Merge branch 'master' into npthnpth

Conflicts:
	ChangeLog-2011
	Makefile.am
	agent/ChangeLog-2011
	agent/gpg-agent.c
	dirmngr/ChangeLog-2011
	dirmngr/dirmngr.c
	doc/HACKING
	g13/g13.c
	po/de.po
	scd/ChangeLog-2011
	scd/apdu.c
	scd/command.c
	scd/scdaemon.c
	scripts/gitlog-to-changelog
	tools/ChangeLog-2011

9 files changed, 335 insertions, 29 deletions

diff --git a/sm/call-dirmngr.c b/sm/call-dirmngr.c
index cdaa9dcfa..92f7a0e2c 100644
--- a/sm/call-dirmngr.c
+++ b/sm/call-dirmngr.c
@@ -816,7 +816,7 @@ get_cached_cert (assuan_context_t ctx,
   char hexfpr[2*20+1];
   struct membuf mb;
   char *buf;
-  size_t buflen;
+  size_t buflen = 0;
   ksba_cert_t cert;
 
   *r_cert = NULL;
diff --git a/sm/certchain.c b/sm/certchain.c
index 1a2632504..54c7a5772 100644
--- a/sm/certchain.c
+++ b/sm/certchain.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* certchain.c - certificate chain validation
  * Copyright (C) 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005,
- *               2006, 2007, 2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *               2006, 2007, 2008, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -1193,6 +1193,7 @@ ask_marktrusted (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, int listmode)
 
    VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR  - Do not do any dirmngr isvalid checks.
    VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL - Check according to chain model.
+   VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED       - Check according to the STEED model.
 */
 static int
 do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
@@ -1305,13 +1306,21 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
              We used to do this only later but changed it to call the
              check right here so that we can access special flags
              associated with that specific root certificate.  */
-          istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL,
-                                                rootca_flags);
+          if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (subject_cert))
+            {
+              memset (rootca_flags, 0, sizeof *rootca_flags);
+              istrusted_rc = ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
+                              ? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED));
+            }
+          else
+            istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, NULL,
+                                                  rootca_flags);
           audit_log_cert (ctrl->audit, AUDIT_ROOT_TRUSTED,
                           subject_cert, istrusted_rc);
           /* If the chain model extended attribute is used, make sure
              that our chain model flag is set. */
-          if (has_validation_model_chain (subject_cert, listmode, listfp))
+          if (!(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
+              && has_validation_model_chain (subject_cert, listmode, listfp))
             rootca_flags->chain_model = 1;
         }
 
