diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'agent')
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/ChangeLog | 129 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/agent.h | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/cvt-openpgp.c | 97 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/findkey.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/gpg-agent.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/pksign.c | 27 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | agent/protect.c | 172 |
7 files changed, 272 insertions, 174 deletions
diff --git a/agent/ChangeLog b/agent/ChangeLog index 542695bea..c022852e8 100644 --- a/agent/ChangeLog +++ b/agent/ChangeLog @@ -1,7 +1,42 @@ +2011-02-03 Werner Koch <[email protected]> + + * protect.c (protect_info): Support ECC algos. + + * pksign.c (do_encode_dsa): Map public key algo number. Extend + DSA size check for ECDSA. + + * gpg-agent.c: Include cipher.h. + (map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry): New. + + * findkey.c (key_parms_from_sexp): Support ECDH. + + * cvt-openpgp.c (get_keygrip): Support ECC algorithms. + (convert_secret_key): Ditto. + (do_unprotect): Ditto. + +2011-02-02 Werner Koch <[email protected]> + + * cvt-openpgp.c (convert_secret_key): Remove algo mapping. + +2011-01-31 Werner Koch <[email protected]> + + * cvt-openpgp.c (convert_to_openpgp): Adjust to reverted Libgcrypt + ABI. + + * protect.c (protect_info): Adjust ECDSA and ECDH parameter names. + Add "ecc". + * findkey.c (key_parms_from_sexp): Ditto. + 2011-01-19 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * trustlist.c (read_one_trustfile): Also chop an CR. +2011-01-21 Werner Koch <[email protected]> + + * pksign.c (do_encode_dsa): Compare MDLEN to bytes. + + * cvt-openpgp.c (GCRY_PK_ECDH) [!HAVE_GCRY_PK_ECDH]: New. + 2010-12-02 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * gpg-agent.c (CHECK_OWN_SOCKET_INTERVAL) [W32CE]: Set to 60 @@ -510,7 +545,7 @@ * genkey.c (agent_protect_and_store): Return RC and not 0. * protect.c (do_encryption): Fix ignored error code from malloc. Reported by Fabian Keil. - + 2009-06-17 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * call-pinentry.c (agent_get_confirmation): Add arg WITH_CANCEL. @@ -534,7 +569,7 @@ * trustlist.c: Include estream.h. (agent_marktrusted): Replace stdio stream by estream functions. - * protect-tool.c (store_private_key): Use bin2hex. + * protect-tool.c (store_private_key): Use bin2hex. 2009-06-02 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -548,7 +583,7 @@ 2009-05-15 Werner Koch <[email protected]> Fix bug #1053. - + * agent.h (lookup_ttl_t): New. * findkey.c (unprotect): Add arg LOOKUP_TTL. (agent_key_from_file): Ditto. @@ -626,7 +661,7 @@ (agent_istrusted): Add arg R_DISABLED. Change all callers. (agent_marktrusted): Do not ask if flagged as disabled. Reverse the order of the questions. Store the disabled flag. - + * gpg-agent.c (main): Save signal mask and open fds. Restore mask and close all fds prior to the exec. Fixes bug#1013. @@ -737,11 +772,11 @@ * command.c (cmd_geteventcounter): Mark unused arg. (cmd_listtrusted, cmd_pksign, cmd_pkdecrypt, cmd_genkey): Ditto. (cmd_updatestartuptty, post_cmd_notify): Ditto. - * command-ssh.c (add_control_entry) - (ssh_handler_request_identities, ssh_handler_remove_identity) - (ssh_handler_remove_all_identities, ssh_handler_lock) + * command-ssh.c (add_control_entry) + (ssh_handler_request_identities, ssh_handler_remove_identity) + (ssh_handler_remove_all_identities, ssh_handler_lock) (ssh_handler_unlock): Ditto. - * call-pinentry.c (pinentry_active_p, popup_message_thread) + * call-pinentry.c (pinentry_active_p, popup_message_thread) (agent_popup_message_stop): Ditto. * findkey.c (agent_public_key_from_file): Ditto. * genkey.c (check_passphrase_pattern): Ditto. @@ -860,7 +895,7 @@ * agent.h (struct server_control_s): Add XAUTHORITY and PINENTRY_USER_DATA. * gpg-agent.c: New option --xauthority. - (main, agent_init_default_ctrl) + (main, agent_init_default_ctrl) (agent_deinit_default_ctrl): Implemented * command.c (cmd_updatestartuptty): Ditto. * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): Ditto. @@ -1020,7 +1055,7 @@ 2007-06-21 Werner Koch <[email protected]> - * agent.h (ctrl_t): Remove. It is now declared in ../common/util.h. + * agent.h (ctrl_t): Remove. It is now declared in ../common/util.h. * gpg-agent.c (check_for_running_agent): New arg SILENT. Changed all callers. @@ -1053,7 +1088,7 @@ * preset-passphrase.c (main): Setup default socket name for simple-pwquery. (map_spwq_error): Remove. - (MAP_SPWQ_ERROR_IMPL): New. + (MAP_SPWQ_ERROR_IMPL): New. * call-pinentry.c (start_pinentry): Use gnupg_module_name. * call-scd.c (start_scd): Ditto. @@ -1115,7 +1150,7 @@ (main): Call the setup_libgcrypt_logging helper. * protect-tool.c (my_gcry_logger): Removed. (main): Call the setup_libgcrypt_logging helper. - + 2007-04-03 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * trustlist.c (read_trustfiles): Take a missing trustlist as an @@ -1123,7 +1158,7 @@ 2007-03-20 Werner Koch <[email protected]> - * protect-tool.c: New option --p12-charset. + * protect-tool.c: New option --p12-charset. * minip12.c (p12_build): Implement it. 2007-03-19 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -1158,7 +1193,7 @@ 2007-01-31 Werner Koch <[email protected]> - * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): + * command-ssh.c (start_command_handler_ssh): * Makefile.am (t_common_ldadd): Add LIBICONV. @@ -1286,7 +1321,7 @@ (agent_pksign_do): Use it here for the TLS algo. * agent.h (GCRY_MD_USER_TLS_MD5SHA1): New. * divert-scd.c (pksign): Add case for tls-md5sha1. - + * divert-scd.c (encode_md_for_card): Check that the algo is valid. 