_("use as output file")},
{ 'v', "verbose", 0, N_("verbose") },
- { 'n', "dry-run", 0, N_("don't make any changes") },
+ { 'n', "dry-run", 0, N_("do not make any changes") },
{ 500, "batch", 0, N_("batch mode: never ask")},
{ 501, "yes", 0, N_("assume yes on most questions")},
{ 502, "no", 0, N_("assume no on most questions")},
@@ -275,7 +276,7 @@ build_list( const char *text, const char * (*mapf)(int), int (*chkf)(int) )
static void
i18n_init(void)
{
- #ifdef HAVE_LIBINTL
+ #ifdef ENABLE_NLS
#ifdef HAVE_LC_MESSAGES
setlocale( LC_MESSAGES, "" );
#else
@@ -393,6 +394,7 @@ main( int argc, char **argv )
*/
log_set_name("gpg");
secure_random_alloc(); /* put random number into secure memory */
+ init_signals();
#endif
i18n_init();
opt.compress = -1; /* defaults to standard compress level */
diff --git a/g10/getkey.c b/g10/getkey.c
index 300e33b86..e8d9d15a5 100644
--- a/g10/getkey.c
+++ b/g10/getkey.c
@@ -68,10 +68,10 @@ static pkc_cache_entry_t pkc_cache;
static int pkc_cache_entries; /* number of entries in pkc cache */
-static int scan_keyring( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid,
- const char *name, const char *filename );
-static int scan_secret_keyring( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid,
- const char *name, const char *filename);
+static int lookup( PKT_public_cert *pkc,
+ int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name );
+static int lookup_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc,
+ int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name );
/* note this function may be called before secure memory is
* available */
@@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ add_secret_keyring( const char *name )
}
-void
+static void
cache_public_cert( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
{
pkc_cache_entry_t ce;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cache_user_id( PKT_user_id *uid, u32 *keyid )
for(r=user_id_db; r; r = r->next )
if( r->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && r->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
if( DBG_CACHE )
- log_debug("cache_user_id: already in cache\n");
+ log_debug("cache_user_id: already in cache\n");
return;
}
@@ -241,7 +241,6 @@ get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
int internal = 0;
int rc = 0;
pkc_cache_entry_t ce;
- STRLIST sl;
/* lets see wether we checked the keyid already */
@@ -249,14 +248,13 @@ get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
if( kl->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && kl->keyid[1] == keyid[1] )
return G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY; /* already checked and not found */
- /* 1. Try to get it from our cache */
+ /* Try to get it from our cache */
for( ce = pkc_cache; ce; ce = ce->next )
if( ce->keyid[0] == keyid[0] && ce->keyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
if( pkc )
copy_public_cert( pkc, ce->pkc );
return 0;
}
-
/* more init stuff */
if( !pkc ) {
pkc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkc );
@@ -264,14 +262,12 @@ get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
}
- /* 2. Try to get it from the keyrings */
- for(sl = keyrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
- if( !scan_keyring( pkc, keyid, NULL, sl->d ) )
- goto leave;
-
- /* 3. Try to get it from a key server */
+ /* do a lookup */
+ rc = lookup( pkc, 11, keyid, NULL );
+ if( !rc )
+ goto leave;
- /* 4. not found: store it for future reference */
+ /* not found: store it for future reference */
kl = m_alloc( sizeof *kl );
kl->keyid[0] = keyid[0];
kl->keyid[1] = keyid[1];
@@ -288,6 +284,32 @@ get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
}
+static int
+hextobyte( const byte *s )
+{
+ int c;
+
+ if( *s >= '0' && *s <= '9' )
+ c = 16 * (*s - '0');
+ else if( *s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F' )
+ c = 16 * (10 + *s - 'A');
+ else if( *s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f' )
+ c = 16 * (10 + *s - 'a');
+ else
+ return -1;
+ s++;
+ if( *s >= '0' && *s <= '9' )
+ c += *s - '0';
+ else if( *s >= 'A' && *s <= 'F' )
+ c += 10 + *s - 'A';
+ else if( *s >= 'a' && *s <= 'f' )
+ c += 10 + *s - 'a';
+ else
+ return -1;
+ return c;
+}
+
+
/****************
* Try to get the pubkey by the userid. This functions looks for the
* first pubkey certificate which has the given name in a user_id.
@@ -302,26 +324,30 @@ get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
* (Not yet implemented)
* - If the username starts with a left angle, we assume it is a complete
* email address and look only at this part.
+ * - If the username starts with a '.', we assume it is the ending
+ * part of an email address
+ * - If the username starts with an '@', we assume it is a part of an
+ * email address
* - If the userid start with an '=' an exact compare is done; this may
* also follow the keyid in which case both parts are matched.
- * (Not yet implemented)
- *
+ * - If the userid starts with a '*' a case insensitive substring search is
+ * done (This is also the default).