@@ -1383,7 +1392,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
           /* Set the flag for qualified signatures.  This flag is
              deduced from a list of root certificates allowed for
              qualified signatures. */
-          if (is_qualified == -1)
+          if (is_qualified == -1 && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
             {
               gpg_error_t err;
               size_t buflen;
@@ -1437,8 +1446,11 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
                  expired it does not make much sense to ask the user
                  whether we wants to trust the root certificate.  We
                  should do this only if the certificate under question
-                 will then be usable.  */
+                 will then be usable.  If the certificate has a well
+                 known private key asking the user does not make any
+                 sense.  */
               if ( !any_expired
+                   && !gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (subject_cert)
                    && (!listmode || !already_asked_marktrusted (subject_cert))
                    && ask_marktrusted (ctrl, subject_cert, listmode) )
                 rc = 0;
@@ -1455,6 +1467,8 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
           /* Check for revocations etc. */
           if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR))
             ;
+          else if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
+            ; /* Fixme: check revocations via DNS.  */
           else if (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check || rootca_flags->relax)
             ;
           else
@@ -1586,8 +1600,16 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
                performance reasons. */
             if (is_root)
               {
-                istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, issuer_cert, NULL,
-                                                      rootca_flags);
+                if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (issuer_cert))
+                  {
+                    memset (rootca_flags, 0, sizeof *rootca_flags);
+                    istrusted_rc = ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)
+                                    ? 0 : gpg_error (GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED));
+                  }
+                else
+                  istrusted_rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted
+                    (ctrl, issuer_cert, NULL, rootca_flags);
+
                 if (!istrusted_rc && rootca_flags->relax)
                   {
                     /* Ignore the error due to the relax flag.  */
@@ -1627,6 +1649,8 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
          be fixed. */
       if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR))
         rc = 0;
+      else if ((flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
+        rc = 0; /* Fixme: XXX */
       else if (is_root && (opt.no_trusted_cert_crl_check
                            || (!istrusted_rc && rootca_flags->relax)))
         rc = 0;
@@ -1722,7 +1746,7 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
      capability of the certificate under question, store the result as
      user data in all certificates of the chain.  We do this even if the
      validation itself failed.  */
-  if (is_qualified != -1)
+  if (is_qualified != -1 && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
     {
       gpg_error_t err;
       chain_item_t ci;
@@ -1780,8 +1804,8 @@ do_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime_arg,
    do_validate_chain.  This function is a wrapper to handle a root
    certificate with the chain_model flag set.  If RETFLAGS is not
    NULL, flags indicating now the verification was done are stored
-   there.  The only defined flag for RETFLAGS is
-   VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL.
+   there.  The only defined vits for RETFLAGS are
+   VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL and VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED.
 
    If you are verifying a signature you should set CHECKTIME to the
    creation time of the signature.  If your are verifying a
@@ -1801,16 +1825,27 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime,
   if (!retflags)
     retflags = &dummy_retflags;
 
+  /* If the session requested a certain validation mode make sure the
+     corresponding flags are set.  */
   if (ctrl->validation_model == 1)
     flags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL;
+  else if (ctrl->validation_model == 2)
+    flags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED;
 
+  /* If the chain model was forced, set this immediately into
+     RETFLAGS.  */
   *retflags = (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL);
+
   memset (&rootca_flags, 0, sizeof rootca_flags);
 
   rc = do_validate_chain (ctrl, cert, checktime,
                           r_exptime, listmode, listfp, flags,
                           &rootca_flags);
-  if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED
+  if (!rc && (flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED))
+    {
+      *retflags |= VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED;
+    }
+  else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_CERT_EXPIRED
       && !(flags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)
       && (rootca_flags.valid && rootca_flags.chain_model))
     {
@@ -1824,6 +1859,8 @@ gpgsm_validate_chain (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, ksba_isotime_t checktime,
 
   if (opt.verbose)
     do_list (0, listmode, listfp, _("validation model used: %s"),
+             (*retflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)?
+             "steed" :
              (*retflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)?
              _("chain"):_("shell"));
 
diff --git a/sm/certlist.c b/sm/certlist.c
index 0e9031953..241364a3a 100644
--- a/sm/certlist.c
+++ b/sm/certlist.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* certlist.c - build list of certificates
  * Copyright (C) 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007,
- *               2008 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *               2008, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -210,6 +210,21 @@ gpgsm_cert_use_ocsp_p (ksba_cert_t cert)
 }
 