2006-10-04 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -1356,7 +1391,7 @@ Replaced all Assuan error codes by libgpg-error codes. Removed all map_to_assuan_status and map_assuan_err. - + * gpg-agent.c (main): Call assuan_set_assuan_err_source to have Assuan switch to gpg-error codes. * command.c (set_error): Adjusted. @@ -1400,7 +1435,7 @@ * minip12.c (oid_pkcs_12_keyBag): New. (parse_bag_encrypted_data): New arg R_RESULT. Support keybags and - return the key object. + return the key object. (p12_parse): Take new arg into account. Free RESULT on error. 2006-06-26 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -1468,7 +1503,7 @@ * call-scd.c (inq_needpin): Reworked to support the new KEYPADINFO. * query.c (start_pinentry): Keep track of the owner. - (popup_message_thread, agent_popup_message_start) + (popup_message_thread, agent_popup_message_start) (agent_popup_message_stop, agent_reset_query): New. * command.c (start_command_handler): Make sure a popup window gets closed. @@ -1519,7 +1554,7 @@ 2005-06-21 Werner Koch <[email protected]> - * minip12.c (create_final): Cast size_t to ulong for printf. + * minip12.c (create_final): Cast size_t to ulong for printf. (build_key_bag, build_cert_bag, build_cert_sequence): Ditto. 2005-06-16 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -1534,7 +1569,7 @@ * protect.c (do_encryption): Ditto. (do_encryption): Made arg PROTBEGIN unsigned. Initialize RESULT and RESULTLEN even on error. - (merge_lists): Need to cast unsigned char * for strcpy. Initialize + (merge_lists): Need to cast unsigned char * for strcpy. Initialize RESULTand RESULTLEN even on error. (agent_unprotect): Likewise for strtoul. (make_shadow_info): Made P and INFO plain char. @@ -1594,7 +1629,7 @@ * command.c (cmd_updatestartuptty): New. * gpg-agent.c: New option --write-env-file. - + * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Make sure that the signals we are handling are not blocked.Block signals while creating new threads. @@ -1864,8 +1899,8 @@ (make_cstring): Ditto. (data_sign): Don't use a variable for the passphrase prompt, make it translatable. - (ssh_request_process): - + (ssh_request_process): + * findkey.c (modify_description): Renamed arguments for clarity, polished documentation. Make comment a C-string. Fixed case of @@ -1991,7 +2026,7 @@ 2004-12-21 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * gpg-agent.c (main): Use default_homedir(). - * protect-tool.c (main): Ditto. + * protect-tool.c (main): Ditto. 2004-12-20 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -2017,7 +2052,7 @@ * query.c (initialize_module_query): New. * call-scd.c (initialize_module_call_scd): New. * gpg-agent.c (main): Call them. - + 2004-12-18 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * gpg-agent.c (main): Remove special Pth initialize. @@ -2069,10 +2104,10 @@ to Moritz for pointing this out. 2004-09-25 Moritz Schulte <[email protected]> - + * agent.h: Declare: agent_pksign_do. (struct server_control_s): New member: raw_value. - + * pksign.c (do_encode_md): New argument: raw_value; support generation of raw (non-pkcs1) data objects; adjust callers. (agent_pksign_do): New function, based on code ripped @@ -2080,7 +2115,7 @@ (agent_pksign): Use agent_pksign_do. * command.c (start_command_handler): Set ctrl.digest.raw_value. - + 2004-09-09 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * gpg-agent.c (check_for_running_agent): New. @@ -2121,14 +2156,14 @@ * gpg-agent.c (handle_signal): Reload the trustlist on SIGHUP. (start_connection_thread): Hack to simulate a ticker. - * trustlist.c (agent_trustlist_housekeeping) + * trustlist.c (agent_trustlist_housekeeping) (agent_reload_trustlist): New. Protected all global functions here with a simple counter which is sufficient for Pth. 2004-05-03 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * gpg-agent.c: Remove help texts for options lile --lc-ctype. - (main): New option --allow-mark-trusted. + (main): New option --allow-mark-trusted. * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Use it here. 2004-04-30 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -2201,7 +2236,7 @@ string. Changed all callers. * minip12.c: Revamped the build part. - (p12_build): New args CERT and CERTLEN. + (p12_build): New args CERT and CERTLEN. 