diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/sig-check.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/sig-check.c | 93 |
1 files changed, 48 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/g10/sig-check.c b/g10/sig-check.c index e5de025ca..fc6983993 100644 --- a/g10/sig-check.c +++ b/g10/sig-check.c @@ -210,33 +210,32 @@ check_signature2 (ctrl_t ctrl, } - if (!rc && sig->sig_class < 2 && is_status_enabled ()) - { - /* This signature id works best with DLP algorithms because - * they use a random parameter for every signature. Instead of - * this sig-id we could have also used the hash of the document - * and the timestamp, but the drawback of this is, that it is - * not possible to sign more than one identical document within - * one second. Some remote batch processing applications might - * like this feature here. - * - * Note that before 2.0.10, we used RIPE-MD160 for the hash - * and accidentally didn't include the timestamp and algorithm - * information in the hash. Given that this feature is not - * commonly used and that a replay attacks detection should - * not solely be based on this feature (because it does not - * work with RSA), we take the freedom and switch to SHA-1 - * with 2.0.10 to take advantage of hardware supported SHA-1 - * implementations. We also include the missing information - * in the hash. Note also the SIG_ID as computed by gpg 1.x - * and gpg 2.x didn't matched either because 2.x used to print - * MPIs not in PGP format. */ - u32 a = sig->timestamp; - int nsig = pubkey_get_nsig (sig->pubkey_algo); - unsigned char *p, *buffer; - size_t n, nbytes; - int i; - char hashbuf[20]; + if( !rc && sig->sig_class < 2 && is_status_enabled() ) { + /* This signature id works best with DLP algorithms because + * they use a random parameter for every signature. Instead of + * this sig-id we could have also used the hash of the document + * and the timestamp, but the drawback of this is, that it is + * not possible to sign more than one identical document within + * one second. Some remote batch processing applications might + * like this feature here. + * + * Note that before 2.0.10, we used RIPE-MD160 for the hash + * and accidentally didn't include the timestamp and algorithm + * information in the hash. Given that this feature is not + * commonly used and that a replay attacks detection should + * not solely be based on this feature (because it does not + * work with RSA), we take the freedom and switch to SHA-1 + * with 2.0.10 to take advantage of hardware supported SHA-1 + * implementations. We also include the missing information + * in the hash. Note also the SIG_ID as computed by gpg 1.x + * and gpg 2.x didn't matched either because 2.x used to print + * MPIs not in PGP format. */ + u32 a = sig->timestamp; + int nsig = pubkey_get_nsig( sig->pubkey_algo ); + unsigned char *p, *buffer; + size_t n, nbytes; + int i; + char hashbuf[20]; /* We use SHA-1 here. */ nbytes = 6; for (i=0; i < nsig; i++ ) @@ -521,25 +520,29 @@ check_signature_end_simple (PKT_public_key *pk, PKT_signature *sig, gcry_md_putc (digest, 0); n = 6; } - /* Add some magic per Section 5.2.4 of RFC 4880. */ - buf[0] = sig->version; - buf[1] = 0xff; - buf[2] = n >> 24; - buf[3] = n >> 16; - buf[4] = n >> 8; - buf[5] = n; - gcry_md_write( digest, buf, 6 ); + /* add some magic per Section 5.2.4 of RFC 4880. */ + buf[0] = sig->version; + buf[1] = 0xff; + buf[2] = n >> 24; + buf[3] = n >> 16; + buf[4] = n >> 8; + buf[5] = n; + gcry_md_write( digest, buf, 6 ); } - gcry_md_final( digest ); - - /* Convert the digest to an MPI. */ - result = encode_md_value (pk, digest, sig->digest_algo ); - if (!result) - return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; - - /* Verify the signature. */ - rc = pk_verify (pk->pubkey_algo, result, sig->data, pk->pkey); - gcry_mpi_release (result); + gcry_md_final( digest ); + + /* Convert the digest to an MPI. */ + result = encode_md_value (pk, digest, sig->digest_algo ); + if (!result) + return GPG_ERR_GENERAL; + + /* Verify the signature. */ + if (DBG_CLOCK && sig->sig_class <= 0x01) + log_clock ("enter pk_verify"); + rc = pk_verify( pk->pubkey_algo, result, sig->data, pk->pkey ); + if (DBG_CLOCK && sig->sig_class <= 0x01) + log_clock ("leave pk_verify"); + gcry_mpi_release (result); if (!rc && sig->flags.unknown_critical) { |