 
+/* Return true if CERT has the well known private key extension.  */
+int
+gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (ksba_cert_t cert)
+{
+  int idx;
+  const char *oid;
+
+  for (idx=0; !ksba_cert_get_extension (cert, idx,
+                                        &oid, NULL, NULL, NULL);idx++)
+    if (!strcmp (oid, "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2") )
+      return 1; /* Yes.  */
+  return 0; /* No.  */
+}
+
+
 static int
 same_subject_issuer (const char *subject, const char *issuer, ksba_cert_t cert)
 {
diff --git a/sm/certreqgen.c b/sm/certreqgen.c
index 41a6d7f05..de7c39c65 100644
--- a/sm/certreqgen.c
+++ b/sm/certreqgen.c
@@ -33,6 +33,22 @@
      %commit
      %echo done
      EOF
+
+   This parameter file was used to create the STEED CA:
+     Key-Type: RSA
+     Key-Length: 1024
+     Key-Grip: 68A638998DFABAC510EA645CE34F9686B2EDF7EA
+     Key-Usage: cert
+     Serial: 1
+     Name-DN: CN=The STEED Self-Signing Nonthority
+     Not-Before: 2011-11-11
+     Not-After: 2106-02-06
+     Subject-Key-Id: 68A638998DFABAC510EA645CE34F9686B2EDF7EA
+     Extension: 2.5.29.19 c 30060101ff020101
+     Extension: 1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2 n 0101ff
+     Signing-Key: 68A638998DFABAC510EA645CE34F9686B2EDF7EA
+     %commit
+
 */
 
 
@@ -68,7 +84,10 @@ enum para_name
     pNOTBEFORE,
     pNOTAFTER,
     pSIGNINGKEY,
-    pHASHALGO
+    pHASHALGO,
+    pAUTHKEYID,
+    pSUBJKEYID,
+    pEXTENSION
   };
 
 struct para_data_s
@@ -89,6 +108,8 @@ struct reqgen_ctrl_s
 };
 
 
+static const char oidstr_authorityKeyIdentifier[] = "2.5.29.35";
+static const char oidstr_subjectKeyIdentifier[] = "2.5.29.14";
 static const char oidstr_keyUsage[] = "2.5.29.15";
 static const char oidstr_basicConstraints[] = "2.5.29.19";
 static const char oidstr_standaloneCertificate[] = "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.1";
@@ -170,8 +191,11 @@ parse_parameter_usage (struct para_data_s *para, enum para_name key)
         ;
       else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (p, "sign") )
         use |= GCRY_PK_USAGE_SIGN;
-      else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (p, "encrypt") )
+      else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (p, "encrypt")
+                || !ascii_strcasecmp (p, "encr") )
         use |= GCRY_PK_USAGE_ENCR;
+      else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (p, "cert") )
+        use |= GCRY_PK_USAGE_CERT;
       else
         {
           log_error ("line %d: invalid usage list\n", r->lnr);
@@ -225,6 +249,9 @@ read_parameters (ctrl_t ctrl, estream_t fp, estream_t out_fp)
     { "Not-After",      pNOTAFTER },
     { "Signing-Key",    pSIGNINGKEY },
     { "Hash-Algo",      pHASHALGO },
+    { "Authority-Key-Id", pAUTHKEYID },
+    { "Subject-Key-Id", pSUBJKEYID },
+    { "Extension",      pEXTENSION, 1 },
     { NULL, 0 }
   };
   char line[1024], *p;
@@ -594,6 +621,74 @@ proc_parameters (ctrl_t ctrl, struct para_data_s *para,
       }
   }
 