2004-02-18 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -2295,7 +2330,7 @@ * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Now return an error code so that we have more detailed error messages in the upper layers. - This fixes the handling of pinentry's cancel button. + This fixes the handling of pinentry's cancel button. * pksign.c (agent_pksign): Changed accordingly. * pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Ditto. * command.c (cmd_passwd): Ditto. @@ -2322,12 +2357,12 @@ * pksign.c (do_encode_md): Allocate enough space. Cast md byte to unsigned char to prevent sign extension. - + 2003-08-14 Timo Schulz <[email protected]> * pksign.c (do_encode_md): Due to the fact pkcs#1 padding is now in Libgcrypt, use the new interface. - + 2003-07-31 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * Makefile.am (gpg_agent_LDADD): Added INTLLIBS. @@ -2377,7 +2412,7 @@ * gpg-agent.c (handle_connections): Adjusted for Pth 2.0 Adjusted for changes in the libgcrypt API. Some more fixes for the - libgpg-error stuff. + libgpg-error stuff. 2003-06-04 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -2456,11 +2491,11 @@ (agent_askpin,agent_get_passphrase,agent_get_confirmation): Add CTRL arg and pass it ot start_pinentry. * command.c (cmd_get_passphrase): Pass CTRL argument. - * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Add CTRL argument + * trustlist.c (agent_marktrusted): Add CTRL argument * command.c (cmd_marktrusted): Pass CTRL argument - * divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): Add CTRL arg. + * divert-scd.c (ask_for_card): Add CTRL arg. (divert_pksign,divert_pkdecrypt): Ditto. Changed caller. - (getpin_cb): Use OPAQUE to pass the CTRL variable. Changed both + (getpin_cb): Use OPAQUE to pass the CTRL variable. Changed both users. * findkey.c (unprotect): Add CTRL arg. (agent_key_from_file): Ditto. @@ -2695,7 +2730,7 @@ convert it to hex here. * findkey.c (agent_write_private_key): New. * genkey.c (store_key): And use it here. - + * pkdecrypt.c (agent_pkdecrypt): Changed the way the diversion is done. * divert-scd.c (divert_pkdecrypt): Changed interface and implemented it. @@ -2725,7 +2760,7 @@ * protect.c (snext,sskip,smatch): Moved to * sexp-parse.h: New file. * divert-scd.c: New. - + 2002-02-27 Werner Koch <[email protected]> * protect.c (agent_shadow_key): New. @@ -2753,7 +2788,7 @@ * gpg-agent.c: New option --default-cache-ttl. * cache.c (agent_put_cache): Use it. - + * cache.c: Add a few debug outputs. * protect.c (agent_private_key_type): New. @@ -2761,10 +2796,10 @@ * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file): Use it to decide whether we have to unprotect a key. (unprotect): Cache the passphrase. - + * findkey.c (agent_key_from_file,agent_key_available): The key files do now require a ".key" suffix to make a script's life - easier. + easier. * genkey.c (store_key): Ditto. 2002-01-31 Werner Koch <[email protected]> @@ -2772,11 +2807,11 @@ * genkey.c (store_key): Protect the key. (agent_genkey): Ask for the passphrase. * findkey.c (unprotect): Actually unprotect the key. - * query.c (agent_askpin): Add an optional start_err_text. + * query.c (agent_askpin): Add an optional start_err_text. 2002-01-30 Werner Koch <[email protected]> - * protect.c: New. + * protect.c: New. (hash_passphrase): Based on the GnuPG 1.0.6 version. * protect-tool.c: New @@ -2830,10 +2865,10 @@ * command.c (rc_to_assuan_status): Removed and changed all callers to use map_to_assuan_status. - + 2001-12-19 Werner Koch <[email protected]> - * keyformat.txt: New. + * keyformat.txt: New. 2001-12-19 Marcus Brinkmann <[email protected]> diff --git a/agent/agent.h b/agent/agent.h index 7716bb0c2..e31b6a78e 100644 --- a/agent/agent.h +++ b/agent/agent.h @@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ const char *get_agent_ssh_socket_name (void); void *get_agent_scd_notify_event (void); #endif void agent_sighup_action (void); +int map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (int openpgp_algo); /*-- command.c --*/ gpg_error_t agent_inq_pinentry_launched (ctrl_t ctrl, unsigned long pid); diff --git a/agent/cvt-openpgp.c b/agent/cvt-openpgp.c index e6a14c436..690459330 100644 --- a/agent/cvt-openpgp.c +++ b/agent/cvt-openpgp.c @@ -28,9 +28,16 @@ #include "i18n.h" #include "cvt-openpgp.h" +/* Macros for compatibility with older libgcrypt versions. */ +#ifndef HAVE_GCRY_PK_ECDSA +# define GCRY_PK_ECDH 302 +#endif + + + /* Helper to pass data via the callback to do_unprotect. */ -struct try_do_unprotect_arg_s +struct try_do_unprotect_arg_s { int is_v4; int is_protected; @@ -80,6 +87,14 @@ get_keygrip (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, unsigned char *grip) "(public-key(rsa(n%m)(e%m)))", pkey[0], pkey[1]); break; + case GCRY_PK_ECDSA: + case GCRY_PK_ECDH: + err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL, + "(public-key(ecc(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)(q%m)))", + pkey[0], pkey[1], pkey[2], pkey[3], pkey[4], + pkey[5]); + break; + default: err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); break; @@ -94,7 +109,8 @@ get_keygrip (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, unsigned char *grip) /* Convert a secret key given as algorithm id and an array of key - parameters into our s-expression based format. */ + parameters into our s-expression based format. Note that + PUBKEY_ALGO has an gcrypt algorithm number. */ static gpg_error_t convert_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey) { @@ -128,6 +144,18 @@ convert_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey) skey[5]); break; + case GCRY_PK_ECDSA: + case GCRY_PK_ECDH: + /* Although our code would work with "ecc" we explicitly use + "ecdh" or "ecdsa" to implicitly set the key capabilities. */ + err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_skey, NULL, + "(private-key(%s(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)(q%m)" + "(d%m)))", + pubkey_algo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA?"ecdsa":"ecdh", + skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3], skey[4], + skey[5], skey[6]); + break; + default: err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); break; @@ -154,7 +182,7 @@ hash_passphrase_and_set_key (const char *passphrase, keylen = gcry_cipher_get_algo_keylen (protect_algo); if (!keylen) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL); - + key = xtrymalloc_secure (keylen); if (!key) return gpg_error_from_syserror (); @@ -174,7 +202,7 @@ static u16 checksum (const unsigned char *p, unsigned int n) { u16 a; - + for (a=0; n; n-- ) a += *p++; return a; @@ -202,6 +230,10 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, *r_key = NULL; + /* Unfortunately, the OpenPGP PK algorithm numbers need to be + re-mapped for Libgcrypt. */ + pubkey_algo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (pubkey_algo); + /* Count the actual number of MPIs is in the array and set the remainder to NULL for easier processing later on. */ for (skeylen = 0; skey[skeylen]; skeylen++) @@ -219,9 +251,6 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, if (gcry_pk_test_algo (pubkey_algo)) { - /* The algorithm numbers are Libgcrypt numbers but fortunately - the OpenPGP algorithm numbers map one-to-one to the Libgcrypt - numbers. */ log_info (_("public key algorithm %d (%s) is not supported\n"), pubkey_algo, gcry_pk_algo_name (pubkey_algo)); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO); @@ -241,7 +270,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE); if (nskey+1 >= skeysize) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BUFFER_TOO_SHORT); - + /* Check whether SKEY is at all protected. If it is not protected merely verify the checksum. */ if (!is_protected) @@ -253,7 +282,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, { if (!skey[i] || gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE)) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); - + err = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, NULL, 0, &nbytes, skey[i]); if (!err) { @@ -270,7 +299,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, if (err) return err; } - + if (actual_csum != desired_csum) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_CHECKSUM); return 0; @@ -293,7 +322,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, s2k_algo, gcry_md_algo_name (s2k_algo)); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_DIGEST_ALGO); } - + err = gcry_cipher_open (&cipher_hd, protect_algo, GCRY_CIPHER_MODE_CFB, (GCRY_CIPHER_SECURE @@ -312,10 +341,10 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, { gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd); return err; - } + } gcry_cipher_setiv (cipher_hd, protect_iv, protect_ivlen); - + actual_csum = 0; if (pkt_version >= 4) { @@ -348,15 +377,15 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, { /* This is the new SHA1 checksum method to detect tampering with the key as used by the Klima/Rosa attack. */ - desired_csum = 0; + desired_csum = 0; actual_csum = 1; /* Default to bad checksum. */ - if (ndata < 20) + if (ndata < 20) log_error ("not enough bytes for SHA-1 checksum\n"); - else + else { gcry_md_hd_t h; - + if (gcry_md_open (&h, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 1)) BUG(); /* Algo not available. */ gcry_md_write (h, data, ndata - 20); @@ -366,13 +395,13 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, gcry_md_close (h); } } - else + else { /* Old 16 bit checksum method. */ if (ndata < 2) { log_error ("not enough bytes for checksum\n"); - desired_csum = 0; + desired_csum = 0; actual_csum = 1; /* Mark checksum bad. */ } else @@ -386,7 +415,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, } } } - + /* Better check it here. Otherwise the gcry_mpi_scan would fail because the length may have an arbitrary value. */ if (desired_csum == actual_csum) @@ -437,7 +466,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); } - + buffer = xtrymalloc_secure (ndata); if (!buffer) { @@ -445,7 +474,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase, gcry_cipher_close (cipher_hd); return err; } - + gcry_cipher_sync (cipher_hd); buffer[0] = p[0]; buffer[1] = p[1]; @@ -526,7 +555,7 @@ try_do_unprotect_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi) pointed to by GRIP. On error NULL is stored at all return arguments. */ gpg_error_t -convert_from_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, +convert_from_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, unsigned char *grip, const char *prompt, const char *cache_nonce, unsigned char **r_key, char **r_passphrase) @@ -594,7 +623,7 @@ convert_from_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, if (!protect_algo && !!strcmp (string, "IDEA")) protect_algo = GCRY_CIPHER_IDEA; xfree (string); - + value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 3, &valuelen); if (!value || !valuelen || valuelen > sizeof iv) goto bad_seckey; @@ -817,7 +846,7 @@ convert_from_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp, bad_seckey: err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY); goto