diff options
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/ChangeLog | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/mainproc.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | g10/seckey-cert.c | 6 |
3 files changed, 20 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/g10/ChangeLog b/g10/ChangeLog index 109ec874d..5e3e2bb81 100644 --- a/g10/ChangeLog +++ b/g10/ChangeLog @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ +2004-06-27 David Shaw <[email protected]> + + * mainproc.c (proc_symkey_enc), seckey-cert.c (do_check): Check + the S2K hash algorithm before we try to generate a passphrase + using it. This prevents hitting BUG() when generating a + passphrase using a hash that we don't have. + 2004-06-23 David Shaw <[email protected]> * keyedit.c (sign_uids): Properly handle remaking a self-sig on diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c index 674a376f1..9b7a4ddc3 100644 --- a/g10/mainproc.c +++ b/g10/mainproc.c @@ -304,6 +304,13 @@ proc_symkey_enc( CTX c, PACKET *pkt ) else log_error(_("encrypted with unknown algorithm %d\n"), algo ); + if(check_digest_algo(enc->s2k.hash_algo)) + { + log_error(_("passphrase generated with unknown digest" + " algorithm %d\n"),enc->s2k.hash_algo); + s=NULL; + } + c->last_was_session_key = 2; if(!s || opt.list_only) goto leave; diff --git a/g10/seckey-cert.c b/g10/seckey-cert.c index 4a949b88e..8870ac3e3 100644 --- a/g10/seckey-cert.c +++ b/g10/seckey-cert.c @@ -65,6 +65,12 @@ do_check( PKT_secret_key *sk, const char *tryagain_text, int *canceled ) } return G10ERR_CIPHER_ALGO; } + if(check_digest_algo(sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo)) + { + log_info(_("protection digest %d is not supported\n"), + sk->protect.s2k.hash_algo); + return G10ERR_DIGEST_ALGO; + } keyid_from_sk( sk, keyid ); keyid[2] = keyid[3] = 0; if( !sk->is_primary ) { |