*/
int
get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_cert *pkc, const char *name )
{
int internal = 0;
int rc = 0;
- STRLIST sl;
const char *s;
u32 keyid[2] = {0}; /* init to avoid compiler warning */
- int use_keyid=0;
+ byte fprint[20];
+ int mode = 0;
/* check what kind of name it is */
for(s = name; *s && isspace(*s); s++ )
;
- if( isdigit( *s ) ) { /* a keyid */
- int i;
+ if( isdigit( *s ) ) { /* a keyid or a fingerprint */
+ int i, j;
char buf[9];
if( *s == '0' && s[1] == 'x' && isxdigit(s[2]) )
@@ -334,7 +360,7 @@ get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_cert *pkc, const char *name )
if( i==9 )
s++;
keyid[1] = strtoul( s, NULL, 16 );
- use_keyid++;
+ mode = 10;
}
else if( i == 16 || (i == 17 && *s == '0') ) { /* complete keyid */
if( i==17 )
@@ -342,51 +368,73 @@ get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_cert *pkc, const char *name )
mem2str(buf, s, 9 );
keyid[0] = strtoul( buf, NULL, 16 );
keyid[1] = strtoul( s+8, NULL, 16 );
- return get_pubkey( pkc, keyid );
+ mode = 11;
+ }
+ else if( i == 32 || ( i == 33 && *s == '0' ) ) { /* md5 fingerprint */
+ if( i==33 )
+ s++;
+ memset(fprint+16, 4, 0);
+ for(j=0; !rc && j < 16; j++, s+=2 ) {
+ int c = hextobyte( s );
+ if( c == -1 )
+ rc = G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
+ else
+ fprint[j] = c;
+ }
+ mode = 16;
+ }
+ else if( i == 40 || ( i == 41 && *s == '0' ) ) { /* sha1/rmd160 fprint*/
+ if( i==33 )
+ s++;
+ for(j=0; !rc && j < 20; j++, s+=2 ) {
+ int c = hextobyte( s );
+ if( c == -1 )
+ rc = G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
+ else
+ fprint[j] = c;
+ }
+ mode = 20;
}
else
rc = G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
}
+ else if( *s == '=' ) { /* exact search */
+ mode = 1;
+ s++;
+ }
+ else if( *s == '*' ) { /* substring search */
+ mode = 2;
+ s++;
+ }
else if( *s == '<' ) { /* an email address */
- /* for now handled like a substring */
- /* a keyserver might use this for quicker access */
+ mode = 3;
}
- else if( *s == '=' ) { /* exact search */
- rc = G10ERR_INV_USER_ID; /* nox yet implemented */
+ else if( *s == '@' ) { /* a part of an email address */
+ mode = 4;
+ s++;
}
- else if( *s == '#' ) { /* use local id */
- rc = G10ERR_INV_USER_ID; /* nox yet implemented */
+ else if( *s == '.' ) { /* an email address, compare from end */
+ mode = 5;
+ s++;
}
- else if( *s == '*' ) { /* substring search */
- name++;
+ else if( *s == '#' ) { /* use local id */
+ rc = G10ERR_INV_USER_ID; /* not yet implemented */
}
else if( !*s ) /* empty string */
rc = G10ERR_INV_USER_ID;
+ else
+ mode = 2;
if( rc )
goto leave;
-
-
if( !pkc ) {
pkc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *pkc );
internal++;
}
- /* 2. Try to get it from the keyrings */
- for(sl = keyrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
- if( use_keyid ) {
- if( !scan_keyring( pkc, keyid, name, sl->d ) )
- goto leave;
- }
- else {
- if( !scan_keyring( pkc, NULL, name, sl->d ) )
- goto leave;
- }
- /* 3. Try to get it from a key server */
-
- /* 4. not found: store it for future reference */
- rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+ rc = mode < 16? lookup( pkc, mode, keyid, name )
+ : lookup( pkc, mode, keyid, fprint );
leave:
if( internal )
@@ -401,23 +449,16 @@ get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_cert *pkc, const char *name )
int
get_seckey( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid )
{
- STRLIST sl;
- int rc=0;
-
- for(sl = secret_keyrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
- if( !(rc=scan_secret_keyring( skc, keyid, NULL, sl->d )) )
- goto found;
- /* fixme: look at other places */
- goto leave;
+ int rc;
- found:
- /* get the secret key (this may prompt for a passprase to
- * unlock the secret key
- */
- if( (rc = check_secret_key( skc )) )
- goto leave;
+ rc = lookup_skc( skc, 11, keyid, NULL );
+ if( !rc ) {
+ /* check the secret key (this may prompt for a passprase to
+ * unlock the secret key
+ */
+ rc = check_secret_key( skc );
+ }
- leave:
return rc;
}
@@ -430,18 +471,10 @@ int
seckey_available( u32 *keyid )
{
PKT_secret_cert *skc;
- STRLIST sl;
- int rc=0;
+ int rc;
skc = m_alloc_clear( sizeof *skc );
- for(sl = secret_keyrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
- if( !(rc=scan_secret_keyring( skc, keyid, NULL, sl->d )) )
- goto found;
- /* fixme: look at other places */
- goto leave;
-
- found:
- leave:
+ rc = lookup_skc( skc, 11, keyid, NULL );
free_secret_cert( skc );
return rc;
}
@@ -455,288 +488,295 @@ seckey_available( u32 *keyid )
int
get_seckey_byname( PKT_secret_cert *skc, const char *name, int unprotect )
{
- STRLIST sl;
- int rc=0;
+ int rc;
- for(sl = secret_keyrings; sl; sl = sl->next )
- if( !(rc=scan_secret_keyring( skc, NULL, name, sl->d ) ) )
- goto found;
- /* fixme: look at other places */
- goto leave;
+ /* fixme: add support for compare_name */
+ rc = lookup_skc( skc, name? 2:15, NULL, name );
+ if( !rc && unprotect )
+ rc = check_secret_key( skc );
- found:
- /* get the secret key (this may prompt for a passprase to
- * unlock the secret key
- */
- if( unprotect )
- if( (rc = check_secret_key( skc )) )
- goto leave;
-
- leave:
return rc;
}
+static int
+compare_name( const char *uid, size_t uidlen, const char *name, int mode )
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if( mode == 1 ) { /* exact match */
+ for(i=0; name[i] && uidlen; i++, uidlen-- )
+ if( uid[i] != name[i] )
+ break;
+ if( !uidlen && !name[i] )
+ return 0; /* found */
+ }
+ else if( mode == 2 ) { /* case insensitive substring */
+ if( memistr( uid, uidlen, name ) )
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if( mode == 3 ) { /* case insensitive email address */
+ /* FIXME: not yet implemented */
+ if( memistr( uid, uidlen, name ) )
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if( mode == 4 ) { /* email substring */
+ /* FIXME: not yet implemented */
+ if( memistr( uid, uidlen, name ) )
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else if( mode == 5 ) { /* email from end */
+ /* FIXME: not yet implemented */
+ if( memistr( uid, uidlen, name ) )
+ return 0;
+ }
+ else
+ BUG();
+ return -1; /* not found */
+}
/****************
- * scan the keyring and look for either the keyid or the name.
