diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'TODO')
| -rw-r--r-- | TODO | 36 |
1 files changed, 32 insertions, 4 deletions
@@ -1,4 +1,27 @@ + * rmove assert in random.c:160 4096 bit keys need more random. + + * list all matching user ids + + * use zlib 1.1.13 to avoid a bug with 13 bit windows + + * FreeBSD: +#define USE_DYNAMIC_LINKING +#define HAVE_DL_DLOPEN + +and the ld option -export-dynamic. + + * +Well, there was one thing extra I needed to do. While configure found the +gdbm library, it didn't add the path the the include file list. I had to +re-run configure with CPPFLAGS set: + + env CPPFLAGS='-I/usr/local/include' configure ... + + + * clearsig: keep lineendings as they are. Remember that trailings + blanks are not hashed. + * Fix ;) revocation and expire stuff. * check preferences (cipher and compress) @@ -11,13 +34,9 @@ * prefer a type 16 subkey for encryption because pgp cannot handle type 20? - * calculation of marginals never yields a completely trusted key. - * The critical bit of signature subpackets is not yet supported; i.e. it is ignored. - * Exportable Certification Flag is ignored - * We need a maintainence pass over the trustdb which flags signatures as expired if the key used to make the signature has expired. Maybe it is a good idea to store the exiration time @@ -58,6 +77,15 @@ * add an option to re-create a public key from a secret key; we can do this in trustdb.c:verify_own_keys. + * signature verification is done duplicated on import: in import.c and + tehn in trustdb.c too. Maybe we can use a flag to skip the actual + verification process (this should work if we use the same keyblock, + but I'm not sure how to accomplish that). Another way is to allow + the import of bogus data and let trustdb mark these keys as invalid; + I see an advantage in this that it may help to prevent a DoS on a + keyserver by sending him a lot of bogus signatures which he has + to check - Needs further investigation. + * change the fake_data stuff to mpi_set_opaque * Is it okay to use gettext for the help system? |