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-rw-r--r--g10/ChangeLog21
-rw-r--r--g10/keygen.c22
-rw-r--r--g10/keyid.c3
-rw-r--r--g10/misc.c4
-rw-r--r--g10/pubkey-enc.c5
-rw-r--r--g10/seckey-cert.c10
-rw-r--r--g10/seskey.c20
7 files changed, 54 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog
index 5847bea2c..2040d7876 100644
--- a/g10/ChangeLog
+++ b/g10/ChangeLog
@@ -1,3 +1,24 @@
+2006-11-21 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
+
+ * keygen.c (ask_expire_interval): Print y2038 warning only for 32
+ bit time_t.
+ (save_unprotected_key_to_card): Made RSA_N_LEN et al a size_t.
+ Cast printf args.
+
+ * seckey-cert.c (do_check): Made NBYTES a size_t.
+ (do_check): Made NDATA a size_t.
+ (protect_secret_key): Made NARR a size_t.
+ (protect_secret_key): Made NVYES a size_t.
+ * pubkey-enc.c (get_it): Made INDATALEN a size_t.
+ (get_it): Made NFRAME a size_t.
+ * keyid.c (hash_public_key): Made NBITS an unsigned int.
+ * misc.c (checksum_mpi): Made NBYTES a size_t.
+ (openpgp_pk_test_algo2): Made USE_BUF a size_t.
+ * seskey.c (encode_session_key): Made NFRAME a size_t.
+ (do_encode_md): Ditto.
+ (encode_md_value): Cast size_t argument of printf.
+ (encode_md_value): Ditto.
+
2006-11-10 Werner Koch <[email protected]>
* parse-packet.c (mpi_read): Changed NREAD to size_t to match the
diff --git a/g10/keygen.c b/g10/keygen.c
index 0ce588c37..4602eabbf 100644
--- a/g10/keygen.c
+++ b/g10/keygen.c
@@ -1849,12 +1849,12 @@ ask_expire_interval(int object,const char *def_expire)
? _("Key expires at %s\n")
: _("Signature expires at %s\n"),
asctimestamp((ulong)(curtime + interval) ) );
- /* FIXME: This check yields warning on alhas: Write a
- configure check and to this check here only for 32 bit
- machines */
- if( (time_t)((ulong)(curtime+interval)) < 0 )
- tty_printf(_("Your system can't display dates beyond 2038.\n"
- "However, it will be correctly handled up to 2106.\n"));
+#if SIZEOF_TIME_T <= 4
+ if ( (time_t)((ulong)(curtime+interval)) < 0 )
+ tty_printf (_("Your system can't display dates beyond 2038.\n"
+ "However, it will be correctly handled up to"
+ " 2106.\n"));
+#endif /*SIZEOF_TIME_T*/
}
if( cpr_enabled() || cpr_get_answer_is_yes("keygen.valid.okay",
@@ -3824,7 +3824,7 @@ save_unprotected_key_to_card (PKT_secret_key *sk, int keyno)
unsigned char *rsa_e = NULL;
unsigned char *rsa_p = NULL;
unsigned char *rsa_q = NULL;
- unsigned int rsa_n_len, rsa_e_len, rsa_p_len, rsa_q_len;
+ size_t rsa_n_len, rsa_e_len, rsa_p_len, rsa_q_len;
unsigned char *sexp = NULL;
unsigned char *p;
char numbuf[55], numbuf2[50];
@@ -3849,22 +3849,22 @@ save_unprotected_key_to_card (PKT_secret_key *sk, int keyno)
+ 4*sizeof (numbuf) + 25 + sizeof(numbuf) + 20);
p = stpcpy (p,"(11:private-key(3:rsa(1:n");
- sprintf (numbuf, "%u:", rsa_n_len);
+ sprintf (numbuf, "%u:", (unsigned int)rsa_n_len);
p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
memcpy (p, rsa_n, rsa_n_len);
p += rsa_n_len;
- sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:e%u:", rsa_e_len);
+ sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:e%u:", (unsigned int)rsa_e_len);
p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
memcpy (p, rsa_e, rsa_e_len);
p += rsa_e_len;
- sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:p%u:", rsa_p_len);
+ sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:p%u:", (unsigned int)rsa_p_len);
p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
memcpy (p, rsa_p, rsa_p_len);
p += rsa_p_len;
- sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:q%u:", rsa_q_len);
+ sprintf (numbuf, ")(1:q%u:", (unsigned int)rsa_q_len);
p = stpcpy (p, numbuf);
memcpy (p, rsa_q, rsa_q_len);
p += rsa_q_len;
diff --git a/g10/keyid.c b/g10/keyid.c
index afafc1afd..0de396f16 100644
--- a/g10/keyid.c
+++ b/g10/keyid.c
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ hash_public_key( gcry_md_hd_t md, PKT_public_key *pk )
unsigned int nn[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY];
byte *pp[PUBKEY_MAX_NPKEY];
int i;
- size_t nbits, nbytes;
+ unsigned int nbits;
+ size_t nbytes;
int npkey = pubkey_get_npkey (pk->pubkey_algo);
/* Two extra bytes for the expiration date in v3 */
diff --git a/g10/misc.c b/g10/misc.c
index 064f1e6be..bf32228c3 100644
--- a/g10/misc.c
+++ b/g10/misc.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ checksum_mpi (gcry_mpi_t a)
{