- * If both, keyid and name are given, look for keyid but use only
- * the low word of it (name is only used as a flag to indicate this mode
- * of operation).
+ * Lookup a key by scanning all keyrings
+ * mode 1 = lookup by NAME (exact)
+ * 2 = lookup by NAME (substring)
+ * 3 = lookup by NAME (email address)
+ * 4 = email address (substring)
+ * 5 = email address (compare from end)
+ * 10 = lookup by short KEYID (don't care about keyid[0])
+ * 11 = lookup by long KEYID
+ * 15 = Get the first key.
+ * 16 = lookup by 16 byte fingerprint which is stored in NAME
+ * 20 = lookup by 20 byte fingerprint which is stored in NAME
+ * Caller must provide an empty PKC, if the pubkey_algo is filled in, only
+ * a key of this algo will be returned.
*/
static int
-scan_keyring( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid,
- const char *name, const char *filename )
+lookup( PKT_public_cert *pkc, int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name )
{
- compress_filter_context_t cfx;
- int rc=0;
- int found = 0;
- IOBUF a;
- PACKET pkt;
- int save_mode;
- u32 akeyid[2];
- PKT_public_cert *last_pk = NULL;
- int shortkeyid;
-
- shortkeyid = keyid && name;
- if( shortkeyid )
- name = NULL; /* not used anymore */
-
- if( !(a = iobuf_open( filename ) ) ) {
- log_debug("scan_keyring: can't open '%s'\n", filename );
- return G10ERR_KEYRING_OPEN;
+ int rc;
+ KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+ KBPOS kbpos;
+
+ rc = enum_keyblocks( 0, &kbpos, &keyblock );
+ if( rc ) {
+ if( rc == -1 )
+ rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+ else if( rc )
+ log_error("enum_keyblocks(open) failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+ goto leave;
}
- if( !DBG_CACHE )
- ;
- else if( shortkeyid )
- log_debug("scan_keyring %s for %08lx\n", filename, (ulong)keyid[1] );
- else if( name )
- log_debug("scan_keyring %s for '%s'\n", filename, name );
- else if( keyid )
- log_debug("scan_keyring %s for %08lx %08lx\n", filename,
- (ulong)keyid[0], (ulong)keyid[1] );
- else
- log_debug("scan_keyring %s (all)\n", filename );
-
- save_mode = set_packet_list_mode(0);
- init_packet(&pkt);
- while( (rc=parse_packet(a, &pkt)) != -1 ) {
- if( rc )
- ; /* e.g. unknown packet */
- else if( keyid && found && pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
- log_error("Hmmm, pubkey without an user id in '%s'\n", filename);
- goto leave;
- }
- else if( pkt.pkttype == PKT_COMPRESSED ) {
- memset( &cfx, 0, sizeof cfx );
- if( pkt.pkt.compressed->algorithm == 1 )
- cfx.pgpmode = 1;
- else if( pkt.pkt.compressed->algorithm != 2 ){
- rc = G10ERR_COMPR_ALGO;
- log_error("compressed keyring: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
- break;
- }
-
- pkt.pkt.compressed->buf = NULL;
- iobuf_push_filter( a, compress_filter, &cfx );
- }
- else if( keyid && pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
- switch( pkt.pkt.public_cert->pubkey_algo ) {
- case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
- case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
- case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
- keyid_from_pkc( pkt.pkt.public_cert, akeyid );
- if( (shortkeyid || akeyid[0] == keyid[0])
- && akeyid[1] == keyid[1] ) {
- copy_public_cert( pkc, pkt.pkt.public_cert );
- found++;
+ while( !(rc = enum_keyblocks( 1, &kbpos, &keyblock )) ) {
+ KBNODE k, kk;
+ if( mode < 10 ) { /* name lookup */
+ for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+ if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+ && !compare_name( k->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ k->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, name, mode)) {
+ /* we found a matching name, look for the key */
+ for(kk=keyblock; kk; kk = kk->next )
+ if( ( kk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT
+ || kk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT )
+ && ( !pkc->pubkey_algo
+ || pkc->pubkey_algo
+ == kk->pkt->pkt.public_cert->pubkey_algo))
+ break;
+ if( kk ) {
+ u32 aki[2];
+ keyid_from_pkc( kk->pkt->pkt.public_cert, aki );
+ cache_user_id( k->pkt->pkt.user_id, aki );
+ k = kk;
+ break;
+ }
+ else
+ log_error("No key for userid\n");
}
- break;
- default:
- log_error("cannot handle pubkey algo %d\n",
- pkt.pkt.public_cert->pubkey_algo);
}
}
- else if( keyid && found && pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
- cache_user_id( pkt.pkt.user_id, keyid );
- goto leave;
- }
- else if( name && pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
- if( last_pk )
- free_public_cert(last_pk);
- last_pk = pkt.pkt.public_cert;
- pkt.pkt.public_cert = NULL;
- }
- else if( name && pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
- if( memistr( pkt.pkt.user_id->name, pkt.pkt.user_id->len, name )) {
- if( !last_pk )
- log_error("Ooops: no pubkey for userid '%.*s'\n",
- pkt.pkt.user_id->len, pkt.pkt.user_id->name);
- else if( pkc->pubkey_algo &&
- pkc->pubkey_algo != last_pk->pubkey_algo )
- log_info("skipping id '%.*s': want algo %d, found %d\n",
- pkt.pkt.user_id->len, pkt.pkt.user_id->name,
- pkc->pubkey_algo, last_pk->pubkey_algo );
- else {
- copy_public_cert( pkc, last_pk );
- goto leave;
- }
+ else { /* keyid or fingerprint lookup */
+ for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+ if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT
+ || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT ) {
+ if( mode == 10 || mode == 11 ) {
+ u32 aki[2];