+  /* Check the optional AuthorityKeyId.  */
+  string = get_parameter_value (para, pAUTHKEYID, 0);
+  if (string)
+    {
+      for (s=string, i=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, i++)
+        ;
+      if (*s || (i&1))
+        {
+          r = get_parameter (para, pAUTHKEYID, 0);
+          log_error (_("line %d: invalid authority-key-id\n"), r->lnr);
+          xfree (cardkeyid);
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PARAMETER);
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* Check the optional SubjectKeyId.  */
+  string = get_parameter_value (para, pSUBJKEYID, 0);
+  if (string)
+    {
+      for (s=string, i=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, i++)
+        ;
+      if (*s || (i&1))
+        {
+          r = get_parameter (para, pSUBJKEYID, 0);
+          log_error (_("line %d: invalid subject-key-id\n"), r->lnr);
+          xfree (cardkeyid);
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PARAMETER);
+        }
+    }
+
+  /* Check the optional extensions. */
+  for (seq=0; (string=get_parameter_value (para, pEXTENSION, seq)); seq++)
+    {
+      int okay = 0;
+
+      s = strpbrk (string, " \t:");
+      if (s)
+        {
+          s++;
+          while (spacep (s))
+            s++;
+          if (*s && strchr ("nNcC", *s))
+            {
+              s++;
+              while (spacep (s))
+                s++;
+              if (*s == ':')
+                s++;
+              if (*s)
+                {
+                  while (spacep (s))
+                    s++;
+                  for (i=0; hexdigitp (s); s++, i++)
+                    ;
+                  if (!((*s && *s != ':') || !i || (i&1)))
+                    okay = 1;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+      if (!okay)
+        {
+          r = get_parameter (para, pEXTENSION, seq);
+          log_error (_("line %d: invalid extension syntax\n"), r->lnr);
+          xfree (cardkeyid);
+          return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INV_PARAMETER);
+        }
+    }
+
   /* Create or retrieve the public key.  */
   if (cardkeyid) /* Take the key from the current smart card. */
     {
@@ -838,6 +933,14 @@ create_request (ctrl_t ctrl,
       err = ksba_certreq_add_extension (cr, oidstr_keyUsage, 1,
                                         "\x03\x02\x04\x30", 4);
     }
+  else if (use == GCRY_PK_USAGE_CERT)
+    {
+      /* For certify only we encode the bits:
+         KSBA_KEYUSAGE_KEY_CERT_SIGN
+         KSBA_KEYUSAGE_CRL_SIGN */
+      err = ksba_certreq_add_extension (cr, oidstr_keyUsage, 1,
+                                        "\x03\x02\x01\x06", 4);
+    }
   else
     err = 0; /* Both or none given: don't request one. */
   if (err)
@@ -889,7 +992,7 @@ create_request (ctrl_t ctrl,
           *p++ = '0';
           strcpy (p, string);
           for (p=hexbuf, len=0; p[0] && p[1]; p += 2)
-            ((unsigned char*)hexbuf)[len++] = xtoi_2 (s);
+            ((unsigned char*)hexbuf)[len++] = xtoi_2 (p);
           /* Now build the S-expression.  */
           snprintf (numbuf, DIM(numbuf), "%u:", (unsigned int)len);
           buf = p = xtrymalloc (1 + strlen (numbuf) + len + 1 + 1);
@@ -1009,6 +1112,139 @@ create_request (ctrl_t ctrl,
             goto leave;
           }
       }
+
+      /* Insert the AuthorityKeyId.  */
+      string = get_parameter_value (para, pAUTHKEYID, 0);
+      if (string)
+        {
+          char *hexbuf;
+
+          /* Allocate a buffer for in-place conversion.  We also add 4
+             extra bytes space for the tags and lengths fields.  */
+          hexbuf = xtrymalloc (4 + strlen (string) + 1);
+          if (!hexbuf)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          strcpy (hexbuf+4, string);
+          for (p=hexbuf+4, len=0; p[0] && p[1]; p += 2)
+            ((unsigned char*)hexbuf)[4+len++] = xtoi_2 (p);
+          if (len > 125)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+              xfree (hexbuf);
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          hexbuf[0] = 0x30;  /* Tag for a Sequence.  */
+          hexbuf[1] = len+2;
