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Diffstat (limited to 'g10/ChangeLog')
-rw-r--r-- | g10/ChangeLog | 65 |
1 files changed, 65 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog index 4dbd64c12..ccdc0f98e 100644 --- a/g10/ChangeLog +++ b/g10/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,68 @@ +2002-02-28 David Shaw <[email protected]> + + * getkey.c (check_revocation_keys): New function to check a + revocation against a list of potential revocation keys. Note the + loop-breaking code here. This is to prevent blowing up if A is + B's revocation key, while B is also A's. Note also that this is + written so that a revoked revoker can still issue revocations: + i.e. If A revokes B, but A is revoked, B is still revoked. I'm + not completely convinced this is the proper behavior, but it + matches how PGP does it. It does at least have the advantage of + much simpler code - my first version of this had lots of loop + maintaining code so you could chain revokers many levels deep and + if D was revoked, C was not, which meant that B was, and so on. + It was sort of scary, actually. + + * getkey.c (merge_selfsigs_main): Add any revocation keys onto the + pk. This is particularly interesting since we normally only get + data from the most recent 1F signature, but you need multiple 1F + sigs to properly handle revocation keys (PGP does it this way, and + a revocation key could be marked "sensitive" and hence in a + different signature). Also, if a pk has a revocation key set, + check for revocation sigs that were not made by us - if made by a + valid revocation key, mark the pk revoked. + + * packet.h, getkey.c (cache_public_key): do not cache key if + "dont_cache" is set. This allows the revocation key code to look + up a key and return information that may be inaccurate to prevent + loops without caching the fake data. + + * packet.h, sig-check.c (do_signature_check): Record if a + signature was made by a revoked pk. + + * packet.h, parse-packet.c (parse_one_sig_subpkt, + can_handle_critical, parse_signature): Get revocation key + information out of direct sigs. + + * keylist.c (list_keyblock_print): don't assume that the presence + of a 0x20 signature means the key is revoked. With revocation + keys, this may not be true if the revocation key is not around to + verify it or if verification failed. Also, 0x1F should get listed + as "sig", and not "unexpected signature class". + + * keyedit.c (show_key_with_all_names): Add a flag for printing + revoker information and change all callers. + + * import.c (merge_blocks): merge in any new direct key (0x1F) + sigs. + + * import.c (import_revoke_cert): don't keep processing after a + revocation is rejected. + + * import.c (delete_inv_parts): Allow importing a revocation + signature even if it was not issued by the key. This allows a + revocation key to issue it. Of course, the sig still needs to be + checked before we trust it. + + * free-packet.c (copy_public_key): Include a new copy of the + revocation keys when duping a pk. + + * free-packet.c (free_seckey_enc, release_public_key_parts): Free + any revocation keys that are attached to a sig or pk. + + * export.c (do_export_stream): Do not export signatures with + "sensitive" revocation keys in them. + 2002-02-27 David Shaw <[email protected]> * export.c (do_export_stream): Do not include v3 keys in a |