+ keyid_from_pkc( k->pkt->pkt.public_cert, aki );
+ if( aki[1] == keyid[1]
+ && ( mode == 10 || aki[0] == keyid[0] )
+ && ( !pkc->pubkey_algo
+ || pkc->pubkey_algo
+ == k->pkt->pkt.public_cert->pubkey_algo) ){
+ /* cache the userid */
+ for(kk=keyblock; kk; kk = kk->next )
+ if( kk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+ break;
+ if( kk )
+ cache_user_id( kk->pkt->pkt.user_id, aki );
+ else
+ log_error("No userid for key\n");
+ break; /* found */
+ }
+ }
+ else if( mode == 15 ) { /* get the first key */
+ if( !pkc->pubkey_algo
+ || pkc->pubkey_algo
+ == k->pkt->pkt.public_cert->pubkey_algo )
+ break;
+ }
+ else if( mode == 16 || mode == 20 ) {
+ size_t an;
+ byte *afp = fingerprint_from_pkc(
+ k->pkt->pkt.public_cert, &an );
+ if( an == mode && !memcmp( afp, name, an)
+ && ( !pkc->pubkey_algo
+ || pkc->pubkey_algo
+ == k->pkt->pkt.public_cert->pubkey_algo) ) {
+ m_free(afp);
+ break;
+ }
+ m_free(afp);
+ }
+ else
+ BUG();
+ } /* end compare public keys */
}
}
- else if( !keyid && !name && pkt.pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT ) {
- if( last_pk )
- free_public_cert(last_pk);
- last_pk = pkt.pkt.public_cert;
- pkt.pkt.public_cert = NULL;
+ if( k ) { /* found */
+ assert( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT
+ || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT );
+ copy_public_cert( pkc, k->pkt->pkt.public_cert );
+ break; /* enumeration */
}
- else if( !keyid && !name && pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
- if( !last_pk )
- log_error("Ooops: no pubkey for userid '%.*s'\n",
- pkt.pkt.user_id->len, pkt.pkt.user_id->name);
- else {
- if( last_pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL
- || last_pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
- || last_pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- keyid_from_pkc( last_pk, akeyid );
- cache_user_id( pkt.pkt.user_id, akeyid );
- }
- cache_public_cert( last_pk );
- }
- }
- free_packet(&pkt);
+ release_kbnode( keyblock );
+ keyblock = NULL;
}
- rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+ if( rc == -1 )
+ rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+ else if( rc )
+ log_error("enum_keyblocks(read) failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
leave:
- if( last_pk )
- free_public_cert(last_pk);
- free_packet(&pkt);
- iobuf_close(a);
- set_packet_list_mode(save_mode);
+ enum_keyblocks( 2, &kbpos, &keyblock ); /* close */
+ release_kbnode( keyblock );
return rc;
}
-
/****************
- * This is the function to get a secret key. We use an extra function,
- * so that we can easily add special handling for secret keyrings
- * PKT returns the secret key certificate.
+ * Ditto for secret keys
*/
static int
-scan_secret_keyring( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid,
- const char *name, const char *filename )
+lookup_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, int mode, u32 *keyid, const char *name )
{
- int rc=0;
- int found = 0;
- IOBUF a;
- PACKET pkt;
- int save_mode;
- u32 akeyid[2];
- PKT_secret_cert *last_pk = NULL;
- int get_first;
- u32 dummy_keyid[2];
-
- get_first = !keyid && !name;
- if( get_first )
- keyid = dummy_keyid;
-
- if( !(a = iobuf_open( filename ) ) ) {
- log_debug("scan_secret_keyring: can't open '%s'\n", filename );
- return G10ERR_KEYRING_OPEN;
+ int rc;
+ KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
+ KBPOS kbpos;
+
+ rc = enum_keyblocks( 5 /* open secret */, &kbpos, &keyblock );
+ if( rc ) {
+ if( rc == -1 )
+ rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+ else if( rc )
+ log_error("enum_keyblocks(open secret) failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc) );
+ goto leave;
}
- save_mode = set_packet_list_mode(0);
- init_packet(&pkt);
- while( (rc=parse_packet(a, &pkt)) != -1 ) {
- if( rc )
- ; /* e.g. unknown packet */
- else if( keyid && found && pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT ) {
- log_error("Hmmm, seckey without an user id in '%s'\n", filename);
- goto leave;
- }
- else if( keyid && pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT ) {
- switch( pkt.pkt.secret_cert->pubkey_algo ) {
- case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
- case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:
- case PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA:
- if( get_first ) {
- copy_secret_cert( skc, pkt.pkt.secret_cert );
- found++;
- }
- else {
- keyid_from_skc( pkt.pkt.secret_cert, akeyid );
- if( (akeyid[0] == keyid[0] && akeyid[1] == keyid[1]) ) {
- copy_secret_cert( skc, pkt.pkt.secret_cert );
- found++;
+ while( !(rc = enum_keyblocks( 1, &kbpos, &keyblock )) ) {
+ KBNODE k, kk;
+ if( mode < 10 ) { /* name lookup */
+ for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+ if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID
+ && !compare_name( k->pkt->pkt.user_id->name,
+ k->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, name, mode)) {
+ /* we found a matching name, look for the key */
+ for(kk=keyblock; kk; kk = kk->next )
+ if( ( kk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT
+ || kk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT )
+ && ( !skc->pubkey_algo
+ || skc->pubkey_algo
+ == kk->pkt->pkt.secret_cert->pubkey_algo))
+ break;
+ if( kk ) {
+ u32 aki[2];
+ keyid_from_skc( kk->pkt->pkt.secret_cert, aki );
+ cache_user_id( k->pkt->pkt.user_id, aki );
+ k = kk;
+ break;
}
+ else
+ log_error("No key for userid (in skc)\n");
}
- break;
- default:
- log_error("cannot handle pubkey algo %d\n",
- pkt.pkt.secret_cert->pubkey_algo);
}
}
- else if( keyid && found && pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
- goto leave;
- }
- else if( name && pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT ) {
- if( last_pk )
- free_secret_cert(last_pk);
- last_pk = pkt.pkt.secret_cert;
- pkt.pkt.secret_cert = NULL;
- }
- else if( name && pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
- if( memistr( pkt.pkt.user_id->name, pkt.pkt.user_id->len, name )) {
- if( !last_pk )
- log_error("Ooops: no seckey for userid '%.*s'\n",
- pkt.pkt.user_id->len, pkt.pkt.user_id->name);
- else if( skc->pubkey_algo &&
- skc->pubkey_algo != last_pk->pubkey_algo )
- log_info("skipping id '%.*s': want algo %d, found %d\n",
- pkt.pkt.user_id->len, pkt.pkt.user_id->name,
- skc->pubkey_algo, last_pk->pubkey_algo );
- else {
- copy_secret_cert( skc, last_pk );
- goto leave;
- }
+ else { /* keyid or fingerprint lookup */
+ for(k=keyblock; k; k = k->next ) {
+ if( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT
+ || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT ) {
+ if( mode == 10 || mode == 11 ) {
+ u32 aki[2];
+ keyid_from_skc( k->pkt->pkt.secret_cert, aki );
+ if( aki[1] == keyid[1]
+ && ( mode == 10 || aki[0] == keyid[0] )
+ && ( !skc->pubkey_algo
+ || skc->pubkey_algo
+ == k->pkt->pkt.secret_cert->pubkey_algo) ){
+ /* cache the userid */
+ for(kk=keyblock; kk; kk = kk->next )
+ if( kk->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID )
+ break;
+ if( kk )
+ cache_user_id( kk->pkt->pkt.user_id, aki );
+ else
+ log_error("No userid for key\n");
+ break; /* found */
+ }
+ }
+ else if( mode == 15 ) { /* get the first key */
+ if( !skc->pubkey_algo
+ || skc->pubkey_algo
+ == k->pkt->pkt.secret_cert->pubkey_algo )
+ break;
+ }
+ else if( mode == 16 || mode == 20 ) {
+ size_t an;
+ byte *afp = fingerprint_from_skc(
+ k->pkt->pkt.secret_cert, &an );
+ if( an == mode && !memcmp( afp, name, an)
+ && ( !skc->pubkey_algo
+ || skc->pubkey_algo
+ == k->pkt->pkt.secret_cert->pubkey_algo) ) {
+ m_free(afp);
+ break;
+ }
+ m_free(afp);
+ }
+ else
+ BUG();
+ } /* end compare secret keys */
}
}
- else if( !keyid && !name && pkt.pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT ) {
- if( last_pk )
- free_secret_cert(last_pk);
- last_pk = pkt.pkt.secret_cert;
- pkt.pkt.secret_cert = NULL;
+ if( k ) { /* found */
+ assert( k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT
+ || k->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT );
+ copy_secret_cert( skc, k->pkt->pkt.secret_cert );
+ break; /* enumeration */
}
- else if( !keyid && !name && pkt.pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) {
- if( !last_pk )
- log_error("Ooops: no seckey for userid '%.*s'\n",
- pkt.pkt.user_id->len, pkt.pkt.user_id->name);
- else {
- if( last_pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL
- || last_pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA
- || last_pk->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) {
- keyid_from_skc( last_pk, akeyid );
- cache_user_id( pkt.pkt.user_id, akeyid );
- }
- }
- }
- free_packet(&pkt);
+ release_kbnode( keyblock );
+ keyblock = NULL;
}
- rc = G10ERR_NO_SECKEY;
+ if( rc == -1 )
+ rc = G10ERR_NO_PUBKEY;
+ else if( rc )
+ log_error("enum_keyblocks(read) failed: %s\n", g10_errstr(rc));
leave:
- if( last_pk )
- free_secret_cert(last_pk);
- free_packet(&pkt);
- iobuf_close(a);
- set_packet_list_mode(save_mode);
+ enum_keyblocks( 2, &kbpos, &keyblock ); /* close */
+ release_kbnode( keyblock );
return rc;
}
+
/****************
* Enumerate all secret keys. Caller must use these procedure:
* 1) create a void pointer and initialize it to NULL
diff --git a/g10/keydb.h b/g10/keydb.h
index a115578da..6a2425272 100644
--- a/g10/keydb.h
+++ b/g10/keydb.h
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ struct keyblock_pos_struct {
ulong offset; /* position information */
unsigned count; /* length of the keyblock in packets */
IOBUF fp; /* used by enum_keyblocks */
+ int secret; /* working on a secret keyring */
PACKET *pkt; /* ditto */
};
typedef struct keyblock_pos_struct KBPOS;
@@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ int make_dek_from_passphrase( DEK *dek, int mode, byte *salt );
void add_keyring( const char *name );
const char *get_keyring( int sequence );
void add_secret_keyring( const char *name );
-void cache_public_cert( PKT_public_cert *pkc );
-void cache_user_id( PKT_user_id *uid, u32 *keyid );
+/*void cache_public_cert( PKT_public_cert *pkc );
+void cache_user_id( PKT_user_id *uid, u32 *keyid );*/
int get_pubkey( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid );
int get_pubkey_byname( PKT_public_cert *pkc, const char *name );
int get_seckey( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid );
diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c
index ef7b1ba1b..da426aa2a 100644
--- a/g10/keyid.c
+++ b/g10/keyid.c
@@ -106,6 +106,56 @@ v3_elg_fingerprint_md( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
}
static MD_HANDLE
+elg_fingerprint_md( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
+{
+ MD_HANDLE md;
+ byte *buf1, *buf3, *buf4 ;
+ byte *p1, *p3, *p4;
+ unsigned n1, n3, n4;
+ unsigned nb1, nb3, nb4;
+ unsigned n;
+
+ nb1 = mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.dsa.p);
+ p1 = buf1 = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.dsa.p, &n1, NULL );
