diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/gpgsm.texi')
| -rw-r--r-- | doc/gpgsm.texi | 48 |
1 files changed, 24 insertions, 24 deletions
diff --git a/doc/gpgsm.texi b/doc/gpgsm.texi index 0de3daf4d..bdb03783e 100644 --- a/doc/gpgsm.texi +++ b/doc/gpgsm.texi @@ -304,7 +304,7 @@ and to change the default configuration. * Certificate Options:: Certificate related options. * Input and Output:: Input and Output. * CMS Options:: How to change how the CMS is created. -* Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually don't want to do. +* Esoteric Options:: Doing things one usually do not want to do. @end menu @@ -346,14 +346,14 @@ Change the default name of the policy file to @var{filename}. Specify an agent program to be used for secret key operations. The default value is the @file{/usr/local/bin/gpg-agent}. This is only used as a fallback when the environment variable @code{GPG_AGENT_INFO} is not -set or a running agent can't be connected. +set or a running agent cannot be connected. @item --dirmngr-program @var{file} @opindex dirmnr-program Specify a dirmngr program to be used for @acronym{CRL} checks. The default value is @file{/usr/sbin/dirmngr}. This is only used as a fallback when the environment variable @code{DIRMNGR_INFO} is not set or -a running dirmngr can't be connected. +a running dirmngr cannot be connected. @item --prefer-system-dirmngr @opindex prefer-system-dirmngr @@ -367,7 +367,7 @@ Entirely disable the use of the Dirmngr. @item --no-secmem-warning @opindex no-secmem-warning -Don't print a warning when the so called "secure memory" can't be used. +Do not print a warning when the so called "secure memory" cannot be used. @item --log-file @var{file} @opindex log-file @@ -407,7 +407,7 @@ By default the @acronym{CRL} for trusted root certificates are checked like for any other certificates. This allows a CA to revoke its own certificates voluntary without the need of putting all ever issued certificates into a CRL. The disable option may be used to switch this -extra check off. Due to the caching done by the Dirmngr, there won't be +extra check off. Due to the caching done by the Dirmngr, there will not be any noticeable performance gain. Note, that this also disables possible OCSP checks for trusted root certificates. A more specific way of disabling this check is by adding the ``relax'' keyword to the root CA @@ -428,12 +428,12 @@ command. This option should not be used in a configuration file. @itemx --disable-ocsp @opindex enable-ocsp @opindex disable-ocsp -Be default @acronym{OCSP} checks are disabled. The enable option may +By default @acronym{OCSP} checks are disabled. The enable option may be used to enable OCSP checks via Dirmngr. If @acronym{CRL} checks are also enabled, CRLs will be used as a fallback if for some reason an -OCSP request won't succeed. Note, that you have to allow OCSP +OCSP request will not succeed. Note, that you have to allow OCSP requests in Dirmngr's configuration too (option -@option{--allow-ocsp} and configure dirmngr properly. If you don't do +@option{--allow-ocsp}) and configure Dirmngr properly. If you do not do so you will get the error code @samp{Not supported}. @item --auto-issuer-key-retrieve @@ -451,10 +451,11 @@ address and the time when you verified the signature. @item --validation-model @var{name} @opindex validation-model This option changes the default validation model. The only possible -values are "shell" (which is the default) and "chain" which forces the -use of the chain model. The chain model is also used if an option in -the @file{trustlist.txt} or an attribute of the certificate requests it. -However the standard model (shell) is in that case always tried first. +values are "shell" (which is the default), "chain" which forces the +use of the chain model and "steed" for a new simplified model. The +chain model is also used if an option in the @file{trustlist.txt} or +an attribute of the certificate requests it. However the standard +model (shell) is in that case always tried first. @item --ignore-cert-extension @var{oid} @opindex ignore-cert-extension @@ -463,7 +464,7 @@ Add @var{oid} to the list of ignored certificate extensions. The @code{2.5.29.3}. This option may be used more than once. Critical flagged certificate extensions matching one of the OIDs in the list are treated as if they are actually handled and thus the certificate -won't be rejected due to an unknown