diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/mainproc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/mainproc.c | 1758 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1758 deletions
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c deleted file mode 100644 index 40b9bd20a..000000000 --- a/g10/mainproc.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1758 +0,0 @@ -/* mainproc.c - handle packets - * Copyright (C) 1998,1999,2000,2001,2002,2003 Free Software Foundation, Inc. - * - * This file is part of GnuPG. - * - * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or - * (at your option) any later version. - * - * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - * GNU General Public License for more details. - * - * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA - */ - -#include <config.h> -#include <stdio.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> -#include <assert.h> -#include <time.h> - -#include "packet.h" -#include "iobuf.h" -#include "memory.h" -#include "options.h" -#include "util.h" -#include "cipher.h" -#include "keydb.h" -#include "filter.h" -#include "main.h" -#include "status.h" -#include "i18n.h" -#include "trustdb.h" -#include "keyserver-internal.h" -#include "photoid.h" - - -struct kidlist_item { - struct kidlist_item *next; - u32 kid[2]; - int pubkey_algo; - int reason; -}; - - - -/**************** - * Structure to hold the context - */ -typedef struct mainproc_context *CTX; -struct mainproc_context { - struct mainproc_context *anchor; /* may be useful in the future */ - PKT_public_key *last_pubkey; - PKT_secret_key *last_seckey; - PKT_user_id *last_user_id; - md_filter_context_t mfx; - int sigs_only; /* process only signatures and reject all other stuff */ - int encrypt_only; /* process only encrytion messages */ - STRLIST signed_data; - const char *sigfilename; - DEK *dek; - int last_was_session_key; - KBNODE list; /* the current list of packets */ - int have_data; - iobuf_t iobuf; /* used to get the filename etc. */ - int trustletter; /* temp usage in list_node */ - ulong local_id; /* ditto */ - struct kidlist_item *pkenc_list; /* list of encryption packets */ - struct { - int op; - int stop_now; - } pipemode; -}; - - -static int do_proc_packets( CTX c, iobuf_t a ); - -static void list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ); -static void proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ); - - -static void -release_list( CTX c ) -{ - if( !c->list ) - return; - proc_tree(c, c->list ); - release_kbnode( c->list ); - while( c->pkenc_list ) { - struct kidlist_item *tmp = c->pkenc_list->next; - xfree ( c->pkenc_list ); - c->pkenc_list = tmp; - } - c->pkenc_list = NULL; - c->list = NULL; - c->have_data = 0; - c->last_was_session_key = 0; - c->pipemode.op = 0; - c->pipemode.stop_now = 0; - xfree (c->dek); c->dek = NULL; -} - - -static int -add_onepass_sig( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - KBNODE node; - - if( c->list ) { /* add another packet */ - /* We can only append another onepass packet if the list - * does contain only onepass packets */ - for( node=c->list; node && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG; - node = node->next ) - ; - if( node ) { - /* this is not the case, so we flush the current thing and - * allow this packet to start a new verification thing */ - release_list( c ); - c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); - } - else - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); - } - else /* insert the first one */ - c->list = node = new_kbnode( pkt ); - - return 1; -} - - -static int -add_gpg_control( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { - /* New clear text signature. - * Process the last one and reset everything */ - release_list(c); - } - else if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control == CTRLPKT_PIPEMODE ) { - /* Pipemode control packet */ - if ( pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen < 2 ) - log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet length\n"); - if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 1) { - /* start the whole thing */ - assert ( !c->list ); /* we should be in a pretty virgin state */ - assert ( !c->pipemode.op ); - c->pipemode.op = pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[1]; - } - else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 2) { - /* the signed material follows in a plaintext packet */ - assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ); - } - else if (pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data[0] == 3) { - assert ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ); - release_list (c); - /* and tell the outer loop to terminate */ - c->pipemode.stop_now = 1; - } - else - log_fatal ("invalid pipemode control packet code\n"); - return 0; /* no need to store the packet */ - } - - if( c->list ) /* add another packet */ - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt )); - else /* insert the first one */ - c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); - - return 1; -} - - - -static int -add_user_id( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - if( !c->list ) { - log_error("orphaned user ID\n" ); - return 0; - } - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); - return 1; -} - -static int -add_subkey( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - if( !c->list ) { - log_error("subkey w/o mainkey\n" ); - return 0; - } - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); - return 1; -} - -static int -add_ring_trust( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - if( !c->list ) { - log_error("ring trust w/o key\n" ); - return 0; - } - add_kbnode( c->list, new_kbnode( pkt ) ); - return 1; -} - - -static int -add_signature( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - KBNODE node; - - if( pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE && !c->list ) { - /* This is the first signature for the following datafile. - * GPG does not write such packets; instead it always uses - * onepass-sig packets. The drawback of PGP's method - * of prepending the signature to the data is - * that it is not possible to make a signature from data read - * from stdin. (GPG is able to read PGP stuff anyway.) */ - node = new_kbnode( pkt ); - c->list = node; - return 1; - } - else if( !c->list ) - return 0; /* oops (invalid packet sequence)*/ - else if( !c->list->pkt ) - BUG(); /* so nicht */ - - /* add a new signature node id at the end */ - node = new_kbnode( pkt ); - add_kbnode( c->list, node ); - return 1; -} - -static void -symkey_decrypt_sesskey (DEK * dek, byte *sesskey, size_t slen) -{ - CIPHER_HANDLE hd; - int n; - - if (slen < 17 || slen > 33) - { - log_error ( _("weird size for an encrypted session key (%d)\n"), - (int)slen); - return; - } - /* we checked the DEK values before, so consider all errors as fatal */ - if (gcry_cipher_open (&hd, dek->algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, 1)) - BUG(); - if (gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, dek->key, dek->keylen)) - BUG(); - gcry_cipher_setiv (hd, NULL, 0); - gcry_cipher_decrypt (hd, sesskey, slen, NULL, 0); - gcry_cipher_close (hd); - /* check first byte (the cipher algo) */ - if (openpgp_cipher_test_algo (sesskey[0])) - { - log_error (_("invalid symkey algorithm detected (%d)\n"), - sesskey[0]); - return; - } - n = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (sesskey[0]); - if (n > DIM(dek->key)) - BUG (); - /* now we replace the dek components with the real session key - to decrypt the contents of the sequencing packet. */ - dek->keylen = n; - dek->algo = sesskey[0]; - memcpy (dek->key, sesskey + 1, dek->keylen); - /*log_hexdump ("thekey", dek->key, dek->keylen);*/ -} - -static void -proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - PKT_symkey_enc *enc; - - enc = pkt->pkt.symkey_enc; - if (!enc) - log_error ("invalid symkey encrypted packet\n"); - else { - int algo = enc->cipher_algo; - const char *s; - - s = gcry_cipher_algo_name (algo); - if (s && *s) - log_info(_("%s encrypted data\n"), s ); - else - log_info(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo ); - - c->last_was_session_key = 2; - if ( opt.list_only ) - goto leave; - c->dek = passphrase_to_dek( NULL, 0, algo, &enc->s2k, 0, NULL, NULL ); - if (c->dek) - c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; - if ( c->dek && enc->seskeylen ) - symkey_decrypt_sesskey( c->dek, enc->seskey, enc->seskeylen ); - } -leave: - free_packet(pkt); -} - -static void -proc_pubkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - PKT_pubkey_enc *enc; - int result = 0; - - /* check whether the secret key is available and store in this case */ - c->last_was_session_key = 1; - enc = pkt->pkt.pubkey_enc; - /*printf("enc: encrypted by a pubkey with keyid %08lX\n", enc->keyid[1] );*/ - /* Hmmm: why do I have this algo check here - anyway there is - * function to check it. */ - if( opt.verbose ) - log_info(_("public key is %08lX\n"), (ulong)enc->keyid[1] ); - - if( is_status_enabled() ) { - char buf[50]; - sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d 0", - (ulong)enc->keyid[0], (ulong)enc->keyid[1], enc->pubkey_algo ); - write_status_text( STATUS_ENC_TO, buf ); - } - - if( !opt.list_only && opt.override_session_key ) { - /* It does not make much sense to store the session key in - * secure memory because it has already been passed on the - * command line and the GCHQ knows about it */ - c->dek = xcalloc (1, sizeof *c->dek ); - result = get_override_session_key ( c->dek, opt.override_session_key ); - if ( result ) { - xfree (c->dek); c->dek = NULL; - } - } - else if( is_ELGAMAL(enc->pubkey_algo) - || enc->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA - || is_RSA(enc->pubkey_algo) ) { - if ( !c->dek && ((!enc->keyid[0] && !enc->keyid[1]) - || opt.try_all_secrets - || !seckey_available( enc->keyid )) ) { - if( opt.list_only ) - result = -1; - else { - c->dek = xcalloc_secure (1, sizeof *c->dek); - if( (result = get_session_key( enc, c->dek )) ) { - /* error: delete the DEK */ - xfree (c->dek); c->dek = NULL; - } - } - } - else - result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY; - } - else - result = GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO; - - if( result == -1 ) - ; - else { - if( !result ) { - if( opt.verbose > 1 ) - log_info( _("public key encrypted data: good DEK\n") ); - if ( opt.show_session_key ) { - int i; - char *buf = xmalloc ( c->dek->keylen*2 + 20 ); - sprintf ( buf, "%d:", c->dek->algo ); - for(i=0; i < c->dek->keylen; i++ ) - sprintf(buf+strlen(buf), "%02X", c->dek->key[i] ); - log_info( "session key: \"%s\"\n", buf ); - write_status_text ( STATUS_SESSION_KEY, buf ); - } - } - /* store it for later display */ - { - struct kidlist_item *x = xmalloc ( sizeof *x ); - x->kid[0] = enc->keyid[0]; - x->kid[1] = enc->keyid[1]; - x->pubkey_algo = enc->pubkey_algo; - x->reason = result; - x->next = c->pkenc_list; - c->pkenc_list = x; - } - } - free_packet(pkt); -} - - - -/**************** - * Print the list of public key encrypted packets which we could - * not decrypt. - */ -static void -print_pkenc_list( struct kidlist_item *list, int failed ) -{ - for( ; list; list = list->next ) { - PKT_public_key *pk; - const char *algstr; - - if ( failed && !list->reason ) - continue; - if ( !failed && list->reason ) - continue; - - algstr = gcry_pk_algo_name (list->pubkey_algo); - pk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *pk ); - - if (!algstr || !*algstr) - algstr = "[?]"; - pk->pubkey_algo = list->pubkey_algo; - if( !get_pubkey( pk, list->kid ) ) { - size_t n; - char *p; - log_info( _("encrypted with %u-bit %s key, ID %08lX, created %s\n"), - nbits_from_pk( pk ), algstr, (ulong)list->kid[1], - strtimestamp(pk->timestamp) ); - fputs(" \"", log_get_stream() ); - p = get_user_id( list->kid, &n ); - print_utf8_string2 ( log_get_stream(), p, n, '"' ); - xfree (p); - fputs("\"\n", log_get_stream() ); - } - else { - log_info(_("encrypted with %s key, ID %08lX\n"), - algstr, (ulong) list->kid[1] ); - } - free_public_key( pk ); - - if( gpg_err_code (list->reason) == GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY ) { - if( is_status_enabled() ) { - char buf[20]; - sprintf(buf,"%08lX%08lX", (ulong)list->kid[0], - (ulong)list->kid[1] ); - write_status_text( STATUS_NO_SECKEY, buf ); - } - } - else if (list->reason) - log_info(_("public key decryption failed: %s\n"), - gpg_strerror (list->reason)); - } -} - - -static void -proc_encrypted( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - int result = 0; - - if (!opt.quiet) { - print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 1 ); - print_pkenc_list ( c->pkenc_list, 0 ); - } - - write_status( STATUS_BEGIN_DECRYPTION ); - - /*log_debug("dat: %sencrypted data\n", c->dek?"":"conventional ");*/ - if( opt.list_only ) - result = -1; - else if( !c->dek && !c->last_was_session_key ) { - int algo; - STRING2KEY s2kbuf, *s2k = NULL; - - /* assume this