+ for( ; !*p1 && n1; p1++, n1-- ) /* skip leading null bytes */
+ ;
+ nb3 = mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.dsa.g);
+ p3 = buf3 = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.dsa.g, &n3, NULL );
+ for( ; !*p3 && n3; p3++, n3-- )
+ ;
+ nb4 = mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.dsa.y);
+ p4 = buf4 = mpi_get_buffer( pkc->d.dsa.y, &n4, NULL );
+ for( ; !*p4 && n4; p4++, n4-- )
+ ;
+
+ /* calculate length of packet */
+ n = 12 + n1 + n3 +n4 ;
+ md = md_open( DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1, 0);
+
+ md_putc( md, 0x99 ); /* ctb */
+ md_putc( md, n >> 8 ); /* 2 byte length header */
+ md_putc( md, n );
+ md_putc( md, 4 ); /* version */
+ { u32 a = pkc->timestamp;
+ md_putc( md, a >> 24 );
+ md_putc( md, a >> 16 );
+ md_putc( md, a >> 8 );
+ md_putc( md, a );
+ }
+ md_putc( md, pkc->pubkey_algo );
+ md_putc( md, nb1>>8); md_putc( md, nb1 ); md_write( md, p1, n1 );
+ md_putc( md, nb3>>8); md_putc( md, nb3 ); md_write( md, p3, n3 );
+ md_putc( md, nb4>>8); md_putc( md, nb4 ); md_write( md, p4, n4 );
+ m_free(buf1);
+ m_free(buf3);
+ m_free(buf4);
+ md_final( md );
+
+ return md;
+}
+
+
+static MD_HANDLE
dsa_fingerprint_md( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
{
MD_HANDLE md;
@@ -161,18 +211,22 @@ dsa_fingerprint_md( PKT_public_cert *pkc )
}
static MD_HANDLE
-v3_elg_fingerprint_md_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc )
+elg_fingerprint_md_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc )
{
PKT_public_cert pkc;
pkc.pubkey_algo = skc->pubkey_algo;
+ pkc.version = skc->version;
pkc.timestamp = skc->timestamp;
pkc.valid_days = skc->valid_days;
pkc.pubkey_algo = skc->pubkey_algo;
pkc.d.elg.p = skc->d.elg.p;
pkc.d.elg.g = skc->d.elg.g;
pkc.d.elg.y = skc->d.elg.y;
- return v3_elg_fingerprint_md( &pkc );
+ if( pkc.version < 4 )
+ return v3_elg_fingerprint_md( &pkc );
+ else
+ return elg_fingerprint_md( &pkc );
}
static MD_HANDLE
@@ -207,8 +261,11 @@ keyid_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, u32 *keyid )
if( skc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
const byte *dp;
MD_HANDLE md;
- md = v3_elg_fingerprint_md_skc(skc);
- dp = md_read( md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ md = elg_fingerprint_md_skc(skc);
+ if( skc->version < 4 )
+ dp = md_read( md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ else
+ dp = md_read( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
lowbits = keyid[1];
@@ -250,14 +307,20 @@ keyid_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc, u32 *keyid )
if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
const byte *dp;
MD_HANDLE md;
- md = v3_elg_fingerprint_md(pkc);
- dp = md_read( md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ if( pkc->version < 4 ) {
+ md = v3_elg_fingerprint_md(pkc);
+ dp = md_read( md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ }
+ else {
+ md = elg_fingerprint_md(pkc);
+ dp = md_read( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
+ }
keyid[0] = dp[12] << 24 | dp[13] << 16 | dp[14] << 8 | dp[15] ;
keyid[1] = dp[16] << 24 | dp[17] << 16 | dp[18] << 8 | dp[19] ;
lowbits = keyid[1];
md_close(md);
}
- else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA ) {
+ else if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA ) {
const byte *dp;
MD_HANDLE md;
md = dsa_fingerprint_md(pkc);
@@ -380,6 +443,7 @@ fingerprint_from_skc( PKT_secret_cert *skc, size_t *ret_len )
byte *p;
pkc.pubkey_algo = skc->pubkey_algo;
+ pkc.version = skc->version;
if( pkc.pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
pkc.timestamp = skc->timestamp;
pkc.valid_days = skc->valid_days;
@@ -419,8 +483,14 @@ fingerprint_from_pkc( PKT_public_cert *pkc, size_t *ret_len )
if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
MD_HANDLE md;
- md = v3_elg_fingerprint_md(pkc);
- dp = md_read( md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ if( pkc->version < 4 ) {
+ md = v3_elg_fingerprint_md(pkc);
+ dp = md_read( md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 );
+ }
+ else {
+ md = elg_fingerprint_md(pkc);
+ dp = md_read( md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
+ }
array = m_alloc( 20 );
len = 20;
memcpy(array, dp, 20 );
diff --git a/g10/keylist.c b/g10/keylist.c
index 25573663a..3d209ecf8 100644
--- a/g10/keylist.c
+++ b/g10/keylist.c
@@ -107,6 +107,7 @@ list_one( const char *name )
goto leave;
}
+
/* get the keyid from the keyblock */
node = find_kbnode( keyblock, PKT_PUBLIC_CERT );
if( !node ) {
diff --git a/g10/main.h b/g10/main.h
index 5078e80aa..c162fd9cd 100644
--- a/g10/main.h
+++ b/g10/main.h
@@ -113,4 +113,7 @@ int decrypt_message( const char *filename );
/*-- plaintext.c --*/
int hash_datafiles( MD_HANDLE md, STRLIST files, int textmode );
+/*-- signal.c --*/
+void init_signals(void);
+
#endif /*G10_MAIN_H*/
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c
index 3ca23ccc0..b5ceecef8 100644
--- a/g10/mainproc.c
+++ b/g10/mainproc.c
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node )
log_info("%s signature from ", rc? "BAD":"Good");
print_keyid( stderr, sig->keyid );
putc('\n', stderr);
- if( opt.batch )
+ if( opt.batch && rc )
g10_exit(1);
}
else {
diff --git a/g10/packet.h b/g10/packet.h
index 53448bd8e..5f29b83e5 100644
--- a/g10/packet.h
+++ b/g10/packet.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ typedef struct packet_struct PACKET;
typedef struct {
u32 keyid[2]; /* 64 bit keyid */
+ byte version;