+          hexbuf[2] = 0x80;  /* Context tag for an implicit Octet string.  */
+          hexbuf[3] = len;
+          err = ksba_certreq_add_extension (cr, oidstr_authorityKeyIdentifier,
+                                            0,
+                                            hexbuf, 4+len);
+          xfree (hexbuf);
+          if (err)
+            {
+              log_error ("error setting the authority-key-id: %s\n",
+                         gpg_strerror (err));
+              goto leave;
+            }
+        }
+
+      /* Insert the SubjectKeyId.  */
+      string = get_parameter_value (para, pSUBJKEYID, 0);
+      if (string)
+        {
+          char *hexbuf;
+
+          /* Allocate a buffer for in-place conversion.  We also add 2
+             extra bytes space for the tag and length field.  */
+          hexbuf = xtrymalloc (2 + strlen (string) + 1);
+          if (!hexbuf)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          strcpy (hexbuf+2, string);
+          for (p=hexbuf+2, len=0; p[0] && p[1]; p += 2)
+            ((unsigned char*)hexbuf)[2+len++] = xtoi_2 (p);
+          if (len > 127)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_TOO_LARGE);
+              xfree (hexbuf);
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          hexbuf[0] = 0x04;  /* Tag for an Octet string.  */
+          hexbuf[1] = len;
+          err = ksba_certreq_add_extension (cr, oidstr_subjectKeyIdentifier, 0,
+                                            hexbuf, 2+len);
+          xfree (hexbuf);
+          if (err)
+            {
+              log_error ("error setting the subject-key-id: %s\n",
+                         gpg_strerror (err));
+              goto leave;
+            }
+        }
+
+      /* Insert additional extensions.  */
+      for (seq=0; (string = get_parameter_value (para, pEXTENSION, seq)); seq++)
+        {
+          char *hexbuf;
+          char *oidstr;
+          int crit = 0;
+
+          s = strpbrk (string, " \t:");
+          if (!s)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
+              goto leave;
+            }
+
+          oidstr = xtrymalloc (s - string + 1);
+          if (!oidstr)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          memcpy (oidstr, string, (s-string));
+          oidstr[(s-string)] = 0;
+
+          s++;
+          while (spacep (s))
+            s++;
+          if (!*s)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
+              xfree (oidstr);
+              goto leave;
+            }
+
+          if (strchr ("cC", *s))
+            crit = 1;
+          s++;
+          while (spacep (s))
+            s++;
+          if (*s == ':')
+            s++;
+          while (spacep (s))
+            s++;
+
+          hexbuf = xtrystrdup (s);
+          if (!hexbuf)
+            {
+              err = gpg_error_from_syserror ();
+              xfree (oidstr);
+              goto leave;
+            }
+          for (p=hexbuf, len=0; p[0] && p[1]; p += 2)
+            ((unsigned char*)hexbuf)[len++] = xtoi_2 (p);
+          err = ksba_certreq_add_extension (cr, oidstr, crit,
+                                            hexbuf, len);
+          xfree (oidstr);
+          xfree (hexbuf);
+        }
     }
   else
     sigkey = public;
diff --git a/sm/gpgsm.c b/sm/gpgsm.c
index dc9f2e032..7164f4274 100644
--- a/sm/gpgsm.c
+++ b/sm/gpgsm.c
@@ -2004,6 +2004,8 @@ gpgsm_parse_validation_model (const char *model)
     return 0;
   else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (model, "chain") )
     return 1;
+  else if ( !ascii_strcasecmp (model, "steed") )
+    return 2;
   else
     return -1;
 }
diff --git a/sm/gpgsm.h b/sm/gpgsm.h
index 31cd95150..6c68af746 100644
--- a/sm/gpgsm.h
+++ b/sm/gpgsm.h
@@ -195,7 +195,9 @@ struct server_control_s
                          certificates up the chain (0 = none, 1 = only
                          signer) */
   int use_ocsp;       /* Set to true if OCSP should be used. */
-  int validation_model; /* Set to 1 for the chain model.  */
+  int validation_model; /* 0 := standard model (shell),
+                           1 := chain model,
+                           2 := STEED model. */
 };
 