is old style conventional encrypted data */ - if ( (algo = opt.def_cipher_algo)) - log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), - gcry_cipher_algo_name (algo)); - else if ( gcry_cipher_test_algo(CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA) ) { - algo = opt.def_cipher_algo; - if (!algo) - algo = opt.s2k_cipher_algo; - idea_cipher_warn(1); - log_info (_("IDEA cipher unavailable, " - "optimistically attempting to use %s instead\n"), - gcry_cipher_algo_name (algo)); - } - else { - algo = CIPHER_ALGO_IDEA; - if (!opt.s2k_digest_algo) { - /* If no digest is given we assume MD5 */ - s2kbuf.mode = 0; - s2kbuf.hash_algo = GCRY_MD_MD5; - s2k = &s2kbuf; - } - log_info (_("assuming %s encrypted data\n"), "IDEA"); - } - - c->dek = passphrase_to_dek ( NULL, 0, algo, s2k, 0, NULL, NULL ); - if (c->dek) - c->dek->algo_info_printed = 1; - } - else if( !c->dek ) - result = GPG_ERR_NO_SECKEY; - if( !result ) - result = decrypt_data( c, pkt->pkt.encrypted, c->dek ); - - xfree (c->dek); c->dek = NULL; - if( result == -1 ) - ; - else if( !result || (gpg_err_code (result)==GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE - && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) { - write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY ); - if( opt.verbose > 1 ) - log_info(_("decryption okay\n")); - if( pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result ) - write_status( STATUS_GOODMDC ); - else if(!opt.no_mdc_warn) - log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n")); - } - else if( gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ) { - log_error(_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n")); - write_status( STATUS_BADMDC ); - write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED ); - } - else { - write_status( STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED ); - log_error(_("decryption failed: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (result)); - /* Hmmm: does this work when we have encrypted using multiple - * ways to specify the session key (symmmetric and PK)*/ - } - free_packet(pkt); - c->last_was_session_key = 0; - write_status( STATUS_END_DECRYPTION ); -} - - - -static void -proc_plaintext( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - PKT_plaintext *pt = pkt->pkt.plaintext; - int any, clearsig, only_md5, rc; - KBNODE n; - - if( pt->namelen == 8 && !memcmp( pt->name, "_CONSOLE", 8 ) ) - log_info(_("NOTE: sender requested \"for-your-eyes-only\"\n")); - else if( opt.verbose ) - log_info(_("original file name='%.*s'\n"), pt->namelen, pt->name); - free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); - gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0); - /* fixme: we may need to push the textfilter if we have sigclass 1 - * and no armoring - Not yet tested - * Hmmm, why don't we need it at all if we have sigclass 1 - * Should we assume that plaintext in mode 't' has always sigclass 1?? - * See: Russ Allbery's mail 1999-02-09 - */ - any = clearsig = only_md5 = 0; - for(n=c->list; n; n = n->next ) { - if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) { - if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ) { - gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo ); - if( !any && n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->digest_algo - == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 ) - only_md5 = 1; - else - only_md5 = 0; - any = 1; - } - if( n->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class != 0x01 ) - only_md5 = 0; - } - else if( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL - && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control - == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { - size_t datalen = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->datalen; - const byte *data = n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->data; - - /* check that we have at least the sigclass and one hash */ - if ( datalen < 2 ) - log_fatal("invalid control packet CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START\n"); - /* Note that we don't set the clearsig flag for not-dash-escaped - * documents */ - clearsig = (*data == 0x01); - for( data++, datalen--; datalen; datalen--, data++ ) - gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, *data ); - any = 1; - break; /* no pass signature pakets are expected */ - } - } - - if( !any && !opt.skip_verify ) { - /* no onepass sig packet: enable all standard algos */ - gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_RMD160 ); - gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 ); - gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 ); - } - if( opt.pgp2_workarounds && only_md5 && !opt.skip_verify ) { - /* This is a kludge to work around a bug in pgp2. It does only - * catch those mails which are armored. To catch the non-armored - * pgp mails we could see whether there is the signature packet - * in front of the plaintext. If someone needs this, send me a patch. - */ - gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0); - } - if ( DBG_HASHING ) { - gcry_md_start_debug ( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); - if ( c->mfx.md2 ) - gcry_md_start_debug ( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); - } - if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ) - rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, 0, NULL ); - else { - int failed; - - rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, c->sigs_only, clearsig, &failed); - if( rc && failed && !c->sigs_only) { - /* can't write output but we hash it anyway to - * check the signature */ - rc = handle_plaintext( pt, &c->mfx, 1, clearsig, NULL ); - } - } - if( rc ) - log_error( "handle plaintext failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); - free_packet(pkt); - c->last_was_session_key = 0; - - /* We add a marker control packet instead of the plaintext packet. - * This is so that we can later detect invalid packet sequences. - */ - n = new_kbnode (create_gpg_control (CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK, NULL, 0)); - if (c->list) - add_kbnode (c->list, n); - else - c->list = n; -} - - -static int -proc_compressed_cb( iobuf_t a, void *info ) -{ - return proc_signature_packets( info, a, ((CTX)info)->signed_data, - ((CTX)info)->sigfilename ); -} - -static int -proc_encrypt_cb( iobuf_t a, void *info ) -{ - return proc_encryption_packets( info, a ); -} - -static void -proc_compressed( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) -{ - PKT_compressed *zd = pkt->pkt.compressed; - int rc; - - /*printf("zip: compressed data packet\n");*/ - if( c->sigs_only ) - rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_compressed_cb, c ); - else if( c->encrypt_only ) - rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, proc_encrypt_cb, c ); - else - rc = handle_compressed( c, zd, NULL, NULL ); - if( rc ) - log_error("uncompressing failed: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); - free_packet(pkt); - c->last_was_session_key = 0; -} - -/**************** - * check the signature - * Returns: 0 = valid signature or an error code - */ -static int -do_check_sig( CTX c, KBNODE node, int *is_selfsig, - int *is_expkey, int *is_revkey ) -{ - PKT_signature *sig; - MD_HANDLE md = NULL, md2 = NULL; - int algo, rc; - - assert( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ); - if( is_selfsig ) - *is_selfsig = 0; - sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; - - algo = sig->digest_algo; - if( (rc = gcry_md_test_algo(algo)) ) - return rc; - - if( sig->sig_class == 0x00 ) { - if( c->mfx.md ) - gcry_md_copy (&md,c->mfx.md); - else /* detached signature */ - gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will - enable the md*/ - } - else if( sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { - /* how do we know that we have to hash the (already hashed) text - * in canonical mode ??? (calculating both modes???) */ - if( c->mfx.md ) { - gcry_md_copy (&md, c->mfx.md); - if (c->mfx.md2) - gcry_md_copy (&md2, c->mfx.md2); - } - else { /* detached signature */ - log_debug("Do we really need this here?"); - gcry_md_open (&md, 0, 0 ); /* signature_check() will - enable the md*/ - gcry_md_open (&md2, 0, 0 ); - } - } - else if( (sig->sig_class&~3) == 0x10 - || sig->sig_class == 0x18 - || sig->sig_class == 0x1f - || sig->sig_class == 0x20 - || sig->sig_class == 0x28 - || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) { - if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY - || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { - return check_key_signature( c->list, node, is_selfsig ); - } - else if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 ) { - log_info(_("standalone revocation - " - "use \"gpg --import\" to apply\n")); - return GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED; - } - else { - log_error("invalid root packet for sigclass %02x\n", - sig->sig_class); - return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS; - } - } - else - return GPG_ERR_SIG_CLASS; - rc = signature_check2( sig, md, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL ); - if( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE && md2 ) - rc = signature_check2( sig, md2, NULL, is_expkey, is_revkey, NULL ); - gcry_md_close (md); - gcry_md_close (md2); - - return rc; -} - - -static void -print_userid( PACKET *pkt ) -{ - if( !pkt ) - BUG(); - if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) { - printf("ERROR: unexpected packet type %d", pkt->pkttype ); - return; - } - if( opt.with_colons ) - { - if(pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) - printf("%u %lu", - pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs, - pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_len); - else - print_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, - pkt->pkt.user_id->len, ':'); - } - else - print_utf8_string( stdout, pkt->pkt.user_id->name, - pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); -} - - -/**************** - * List the certificate in a user friendly way - */ - -static void -list_node( CTX c, KBNODE node ) -{ - int any=0; - int mainkey; - - if( !node ) - ; - else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) ) - || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { - PKT_public_key *pk = node->pkt->pkt.public_key; - - if( opt.with_colons ) { - u32 keyid[2]; - keyid_from_pk( pk, keyid ); - if( mainkey ) { - c->local_id = pk->local_id; - c->trustletter = opt.fast_list_mode? - 0 : get_validity_info( pk, NULL ); - } - printf("%s:", mainkey? "pub":"sub" ); - if( c->trustletter ) - putchar( c->trustletter ); - printf(":%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", - nbits_from_pk( pk ), - pk->pubkey_algo, - (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1], - colon_datestr_from_pk( pk ), - colon_strtime (pk->expiredate) ); - if( c->local_id ) - printf("%lu", c->local_id ); - putchar(':'); - if( mainkey && !opt.fast_list_mode ) - putchar( get_ownertrust_info (pk) ); - putchar(':'); - if( node->next && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST) { - putchar('\n'); any=1; - if( opt.fingerprint ) - print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 ); - printf("rtv:1:%u:\n", - node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval ); - } - } - else - printf("%s %4u%c/%08lX %s ", - mainkey? "pub":"sub", - nbits_from_pk( pk ), - pubkey_letter( pk->pubkey_algo ), - (ulong)keyid_from_pk( pk, NULL ), - datestr_from_pk( pk ) ); - - if( mainkey ) { - /* and now list all userids with their signatures */ - for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) { - if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { - if( !any ) { - if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) - puts("[revoked]"); - else - putchar('\n'); - any = 1; - } - list_node(c, node ); - } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) { - if( any ) { - if( opt.with_colons ) - printf("%s:::::::::", - node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid"); - else - printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" ); - } - print_userid( node->pkt ); - if( opt.with_colons ) - putchar(':'); - putchar('\n'); - if( opt.fingerprint && !any ) - print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 ); - if( node->next - && node->next->pkt->pkttype == PKT_RING_TRUST ) { - printf("rtv:2:%u:\n", - node->next->pkt->pkt.ring_trust->trustval ); - } - any=1; - } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { - if( !any ) { - putchar('\n'); - any = 1; - } - list_node(c, node ); - } - } - } - else if( pk->expiredate ) { /* of subkey */ - printf(_(" [expires: %s]"), expirestr_from_pk( pk ) ); - } - - if( !any ) - putchar('\n'); - if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 ) - print_fingerprint( pk, NULL, 0 ); - } - else if( (mainkey = (node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY) ) - || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) { - PKT_secret_key *sk = node->pkt->pkt.secret_key; - - if( opt.with_colons ) { - u32 keyid[2]; - keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid ); - printf("%s::%u:%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:::", - mainkey? "sec":"ssb", - nbits_from_sk( sk ), - sk->pubkey_algo, - (ulong)keyid[0],(ulong)keyid[1], - colon_datestr_from_sk( sk ), - colon_strtime (sk->expiredate) - /* fixme: add LID */ ); - } - else - printf("%s %4u%c/%08lX %s ", - mainkey? "sec":"ssb", - nbits_from_sk( sk ), - pubkey_letter( sk->pubkey_algo ), - (ulong)keyid_from_sk( sk, NULL ), - datestr_from_sk( sk ) ); - if( mainkey ) { - /* and now list all userids with their signatures */ - for( node = node->next; node; node = node->next ) { - if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { - if( !any ) { - if( node->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class == 0x20 ) - puts("[revoked]"); - else - putchar('\n'); - any = 1; - } - list_node(c, node ); - } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) { - if( any ) { - if( opt.with_colons ) - printf("%s:::::::::", - node->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data?"uat":"uid"); - else - printf( "uid%*s", 28, "" ); - } - print_userid( node->pkt ); - if( opt.with_colons ) - putchar(':'); - putchar('\n'); - if( opt.fingerprint && !any ) - print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 ); - any=1; - } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY ) { - if( !any ) { - putchar('\n'); - any = 1; - } - list_node(c, node ); - } - } - } - if( !any ) - putchar('\n'); - if( !mainkey && opt.fingerprint > 1 ) - print_fingerprint( NULL, sk, 0 ); - } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { - PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; - int is_selfsig = 0; - int rc2=0; - size_t n; - char *p; - int sigrc = ' '; - - if( !opt.list_sigs ) - return; - - if( sig->sig_class == 0x20 || sig->sig_class == 0x30 ) - fputs("rev", stdout); - else - fputs("sig", stdout); - if( opt.check_sigs ) { - fflush(stdout); - switch( gpg_err_code (rc2=do_check_sig( c, node, - &is_selfsig, - NULL, NULL )) ) { - case 0: sigrc = '!'; break; - case GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE: sigrc = '-'; break; - case GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY: - case GPG_ERR_UNUSABLE_PUBKEY: sigrc = '?'; break; - default: sigrc = '%'; break; - } - } - else { /* check whether this is a self signature */ - u32 keyid[2]; - - if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY - || c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) { - if( c->list->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY ) - keyid_from_pk( c->list->pkt->pkt.public_key, keyid ); - else - keyid_from_sk( c->list->pkt->pkt.secret_key, keyid ); - - if( keyid[0] == sig->keyid[0] && keyid[1] == sig->keyid[1] ) - is_selfsig = 1; - } - } - if( opt.with_colons ) { - putchar(':'); - if( sigrc != ' ' ) - putchar(sigrc); - printf("::%d:%08lX%08lX:%s:%s:", sig->pubkey_algo, - (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1], - colon_datestr_from_sig(sig), - colon_expirestr_from_sig(sig)); - - if(sig->trust_depth || sig->trust_value) - printf("%d %d",sig->trust_depth,sig->trust_value); - printf(":"); - - if(sig->trust_regexp) - print_string(stdout,sig->trust_regexp, - strlen(sig->trust_regexp),':'); - printf(":"); - } - else - printf("%c %08lX %s ", - sigrc, (ulong)sig->keyid[1], datestr_from_sig(sig)); - if( sigrc == '%' ) - printf("[%s] ", gpg_strerror (rc2) ); - else if( sigrc == '?' ) - ; - else if( is_selfsig ) { - if( opt.with_colons ) - putchar(':'); - fputs( sig->sig_class == 0x18? "[keybind]":"[selfsig]", stdout); - if( opt.with_colons ) - putchar(':'); - } - else if( !opt.fast_list_mode ) { - p = get_user_id( sig->keyid, &n ); - print_string( stdout, p, n, opt.with_colons ); - xfree (p); - } - if( opt.with_colons ) - printf(":%02x%c:", sig->sig_class, sig->flags.exportable?'x':'l'); - putchar('\n'); - } - else - log_error("invalid node with packet of type %d\n", node->pkt->pkttype); -} - - - -int -proc_packets( void *anchor, iobuf_t a ) -{ - int rc; - CTX c = xcalloc (1, sizeof *c ); - - c->anchor = anchor; - rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); - xfree ( c ); - return rc; -} - - - -int -proc_signature_packets( void *anchor, iobuf_t a, - STRLIST signedfiles, const char *sigfilename ) -{ - CTX c = xcalloc (1, sizeof *c ); - int rc; - - c->anchor = anchor; - c->sigs_only = 1; - c->signed_data = signedfiles; - c->sigfilename = sigfilename; - rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); - xfree ( c ); - return rc; -} - -int -proc_encryption_packets( void *anchor, iobuf_t a ) -{ - CTX c = xcalloc (1, sizeof *c ); - int rc; - - c->anchor = anchor; - c->encrypt_only = 1; - rc = do_proc_packets( c, a ); - xfree ( c ); - return rc; -} - - -int -do_proc_packets( CTX c, iobuf_t a ) -{ - PACKET *pkt = xmalloc ( sizeof *pkt ); - int rc=0; - int any_data=0; - int newpkt; - - c->iobuf = a; - init_packet(pkt); - while( (rc=parse_packet(a, pkt)) != -1 ) { - any_data = 1; - if( rc ) { - free_packet(pkt); - /* stop processing when an invalid packet has been encountered - * but don't do so when we are doing a --list-packet. */ - if( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET && opt.list_packets != 2 ) - break; - continue; - } - newpkt = -1; - if( opt.list_packets ) { - switch( pkt->pkttype ) { - case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; - default: newpkt = 0; break; - } - } - else if( c->sigs_only ) { - switch( pkt->pkttype ) { - case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: - case PKT_SECRET_KEY: - case PKT_USER_ID: - case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: - case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: - write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); - rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED; - goto leave; - case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; - default: newpkt = 0; break; - } - } - else if( c->encrypt_only ) { - switch( pkt->pkttype ) { - case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: - case PKT_SECRET_KEY: - case PKT_USER_ID: - write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); - rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED; - goto leave; - case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; - default: newpkt = 0; break; - } - } - else { - switch( pkt->pkttype ) { - case PKT_PUBLIC_KEY: - case PKT_SECRET_KEY: - release_list( c ); - c->list = new_kbnode( pkt ); - newpkt = 1; - break; - case PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY: - case PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY: - newpkt = add_subkey( c, pkt ); - break; - case PKT_USER_ID: newpkt = add_user_id( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_SIGNATURE: newpkt = add_signature( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_COMPRESSED: proc_compressed( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig( c, pkt ); break; - case PKT_GPG_CONTROL: newpkt = add_gpg_control(c, pkt); break; - case PKT_RING_TRUST: newpkt = add_ring_trust( c, pkt ); break; - default: newpkt = 0; break; - } - } - /* This is a very ugly construct and frankly, I don't remember why - * I used it. Adding the MDC check here is a hack. - * The right solution is to initiate another context for encrypted - * packet and not to reuse the current one ... It works right - * when there is a compression packet inbetween which adds just - * an extra layer. - * Hmmm: Rewrite this whole module here?? - */ - if( pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE && pkt->pkttype != PKT_MDC ) - c->have_data = pkt->pkttype == PKT_PLAINTEXT; - - if( newpkt == -1 ) - ; - else if( newpkt ) { - pkt = xmalloc ( sizeof *pkt ); - init_packet(pkt); - } - else - free_packet(pkt); - if ( c->pipemode.stop_now ) { - /* we won't get an EOF in pipemode, so we have to - * break the loop here */ - rc = -1; - break; - } - } - if( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_INV_PACKET ) - write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "3" ); - if( any_data ) - rc = 0; - else if( rc == -1 ) - write_status_text( STATUS_NODATA, "2" ); - - - leave: - release_list( c ); - xfree (c->dek); - free_packet( pkt ); - xfree ( pkt ); - free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); - return rc; -} - - -static int -check_sig_and_print( CTX c, KBNODE node ) -{ - PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; - const char *astr, *tstr; - int rc, is_expkey=0, is_revkey=0; - - if( opt.skip_verify ) { - log_info(_("signature verification suppressed\n")); - return 0; - } - - /* It is not in all cases possible to check multiple signatures: - * PGP 2 (which is also allowed by OpenPGP), does use the packet - * sequence: sig+data, OpenPGP does use onepas+data=sig and GnuPG - * sometimes uses (because I did'nt read the specs right) data+sig. - * Because it is possible to create multiple signatures with - * different packet sequence (e.g. data+sig and sig+data) it might - * not be possible to get it right: let's say we have: - * data+sig, sig+data,sig+data and we have not yet encountered the last - * data, we could also see this a one data with 2 signatures and then - * data+sig. - * To protect against this we check that all signatures follow - * without any intermediate packets. Note, that we won't get this - * error when we use onepass packets or cleartext signatures because - * we reset the list every time - * - * FIXME: Now that we have these marker packets, we should create a - * real grammar and check against this. - */ - { - KBNODE n; - int n_sig=0; - - for (n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) { - if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) - n_sig++; - } - if (n_sig > 1) { /* more than one signature - check sequence */ - int tmp, onepass; - - for (tmp=onepass=0,n=c->list; n; n=n->next ) { - if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG) - onepass++; - else if (n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL - && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control - == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { - onepass++; /* handle the same way as a onepass */ - } - else if ( (tmp && n->pkt->pkttype != PKT_SIGNATURE) ) { - log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n")); - return 0; - } - else if ( n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) - tmp = 1; - else if (!tmp && !onepass - && n->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL - && n->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control - == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) { - /* plaintext before signatures but no one-pass packets*/ - log_error(_("can't handle these multiple signatures\n")); - return 0; - } - } - } - } - - tstr = asctimestamp(sig->timestamp); - astr = gcry_pk_algo_name (sig->pubkey_algo); - if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_LONG_KEYID) - { - log_info(_("Signature made %.*s\n"),(int)strlen(tstr), tstr); - log_info(_(" using %s key %08lX%08lX\n"), - astr? astr: "?",(ulong)sig->keyid[0],(ulong)sig->keyid[1] ); - } - else - log_info(_("Signature made %.*s using %s key ID %08lX\n"), - (int)strlen(tstr), tstr, astr? astr: "?", - (ulong)sig->keyid[1] ); - - rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey ); - if( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY - && opt.keyserver_scheme && opt.keyserver_options.auto_key_retrieve) { - if( keyserver_import_keyid ( sig->keyid )==0 ) - rc = do_check_sig(c, node, NULL, &is_expkey, &is_revkey ); - } - - - /* If the key still isn't found, try to inform the user where it - can be found. */ - if(gpg_err_code (rc)==GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY && sig->flags.pref_ks) - { - const byte *p; - int seq=0; - size_t n; - - while((p=enum_sig_subpkt(sig->hashed,SIGSUBPKT_PREF_KS,&n,&seq,NULL))) - { - /* According to my favorite copy editor, in English - grammar, you say "at" if the key is located on a web - page, but "from" if it is located on a keyserver. I'm - not going to even try to make two strings here :) */ - log_info(_("Key available at: ") ); - print_string( log_get_stream(), p, n, 0 ); - putc( '\n', log_get_stream() ); - } - } - - - if( !rc || gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ) { - KBNODE un, keyblock; - int count=0, statno; - char keyid_str[50]; - PKT_public_key *pk=NULL; - - if(rc) - statno=STATUS_BADSIG; - else if(sig->flags.expired) - statno=STATUS_EXPSIG; - else if(is_expkey) - statno=STATUS_EXPKEYSIG; - else if(is_revkey) - statno=STATUS_REVKEYSIG; - else - statno=STATUS_GOODSIG; - - keyblock = get_pubkeyblock( sig->keyid ); - - sprintf (keyid_str, "%08lX%08lX [uncertain] ", - (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1]); - - /* find and print the primary user ID */ - for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { - int valid; - - if(un->pkt->pkttype==PKT_PUBLIC_KEY) - { - pk=un->pkt->pkt.public_key; - continue; - } - if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) - continue; - if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->created ) - continue; - if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked ) - continue; - if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired ) - continue; - if ( !