byte pubkey_algo; /* algorithm used for public key scheme */
union {
struct {
diff --git a/g10/parse-packet.c b/g10/parse-packet.c
index 0cc2ece01..4281ef173 100644
--- a/g10/parse-packet.c
+++ b/g10/parse-packet.c
@@ -425,7 +425,6 @@ skip_rest( IOBUF inp, unsigned long pktlen )
static int
parse_publickey( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
{
- int version;
unsigned n;
PKT_pubkey_enc *k;
@@ -434,17 +433,17 @@ parse_publickey( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen, PACKET *packet )
log_error("packet(%d) too short\n", pkttype);
goto leave;
}
- version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
- if( version != 2 && version != 3 ) {
- log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, version);
+ k->version = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
+ if( k->version != 2 && k->version != 3 ) {
+ log_error("packet(%d) with unknown version %d\n", pkttype, k->version);
goto leave;
}
k->keyid[0] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
k->keyid[1] = read_32(inp); pktlen -= 4;
k->pubkey_algo = iobuf_get_noeof(inp); pktlen--;
if( list_mode )
- printf(":public key encoded packet: keyid %08lX%08lX\n",
- (ulong)k->keyid[0], (ulong)k->keyid[1]);
+ printf(":public key encoded packet: version %d, keyid %08lX%08lX\n",
+ k->version, (ulong)k->keyid[0], (ulong)k->keyid[1]);
if( k->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
n = pktlen;
k->d.elg.a = mpi_read(inp, &n, 0); pktlen -=n;
@@ -791,7 +790,10 @@ parse_certificate( IOBUF inp, int pkttype, unsigned long pktlen,
if( list_mode )
printf(":%s key packet:\n"
"\tversion %d, created %lu, valid for %hu days\n",
- pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT? "public": "secret",
+ pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_CERT? "public" :
+ pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT? "secret" :
+ pkttype == PKT_PUBKEY_SUBCERT? "public sub" :
+ pkttype == PKT_SECKEY_SUBCERT? "secret sub" : "??",
version, timestamp, valid_period );
if( pkttype == PKT_SECRET_CERT ) {
pkt->pkt.secret_cert->timestamp = timestamp;
diff --git a/g10/ringedit.c b/g10/ringedit.c
index 1ec35b811..49e46ecde 100644
--- a/g10/ringedit.c
+++ b/g10/ringedit.c
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static int keyring_search( PACKET *pkt, KBPOS *kbpos, IOBUF iobuf,
static int keyring_search2( PUBKEY_FIND_INFO info, KBPOS *kbpos,
const char *fname);
static int keyring_read( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root );
-static int keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root );
+static int keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root, int skipsigs );
static int keyring_copy( KBPOS *kbpos, int mode, KBNODE root );
@@ -346,11 +346,13 @@ read_keyblock( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
* Mode is: 0 = open
* 1 = read
* 2 = close
+ * 5 = open secret keyrings
+ * 11 = read but skip signature and comment packets.
* all others are reserved!
- * Note that you do not need a search prior to call this function,
- * only handle is needed.
- * NOTE: It is not alloed to do an insert/update/delte with this
- * keyblock, if you want to do this, user search/read!
+ * Note that you do not need a search prior to this function,
+ * only a handle is needed.
+ * NOTE: It is not allowed to do an insert/update/delte with this
+ * keyblock, if you want to do this, use search/read!
*/
int
enum_keyblocks( int mode, KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
@@ -358,15 +360,23 @@ enum_keyblocks( int mode, KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
int rc = 0;
RESTBL *rentry;
- if( !mode || mode == 100 ) {
+ if( !mode || mode == 5 || mode == 100 ) {
int i;
kbpos->fp = NULL;
- if( !mode )
+ if( !mode ) {
+ kbpos->secret = 0;
i = 0;
+ }
+ else if( mode == 5 ) {
+ kbpos->secret = 1;
+ mode = 0;
+ i = 0;
+ }
else
i = kbpos->resno+1;
for(; i < MAX_RESOURCES; i++ )
- if( resource_table[i].used && !resource_table[i].secret )
+ if( resource_table[i].used
+ && !resource_table[i].secret == !kbpos->secret )
break;
if( i == MAX_RESOURCES )
return -1; /* no resources */
@@ -379,13 +389,13 @@ enum_keyblocks( int mode, KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
}
kbpos->pkt = NULL;
}
- else if( mode == 1 ) {
+ else if( mode == 1 || mode == 11 ) {
int cont;
do {
cont = 0;
if( !kbpos->fp )
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
- rc = keyring_enum( kbpos, ret_root );
+ rc = keyring_enum( kbpos, ret_root, mode == 11 );
if( rc == -1 ) {
assert( !kbpos->pkt );
rentry = check_pos( kbpos );
@@ -703,13 +713,12 @@ keyring_read( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
static int
-keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
+keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root, int skipsigs )
{
PACKET *pkt;
int rc;
RESTBL *rentry;
KBNODE root = NULL;
- int in_cert = 0;
if( !(rentry=check_pos(kbpos)) )
return G10ERR_GENERAL;
@@ -736,17 +745,28 @@ keyring_enum( KBPOS *kbpos, KBNODE *ret_root )
switch( pkt->pkttype ) {
case PKT_PUBLIC_CERT:
case PKT_SECRET_CERT:
- if( in_cert ) { /* store this packet */
+ if( root ) { /* store this packet */
kbpos->pkt = pkt;
pkt = NULL;
goto ready;
}
- in_cert = 1;
+ root = new_kbnode( pkt );
+ pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt );
+ init_packet(pkt);
+ break;
+
default:
- if( !root )
- root = new_kbnode( pkt );
- else
- add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