critical extension. Use this +will not be rejected due to an unknown critical extension. Use this option with care because extensions are usually flagged as critical for a reason. @@ -479,7 +480,6 @@ for a reason. @item --armor @itemx -a @opindex armor -@opindex -a Create PEM encoded output. Default is binary output. @item --base64 @@ -506,7 +506,7 @@ Assume the input data is binary encoded. PKCS#12 files. This option may be used to force the passphrase to be encoded in the specified encoding @var{name}. This is useful if the application used to import the key uses a different encoding and thus -won't be able to import a file generated by @command{gpgsm}. Commonly +will not be able to import a file generated by @command{gpgsm}. Commonly used values for @var{name} are @code{Latin1} and @code{CP850}. Note that @command{gpgsm} itself automagically imports any file with a passphrase encoded to the most commonly used encodings. @@ -523,7 +523,6 @@ set; however @option{--default-key} always overrides this. @item --local-user @var{user_id} @item -u @var{user_id} @opindex local-user -@opindex -u Set the user(s) to be used for signing. The default is the first secret key found in the database. @@ -605,7 +604,7 @@ interoperability problems. @c ******** ESOTERIC OPTIONS *************** @c ******************************************* @node Esoteric Options -@subsection Doing things one usually don't want to do. +@subsection Doing things one usually do not want to do. @table @gnupgtabopt @@ -954,7 +953,7 @@ of af a transfer error, a program error or tampering with the message). @end table @item Error verifying a signature -For some reason the signature could not be verified, i.e. it can't be +For some reason the signature could not be verified, i.e. it cannot be decided whether the signature is valid or invalid. A common reason for this is a missing certificate. @@ -1044,9 +1043,9 @@ already existing key. Key-Length will be ignored when given. @item Key-Usage: @var{usage-list} Space or comma delimited list of key usage, allowed values are -@samp{encrypt} and @samp{sign}. This is used to generate the keyUsage -extension. Please make sure that the algorithm is capable of this -usage. Default is to allow encrypt and sign. +@samp{encrypt}, @samp{sign} and @samp{cert}. This is used to generate +the keyUsage extension. Please make sure that the algorithm is +capable of this usage. Default is to allow encrypt and sign. @item Name-DN: @var{subject-name} This is the Distinguished Name (DN) of the subject in RFC-2253 format. @@ -1158,7 +1157,7 @@ Set the recipient for the encryption. @var{userID} should be the internal representation of the key; the server may accept any other way of specification. If this is a valid and trusted recipient the server does respond with OK, otherwise the return is an ERR with the reason why -the recipient can't be used, the encryption will then not be done for +the recipient cannot be used, the encryption will then not be done for this recipient. If the policy is not to encrypt at all if not all recipients are valid, the client has to take care of this. All @code{RECIPIENT} commands are cumulative until a @code{RESET} or an @@ -1206,7 +1205,8 @@ It takes the plaintext from the @code{INPUT} command, writes to the ciphertext to the file descriptor set with the @code{OUTPUT} command, take the recipients from all the recipients set so far. If this command fails the clients should try to delete all output currently done or -otherwise mark it as invalid. @command{GPGSM} does ensure that there won't be any +otherwise mark it as invalid. @command{GPGSM} does ensure that there +will not be any security problem with leftover data on the output in this case. This command should in general not fail, as all necessary checks have @@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ to the signer's key. @var{userID} should be the internal representation of the key; the server may accept any other way of specification. If this is a valid and trusted recipient the server does respond with OK, otherwise the return is an ERR with the reason why -the key can't be used, the signature will then not be created using +the key cannot be used, the signature will then not be created using this key. If the policy is not to sign at all if not all keys are valid, the client has to take care of this. All @code{SIGNER} commands are cumulative until a @code{RESET} is done. |