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary ) - continue; - /* We want the textual user ID here */ - if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) - continue; - - assert(pk); - - /* Get it before we print anything to avoid interrupting - the output with the "please do a --check-trustdb" - line. */ - valid=get_validity(pk,un->pkt->pkt.user_id); - - keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */ - write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str, - un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, - un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len, - -1 ); - - log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"") - : sig->flags.expired ? _("Expired signature from \"") - : _("Good signature from \"")); - print_utf8_string( log_get_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, - un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); - if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_VALIDITY) - fprintf (log_get_stream(), - "\" [%s]\n",trust_value_to_string(valid)); - else - fputs("\"\n", log_get_stream() ); - count++; - } - if( !count ) { /* just in case that we have no valid textual - userid */ - /* Try for an invalid textual userid */ - for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { - if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID && - !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) - break; - } - - /* Try for any userid at all */ - if(!un) { - for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { - if( un->pkt->pkttype == PKT_USER_ID ) - break; - } - } - - if (opt.trust_model==TM_ALWAYS || !un) - keyid_str[17] = 0; /* cut off the "[uncertain]" part */ - - write_status_text_and_buffer (statno, keyid_str, - un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]", - un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3, - -1 ); - - log_info(rc? _("BAD signature from \"") - : sig->flags.expired ? _("Expired signature from \"") - : _("Good signature from \"")); - if (opt.trust_model!=TM_ALWAYS && un) { - fputs(_("[uncertain]"), log_get_stream() ); - putc(' ', log_get_stream() ); - } - print_utf8_string( log_get_stream(), - un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name:"[?]", - un? un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len:3 ); - fputs("\"\n", log_get_stream() ); - } - - /* If we have a good signature and already printed - * the primary user ID, print all the other user IDs */ - if ( count && !rc ) { - for( un=keyblock; un; un = un->next ) { - if( un->pkt->pkttype != PKT_USER_ID ) - continue; - if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_revoked ) - continue; - if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_expired ) - continue; - /* Only skip textual primaries */ - if ( un->pkt->pkt.user_id->is_primary && - !un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data ) - continue; - - if(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attrib_data) - { - dump_attribs(un->pkt->pkt.user_id,pk,NULL); - - if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_PHOTOS) - show_photos(un->pkt->pkt.user_id->attribs, - un->pkt->pkt.user_id->numattribs,pk,NULL); - } - - log_info( _(" aka \"")); - print_utf8_string( log_get_stream(), un->pkt->pkt.user_id->name, - un->pkt->pkt.user_id->len ); - if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_VALIDITY) - fprintf (log_get_stream(), "\" [%s]\n", - trust_value_to_string(get_validity(pk, - un->pkt-> - pkt.user_id))); - else - fputs("\"\n", log_get_stream() ); - } - } - release_kbnode( keyblock ); - - if( !rc ) - { - if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_POLICY) - show_policy_url(sig,0,1); - else - show_policy_url(sig,0,2); - - if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_KEYSERVER) - show_keyserver_url(sig,0,1); - else - show_keyserver_url(sig,0,2); - - if(opt.verify_options&VERIFY_SHOW_NOTATION) - show_notation(sig,0,1); - else - show_notation(sig,0,2); - } - - if( !rc && is_status_enabled() ) { - /* print a status response with the fingerprint */ - PKT_public_key *vpk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *vpk ); - - if( !get_pubkey( vpk, sig->keyid ) ) { - byte array[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN], *p; - char buf[MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN*4+90], *bufp; - size_t i, n; - - bufp = buf; - fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n ); - p = array; - for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2) - sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p ); - /* TODO: Replace the reserved '0' in the field below - with bits for status flags (policy url, notation, - etc.). Remember to make the buffer larger to - match! */ - sprintf(bufp, " %s %lu %lu %d 0 %d %d %02X ", - strtimestamp( sig->timestamp ), - (ulong)sig->timestamp,(ulong)sig->expiredate, - sig->version,sig->pubkey_algo,sig->digest_algo, - sig->sig_class); - bufp = bufp + strlen (bufp); - if (!vpk->is_primary) { - u32 akid[2]; - - akid[0] = vpk->main_keyid[0]; - akid[1] = vpk->main_keyid[1]; - free_public_key (vpk); - vpk = xcalloc (1, sizeof *vpk ); - if (get_pubkey (vpk, akid)) { - /* impossible error, we simply return a zeroed out fpr */ - n = MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN < 20? MAX_FINGERPRINT_LEN : 20; - memset (array, 0, n); - } - else - fingerprint_from_pk( vpk, array, &n ); - } - p = array; - for(i=0; i < n ; i++, p++, bufp += 2) - sprintf(bufp, "%02X", *p ); - write_status_text( STATUS_VALIDSIG, buf ); - } - free_public_key( vpk ); - } - - if( !rc ) - rc = check_signatures_trust( sig ); - - if(sig->flags.expired) - { - log_info(_("Signature expired %s\n"), - asctimestamp(sig->expiredate)); - rc=GPG_ERR_GENERAL; /* need a better error here? */ - } - else if(sig->expiredate) - log_info(_("Signature expires %s\n"),asctimestamp(sig->expiredate)); - - if(opt.verbose) - log_info(_("%s signature, digest algorithm %s\n"), - sig->sig_class==0x00?_("binary"): - sig->sig_class==0x01?