u16 csum;
byte *buffer;
- unsigned int nbytes;
+ size_t nbytes;
if ( gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, NULL, 0, &nbytes, a) )
BUG ();
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@ openpgp_pk_test_algo( int algo )
int
openpgp_pk_test_algo2( int algo, unsigned int use )
{
- int use_buf = use;
+ size_t use_buf = use;
if (algo == GCRY_PK_ELG_E)
algo = GCRY_PK_ELG;
diff --git a/g10/pubkey-enc.c b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
index fca19f849..777e5f788 100644
--- a/g10/pubkey-enc.c
+++ b/g10/pubkey-enc.c
@@ -155,7 +155,8 @@ get_it( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
int rc;
gcry_mpi_t plain_dek = NULL;
byte *frame = NULL;
- unsigned n, nframe;
+ unsigned int n;
+ size_t nframe;
u16 csum, csum2;
int card = 0;
@@ -167,7 +168,7 @@ get_it( PKT_pubkey_enc *enc, DEK *dek, PKT_secret_key *sk, u32 *keyid )
size_t rbuflen;
char *snbuf;
unsigned char *indata = NULL;
- unsigned int indatalen;
+ size_t indatalen;
snbuf = serialno_and_fpr_from_sk (sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen, sk);
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c
index a059aa00f..4a22a4524 100644
--- a/g10/seckey-cert.c
+++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
byte *buffer;
u16 csum=0;
int i, res;
- unsigned int nbytes;
+ size_t nbytes;
if( sk->is_protected ) { /* remove the protection */
DEK *dek = NULL;
@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int mode,
for(i=pubkey_get_npkey(sk->pubkey_algo);
i < pubkey_get_nskey(sk->pubkey_algo); i++ ) {
byte *p;
- int ndata;
+ size_t ndata;
unsigned int ndatabits;
assert (gcry_mpi_get_flag (sk->skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE));
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
{
int i,j, rc = 0;
byte *buffer;
- unsigned nbytes;
+ size_t nbytes;
u16 csum;
if( !dek )
@@ -370,8 +370,8 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_key *sk, DEK *dek )
gcry_cipher_setiv (cipher_hd, sk->protect.iv, sk->protect.ivlen);
if( sk->version >= 4 ) {
byte *bufarr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
- unsigned narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
- unsigned nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
+ size_t narr[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
+ unsigned int nbits[PUBKEY_MAX_NSKEY];
int ndata=0;
byte *p, *data;
diff --git a/g10/seskey.c b/g10/seskey.c
index c0efc3ae7..6ac83b01f 100644
--- a/g10/seskey.c
+++ b/g10/seskey.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ make_session_key( DEK *dek )
gcry_mpi_t
encode_session_key (DEK *dek, unsigned int nbits)
{
- int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
+ size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
byte *p;
byte *frame;
int i,n;
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static gcry_mpi_t
do_encode_md( gcry_md_hd_t md, int algo, size_t len, unsigned nbits,
const byte *asn, size_t asnlen )
{
- int nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
+ size_t nframe = (nbits+7) / 8;
byte *frame;
int i,n;
gcry_mpi_t a;
@@ -237,11 +237,11 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
or something like that, which would look correct but allow
trivial forgeries. Yes, I know this rules out using MD5 with
DSA. ;) */
-
- if(qbytes<160)
+ if (qbytes < 160)
{
- log_error(_("DSA key %s uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
- pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),qbytes);
+ log_error (_("DSA key %s uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"),
+ pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),
+ (unsigned int)qbytes);
return NULL;
}
@@ -249,11 +249,11 @@ encode_md_value (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_secret_key *sk,
/* Check if we're too short. Too long is safe as we'll
automatically left-truncate. */
-
- if(gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < qbytes)
+ if (gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hash_algo) < qbytes)
{
- log_error(_("DSA key %s requires a %u bit or larger hash\n"),
- pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),qbytes*8);
+ log_error (_("DSA key %s requires a %u bit or larger hash\n"),
+ pk?keystr_from_pk(pk):keystr_from_sk(sk),
+ (unsigned int)(qbytes*8));
return NULL;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-06-19 07:57:33 +0000