 
@@ -307,7 +309,7 @@ int gpgsm_create_cms_signature (ctrl_t ctrl,
 /* Flags used with  gpgsm_validate_chain.  */
 #define VALIDATE_FLAG_NO_DIRMNGR  1
 #define VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL 2
-
+#define VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED       4
 
 int gpgsm_walk_cert_chain (ctrl_t ctrl,
                            ksba_cert_t start, ksba_cert_t *r_next);
@@ -326,6 +328,7 @@ int gpgsm_cert_use_verify_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_cert_use_decrypt_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_cert_use_cert_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_cert_use_ocsp_p (ksba_cert_t cert);
+int gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (ksba_cert_t cert);
 int gpgsm_certs_identical_p (ksba_cert_t cert_a, ksba_cert_t cert_b);
 int gpgsm_add_cert_to_certlist (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert,
                                 certlist_t *listaddr, int is_encrypt_to);
diff --git a/sm/keylist.c b/sm/keylist.c
index e67c2d8d3..42c533a6d 100644
--- a/sm/keylist.c
+++ b/sm/keylist.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* keylist.c - Print certificates in various formats.
- * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003,
- *               2004, 2005, 2008, 2009 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009,
+ *               2010, 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
  *
  * This file is part of GnuPG.
  *
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ static struct
   /* GnuPG extensions */
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.1.1", "pkaAddress" },
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.1", "standaloneCertificate" },
+  { "1.3.6.1.4.1.11591.2.2.2", "wellKnownPrivateKey" },
 
   /* Extensions used by the Bundesnetzagentur.  */
   { "1.3.6.1.4.1.8301.3.5", "validityModel" },
@@ -420,7 +421,12 @@ list_cert_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int validity,
           && *not_after && strcmp (current_time, not_after) > 0 )
         *truststring = 'e';
       else if (valerr)
-        *truststring = 'i';
+        {
+          if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (cert))
+            *truststring = 'w';  /* Well, this is dummy CA.  */
+          else
+            *truststring = 'i';
+        }
       else if (ctrl->with_validation && !is_root)
         *truststring = 'f';
     }
@@ -432,12 +438,17 @@ list_cert_colon (ctrl_t ctrl, ksba_cert_t cert, unsigned int validity,
     {
       struct rootca_flags_s dummy_flags;
 
-      rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, cert, NULL, &dummy_flags);
-      if (!rc)
-        *truststring = 'u';  /* Yes, we trust this one (ultimately). */
-      else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED)
-        *truststring = 'n';  /* No, we do not trust this one. */
-      /* (in case of an error we can't tell anything.) */
+      if (gpgsm_cert_has_well_known_private_key (cert))
+        *truststring = 'w';  /* Well, this is dummy CA.  */
+      else
+        {
+          rc = gpgsm_agent_istrusted (ctrl, cert, NULL, &dummy_flags);
+          if (!rc)
+            *truststring = 'u';  /* Yes, we trust this one (ultimately). */
+          else if (gpg_err_code (rc) == GPG_ERR_NOT_TRUSTED)
+            *truststring = 'n';  /* No, we do not trust this one. */
+          /* (in case of an error we can't tell anything.) */
+        }
     }
 
   if (*truststring)
diff --git a/sm/server.c b/sm/server.c
index 19c4a1678..385eb538a 100644
--- a/sm/server.c
+++ b/sm/server.c
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ option_handler (assuan_context_t ctx, const char *key, const char *value)
   else if (!strcmp (key, "validation-model"))
     {
       int i = gpgsm_parse_validation_model (value);
-      if ( i >= 0 && i <= 1 )
+      if ( i >= 0 && i <= 2 )
         ctrl->validation_model = i;
       else
         err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_ASS_PARAMETER);
diff --git a/sm/verify.c b/sm/verify.c
index c77eb5744..1173f66d1 100644
--- a/sm/verify.c
+++ b/sm/verify.c
@@ -624,6 +624,8 @@ gpgsm_verify (ctrl_t ctrl, int in_fd, int data_fd, estream_t out_fp)
       }
 
       gpgsm_status (ctrl, STATUS_TRUST_FULLY,
+                    (verifyflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_STEED)?
+                    "0 steed":
                     (verifyflags & VALIDATE_FLAG_CHAIN_MODEL)?
                     "0 chain": "0 shell");