+ /* skip pakets at the begin of a keyring, until we find
+ * a start packet; issue a warning if it is not a comment */
+ if( !root && pkt->pkttype != PKT_COMMENT )
+ log_info("keyring_enum: skipped packet of type %d\n",
+ pkt->pkttype );
+ if( !root || (skipsigs && ( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE
+ ||pkt->pkttype == PKT_COMMENT )) ) {
+ init_packet(pkt);
+ break;
+ }
+ add_kbnode( root, new_kbnode( pkt ) );
pkt = m_alloc( sizeof *pkt );
init_packet(pkt);
break;
diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c
index f25f2e19f..27e166ace 100644
--- a/g10/sig-check.c
+++ b/g10/sig-check.c
@@ -63,6 +63,10 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
MPI result = NULL;
int rc=0;
+
+ if( pkc->timestamp > sig->timestamp )
+ return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT; /* pubkey newer that signature */
+
if( pkc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) {
ELG_public_key pkey;
@@ -96,8 +100,6 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
* signature */
md_enable( digest, sig->digest_algo );
- assert( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 );
-
/* complete the digest */
if( sig->version >= 4 )
md_putc( digest, sig->version );
@@ -117,10 +119,10 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
if( sig->hashed_data ) {
n = (sig->hashed_data[0] << 8) | sig->hashed_data[1];
md_write( digest, sig->hashed_data, n+2 );
- n += 4;
+ n += 6;
}
else
- n = 4;
+ n = 6;
/* add some magic */
buf[0] = sig->version;
buf[1] = 0xff;
@@ -131,8 +133,10 @@ do_check( PKT_public_cert *pkc, PKT_signature *sig, MD_HANDLE digest )
md_write( digest, buf, 6 );
}
md_final( digest );
- log_hexdump("digest is: ", md_read(digest, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1), 20);
- result = encode_md_value( digest, mpi_get_nbits(pkc->d.dsa.p));
+ result = mpi_alloc( (md_digest_length(sig->digest_algo)
+ +BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB-1) / BYTES_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+ mpi_set_buffer( result, md_read(digest, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1),
+ md_digest_length(sig->digest_algo), 0 );
pkey.p = pkc->d.dsa.p;
pkey.q = pkc->d.dsa.q;
pkey.g = pkc->d.dsa.g;
@@ -288,13 +292,11 @@ check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )
keyid_from_pkc( pkc, keyid );
md = md_open( algo, 0 );
- if( sig->sig_class== 16 )
- md->debug = fopen("dsahashsig","w");
hash_public_cert( md, pkc );
if( sig->version >=4 ) {
byte buf[5];
buf[0] = 0xb4; /* indicates a userid packet */
- buf[1] = uid->len >> 24; /* but use 4 length bytes */
+ buf[1] = uid->len >> 24; /* always use 4 length bytes */
buf[2] = uid->len >> 16;
buf[3] = uid->len >> 8;
buf[4] = uid->len;
@@ -309,8 +311,6 @@ check_key_signature( KBNODE root, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig )
else
rc = signature_check( sig, md );
md_close(md);
- if( sig->sig_class== 16 )
- fclose(md->debug);
}
else {
log_error("no user id for key signature packet\n");
diff --git a/g10/sign.c b/g10/sign.c
index 4cf7b7bd6..fffee0870 100644
--- a/g10/sign.c
+++ b/g10/sign.c
@@ -871,8 +871,8 @@ delete_key( const char *username, int secret )
KBNODE keyblock = NULL;
KBNODE node;
KBPOS kbpos;
- PKT_public_cert *pkc;
- PKT_secret_cert *skc;
+ PKT_public_cert *pkc = NULL;
+ PKT_secret_cert *skc = NULL;
u32 keyid[2];
int okay=0;
diff --git a/g10/signal.c b/g10/signal.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9d57b6258
--- /dev/null
+++ b/g10/signal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/* signal.c - signal handling
+ * Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GNUPG.
+ *
+ * GNUPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GNUPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include "options.h"
+#include "errors.h"
+#include "memory.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "main.h"
+#include "ttyio.h"
+
+
+
+static RETSIGTYPE
+print_and_exit( int sig )
+{
+ const char *p;
+
+ /* Hmm, use only safe functions (we should do an autoconf test) */
+ write( 2, "\nCaught ", 8 );
+ #if SYS_SIGLIST_DECLARED
+ p = sys_siglist[sig];
+ write( 2, p, strlen(p) );
+ #else
+ write( 2, "a signal", 8 );
+ #endif
+ write( 2, "... exiting\n", 12 );
+ secmem_term();
+ exit(2); /* not correct but .. */
+}
+
+
+void
+init_signals()
+{
+ #if 0
+ struct sigaction nact;
+
+ nact.sa_handler = print_and_exit;
+ sigemptyset (&nact.sa_mask);
+ nact.sa_flags = 0;
+
+ sigaction( SIGINT, &nact, NULL );
+ sigaction( SIGHUP, &nact, NULL );
+ sigaction( SIGTERM, &nact, NULL );
+ #endif
+}
+
+
diff --git a/g10/trustdb.c b/g10/trustdb.c
index 257c37204..9bea383c7 100644
--- a/g10/trustdb.c
+++ b/g10/trustdb.c
@@ -1388,8 +1388,8 @@ propagate_trust( TRUST_SEG_LIST tslist )
/****************
- * we have the pubkey record but nothing more is known
- * function may re-read dr.
+ * we have the pubkey record but nothing more is known.
+ * (function may re-read dr)
*/
static int
do_check( ulong pubkeyid, TRUSTREC *dr, unsigned *trustlevel )
@@ -1736,7 +1736,11 @@ check_trust( PKT_public_cert *pkc, unsigned *r_trustlevel )
pkc->local_id );
}
}
- /* fixme: do some additional checks on the pubkey record */
+ if( pkc->timestamp > make_timestamp() ) {
+ log_info("public key created in future (time warp or clock problem)\n");
+ return G10ERR_TIME_CONFLICT;
+ }
+
rc = do_check( pkc->local_id, &rec, &trustlevel );
if( rc ) {
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-06-19 09:35:14 +0000