diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/seckey-cert.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/seckey-cert.c | 42 |
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c index 855e3d1b9..f963fd63f 100644 --- a/g10/seckey-cert.c +++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c @@ -1,14 +1,14 @@ /* seckey-cert.c - secret key certifucate packet handling - * Copyright (c) 1997 by Werner Koch (dd9jn) + * Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * - * This file is part of G10. + * This file is part of GNUPG. * - * G10 is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * GNUPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or * (at your option) any later version. * - * G10 is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * GNUPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the * GNU General Public License for more details. @@ -72,21 +72,27 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert ) MPI test_x; BLOWFISH_context *blowfish_ctx=NULL; - switch( cert->d.elg.protect_algo ) { + switch( cert->d.elg.protect.algo ) { case CIPHER_ALGO_NONE: BUG(); break; case CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH: keyid_from_skc( cert, keyid ); - dek = get_passphrase_hash( keyid, NULL ); + if( cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 1 + || cert->d.elg.protect.s2k == 3 ) + dek = get_passphrase_hash( keyid, NULL, + cert->d.elg.protect.salt ); + else + dek = get_passphrase_hash( keyid, NULL, NULL ); + blowfish_ctx = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *blowfish_ctx ); blowfish_setkey( blowfish_ctx, dek->key, dek->keylen ); m_free(dek); /* pw is in secure memory, so m_free() burns it */ blowfish_setiv( blowfish_ctx, NULL ); - memcpy(save_iv, cert->d.elg.protect.blowfish.iv, 8 ); + memcpy(save_iv, cert->d.elg.protect.iv, 8 ); blowfish_decode_cfb( blowfish_ctx, - cert->d.elg.protect.blowfish.iv, - cert->d.elg.protect.blowfish.iv, 8 ); + cert->d.elg.protect.iv, + cert->d.elg.protect.iv, 8 ); mpi_set_secure(cert->d.elg.x ); - /*fixme: maybe it is better to set the buger secure with a + /*fixme: maybe it is better to set the buffer secure with a * new get_buffer_secure() function */ buffer = mpi_get_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, &nbytes, NULL ); csum = checksum_u16( nbytes*8 ); @@ -99,7 +105,7 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert ) /* now let's see wether we have used the right passphrase */ if( csum != cert->d.elg.csum ) { mpi_free(test_x); - memcpy( cert->d.elg.protect.blowfish.iv, save_iv, 8 ); + memcpy( cert->d.elg.protect.iv, save_iv, 8 ); return G10ERR_BAD_PASS; } @@ -111,7 +117,7 @@ check_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert ) memset( &skey, 0, sizeof skey ); if( !res ) { mpi_free(test_x); - memcpy( cert->d.elg.protect.blowfish.iv, save_iv, 8 ); + memcpy( cert->d.elg.protect.iv, save_iv, 8 ); return G10ERR_BAD_PASS; } mpi_set(cert->d.elg.x, test_x); @@ -144,15 +150,15 @@ protect_elg( PKT_secret_cert *cert, DEK *dek ) if( !cert->d.elg.is_protected ) { /* add the protection */ BLOWFISH_context *blowfish_ctx=NULL; - switch( cert->d.elg.protect_algo ) { + switch( cert->d.elg.protect.algo ) { case CIPHER_ALGO_NONE: BUG(); break; case CIPHER_ALGO_BLOWFISH: blowfish_ctx = m_alloc_secure( sizeof *blowfish_ctx ); blowfish_setkey( blowfish_ctx, dek->key, dek->keylen ); blowfish_setiv( blowfish_ctx, NULL ); blowfish_encode_cfb( blowfish_ctx, - cert->d.elg.protect.blowfish.iv, - cert->d.elg.protect.blowfish.iv, 8 ); + cert->d.elg.protect.iv, + cert->d.elg.protect.iv, 8 ); buffer = mpi_get_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, &nbytes, NULL ); blowfish_encode_cfb( blowfish_ctx, buffer, buffer, nbytes ); mpi_set_buffer( cert->d.elg.x, buffer, nbytes, 0 ); @@ -296,7 +302,7 @@ int is_secret_key_protected( PKT_secret_cert *cert ) { if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) - return cert->d.elg.is_protected? cert->d.elg.protect_algo : 0; + return cert->d.elg.is_protected? cert->d.elg.protect.algo : 0; #ifdef HAVE_RSA_CIPHER else if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) return cert->d.rsa.is_protected? cert->d.rsa.protect_algo : 0; @@ -317,10 +323,6 @@ protect_secret_key( PKT_secret_cert *cert, DEK *dek ) if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL ) return protect_elg( cert, dek ); - #if 0 /* noy yet implemented */ - else if( cert->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_RSA ) - return protect_rsa( cert, dek ); - #endif else return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; } |