leave; - + outofmem: err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ENOMEM); goto leave; @@ -843,13 +872,13 @@ key_from_sexp (gcry_sexp_t sexp, const char *elems, gcry_mpi_t *array) } array[idx] = gcry_sexp_nth_mpi (l2, 1, GCRYMPI_FMT_USG); gcry_sexp_release (l2); - if (!array[idx]) + if (!array[idx]) { err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); /* Required parameter invalid. */ goto leave; } } - + leave: if (err) { @@ -997,7 +1026,7 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase, gcry_sexp_release (list); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_OBJ); /* Invalid structure of object. */ } - + algo = gcry_pk_map_name (name); xfree (name); @@ -1008,6 +1037,7 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase, case GCRY_PK_ELG_E: algoname = "elg"; npkey = 3; elems = "pgyx"; break; case GCRY_PK_DSA: algoname = "dsa"; npkey = 4; elems = "pqgyx"; break; case GCRY_PK_ECDSA: algoname = "ecdsa"; npkey = 6; elems = "pabgnqd"; break; + case GCRY_PK_ECDH: algoname = "ecdh"; npkey = 6; elems = "pabgnqd"; break; default: algoname = ""; npkey = 0; elems = NULL; break; } assert (!elems || strlen (elems) < DIM (array) ); @@ -1037,10 +1067,10 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase, int format_args_buf_int[1]; void *format_args[10+2]; size_t n; - gcry_sexp_t tmpkey, tmpsexp; - + gcry_sexp_t tmpkey, tmpsexp = NULL; + snprintf (countbuf, sizeof countbuf, "%lu", s2k_count); - + init_membuf (&mbuf, 50); put_membuf_str (&mbuf, "(skey"); for (i=j=0; i < npkey; i++) @@ -1073,7 +1103,7 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase, " %S\n" " (protection sha1 aes %b 1:3 sha1 %b %s))\n", algoname, - tmpkey, + tmpkey, (int)sizeof protect_iv, protect_iv, (int)sizeof salt, salt, countbuf); @@ -1085,7 +1115,6 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase, for (i=0; i < DIM (array); i++) gcry_mpi_release (array[i]); - + return err; } - diff --git a/agent/findkey.c b/agent/findkey.c index 91fb8c14c..108146693 100644 --- a/agent/findkey.c +++ b/agent/findkey.c @@ -726,6 +726,16 @@ key_parms_from_sexp (gcry_sexp_t s_key, gcry_sexp_t *r_list, algoname = "dsa"; elems = "pqgy"; } + else if (n==5 && !memcmp (name, "ecdsa", 5)) + { + algoname = "ecdsa"; + elems = "pabgnq"; + } + else if (n==4 && !memcmp (name, "ecdh", 4)) + { + algoname = "ecdh"; + elems = "pabgnq"; + } else if (n==3 && !memcmp (name, "elg", 3)) { algoname = "elg"; diff --git a/agent/gpg-agent.c b/agent/gpg-agent.c index ca150b471..db9039278 100644 --- a/agent/gpg-agent.c +++ b/agent/gpg-agent.c @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ #include "gc-opt-flags.h" #include "exechelp.h" #include "asshelp.h" +#include "../include/cipher.h" /* for PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA, PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH */ enum cmd_and_opt_values { aNull = 0, @@ -2301,3 +2302,12 @@ check_for_running_agent (int silent, int mode) assuan_release (ctx); return 0; } + +/* TODO: it is also in misc, which is not linked with the agent */ +/* FIXME: The agent should not know about openpgp internals - weel + except for some stuff in cvt-openpgp. */ +int +map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (int algo) +{ + return (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDSA ? GCRY_PK_ECDSA : (algo==PUBKEY_ALGO_ECDH ? GCRY_PK_ECDH : algo)); +} diff --git a/agent/pksign.c b/agent/pksign.c index ac5f4e1a0..0414bc347 100644 --- a/agent/pksign.c +++ b/agent/pksign.c @@ -113,18 +113,21 @@ get_dsa_qbits (gcry_sexp_t key) /* Encode a message digest for use with an DSA algorithm. */ static gpg_error_t -do_encode_dsa (const byte * md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey, +do_encode_dsa (const byte *md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey, gcry_sexp_t *r_hash) { gpg_error_t err; gcry_sexp_t hash; unsigned int qbits; + int pkalgo; *r_hash = NULL; - if (dsaalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA) + pkalgo = map_pk_openpgp_to_gcry (dsaalgo); + + if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_ECDSA) qbits = gcry_pk_get_nbits (pkey); - else if (dsaalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA) + else if (pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA) qbits = get_dsa_qbits (pkey); else return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_WRONG_PUBKEY_ALGO); @@ -143,20 +146,28 @@ do_encode_dsa (const byte * md, size_t mdlen, int dsaalgo, gcry_sexp_t pkey, if (qbits < 160) { log_error (_("%s key uses an unsafe (%u bit) hash\n"), - gcry_pk_algo_name (dsaalgo), qbits); + gcry_pk_algo_name (pkalgo), qbits); return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH); } /* Check if we're too short. Too long is safe as we'll - automatically left-truncate. */ - if (mdlen < qbits/8) + * automatically left-truncate. + * + * This check would require the use of SHA512 with ECDSA 512. I + * think this is overkill to fail in this case. Therefore, relax + * the check, but only for ECDSA keys. We may need to adjust it + * later for general case. (Note that the check is really a bug for + * ECDSA 521 as the only hash that matches it is SHA 512, but 512 < + * 521 ). + */ + if (mdlen < ((pkalgo==GCRY_PK_ECDSA && qbits > 521) ? 