_("textmode"):_("unknown"), - gcry_md_algo_name (sig->digest_algo)); - - if( rc ) - g10_errors_seen = 1; - if( opt.batch && rc ) - g10_exit(1); - } - else { - char buf[50]; - sprintf(buf, "%08lX%08lX %d %d %02x %lu %d", - (ulong)sig->keyid[0], (ulong)sig->keyid[1], - sig->pubkey_algo, sig->digest_algo, - sig->sig_class, (ulong)sig->timestamp, rc ); - write_status_text( STATUS_ERRSIG, buf ); - if( gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NO_PUBKEY ) { - buf[16] = 0; - write_status_text( STATUS_NO_PUBKEY, buf ); - } - if( rc != GPG_ERR_NOT_PROCESSED ) - log_error(_("Can't check signature: %s\n"), gpg_strerror (rc) ); - } - return rc; -} - - -/**************** - * Process the tree which starts at node - */ -static void -proc_tree( CTX c, KBNODE node ) -{ - KBNODE n1; - int rc; - - if( opt.list_packets || opt.list_only ) - return; - - /* we must skip our special plaintext marker packets here becuase - they may be the root packet. These packets are only used in - addionla checks and skipping them here doesn't matter */ - while ( node - && node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL - && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control - == CTRLPKT_PLAINTEXT_MARK ) { - node = node->next; - } - if (!node) - return; - - c->local_id = 0; - c->trustletter = ' '; - if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_KEY - || node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY ) { - merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); - list_node( c, node ); - } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SECRET_KEY ) { - merge_keys_and_selfsig( node ); - list_node( c, node ); - } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_ONEPASS_SIG ) { - /* check all signatures */ - if( !c->have_data ) { - free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); - /* prepare to create all requested message digests */ - gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, 0, 0); - - /* fixme: why looking for the signature packet and not 1passpacket*/ - for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) { - gcry_md_enable ( c->mfx.md, n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo); - } - /* ask for file and hash it */ - if( c->sigs_only ) { - rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, NULL, - c->signed_data, c->sigfilename, - n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 ); - } - else { - rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, - iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf), - n1? (n1->pkt->pkt.onepass_sig->sig_class == 0x01):0 ); - } - if( rc ) { - log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); - return; - } - } - else if ( c->signed_data ) { - log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); - return; - } - - for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) - check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); - } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_GPG_CONTROL - && node->pkt->pkt.gpg_control->control - == CTRLPKT_CLEARSIGN_START ) { - /* clear text signed message */ - if( !c->have_data ) { - log_error("cleartext signature without data\n" ); - return; - } - else if ( c->signed_data ) { - log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); - return; - } - - for( n1 = node; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )); ) - check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); - } - else if( node->pkt->pkttype == PKT_SIGNATURE ) { - PKT_signature *sig = node->pkt->pkt.signature; - int multiple_ok=1; - - n1=find_next_kbnode(node, PKT_SIGNATURE); - if(n1) - { - byte class=sig->sig_class; - byte hash=sig->digest_algo; - - for(; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE))) - { - /* We can't currently handle multiple signatures of - different classes or digests (we'd pretty much have - to run a different hash context for each), but if - they are all the same, make an exception. */ - if(n1->pkt->pkt.signature->sig_class!=class - || n1->pkt->pkt.signature->digest_algo!=hash) - { - multiple_ok=0; - log_info(_("WARNING: multiple signatures detected. " - "Only the first will be checked.\n")); - break; - } - } - } - - if( sig->sig_class != 0x00 && sig->sig_class != 0x01 ) - log_info(_("standalone signature of class 0x%02x\n"), - sig->sig_class); - else if( !c->have_data ) { - /* detached signature */ - free_md_filter_context( &c->mfx ); - gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md, sig->digest_algo, 0); - if( !opt.pgp2_workarounds ) - ; - else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_MD5 - && is_RSA( sig->pubkey_algo ) ) { - /* enable a workaround for a pgp2 bug */ - gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, DIGEST_ALGO_MD5, 0 ); - } - else if( sig->digest_algo == DIGEST_ALGO_SHA1 - && sig->pubkey_algo == PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA - && sig->sig_class == 0x01 ) { - /* enable the workaround also for pgp5 when the detached - * signature has been created in textmode */ - gcry_md_open (&c->mfx.md2, sig->digest_algo, 0 ); - } -#if 0 /* workaround disabled */ - /* Here we have another hack to work around a pgp 2 bug - * It works by not using the textmode for detached signatures; - * this will let the first signature check (on md) fail - * but the second one (on md2) which adds an extra CR should - * then produce the "correct" hash. This is very, very ugly - * hack but it may help in some cases (and break others) - */ - /* c->mfx.md2? 0 :(sig->sig_class == 0x01) */ -#endif - if ( DBG_HASHING ) { - gcry_md_start_debug ( c->mfx.md, "verify" ); - if ( c->mfx.md2 ) - gcry_md_start_debug ( c->mfx.md2, "verify2" ); - } - if( c->sigs_only ) { - rc = hash_datafiles( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, - c->signed_data, c->sigfilename, - (sig->sig_class == 0x01) ); - } - else { - rc = ask_for_detached_datafile( c->mfx.md, c->mfx.md2, - iobuf_get_real_fname(c->iobuf), - (sig->sig_class == 0x01) ); - } - if( rc ) { - log_error("can't hash datafile: %s\n", gpg_strerror (rc)); - return; - } - } - else if ( c->signed_data ) { - log_error (_("not a detached signature\n") ); - return; - } - else if ( c->pipemode.op == 'B' ) - ; /* this is a detached signature trough the pipemode handler */ - else if (!opt.quiet) - log_info(_("old style (PGP 2.x) signature\n")); - - if(multiple_ok) - for( n1 = node; n1; (n1 = find_next_kbnode(n1, PKT_SIGNATURE )) ) - check_sig_and_print( c, n1 ); - else - check_sig_and_print( c, node ); - } - else { - dump_kbnode (c->list); - log_error(_("invalid root packet detected in proc_tree()\n")); - dump_kbnode (node); - } -} |