512 : qbits)/8) { log_error (_("a %zu bit hash is not valid for a %u bit %s key\n"), mdlen*8, gcry_pk_get_nbits (pkey), - gcry_pk_algo_name (dsaalgo)); + gcry_pk_algo_name (pkalgo)); /* FIXME: we need to check the requirements for ECDSA. */ - if (mdlen < 20 || dsaalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA) + if (mdlen < 20 || pkalgo == GCRY_PK_DSA) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_LENGTH); } diff --git a/agent/protect.c b/agent/protect.c index 795d06231..94de89311 100644 --- a/agent/protect.c +++ b/agent/protect.c @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /* protect.c - Un/Protect a secret key * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, - * 2003, 2007, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc. + * 2003, 2007, 2009, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. * * This file is part of GnuPG. * @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ /* A table containing the information needed to create a protected - private key */ + private key. */ static struct { const char *algo; const char *parmlist; @@ -52,6 +52,9 @@ static struct { { "rsa", "nedpqu", 2, 5 }, { "dsa", "pqgyx", 4, 4 }, { "elg", "pgyx", 3, 3 }, + { "ecdsa","pabgnqd", 6, 6 }, + { "ecdh", "pabgnqd", 6, 6 }, + { "ecc", "pabgnqd", 6, 6 }, { NULL } }; @@ -82,14 +85,14 @@ calibrate_get_time (struct calibrate_time_s *data) #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM # ifdef HAVE_W32CE_SYSTEM GetThreadTimes (GetCurrentThread (), -# else +# else GetProcessTimes (GetCurrentProcess (), # endif &data->creation_time, &data->exit_time, &data->kernel_time, &data->user_time); #else struct tms tmp; - + times (&tmp); data->ticks = tmp.tms_utime; #endif @@ -100,12 +103,12 @@ static unsigned long calibrate_elapsed_time (struct calibrate_time_s *starttime) { struct calibrate_time_s stoptime; - + calibrate_get_time (&stoptime); #ifdef HAVE_W32_SYSTEM { unsigned long long t1, t2; - + t1 = (((unsigned long long)starttime->kernel_time.dwHighDateTime << 32) + starttime->kernel_time.dwLowDateTime); t1 += (((unsigned long long)starttime->user_time.dwHighDateTime << 32) @@ -142,7 +145,7 @@ calibrate_s2k_count_one (unsigned long count) /* Measure the time we need to do the hash operations and deduce an - S2K count which requires about 100ms of time. */ + S2K count which requires about 100ms of time. */ static unsigned long calibrate_s2k_count (void) { @@ -194,7 +197,7 @@ get_standard_s2k_count (void) /* Calculate the MIC for a private key or shared secret S-expression. SHA1HASH should point to a 20 byte buffer. This function is suitable for all algorithms. */ -static int +static int calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) { const unsigned char *hash_begin, *hash_end; @@ -208,13 +211,13 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (smatch (&s, n, "private-key")) is_shared_secret = 0; else if (smatch (&s, n, "shared-secret")) is_shared_secret = 1; else - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); hash_begin = s; @@ -223,7 +226,7 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; /* Skip the algorithm name. */ } @@ -232,18 +235,18 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; if ( *s != ')' ) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s++; } if (*s != ')') - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s++; hash_end = s; @@ -266,7 +269,7 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) (d #046129F..[some bytes not shown]..81#) (p #00e861b..[some bytes not shown]..f1#) (q #00f7a7c..[some bytes not shown]..61#) - (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) + (u #304559a..[some bytes not shown]..9b#) the returned block is the S-Expression: @@ -274,7 +277,7 @@ calculate_mic (const unsigned char *plainkey, unsigned char *sha1hash) */ static int -do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, +do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, const char *passphrase, const unsigned char *sha1hash, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) { @@ -327,14 +330,14 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, { unsigned char *key; size_t keylen = PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN; - + key = gcry_malloc_secure (keylen); if (!key) rc = out_of_core (); else { rc = hash_passphrase (passphrase, GCRY_MD_SHA1, - 3, iv+2*blklen, + 3, iv+2*blklen, get_standard_s2k_count (), key, keylen); if (!rc) rc = gcry_cipher_setkey (hd, key, keylen); @@ -354,7 +357,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, p += 20; *p++ = ')'; *p++ = ')'; - memcpy (p, iv+blklen, blklen); + memcpy (p, iv+blklen, blklen); p += blklen; assert ( p - outbuf == outlen); rc = gcry_cipher_encrypt (hd, outbuf, enclen, NULL, 0); @@ -372,7 +375,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc ((sha1 salt no_of_iterations) 16byte_iv) encrypted_octet_string) - + in canoncical format of course. We use asprintf and %n modifier and dummy values as placeholders. */ { @@ -382,7 +385,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, p = xtryasprintf ("(9:protected%d:%s((4:sha18:%n_8bytes_%u:%s)%d:%n%*s)%d:%n%*s)", (int)strlen (modestr), modestr, - &saltpos, + &saltpos, (unsigned int)strlen (countbuf), countbuf, blklen, &ivpos, blklen, "", enclen, &encpos, enclen, ""); @@ -408,7 +411,7 @@ do_encryption (const unsigned char *protbegin, size_t protlen, /* Protect the key encoded in canonical format in PLAINKEY. We assume a valid S-Exp here. */ -int +int agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) { @@ -439,9 +442,9 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "private-key")) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); depth++; @@ -449,13 +452,13 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); for (infidx=0; protect_info[infidx].algo && !smatch (&s, n, protect_info[infidx].algo); infidx++) ; if (!protect_info[infidx].algo) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); prot_begin = prot_end = NULL; for (i=0; (c=protect_info[infidx].parmlist[i]); i++) @@ -468,27 +471,27 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (n != 1 || c != *s) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s +=n; /* skip value */ if (*s != ')') - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); depth--; if (i == protect_info[infidx].prot_to) prot_end = s; s++; } if (*s != ')' || !prot_begin || !prot_end ) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); depth--; hash_end = s; s++; - /* skip to the end of the S-exp */ + /* Skip to the end of the S-expression. */ assert (depth == 1); rc = sskip (&s, &depth); if (rc) @@ -496,10 +499,10 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, assert (!depth); real_end = s-1; - + /* Hash the stuff. Because the timestamp_exp won't get protected, we can't simply hash a continuous buffer but need to use several - md_writes. */ + md_writes. */ rc = gcry_md_open (&md, GCRY_MD_SHA1, 0 ); if (rc) return rc; @@ -552,8 +555,8 @@ agent_protect (const unsigned char *plainkey, const char *passphrase, /* Do the actual decryption and check the return list for consistency. */ static int -do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, - const char *passphrase, +do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, + const char *passphrase, const unsigned char *s2ksalt, unsigned long s2kcount, const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, unsigned char **result) @@ -582,7 +585,7 @@ do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, { unsigned char *key; size_t keylen = PROT_CIPHER_KEYLEN; - + key = gcry_malloc_secure (keylen); if (!key) rc = out_of_core (); @@ -630,7 +633,7 @@ do_decryption (const unsigned char *protected, size_t protectedlen, calculation but then be removed. */ static int merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, - size_t replacepos, + size_t replacepos, const unsigned char *cleartext, unsigned char *sha1hash, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen, @@ -641,7 +644,7 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const unsigned char *s; const unsigned char *startpos, *endpos; int i, rc; - + *result = NULL; *resultlen = 0; *cutoff = 0; @@ -704,7 +707,7 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, goto invalid_sexp; n = snext (&s); if (!smatch (&s, n, "sha1")) - goto invalid_sexp; + goto invalid_sexp; n = snext (&s); if (n != 20) goto invalid_sexp; @@ -717,7 +720,7 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, /* append the parameter list */ memcpy (p, startpos, endpos - startpos); p += endpos - startpos; - + /* Skip over the protected list element in the original list. */ s = protectedkey + replacepos; assert (*s == '('); @@ -755,7 +758,7 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, *cutoff = p - newlist; memcpy (p, startpos, endpos - startpos); p += endpos - startpos; - + /* ready */ *result = newlist; @@ -778,14 +781,14 @@ merge_lists (const unsigned char *protectedkey, /* Unprotect the key encoded in canonical format. We assume a valid S-Exp here. If a protected-at item is available, its value will be stored at protocted_at unless this is NULL. */ -int +int agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, - gnupg_isotime_t protected_at, + gnupg_isotime_t protected_at, unsigned char **result, size_t *resultlen) { int rc; const unsigned char *s; - const unsigned char *protect_list; + const unsigned char *protect_list; size_t n; int infidx, i; unsigned char sha1hash[20], sha1hash2[20]; @@ -807,21 +810,21 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "protected-private-key")) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); for (infidx=0; protect_info[infidx].algo && !smatch (&s, n, protect_info[infidx].algo); infidx++) ; if (!protect_info[infidx].algo) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); /* See wether we have a protected-at timestamp. */ @@ -856,7 +859,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, /* Now find the list with the protected information. Here is an example for such a list: - (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc + (protected openpgp-s2k3-sha1-aes-cbc ((sha1 <salt> <count>) <Initialization_Vector>) <encrypted_data>) */ @@ -869,7 +872,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (smatch (&s, n, "protected")) break; s += n; @@ -881,7 +884,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, /* found */ n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "openpgp-s2k3-sha1-" PROT_CIPHER_STRING "-cbc")) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION); if (*s != '(' || s[1] != '(') @@ -889,7 +892,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, s += 2; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "sha1")) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_PROTECTION); n = snext (&s); @@ -905,7 +908,7 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, is nothing we should worry about */ if (s[n] != ')' ) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); - + /* Old versions of gpg-agent used the funny floating point number in a byte encoding as specified by OpenPGP. However this is not needed and thus we now store it as a plain unsigned integer. We @@ -935,8 +938,8 @@ agent_unprotect (const unsigned char *protectedkey, const char *passphrase, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); - + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + cleartext = NULL; /* Avoid cc warning. */ rc = do_decryption (s, n, passphrase, s2ksalt, s2kcount, @@ -1011,7 +1014,7 @@ agent_private_key_type (const unsigned char *privatekey) store this key in the caller provided buffer KEY. The caller must provide an HASHALGO, a valid S2KMODE (see rfc-2440) and depending on that mode an S2KSALT of 8 random bytes and an S2KCOUNT. - + Returns an error code on failure. */ static int hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, @@ -1031,7 +1034,7 @@ hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); if ((s2kmode == 1 ||s2kmode == 3) && !s2ksalt) return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_VALUE); - + rc = gcry_md_open (&md, hashalgo, GCRY_MD_FLAG_SECURE); if (rc) return rc; @@ -1065,7 +1068,7 @@ hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, } if (count < 8) gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, count); - else + else { gcry_md_write (md, s2ksalt, 8); count -= 8; @@ -1074,7 +1077,7 @@ hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, } else gcry_md_write (md, passphrase, pwlen); - + gcry_md_final (md); i = gcry_md_get_algo_dlen (hashalgo); if (i > keylen - used) @@ -1094,7 +1097,7 @@ s2k_hash_passphrase (const char *passphrase, int hashalgo, unsigned int s2kcount, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { - return hash_passphrase (passphrase, hashalgo, s2kmode, s2ksalt, + return hash_passphrase (passphrase, hashalgo, s2kmode, s2ksalt, (16ul + (s2kcount & 15)) << ((s2kcount >> 4) + 6), key, keylen); } @@ -1137,7 +1140,7 @@ make_shadow_info (const char *serialno, const char *idstring) S-expression is returned in an allocated buffer RESULT will point to. The input parameters are expected to be valid canonicalized S-expressions */ -int +int agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, const unsigned char *shadow_info, unsigned char **result) @@ -1159,16 +1162,16 @@ agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "public-key")) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); depth++; s++; - n = snext (&s); + n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */ while (*s != ')') @@ -1178,15 +1181,15 @@ agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, depth++; s++; n = snext (&s); - if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s +=n; /* skip value */ if (*s != ')') - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); depth--; s++; } @@ -1218,7 +1221,7 @@ agent_shadow_key (const unsigned char *pubkey, /* Parse a canonical encoded shadowed key and return a pointer to the inner list with the shadow_info */ -int +int agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, unsigned char const **shadow_info) { @@ -1233,16 +1236,16 @@ agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, s++; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (!smatch (&s, n, "shadowed-private-key")) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); if (*s != '(') return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_UNKNOWN_SEXP); depth++; s++; - n = snext (&s); + n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s += n; /* skip over the algorithm name */ for (;;) @@ -1254,24 +1257,24 @@ agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, depth++; s++; n = snext (&s); - if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (smatch (&s, n, "shadowed")) break; s += n; n = snext (&s); if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); s +=n; /* skip value */ if (*s != ')') - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); depth--; s++; } /* Found the shadowed list, S points to the protocol */ n = snext (&s); - if (!n) - return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); + if (!n) + return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); if (smatch (&s, n, "t1-v1")) { if (*s != '(') @@ -1291,7 +1294,7 @@ agent_get_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadowkey, parameters addresses. If the serial number or the ID string is not required, NULL may be passed for them. */ gpg_error_t -parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, +parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, char **r_hexsn, char **r_idstr) { const unsigned char *s; @@ -1328,7 +1331,7 @@ parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, } return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_SEXP); } - + if (r_idstr) { *r_idstr = xtrymalloc (n+1); @@ -1347,4 +1350,3 @@ parse_shadow_info (const unsigned char *shadow_info, return 0; } - |